Edgemont School District 23-1 v. South Dakota Department of RevenueEdgemont School District 23-1 v. South Dakota Department of Revenue
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[¶ 1.] Edgemont School District (District) and Fall River County (County) appeal a partial summary judgment that
FACTS
[¶ 2.] Burlington Northern Railroad (BNRR) is an interstate railroad which owns operating property in several counties in South Dakota. Its operating property within South Dakota is subject to tax assessment by the South Dakota Department of Revenue (Department).
[¶ 3.] The assessment and distribution of the value of BNRR’s operating property for property tax purposes has a history of controversy. These same parties were before the court in
Fall River County v. S.D. Dept. of Rev.,
1996 SD 106, 552 N.W.2d 620. In Fall River County, the Department distributed BNRR’s statewide taxable value among
[¶ 4.] This case involves an appeal by District and County to the circuit court contesting the 1995 tax assessment of BNRR by the Department, including the distribution of the statewide value to the counties and other governmental subdivision. In 1995 Department distributed BNRR’s statewide value on a strict pro rata per mile of track basis. The circuit court granted Department and BNRR
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a partial summary judgment finding that
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 5.] Our standard of review on a motion for summary judgment is well established:
In reviewing a grant or a denial of summary judgment underSDCL 15 — 6—56(c), we must determine whether the moving party demonstrated the absence of any genuine, issue of material -fact and showed entitlement to judgment on the merits as a matter of law. The evidence, must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party. The non-moving party, however, must present specific facts showing that a genuine, material issue for trial exists. Our task on appeal is to determine only whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied. If there exists any basis which supports the ruling of the trial court, affirmance of a summary judgment is proper.
Walz v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,
1996 SD 135, ¶ 6, 556 N.W.2d 68, 70 (quoting
Lamp v. First Nat’l Bank of Garretson,
496 N.W.2d 581, 583 (S.D.1993) (citation omitted)). There are no factual issues in this case. There is only the legal question of the statutory interpretation of
[¶ 6.] 1. WHETHER
[¶ 7.] District and County claim that distribution on a strict pro rata per mile basis “result[s] in a purely arbitrary calculation that every mile of rail line within the State of South Dakota has a value of approximately $66,000.” They claim that
[¶ 8.] The rules of statutory interpretation are well established:
The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning ofthe statute as clearly expressed. Since statutes must be construed according to their intent, the intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject. But, in construing statutes together it is presumed that the legislature did not intent an absurd or unreasonable result.
Dahn, 1998 SD 36 at ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d at 539 (citing Moss, 1996 SD 76 at ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d at 17) (citations omitted)).
[¶ 9.]
The department of revenue shall on or before the fourth Monday in August, each year, transmit to the county auditor of each county through which any railroad runs, a statement showing the length of main track, of main line or lines and the branches thereof and sidetracks within such county, not located within the limits of any city or incorporated town, and the assessed value per mile of such main line or lines and branches and sidetracks as fixed by a pro rata distribution per mile of the assessed valuation of such property, except that part located within the limits of cities or incorporated towns, as aforesaid, and such statement shall be entered upon the proper records of the county.
[¶ 10.] “In arriving at the intention of the Legislature, it is presumed that the words of the statute have been used to convey their ordinary, popular meaning.”
Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon,
1997 SD 50, ¶ 9, 562 N.W.2d 888, 891 (quoting
National Farmers v. Universal,
534 N.W.2d 63, 65 (S.D. 1995);
Weger v. Pennington County,
534 N.W.2d 854, 856 (S.D. 1995);
Meyerink v. Northwestern Public Service Co.,
391 N.W.2d 180, 183-84 (S.D.1986)). “This court assumes that statutes mean what they say and that legislators have said what they meant.”
Mid-Century Ins. Co.,
1997 SD 50 at ¶ 9, 562 N.W.2d at 891 (quoting
In re Famous Brands, Inc.,
347 N.W.2d 882, 885 (S.D.1984)). “When the language of the statute is clear, certain, and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, and the court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed in the statute.”
Id.
The language of
[¶ 11.] 2. WHETHER
[¶ 12.] District and County claim that if the trial court’s interpretation of
[¶ 13.] “Standing is established through being a ‘real party in interest’ and it is statutorily controlled.”
Agar Sch. Dist. No. 58-1 v. McGee,
527 N.W.2d 282, 284 (S.D. 1995) (quoting
Wang v. Wang,
393 N.W.2d 771, 775 (S.D. 1986)).
[¶ 14.] “Political subdivisions of states — such as counties . . . are not sovereign entities; they are subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the state to assist in carrying out state governmental functions.” Bailey v. Jones, 81 S.D. 617, 139 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1966) (citation and footnote omitted). “The power of the legislature in the control of counties and other political subdivisions is unrestrained by requirements of due process.” Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 248 N.W.2d 386, 390 (S.D. 1976) (citations omitted).
[¶ 15.] District and County are creations of the legislature and lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of
[A school district] is a legislative creation .... It is not a “person,” within the meaning of any bill of rights or constitutional limitation. It has no rights, no functions, no capacity, except such as are conferred upon it by the legislature.
Exira Community Sch. Dist., 512 N.W.2d at 790 (alterations in original) (quoting Boyd v. Johnson, 212 Iowa 1201, 238 N.W. 61, 65 (1931)).
Counties and other municipal corporations are, of course, the creatures of the Legislature; they exist by reason of statutes enacted within the power of the Legislature, ’ and we see no sound basis upon which a ministerial (or, for that matter, any other) office may question the laws of its being. The creature is not greater than its creator, and may not question that power which brought it into existence and set the bounds of its capacities.
Bd. of Supervisors of Linn County, 263 N.W.2d at 232 (quoting C. Hewitt & Sons Co. v. Keller, 223 Iowa 1372, 275 N.W. 94, 97 (1937)).
[¶ 16.] None of the exceptions to this general rule regarding standing apply because the taxpayers within the district and county are the real parties in interest and can satisfy the traditional standing requirements. Agar Sch. Dist., 527 N.W.2d at 284. “The real party in interest requirement for standing is satisfied if the litigant can show ‘that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the Defendant.’ ” Id. (citing Parsons v. South Dakota Lottery Comm’n, 504 N.W.2d 593, 595 (S.D.1993) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66, 76 (1979))). “[A] taxpayer need not have a special interest in an action or proceedings nor suffer special injury to himself to entitle him to institute an action to protect public rights.” Agar Sch. Dist., 527 N.W.2d at 284 (alteration in original) (quoting Wyatt v. Kundert, 375 N.W.2d 186, 195 (S.D.1985) (citing State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 347, 274 N.W. 319, 321 (1937))).
[¶ 17.] Therefore, we affirm the granting of partial summary judgment.
[¶ 18.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and AMUNDSON, KONENKAMP and GILBERTSON, JJ., concur.
Notes
. The issue of distribution is significant to BNRR because it may claim greater tax credits under
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The Department of Revenue shall on or before the fourth Monday in August, each year, transmit to the county auditor of each county through which any railroad runs, a statement showing the length of main track, of main line or lines and the branches thereof and sidetracks within such county, and the assessed value based on a statewide formula that weights traffic (ton miles) seventy-five percent and miles of track in the county by twenty-five percent. The county auditor shall then distribute the value to each taxing district where the line runs on a per mile basis within the county.