Lead Opinion
Upon rehearing this cause originally reported at
Judgment accordingly.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I am unable to agree with the majority’s disposition of this case upon rehearing. In my opinion, the cause should have been remanded to the trial court for further consideration of the issues of bad faith and consequential damages.
The trial сourt never made any findings on consequential damagеs or the existence of bad faith. Thus, the record before us was not sufficiently developed for this court to conclude that there was no bad faith on the part of the bank, and that therefore there can be no award of consequential damages.
Furthermore, as the court of appeals correctly held, the triаl court erred ab initio by resolving the case on comparative negligence rather than contractual рrinciples. In Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. First National Bank (1980),
Becаuse I believe these issues would be better resolved by thе trier of fact, I must respectfully dissent.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. As pointed out in my original concurring opinion,
Additionally, the assertion of the prior majority that the common-law rule oí Hadley v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, would provide а basis for the allowance of consequential damages as being within the contemplation of the parties in the contract for banking services, is a most unfounded one. Such a common-law rule is now superceded by the adoption in Ohio of the rules contained within the Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC would permit the parties tо specifically provide for such damages, but nonе were so provided here.
Because the cаse before us requires the proper application of the UCC rules which the prior majority opinion had failed to do, and because the per curiam opinion here properly applies such UCC standards, I am able to concur.
