ECLIPSE LIQUIDITY, INC. v. GEDEN HOLDINGS LIMITED
No. 779 EDA 2018
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FILED DECEMBER 07, 2018
2018 PA Super 332
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
Appeal from the Order Entered February 9, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): October Term, 2017, No. 196
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:
Appellant, Geden Holdings Limited, appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on February 9, 2018, denying Appellant’s petition to strike the foreign judgment entered in favor of Appellee, Eclipse Liquidity, Inc., pursuant to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act (“Recognition Act“),
The trial court aptly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal as follows:
On October 2, 2017, [Appellee] filed a praecipe to enter a foreign money judgment requesting the Prothonotary to enter judgment against [Appellant] in the amount of USD $3,447,519.91 “[p]ursuant to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act,
42 P.S. § 22001, et seq. and in accordance with the [J]udgment issued by the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court in and for the United Kingdom….” In addition to the praecipe, a notice addressed to [Appellant] was also filed in this courtstating in relevant part as follows: “Pursuant to Rule 236 of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, you are hereby notified that a [J]udgment has been entered against you in the above proceeding as indicated below,” with the box next to “Money Judgment” checked. A complaint was not filed. On December [21], 2017, [Appellant] filed a petition to strike the judgment. [Appellant] argued the judgment should be stricken because [Appellee] failed to utilize proper procedure by failing to file a complaint or otherwise take any action to obtain a judgment review and recognition of the UK Money Judgment as required by the [Recognition Act]. Upon receipt and review of [Appellee’s] response in opposition to [Appellant’s] petition to strike the court denied [Appellant’s] petition in an order and opinion dated February 7, 2018 and docketed February 9, 2018. This timely appeal followed.1
Trial Court Opinion, filed 4/9/18, at 1-2.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
May a judgment rendered in another country be recognized in Pennsylvania upon the filing of an ex parte praecipe to enter judgment?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
Appellant argues that Appellee was required, before seeking enforcement of the United Kingdom judgment in Pennsylvania, to commence a civil action to determine whether the judgment is valid under the Recognition Act. Appellant emphasizes that recognition and enforcement are distinct concepts. Appellant acknowledges the Recognition Act’s provision that a foreign-country judgment is enforceable in the same manner as a sister-state
Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision on a petition to strike a foreign judgment is whether the court manifestly abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Olympus Corp. v. Canady, 962 A.2d 671, 673 (Pa.Super. 2008). “A petition to strike a judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the record.” Green Acres Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2015).
Further, “[T]he interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court committed an error of law.” Wilson v. Transp. Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 570 (Pa.Super. 2005). “As with all questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de
On the topic of statutory interpretation, this Court has stated:
[We] are constrained by the rules of statutory interpretation, particularly as found in the Statutory Construction Act.
1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501-1991 . The goal in interpreting any statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Our Supreme Court has stated that the plain language of a statute is in general the best indication of the legislative intent that gave rise to the statute. When the language is clear, explicit, and free from any ambiguity, we discern intent from the language alone, and not from the arguments based on legislative history or “spirit” of the statute. We must construe words and phrases in the statute according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. We also must construe a statute in such a way as to give effect to all its provisions, if possible, thereby avoiding the need to label any provision as mere surplusage.
Cimino v. Valley Family Med., 912 A.2d 851, 853 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 731, 921 A.2d 494 (2007) (quoting Weiner v. Fisher, 871 A.2d 1283, 1285-86 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 705, 936 A.2d 41 (2007)). Under Section 1921(c), the court resorts to considerations of “purpose” and “object” of the legislature when the words of a statute are not explicit. Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 583 Pa. 149, 158, 876 A.2d 904, 909 (2005) (referring to consideration of matters such as: (1) occasion and necessity for statute; (2) circumstances under which it was enacted; (3) mischief to be remedied; (4) object to be attained; (5) former law, if any, including other statutes upon same or similar subjects; (6) consequences of particular interpretation; (7) contemporaneous legislative history; (8)
Additionally, “[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548, 554 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 699, 751 A.2d 192 (2000). “The essential elements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case.” Adelphia Cablevision Assocs. Of Radnor, L.P. v. Univ. City Hous. Co., 755 A.2d 703, 712 (Pa.Super. 2000).
The Recognition Act defines a “foreign judgment” as “[a]ny judgment of a foreign government granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment in matrimonial or family matters.”
Except as provided in sections 4 and 5, a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of section 9 is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of another state which is entitled to full faith and credit.
In Pennsylvania, the enforceability of a judgment from another state is governed by the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“Enforcement Act“), which states, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 4306. Enforcement of foreign judgments
* * *
(b) Filing and status of foreign judgments.--A copy of any foreign judgment including the docket entries incidental thereto authenticated in accordance with act of Congress or this title may be filed in the office of the clerk of any court of common pleas of this Commonwealth. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of any court of common pleas of this Commonwealth. A judgment so filed shall be a lien as of the date of filing and shall have the same effect and be subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of any court of common pleas of this Commonwealth and may be
enforced or satisfied in like manner.
* * *
(f) Definition.--As used in this section “foreign judgment” means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court requiring the payment of money which is entitled to full faith and credit in this Commonwealth.
In addressing enforcement of foreign judgments, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:
Under Pennsylvania law, foreign judgments are treated, in the first instance, not as judgments, but as rights of action. Historically, obligees were required to commence a civil action on the existing foreign judgment, consummating in a Pennsylvania judgment, before enforcement could be had in the Commonwealth. …
However, in enacting the various statues providing for registration of foreign judgments, the legislature implemented streamlined procedures for domesticating foreign judgments, establishing registration as an alternative to the commencement of a civil action.
Morrissey v. Morrissey, 552 Pa. 81, 86, 713 A.2d 614, 617 (1998).
The Court in Morrissey discussed the legislature’s implementation of “streamlined procedures for domesticating foreign judgments” in the context of the Enforcement Act and the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
This reading of the statute is consistent with its text, which makes clear the legislature intended to streamline the enforcement of foreign-country judgments by making them “enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of another state which is entitled to full faith and credit.”
Here, Appellee filed a praecipe to enter a foreign money judgment issued in the United Kingdom. The praecipe expressly invoked the Recognition
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the ability to register a foreign judgment by praecipe does not render meaningless the provisions of the Registration Act setting forth grounds for nonrecognition. As under the Enforcement Act, a foreign judgment is not unassailable once entered. The Enforcement Act provides that an aggrieved party may attack the judgment using “the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of any court of common pleas of this Commonwealth.”
Further, Appellant’s reliance on Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse SA v. Fin. Software Sys., Inc., 99 A.3d 79 (Pa. Super. 2014), is misplaced. In Louis Dreyfus, the plaintiff attempted to enforce a foreign-country money judgment by filing a praecipe that cited the Enforcement Act. This Court held
Finally, Appellant’s due process argument ignores that Appellant had a prior opportunity in the original forum to defend against the claims underlying the foreign judgment. The proceedings in the United Kingdom culminated in a judgment, which, though not protected by full faith and credit or immune from attack, is nevertheless entitled to deference under the principles of comity. See In re Christoff‘s Estate, 411 Pa. 419, 423, 192 A.2d 737, 739 (1963) (stating that foreign-country judgments are entitled to “the greatest respect and deference” under the principles of comity). Appellant makes no
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly denied Appellant’s petition to strike the foreign judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/7/18
