91 Iowa 54 | Iowa | 1894
Lead Opinion
In conclusion, we have to say that our views in this case express what we believe was the actual intention of the testatrix, and that it is sufficiently expressed. It appears to us that any one who will take this instrument, and consider all its parts, — take it “by the four comers,” as it is sometimes expressed, — must reach the conclusion that, if the false description is rejected, there are good reasons for holding that there is enough remaining which unmistakably leads to the conclusion that the devise to the defendants is valid, and that any •other result would defeat the intention of the testatrix as clearly manifested by the will, aided by the simple inquiry as to what quarter section she owned in section 14. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
{dissenting). — I. I can not agree to the result reached by the majority of the court in this case. With all due respect, it seems to me that the opinion to a certain extent ignores the issue as presented in the case, and, while conceding that there could be no reformation of the will on the ground of mistake, accident, or surprise, the conclusion reached is attempted to be justified on the theory that, after rejecting the false description, sufficient remains to lead to the identification of the land in controversy. It is said to be a case of latent ambiguity. I do not so regard it. To properly understand the case as presented it becomes
II. So much of the will of deceased as is material to an understanding of the questions raised is here set out: “(3) I am the owner of the following described real estate, situated in Mitchell county, Iowa, to wit [describing several tracts of real estate]; also, the southeast quarter (1-4) of section number fourteen (14), township number ninety-eight (98), range number seventeen (17) west of the fifth (5) principal meridian,” which, with certain other real estate, is designated as “p arcel numb er three (3 ) of my estate. ( 4 ) It is my will, and I hereby direct,- that all the property, real and personal and mixed, owned by me at the time of my death, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this will.” “(6) It is my will, and I hereby give-.and devise to my brother James Eckford, the aforesaid parcel number
III. The question presented is whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the mistake in description, and to show the testatrix’s intention. While it is the duty of the court, in the construction of a will, to ascertain, if possible, the intention of the testator, yet the intention to be sought after is not that which existed in the mind of the testator, but that which is expressed by the language of the will itself. Whatever differences may exist in the adjudicated cases in the application of this rule, it is believed that the rule itself is unchallenged and inexorable. Bingel v. Volz, 31 N. E. Rep. (Ill. Sup.) 13; 2 Woerner, Adm’n, sections 414, 421; 1 Redf. Wills, 433; 1 Jarm. Wills, 409; 2 Jarm. Wills, 838; Mann v. Mann, 14 Johns. 1; Ryerss v. Wheeler, 22 Wend. 148; Cheyney’s Case, 5 Coke, 68; Vernon’s Case, 4 Coke, 4; Strode v. Lady Falkland, 3 Rep. Ch. 98; Martindale v. Warner, 15 Pa. St. 471; Wig. Wills, Introduction, p. 9; Id. “Construction,” 29, 30; Starkweather v. Society, 72 Ill. 50;
IY. It is claimed that this is a case of latent ambiguity, and hence extrinsic evidence is admissible. A latent ambiguity is said to exist 1 ‘when the language employed is clear and intelligible, and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or evidence
I am mindful, also, of the well settled rule (additional to the one stated in division 3 of this opinion) that while, in the construction of a will, reference may be made to surrounding circumstances to ascertain the
V. Applying the rules heretofore mentioned, and the rule as to when a latent ambiguity arises, as laid down in the minority opinion of the United States supreme court in Patch v. White, supra, to the facts in this case, we are to determine whether a latent ambiguity exists, and whether extrinsic evidence of the facts pleaded is admissible. The rules seem plain, but their application to a given case is often surrounded with great difficulty. This to some extent, doubtless arises from the fact that courts, in their desire to arrive at the. testator’s intention, and to avoid seeming hardship, sometimes ignore well-settled rales of construction, and
It is clear to me that to permit extrinsic evidence to change a complete description of real estate undertaken to be devised in a will in a case like this, and substitute in lieu thereof another description, is not ascertaining the intent of the testatrix from the language of the will itself, as the law requires, but is in fact reforming the'will; to that extent making a new one for her. That can not be done. A reformation of a will can not be thus accomplished under the guise of a construction of it. It is alleged in the cross bill that this erroneous description “appears only by mistake and inadvertence of the person who drew the said will; that, by oversight or inadvertence, the said attorney misdescribed the said tract of land,” etc. In a recent case in Illinois, where the same question was presented and the facts were' practically identical, it was held extrinsic evidence was inadmissible. Bingel v. Volz, 31 N. E. Rep. (Ill. Sup.) 13. In Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 Ill. 514 (and which is cited with approval by this court in Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Iowa, 674), there was a devise to Elizabeth Kurtz of an eighty acre tract in section 32. It was proposed to show that the testator, when he died, owned but one eighty acre tract, which was described precisely as was the one devised to said Elizabeth,. except that it was in section 33 instead of 32; that the draughtsman of the will by mistake wrote the erroneous description. The evidence was excluded, and the court said: “The law requires that all wills of land shall be in writing,-and extrinsic evidence is never
If the testator devised property which he did not own, so that the description is false, not in part only, but in toto, in consequence of a mistake of the testator as to his ownership, the rule allowing a latent ambiguity to be explained by extrinsic evidence does not apply. 2 Woerner, Adm’n, p. 894; Hanner v. Moulton, 23 Fed. Rep. 5. Funk v. Davis, 2 N. E. Rep. 739, 103 Ind. 281, was a proceeding to correct an alleged mistake in the description as to lands devised in a will as “N. W. 1-4 of N. W. 1-4,” etc. It was claimed that the testator did not own the land described in the will, but did in fact own the “N. W. 1-4 of the N. E. 1-4;’’that, by mistake, the testator gave the draughtsman who prepared the will the word “northwest” when he meant “northeast.” Parol evidence was excluded. The •court said: “Evidence is admissible which in its nature and effect merely explained what the testator has writ
VI. “A devise of land, correct in its general description, may be established by the correction upon extrinsic testimony as to what it describes in detail, or vice versa.” Schouler, Wills [2d Ed.], section 574. And, as the same author says, “the principle in this latter class of cases is that where there is in the main a sufficient description in the will to ascertain accurately what is devised or bequeathed, a part which is inaccurate may be stricken out as surplusage, but that nothing substantial-shall be added to the will.” It. is claimed in the case at bar that the erroneous description can be stricken out, and that sufficient will remain
Every case I have cited, except the last, as well as the great majority of the adjudicated cases, hold that to come within the rule herein laid down, so as to admit of the introduction of extrinsic evidence, there must be a sufficient general description in the will to lead to an identification of the property after the particular description is stricken out. There is, however, a class of cases which hold that such expressions of ownership in a will as, “as to my real estate, I dispose of it as follows: I own,” followed by the words, “I devise the same,” etc., are sufficient as a general description to carry the land in fact owned by the testator, when it is made to appear that he did not own the land specifically described. Pocock v. Reddinger, 108 Ind. 573, 9 N. E. Rep. 473; Cleveland v. Spilman, 25 Ind. 95; Black v. Richards, 95 Ind. 184. Thus the- words “my land” have been held sufficient to carry the land then in fact owned by the testator, and an attempt to specifically describe the land did not render nugatory this general description. Judy v. Gilbert, 77 Ind. 96. So held, also, where the words “my real estate” were used in a will, and the "testator’s real estate was not otherwise devised. In Becker v. Becker, 12 N. E. Rep. 750, 121 Ill. 341, a testatrix devised her shares of the Mechanics’ Bank stock. She had no bank stock, except shares in the City Bank. It was held that
VII. As I have already stated, it is claimed that the erroneous description in the case at bar occurred by “mistake and inadvertence” of the person who drew the will, or by “oversight and inadvertence” of the. attorney drawing the will. It is the settled rule that the court of equity, even, can not reform a will. It can correct mistakes only when the error appears on the face of the will. So that both mistake and correction can be ascertained and supplied by the context from a plain interpretation' of the instrument as it stands. Schouler, Wills [2 Ed.], sec. 220; Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Iowa, 674; Yates v. Cole, 1 Jones, Eq. 110; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., sec. 871; Bingel v. Volz, 31 N. E. Rep. (Ill. Sup.) 13; Sherwood v. Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357; Chambers v. Watson, 56 Iowa, 676, 10 N. W. Rep. 239. It is a well settled rule that parol evidence can not
VIII. I will briefly refer to the cases in our own state touching the questions arising in the case at bar. In Hopkins v. Grimes, 14 Iowa, 77, the testator employed the word “homestead” in his will to describe the property he devised to his wife during widowhood, and it. was held that as such word, at the time the will was made, had not a definite and technical meaning, and there was nothing in the will to render certain the description, resort might be had to extrinsic evidence. In Alden v. Johnson, 63 Iowa, 127, 18 N. W. Rep. 696, in speaking of the intention of the testator, the court says: “We can look only to the will itself, guided by the rules of interpretation, in order to determine the intention of the testator, and can not, for that purpose, resort to other sources to discover it.” In Huston v. Huston, 37 Iowa, 670, parol evidence was offered to prove declarations of the testator respecting the bequest-to the plaintiff as being in satisfaction of debts sued on; also, respecting a devise to defendant, and as to testator’s intention that the defendant should have most of his property. The court said they were prop
In the ease at bar it is proposed to strike out certain parts of a perfect description, and ingraft therein other words, thereby making the language describe land not mentioned-in the will. Severson v. Severson, 68 Iowa, 656, 27 N. W. Rep. 811, was an action for the admeasurement of dower, and the court reformed an erroneous description. The will showed on its face that the testator undertook to devise to his wife the undivided two thirds of his real estate, and partly by correct description, and partly by misdescription, he gave her the whole of it. He then devised to his daughter, by correct description, an undivided one third of his realty. It was held that the wife took an undivided two thirds, and the daughter an undivided one third, of his realty, and that from the will alone it appeared that the correction in the description should be made. In re Lyon’s Estate, 70 Iowa, 380, 30 N. W. Rep. 642, it was held that parol evidence was not admissible to show that the testator intended to devise different land from that described in the will. The court said: “Now, it seems to us that this, in substance and effect, is a revocation or alteration of the provisions of the will, which are clear, certain, and definite, without a compliance with the statute. * * * The will constitutes written evidence of the testator’s intent, which can only be over
IX. The real estate in controversy, not being otherwise disposed of by the will, passes to plaintiffs under the residuary clause heretofore set out. Schouler, Wills, sec. 521; Floyd v. Carow, 88 N. Y. 560; Riker v. Cornwell, 113 N. Y. 115, 20 N. E. Rep. 604. For the reasons given, the case should be reversed.