146 N.Y.S. 513 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1914
This action was brought pursuant to section 2653a of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the probate of the will' of Thomas Thompson Eckert, deceased, upon the ground that it was not properly executed, was the result of undue influence, and that the testator did not have testamentary capacity. The trial court withdrew from the consideration of the jury the execution and testamentary capacity, and submitted only the question of undue influence. A verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff setting aside the probate, and from the
Questions of fact arising in-actions brought to test the validity of wills are to be determined in precisely the same way as are questions of fact in other actions. If different inferences may fairly and reasonably be drawn from the testimony or evidence, then the facts must be determined by the jury. (Hagan v. Sone, 174 N. Y. 317.) But the court proceeds with great caution in setting aside the probate of a will on the ground of undue influence. It requires that fact to be established. by satisfactory evidence, and if it is not, then it never hesitates to set aside the finding of a jury to the contrary. (Gardiner v. Gardiner, 34 N. Y. 155; Children's Aid Society v. Loveridge, 70 id. 387; Smith v. Keller, 205 id. 39.) The burden of proving undue influence is upon the party who asserts it, and while it is seldom susceptible of direct proof, nevertheless in each case there must be affirmative evidence of the facts from which such influence can fairly and reasonably be inferred. (Hagan v. Sone, supra; Matter of Budlong, 126 N. Y. 423; Rollwagen v. Rollwagen, 63 id. 504; Delafield v. Parish, 25 id. 95.)
Keeping these rules in mind, let us briefly consider some of the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining (a) whether the jury was justified in drawing an inference that the will under consideration was the result of undue influence; and (b) whether its findings to that effect were sufficiently sustained by the evidence.
The testator died on the 20th of October, 1910, then in his ninety-third year, leaving him surviving as his only heirs at law and next of kin two sons, the plaintiff, fifty-six years of age, and the defendant Thomas T. Eckert, Jr., fifty-three years of age. He made the will which is the subject of this controversy on the thirtieth of the preceding August, and it disposed of an estate of the conceded value of at least $1,650,000. By it he
The will, so far as the two sons are concerned, is an unnatural one and in the absence of proof showing why one is so much more favored than the other, less evidence is required to establish undue influence. The testator, for several years prior to his death, had two residences, one in the city of New York, and a summer residence at Elberon, N. J. The will in question was executed at the latter place. The son Thomas, unmarried, had lived with and been supported by his father since about 1890. The son Clendenin married quite early in life and from that time did not live with the testator, and at the time the will was executed was living in Chicago. Notwithstanding the plaintiff had for several years lived apart from the testator,, he and his family frequently visited him and all the evidence tends to show, certainly until within a very few months prior to the execution of the will, that the testator had the same affection and regard for one son that he had for the other; that when he made a gift to one he usually made a substantially similar gift to the other; that when the plaintiff entered business, at or about the time he was married, his father loaned him several thousand dollars, and when the loan was paid, he immediately divided it between the two sons; that as late as December, 1909, Clendenin borrowed from his father $1,000, and when a few days later he repaid the same, the testator sent him a check for $500 as a Christmas present; and that Page actually prepared a draft
Substantially all of the foregoing facts were undisputed. In addition thereto, plaintiff produced evidence from which the jury could find when the will was executed the testator was in a very weak condition, both physically and mentally; that he was quite deaf and at times unable to understand or remember what was said to him; that he spoke disconnectedly and would fall asleep while conversing1; that he had to be dressed and' undressed, and when put to bed at night would insist upon immediately getting up and being dressed, because it was morning; that he would lose his way in his own house; that he insisted upon a cat eating at thé table with him, for which a place and chair were reserved; that for two years preceding the execution of the will he was constantly watched and cared for by a trained nurse; that he was easily influenced and in many ways subservient to and controlled by his son Thomas; that Thomas spoke in a derogatory manner of the plaintiff to the testator at different times, saying that plaintiff was in get-rich-quick schemes; would not pay his debts; wanted to borrow money of the testator, and other statements of like character; that three or four days before the will was made he was heard to say to the testator: “ Father, Olen don’t care anything about you, all he wants is money; see how. he treated me; I would have been better in a Jew’s hands. * * * You know the reason he don’t come dowm here, because he won’t eat at the table with Minnie; ” and that he had to pay $900 club dues for him; that these statements were false, but nevertheless they made an impression upon and influenced the testator; that in June, 1910, when the plaintiff visited the testator he immediately said: “I have got no money to give you;” to which the son
The jury could also have found untrue the testimony of the attorney, Page and Thomas to the effect that the latter did not know that the testator had executed a will until the attorney sent a copy of it after the testator’s death. The attorney went from Mew York to Elberon in company with Thomas, by whom he was introduced to the testator. It seems quite incredible that an attorney, without ever having met the testator before, without ever having had a private consultation with him, considering his age and condition, should have permitted him to execute the will without at least mentioning the fact to the son, who was in charge of the house and the only relative present. And in this connection it is significant that he should call the testator’s attention to the fact that creditors might reach the $50,000 which he was giving to the plaintiff; also that there should be inserted in the will a clause that if any beneficiary con - tested its probate he should thereby forfeit his interest. Plaintiff was the only one who had any personal interest in contesting the will, and the insertion of the clause must have been meant to refer to him, and yet he was named as one of the executors.
It is equally incredible that Page, the secretary of the testator and a member of the household, on most friendly terms with Thomas, should not have mentioned the will to the latter until after the testator’s death.
Thomas told Thom, one of the witnesses to the will, to go to Elberon, and there was the testimony of one witness that Thom said, before he left Mew York, that he was going for the purpose of witnessing a will, and the testimony of another witness that he said, after he arrived there, that he had come down to witness a will. And both he and Miles testified that Thomas said to them that his father wanted them to come to the library
At the conclusion of the evidence it fairly showed a testator, at and for sometime prior to the execution of the will, in fit condition to be easily influenced; that the opportunity was presented for the exercise of undue influence; that the inclination existed in Thomas to exercise it, and that it was so exercised by him and those assisting him.
My conclusion is that the case was properly submitted to the jury and the verdict is sustained by the evidence. (See authorities before cited and Tyler v. Gardiner, 35 N. Y. 559; 40 Cyc. 1164.)
The judgment and order appealed from, therefore, are affirmed, with costs.
Ingraham, P. J., Laughun, Scott and Hotchkiss, JJ., concurred.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.