3 Grant 147 | Pa. | 1862
The opinion of the court was delivered, by
It would be difficult to vindicate the admission of the contents of a letter to the plaintiffs below, written by Shour in the absence of Eckert, and before the notes were made which the plaintiff discounted. It is not easy to see how one who has endorsed a promissory note, can be affected by the declarations of the maker, of which he had no knowledge, and which were made before the note had any existence. As against Myers & Shour, the makers, the letter or its contents (for its loss was sufficiently proved) would have been legitimate evidence to show that the endorsements were made for their accommodation; that is, were such proof necessary. But how could the letter be evidence against Eckert? The court received it, not as proof of Shour’s declarations, but, to use the language of the judge, “ as evidence of contract.” What contract? If between Myers and Shour, or Shour and the plaintiffs, it was irrelevant to the case, res inter alios partes. If between the plaintiffs and the defendant, how could
But was it necessary for the plaintiffs to prove, by affirmative evidence, that the defendant was an accommodation endorser ? They had discounted the notes for the makers, on the day of their date, before their maturity, and with the defendant’s endorsements upon them. Under such circumstances wrere the endorsements not binding, unless it was proved that the notes had never before been negotiated, but were endorsed for the convenience of the drawers ? A bill or note which has been once in circulation, overdue, and coming from the hands of the acceptor or maker, is presumed to be extinguished: Byles on Bills 180; McGee v. Prouty, 9 Metcalf 546. This is because it was the duty of the maker or acceptor to take it up when it fell due, and therefore it is fairly inferrable from his possession of it, after that time, that it has fulfilled its office. But before it has fallen due, the maker of a promissory note is under no obligation to take it up, and the reason fails for presuming its extinguishment from his then having it in. his possession. And with the failure of the reason it is fair to conclude that the rule also ceases. When, as in this case, the maker offers for discount an endorsed note, on the day of its date, and before its maturity, the law does not infer from the endorsement and from the possession of the maker, that the note has been either paid or extinguished. It may be doubted whether the condition of such a note proves that it has ever been in circulation; whether, indeed, it is not rather a just inference that the endorsement was made for the accommodation of the maker, and the note left with him to raise money upon it. In Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Campb. 193, Lord Ellenborough said, “ Payment means, payment in due course, and not by anticipation.” “I agree,” said he, “that a bill paid at maturity cannot be reissued, and that no action can afterwards be maintained upon it by a subsequent endorsee. A payment before it becomes due, however, I think does not extinguish it any more than if it were merely discounted.”
These cases hold there is nothing in the fact that an acceptor or maker of an endorsed note has it in possession, and offers it for discount before its maturity, to give notice to a purchaser of its payment or extinguishment. Their doctrine is, that one who discounts such a note for the maker before it is due, according to its tenor, is an innocent holder for value, and is entitled to recover against any of the parties to it. They cover the present case, and they appear to be supported by sound reason. It
There is nothing else in the record of which he has any reason to complain.
The judgment is affirmed.