delivered the opinion of the court.
This action was brought by F. E. Traylor to recover damages for injuries inflicted by an automobile owned by plaintiffs in error and at the time operated by their employee, S. C. Schaaf. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,500.00, and judgmеnt having been entered thereon this writ of error was allowed.
The parties will be designated according to the positions they occupied in the trial court.
The single contention presented by the petition is that, “cоnceding the negligence of the defendants, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.”
The material facts surrounding the' accident, as they may have been found by the jury, may be stated as follows:
At the timе the injury occurred plaintiff was attempting to cross from the north to the south side of Broad street, in the city of Richmond, at the westerh side of the intersection of Broad and Lombardy streets. Broad street, at
According to plaintiff’s testimony, he left the sidewalk on the north side of Broad street on the proper line for pedestrian travel, and before he stepped from the curb he looked to his left (eastwardly), down Brоad street, for traffic approaching from that direction. There was a car parked at the curb immediately to his left, and a Coca-Cola truck parked close by it in such a manner that it was “practically dоuble parked,” but that did not obscure his view of the street. When he looked to his left, he observed a car making a left turn from Broad into Lombardy street, and another car headed westwardly, standing in the intersection in such a position that it might have been waiting to make a left turn. Another witness for the plaintiff testified that there were two cars standing in the intersection. There was one at least. Before he left the curb plaintiff also saw the car of thе defendants (which he afterwards ascertained was being driven by Schaaf) coming westwardly along the Broad street driveway, down below the safety zone east of the intersection of Lombardy street, and more than the width of thе safety zone from the railway track. The safety zone in question is six feet wide and parallels the railway track for the distance of fifty feet. As he passed
“Q. From the time you got clear of the double parked truck up until the time you were struck, did this Schaaf car keеp its same line of passage, or turn to the right or left, or what?
“A. It seemed to be coming along, looked to me about four feet from the car track all the way.
“Q. What did he do?
“A. When he got about four feet from me, he gave a short turn and hit me right in the back just as I stepped on the ear track.'
“Q. Which side of the car in the intersection did he go? “A. On the left side. Just as I reached the car track, put my foot on the first rail, this car made a short turn (why I don’t know) and hit me right in the back.”
The plaintiff’s eye-witness, Lambert, testified on the point as follows:
“A. Me and Mr. Traylor came through from the British-American to Broad street. There he left me and I was standing on the pavement when he crossed. Three cars came up to turn left on Lombardy street. One car made the turn, and then the car—I didn’t see it until it came out from behind the other two standing there. He came out. Then Mr. Traylor had got across into the car track. This car come оut from behind two cars standing there and struck him and knocked him in between the two car tracks, practically on to the eastbound track.
“Q. Did this car that struck Mr. Traylor go to the right or the left of those two cars that were standing, aрparently to make a left turn?
“A. Went to the left of them.”
The only material conflict in the evidence is furnished by the defendants’ witness, Schaaf, who gave a different account of his action, but as his evidence on the subject was obviously disregarded by thе jury, and is not relied on by the defendants in support of their contention, a recital of his testimony seems unnecessary. The sole question we are called upon to decide is whether or not we should hold that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, under the facts and circumstances above stated, as a matter of law.
In the case of Core v. Wilhelm,
In Newport News & O. P. Ry. & Electric Co. v. Bradford,
“The law does not require a person to know that he is absolutely safe befоre taking a given course of action * * *; he is only required to exercise ordinary care to avoid accident—such care as a reasonably prudent person would exercise under like circumstances.” Norfolk & Portsmouth Traction Co. v. Forrest’s Adm’x,
In thе case at bar the plaintiff looked before he left the sidewalk and saw the car in question coming below the safety zone, which according to the evidence must have been more than 110 feet away. As he cаme from behind the Coca-Cola truck he again looked, and saw the car coming along by the safety zone in the regular and proper
In view of all the facts before us, the most that can be said in defendants’ favor is that the question of whether or not the plaintiff usеd ordinary care and prudence under the circumstances was one to be submitted to the jury, under proper instructions from the court, as it appears was done. Such being the case, and the verdict of the jury being amрly supported by the evidence and approved by the trial court, it is conclusive.
In support of their argument, counsel for defendants chiefly rely upon the cases of Stephen Putney Shoe Co. v. Ormsby’s Adm’r,
We think it can be easily seen from the opinions in these two cases that the facts upon which they were based bear little similarity to the case here. In the Ormsby Case, plaintiff’s intestate came out of the Capitol Square, in
In the Saunders Case, the plaintiff was crossing Broad street, in Richmond, in the nighttime. When he left the sidewalk he looked to his left and saw an automobile coming toward him, what he considered to be half a block away. Without looking again, he walked slowly across the street, with his head down, and when he had gotten about half way between the curb and the eastbound car track, in the middle of the lane provided for vehicular traffic, he walked into the rear of defendant’s car. He did not himself know how the accident happened, or how he was injured. The action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict and entering judgment for the defendant was therefore approved.
From the brief statement of the facts of the cases referred to, we think it quite apparent that they are not in any sense controlling of the instant case, and therefore have no material application to it. It would serve no useful purpose to discuss the other authorities cited by counsel.
For the reasons stated, the judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Epes, J., dissenting.