38 Mich. 454 | Mich. | 1878
The bill in this case is filed to quiet the title to certain lands in the city of Detroit. A small portion of these lands had been contracted by complainant to Eoss and Oakes, who were in possession and had erected a valuable building thereon. The remainder was unimproved, and complainant claimed to be in actual possession. Defendants had brought suit in ejectment against Eoss and Oakes, and the suit was pending when this bill was filed. The decree prayed for was one quieting the title of complainant to all the lands.
I. It is insisted on the part of defendants that equity has no jurisdiction of such a case, the questions involved being legal questions, and a suit being now pending at law in which they might be passed upon and determined. It has been stated, however, that that suit involves a small portion only of the lands, and though all the questions that arise on this record might perhaps be raised and passed upon at law, it is not a matter of course to
II.- Complainant claims title through two independent chains of conveyances, and also by adverse possession. One chain of conveyances is as follows: From Louis Moran, Junior, the original source of title, to Caniff and Cook by mortgages: foreclosure of these mortgages in chancery, and conveyance to Eurotas P. Hastings; Eu-rotas P. Hastings to Charles Larned by deed, and Charles Lamed to complainant by deed. The defendant also claims under Hastings, and the questions which arise on this part of the case relate to the validity and effect of the respective conveyances from Hastings; hi3 title not being disputed by defendants,
It is true it has been decided by .this court that, as deeds are usually acknowledged before they are delivered, it is to be presumed when the date of acknowledgment is subsequent to the date of the deed, that the former, rather than the latter was the date of delivery. Blanchard v. Tyler, 12 Mich., 339; Johnson v. Moore, 28 Mich., 3. This, however, is but a bare presumption, and may easily be overcome by circumstances which are inconsistent with the supposed fact. And it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance which would tend more powerfully in that direction than the coming forward of the grantor to acknowledge his conveyance at a time when, had it not been delivered previously, the ceremony would be a mere nullity. Such is the case here.
If the deed from Hastings to Larned had been delivered in the lifetime of Larned, without acknowledgment, and was found in that condition by Larned's representatives afterwards, a sufficient reason for obtaining the acknowledgment at that time is apparent. But if the deed had
The Larned deed, however, was not recorded until April 16, 1874. Meantime, on May 18, 1866, Hastings executed another conveyance to John, Levi and Hubbard Trowbridge, and under this deed defendant Levi Trow-bridge now claims the land. This last deed was at once placed upon record, and Levi Trowbridge claims the protection of the registry laws as a bona fide purchaser in good faith.
The questions arising under this second deed by Hastings are, First, whether it purports to convey the land in dispute; and second, whether, if it does, it is not. defeated by the notice of complainant’s title derived from her actual possession of the land. The second question becomes immaterial if the first is answered adversely to the defendants. The deed purports, in consideration of one dollar, “to grant, bargain, sell, release and forever quit claim unto the parties of the second
The statute provides that “a deed of quit claim and release, of the form in common use, shall be sufficient to pass all the estate which the grantor could lawfully convey by a deed of bargain and sale.” Comp. L., § 4205. Under this statute this instrument was sufficient to convey what it purported to convey. But what was that? It certainly does not assume to convey a certain piece of land as the property of the grantor, but it covers only the “now remaining” interest of Hastings in the Mullett farm. At that time Hastings had no interest whatever in the premises now in controversy, because he had previously conveyed them to Lamed. How then do the Trowbridges get those premises by this conveyance ? Where a deed describes land by metes and bounds or otherwise, and purports to convey it, the grantee, if a purchaser for value without actual or constructive notice of previous conveyances, is entitled to claim what is described; but when one receives a conveyance of a “remaining” interest, the description itself limits the operative words to the interest remaining uneonveyed. The grantee purchases nothing further, and the grantor assumes to convey nothing more. The deed under the recording laws defeats no prior unrecorded conveyance, because it is not a second conveyance of anything previously conveyed. Both deeds may and do well stand together.
This conclusion renders needless any further examination of complainant’s title, as it shows her to have a better right than the defendant Levi Trowbridge can claim, deduced from the same source of title. It is immaterial whether her other claim of conveyances, or her possession, would or would not strengthen this show
The decree of the court helow in favor of the complainant must he affirmed with costs.