Eaton v. Town of Wells

entry The is: cumstances belied the detectives’ state- ments.” The trial court made no such Judgment vacated. Remanded to the conclusion. The trial court found as a Superior Court for further proceedings matter of fact that the questioning took opinion. consistent with this place room, probable defendant’s motel cause to arrest the defendant was not WATHEN, C.J., with whom present interview, beginning at the of the CLIFFORD, J., joins, dissenting. plainclothes display detectives made no of their weapons, physical there was no I respectfully [¶ must In 24] dissent. defendant, restraint on he moved around my judgment, misapplies Court and, the room on one occasion outside of standard of review set in Thompson forth the room being physically without de- Keohane, 99, 112-13, v. 516 U.S. 116 S.Ct. tained, and the questioning unduly was not (1995), 133 L.Ed.2d 383 engages long. trial recognized court in a de novo review of both the facts and contact, detectives initiated the their ques- the law. tioning became accusatory more as defen- placed dant at himself the scene of the [¶ 25] The factual record is somewhat crime, quickly defendant became the focus complete more than usual it in- because of their investigation, and they highly were cludes a transcript taped interview. suspicious depth of him. The of their sus- This has led the Court to draw conclusions however, picion, is not controlling. As the that are subtly different from the factual Supreme United State Court has noted: findings of example, the trial court. For “Even a clear statement from an officer this Court states that the detectives “did person interrogation under is a disguise not Holloway fact that not, itself, prime suspect dispositive prime suspect.” their The trial court issue, the custody suspects for some are found “the quickly defendant became the free to come and until go police decide investigation, focus of the a fact that the to make an arrest.” Id. detectives were quite clear in stating to addition, the defendant.” In the Court Reviewing the facts found testimony relies on of defendant that is at trial court independently. I conclude that odds with the trial court’s factual findings. defendant’s freedom of movement in his This Court credits Holloway’s testimony motel room was not restrained to the de- that he could weapons. see the detectives’ gree associated with formal arrest until he The trial court found the detectives “made was I arrested. would affirm judg- display no weapons.” of their ment. I agree that it was error for the trial court subjec- to consider defendant’s

tive reaction to the statement that he was court, not under arrest. The trial howev- 2000 ME 176 er, properly considered the fact that the Lisle A. et EATON al. detectives told Holloway he was under arrest and appropriately considered the objective TOWN OF et al. impact of that WELLS statement on the issue of whether Holloway was free to Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. go. Stansbury come and See v. Califor- Argued Sept. 2000. nia, 511 U.S. 114 S.Ct. Decided Oct. 2000. (1994). L.Ed.2d 293 This Court elevates expression the trial court’s of doubt toas sincerity of the detectives’ statements finding

into a that “the surrounding cir- Stern, At- General, Dep. Paul

Attorney for de- (orally), Augusta, torney General fendants. WATHEN, C.J., and

Panel: RUDMAN, SAUFLEY, CLIFFORD, CALKINS, ALEXANDER, and JJ. WATHEN, C.J. Eaton, Eaton, M. A. Alice Lisle Eatons) (the ap- Eldridge

Priscilla Jane Supe- in the peal judgment entered from C.J.) (York Kravchuk, County, rior Court granting public non-jury after a trial an easement over and the Town of Wells Beach and from portion of Wells judgment.1 its final clarifying court’s order judg- cross-appeals from The Town in the Eatons declaring record title ment posses- its claim for adverse denying and de- summary judgment from the sion and property. claim of title to said nying its error, judgment. affirm the Finding no we Background I. 1997, A. Lisle On December [¶ 2] Eaton, individually attorney-in-fact and as Eaton, siblings, Donald H. Jr. for his complaint filed a Eldridge, Priscilla Jane Wells, Town se- the Town of against lectmen, proper- plaintiffs’ and all users of unascertained, persons and all ty (orally), Amy M.A. Nadeau B. Robert claiming unknown under such being, or McGarry, Ardry, Nadeau Nanette M. add complaint was amended to users. The Smith, P.A., Sanford, plain- McGarry & for and to dismiss and dismiss claims tiffs. amended, it iden- redesignate parties. As Eaton, A. individu- plaintiffs as Lisle (orally), Durward Parkinson Susan tified W. Driscoll, Priscilla Jane attorney-in fact for ally Michael MacLeod- Bernstein W. Eaton; Ball, Pakinson, LLC, Alice M. defendant Eldridge, and Bergen & Kenne- Wells; III, remaining bunk, the Town of Wall Thomas F. Mona- as John J. and a title action at law Leahy, quiet Hochadel & claims as ghan, Monaghan, Ketterer, LLP, Portland, equity.2 title action quiet Andrew Libby, grant argument that the court’s The Eatons’ appeal from the court’s 2. 1. The Eatons also judgment their an denying summary by prescription constituted order of easements complaint and the Town’s favor on their taking is not addressed be unconstitutional We need not be address these counterclaim. voluntarily dismissed their the Eatons cause because the court considered issues relating claims. to constitutional count evidentiary an trial. claims on the merits at Therefore, preserved for argument is not Aldrich, Monopoly, v. 683 A.2d See Inc. Oechslie, v. appellate review. See O’Halloran Blanchard, (Me.1996); Bigney 430 A.2d 1979). (Me. 69 n. 1 842-43 trial, Town filed an part answer and of the bifurcated the court counterclaim, found, alia, which included claims for de- inter the Town estab- claratory judgment simple; adverse public’s right lished the to use ‘Wells —fee possession; by acquiescence; title declara- Beach” both on dry sand and the inter- tory judgment easement; easement general tidal zone for pur- recreational — prescription; dedication and acceptance; poses, including but not limited to bathing, easement; implied and offset taxes. The sunbathing, picnicking walking, State of Maine was allowed to intervene and, through an easement prescription and filed an answer an raising as affirma- alternative, in the through dedication and public tive defense the rights trust in the acceptance. The Town also established intertidal encompass zone to walking and right the Town’s to use the beach through other recreational and amusement activi- prescriptive purposes easement for asso- ties, in addition fishing, fowling, and ciated with beach preser- maintenance and navigation. control, vation including raking, litter habitats, maintaining wildlife and seasonal action, During pendency stands, lifeguard but not prove did it has a the Town filed a motion preliminary right to pipe subject parcel install over the injunction to authorize Army Corps to aid its harbor Engineers dredging project access on and across the 2200 prove did not title linear feet to the beach dispute of sand beach in adverse for the possession. The purpose laying pipeline judgment also ordered and incidental the Town pay construction in to the Eatons’ connection with costs but not the Wells attorney Harbor Federal fees in Navigation Project. connection with the Ea- It later tons’ requested the motion for attorney court’s consent to with- sanctions and relating draw its motion for a fees to the preliminary injunc- pre- Town’s motion for tion, injunction. liminary and the Eatons filed a motion for The court then en- judgment sanctions tered a final attorney prior and in based on the fees relation to the motion. decisions in the The court deferred bifurcated trial. action on the motion until the trial. [¶ The pro- 7] Eatons filed motion for posed

[¶ 5] Both sides findings filed motions for sum- of facts and conclusions of mary judgment and the law that court entered the court denied. The Eatons judgment denying appealed cross-appealed. Town’s motion as to and the Town Thereafter, complaint Eatons’ because issues of the Town filed a motion to 73(f) material fact suspend as to the M.R. Eatons’ record title Civ. P. to allow the property; to the granting Superior the Eatons’ mo- Court to act on a motion to clari- tion as to fy the counts of the its judgment, granted. Town’s coun- which we The terclaim involving the Town’s record title court entered an order clarifying that its offsets; and tax judgment and final denying the Eatons’ and all other in orders this motion as remaining case did not counts of the establish the boundaries of Town’s counterclaim. the house lots that abut the concrete sea- wall subject to the west of the sand beach. The court held a bifurcated trial to well, The appealed Eatons this order as first address the Eatons’ claim of record appeals and the were consolidated. title; and, second, if prevailed, the Eatons to equitable address the Town’s use general claims. A[¶ 8] overview of the relevant trial, part On the first of the may bifurcated facts be summarized as follows: The court found that the are Eatons the record case involves title to equitable use of title any portion owners of residual land not con- certain Beach. Wells The Ea- veyed parcel from the originally Eaton, of land great grandfather, tons’ ac- William purchased by William Eaton 1892 and quired approximately pen- 40 acres on the shown plans on the of the Wells Beach insula containing Wells Beach 1892 from Improvement Company. Littlefield, On the second Augustus Samuel Littlefield ¶ A.2d ME drigue, is peninsula George Chaney. omitted). (citation Summary judgment Ocean, by the Atlantic bounded on the east River, produced if the evidence upheld on the will be the west Webhannet on is genuine no that there is mouth of the Webhannet demonstrates north that material fact and River, another. to on the south land of sue as aas others, judgment entitled to moving party Eaton formed the With William omitted). (citation matter of law. See id. Improvement Beach Co. devel- Wells lots, peninsula initially with 300 oped in its coun argued The Town 11]' [¶ Avenue, on both sides of Atlantic situated record title to it holds terclaim development running through the a road sources. subject premises through two purposes parallel the ocean. For with First, Thomas it contends easement, portion on the of the focus was Propri acting agent as for Lord Gorges, over one mile extending Beach Wells Gorges, Maine Ferdinando etor of Sir (a/k/a the length between Mile Road casino Boade, Wheelright, Henry granted John (a/k/a area) jetty to the south and the Rishworth and Edward the mouth Wells Harbor or of Web- allott, bound power full and absolute River) hannet to the north. vnto any lotts or bounds and sett forth Through years, William Eaton’s that shall come to inhabitt any man portion peninsula development the bounds of the their Plantacon.... westerly reduced to certain lots on the side begin from the north said Plantacon of Atlantic Avenue and the lots on the Oegungig Riuer vnto east side of easterly side of Atlantic Avenue within the side of Kinnibuncke and southwest portion between the Mile Road and countrey eight vp miles into the runne sold, jetty. The individual lots were subject premises remaining strip is the Boade argues Wheelwright, that The Town easterly begin- 44 lots of sand beach of the original propri- were the and Rishworth approximately 3000 the north ning feet to and received of the Town of Wells etors encompassing 2200 of the Mile Road and capacity. They argue grant the in that sand, contiguous not linear feet of which is concept property of “as the feudal that development in the because certain lots ownership, this way to fee ownership gave the extending were sold with the land to ... effect of authority of had the grant after During Atlantic Ocean. and William the described conveying fee title to land development property, of the the Eaton’s the Town of Wells.” beach, dry the sand public used the both portion, portion and the intertidal for sun- light in the Viewing the evidence 12] [¶ bathing, walking, and other recreational assuming and favorable to the Town most maintained the purposes, and the Town that summary judgment purposes of for beach. Boade, and Rish- Wheelright, Messrs. original proprietors the worth were II. Record Title right “the proprietors obtained both A. Town’s title jurisdiction, see Mont- well as of soil” as (13 Ives, 21 161 Smedes & Miss. argued gomery The Town 161) (Err. (stating App.1849) & the Eatons’ motion Marshall granting erred in court royal provinces, the crown whereas in dismissing the summary judgment for jurisdic- of soil and subject right both the title to the retained claim of record Town’s tion, the proprietary governments, in the Superior review the Court’s premises. We soil, as right the acquired proprietors summary judgment for errors “entry of a the trial jurisdiction, grant), from law, light most well as the evidence the viewing based on correctly concluded that court party against whom favorable law did as a matter of facts the Town Rodrigue v. Ro those was judgment entered.” 238 prove proprietors its title because the a laying by municipality out of road convey any

did not by pursuant interest to the Town to the enabling statute or by Hutchinson, added). deed. See Howard v. (emphasis 10 Me. user.” Id. at 1313 (1833), Belden, cited in Glidden v. argues [¶ 14] The Town Howard is dis- A.2d 1306 tinguishable from and thus not instructive Howard, involving pre- [¶ 13] Both a this case. In this Wheelright, case Glidden, revolutionary grant, involving Boade and Rishworth the original were a post-revolutionary grant, re-write proprietors obtaining their grant directly involved the rights issue of who owned the Gorges, from Thomas the Deputy Gover- in rangeways. Hoivard was a trespass nor of the In Province of Maine. Howard Glidden, action brought against surveyor for Proprietors Kennebec Sidney Town of for cutting down and car- derived their interest not from the Gover- rying away Maine, trees from a rangeway. See nor the Province of through but Howard, 10 Me. at 336. The Kennebec a deed from the heirs of Boston merchants Proprietors in 1761 had laid out the tract who premises. owned the See Glidden v. Belden, (Me.1996) of land now situated within the limits 1309 n .1 Sidney the Town of (citing Banks, divided into lots. Ronald F. Maine Becomes (1970)). See id. at plan represented 347. The three State The Boston merchants ranges spaces with vacant acquired property reserved be- grant when the ranges tween the rangeways. called by See sold to them William Bradford and a id. The Court respect group concluded with of pilgrims, granted who were rights Town’s in the rangeways arising premises in Council New out, division, out of the original laying England. Banks, See Ronald F. Maine (1970).3 sale of lots as rights follows: “Whatever The Town Becomes State might have acquired by been owners contends that in Howard the court did not lots, adjoining it is clear that the capacity town discuss proprietors Sidney acquired right no of soil in relationship these their Sidney to the Town of reservations. The fee either remained in “presented whereas this case the Town the original proprietors, passed with the explained facts that the means which grant of adjoining.” the lots Id. In granted Glid- the land proprietors came to be den, case, a more recent we were also held only fee.” The “fact” dealing with who owned rangeways they present, however, is that expert their a plan laid out Propri- the Kennebec witness stated in an affidavit that “[a]s Glidden, in etors the Town of China. See concept property feudal ownership gave 684 A.2d at 1309-10. Citing way the above ownership, grant fee this of author- Howard, quoted language in ity we stated Gorges from Thomas to Messrs. in Court Howard “also that Wheelright, held Boade and Rishworth had the ownership of the rangeways remains with conveying effect of fee title to the land Proprietors they expressly unless con- described to the Town of Wells.” This vey statement, public-at- however, their interest therein or the is an assertion of law large acquires an easement over them for which the Town offered no au- legal 1796, (1892). Proprietors 3. The Kennebec owned lands In Jones Plantation was incor- (from Harlem, 'encompass which now porated Vassalboro as a town named later which came) China, Sidney which (formerly pursuant and China became to an act of the Mas- Harlem). 1771, In legislature approved by Vassalboro became a gover- sachusetts pursuant town to the Acts and Resolves of the nor in 1796. See Strien, China, T. Marion Van History Bay. 14(1975). Province of Massachusetts See Alma The Maine; Bicentennial Proprietors Kennebec dissolved between 1815 Vassalborough, History Robbins, Pierce The (1971). Sidney, formerly part In 1792 being and because towns were Maine Vassalboro, part incorpo- incorporated. of the Town of Gordon E. Kershaw, The Kenne- rated as a town. See Town 1749-1775 at 293-95 Excerpt Proprietors Sidney, beck (1975). Kingsbury’s History County from of Kennebec thority. any underlying Wheelright, Henry Nor did offer above-mentioned John support factual basis to and bald con- and Edward Rishworth of Wells. Boade History Bourne, Ll.D., clusory expert. statement its Edward E. See (1875) at 10 and Kennebunk Wells conclusion, Contrary to legal this Thereafter, however, [History of Wells]. following: historical sources reveal July on Massachusetts took control and Proprietors The Kennebec “are not to be 1653, granted corpo- to the Town of Wells compared proprietors with the mere alia, powers, providing, inter rate New England townships, although their township, every shall be a inhabitant Wells powers rights before the law were “enjoy just propaietyes, shall all theire ti- substantially the E. same.” GoRdon Ker- tles, and intersts in the howses and lands Proprietors 1749- shaw, The Kennebeck they possess, by graunt which whither doe (1975). Proprietors 1775 at xiv of New possession, of the or of the former toune England towns have been defined as: Courts,” present and “all the in- Genneral original grantees purchasers habitants of shall be freemen.” Id. Wells land, tract of usually township, which incorporated, at 32. Once the Town was heirs, they and their assigns, or succes- ownership control of the common sors, together they with those whom through period lands went of uncertain- number, chose to admit to their held ty. reported: Bourne ownership. common They enjoyed the ownership March, 1715-16, absolute and exclusive con- the 20th of [O]n [those trol over such tract or up tracts of land who had taken their voted residence] granted responsible to them and were themselves to be owners common of collectively for improvement ungranted of the all the land.... This vote plantation. new specifically, More they proprietary was the introduction of the responsible town, were inducing period they and en- and from this listing comers, settlers and new grantees for lo- and their heirs or assumed the cating houses, soil, home lots dwelling grants title and made accord for building highways and ing pleasure. manage streets .... to their safely To words, In other they judiciously constituted the nu- their interests cleus of newly community township, necessary proper settled it was that a they and at effected, first controlled the organization whole should be and on life, machinery of the politi- town’s both May following, meeting the 14th of cal and economic. proprietors was called.... Thus town, such, as was divested of all Roy Proprietors Akagi, Ph.D., H. The Town date, control of the lands from this England (1924). at of the New Colonies all legislation regard to them and all Although century proprietors seventeenth grants were thenceforth at the will of eighteenth century proprietors dif- proprietors. fered, even in the century, seventeenth “there was already some differentiation History at years 652-53. After of Wells political between the territorial and the of lands laying making grants, out the town[,] jurisdiction of propri- the and the proprietors to divide land and voted the etors alone claimed the former function.” assign by lottery persons owning it to the 289; 12, 20-21, 33, Id. at see also id. at 46. common, in legal rights the and on Febru- beginning propri- “From the it was the ary proprietors, 112 propri- with a etors, town, not the complete who had the meeting purpose etors’ was held for the jurisdiction over the town lands.” at Id. drawing lottery. id. at 656-58. A See 289. in small amount of land still remained Further, above, proprietors, as used another pro-

[¶ 16] committee “commons,” prietors of a “town” In and in changed. also formed to divide the “ Wells, original proprietors it was voted that ‘the committee were 1812 for 240 Lands, commons, right Title & Inter- to cause with his whoole

dividing the be directed est, already surveyed by Nampscoscocke, all the lands to be divid- the name of Called lots, drawing prepare Noguncoth ed into and to bounding [later betweene ” noted, the same.’ Id. at 660. Bourne Kenebunke Oqunquit] [Riv- known as & however, ers], that instructions do not ...” vp hy Cape Porpus “[t]hese falls. & as as complied Likewise, with.... appear to be have been to the the trial court looked ungranted few little tracts of land meeting [T]he town 1715-16 above-referenced remaining parts in the different of the that a matter of law as “conclude[d] tenantless, town are either or have been the interest which the Town of Wells ob- up by persons who have taken some in these instruments tained 1720 under thought permit it not to them to run best was it a fee was not intended to be nor to waste.” Id. by in described the in- interest the land noted, trial struments.” As the court Therefore, though pro- even 1720, significant portions of the were Town prietors eventually that led to the Town of individuals, already owned which the royal grant were closer to the than Wells and thus the intent of acknowledged, Proprietors, the Kennebec the factual dis- parties to the deed could not have been law concerning tinction does not affect the convey proper- to the Town the same ownership remaining land. As Abrahamson, 441 Calthorpe ties. See Proprietors and with the Kennebec (Me.1982) (stating that the A.2d China, Sidney Towns of the Wells deed, interpreting language in court proprietors empowered were to divide and law, a seeks to ascer- question which is lands, allot the but was Massachusetts parties tain the intention of the incorporation that controlled the deed). Therefore, the court did not err Also, can be seen Town of Wells. as concluding as a matter of law that the subsequent history, always town there was did not transfer title to the Town. deed question remaining owned the who townspeople years land and the after the to take town was established voted control B. Eatons’ title Thus, of the common land. the Town’s [¶ 19] The Town contends argument passed that title when the feudal pre of the deeds or into the none devises concept system evolved into a of own- fee conveyed Eaton a 40- decessors of William ership is neither consistent with our case subject parcel. They parcel acre near the supported by history propri- law nor person convey contend that a can correctly in general etors the colonies or the town conveyed into them. See only what Thus, particular. trial history court Abrahamson, Calthorpe v. A.2d a matter of law

was correct that as (Me.1982). the lan Construction of Town, express grant an from the without deed, however, question is a guage of proprietors, derived no title. at The existence and law. See id. 286. Second, the Town contends ques particular nature of boundaries is in 1720 the Town received a deed of law and the location of those bound tion himself, Symond Epps, from behalf of of fact. See Tallwood question aries is a Epps, Major administrators of and Daniel Botka, Land & Dev. Co. v. deceased, Epps, Daniel and also behalf through a letter of attor Wadleigh of John dispute concerning in no ney, all their interest received There is conveying [¶ 20] with the deeds into Wadleigh beginning from Thomas Cha chain of title deed John up and 1892 to the Nampscossah. Thomas Chabinock William Eaton binock (leader) T. Augustus In 1891 Littlefield plaintiffs. of the native sagamore was the area, Chaney conveyed to William George and in 1649 devised to people Eaton: Wadleigh Sagamores “all that the sd John thervnto, Wall, eighths parts lyeth Adioyneing

three undivided wch cer- hay tain lot of ... salt marsh and beach hom- where wee vsed to set our mocks situate in at said Wells Wells added). Storer, (emphasis Lydia as widow beach bounded in the whole thus —Be- and administratrix of the estate of Samuel at ginning grantee Marsh of the Storer, conveyed to broth- Samuel Storer’s Easterly by Town River—thence said Storer, later, er, with Joseph together River to the Atlantic Ocean—thence spouses, her children and their re-con- Southwesterly by the Ocean Grantee’s Storer, son, Joseph veyed Storer’s John Northwesterly by land —thence Grant- following property: place ee’s land beginning, to the con- lying a Certain Island of marsh on Salt taining forty acres more or less.... the South east side of the River of wells added). (emphasis In 1892 Samuel S. Lit- formerly aforesaid Known the name conveyed remaining tlefield interest % point Island Knights and also in the same property. No other deeds or upland Joyning to Said Marsh bounded written documents description. used this by the wall To- sea on southeast Instead, the court based its findings con- geather Rights with all Comon cerning Augustus the source of title into Rights Priviledges appurtinaneis Littlefield, George Chaney, and Samuel whatsoever thereof and there to probate Littlefield on deeds and records wais belonging may belong hereafter with generalized more descriptions, by any ways Manner of or means what- through the assistance of the genealogical soever or howeoever all which Land Boyle. studies of Fred formerly belong and Marsh did to Sam- vel Storer Decea who was husband to Boyle, Mr. professional Lydia Storer aboves.... genealogist, ownership traced the subject premises added). through the (emphasis ancestors of Samuel grandmother Littlefield’s and Au Joseph conveyed Storer his inter- gustus great-grandmother, Littlefield’s homestead, “[t]ogether est in his with all Littlefield, Elizabeth beginning Storer Joyning the salt marsh and Thatch banks with a deed in proprietors 1645 from the ... thereto between the Homestead and Boade, John Wheelwright, Henry and Ed the Sea” 1720 to his son John Storer. ward Rishworth to Ezekial Knights. Ez John Storer died intestate and his estate Jr., Knights, ekial with the consent of his specific properties was divided into father Knights, conveyed Ezekial property Littlefield, each child. Elizabeth Storer to Samuel Storer 1674 as follows: daughter, acquired among prop- his other Marsh,

a Certen Tract of Prcell of sault erty “3 a of salt marsh in Wells called Land, or Meddow lijing being & Trot’s Island + 2 a of be- salt marsh Wells part tween that of the Webbhannet Riv- called the Lower Hawk.” Elizabeth Storer Hoole, fishing er Called & the sea Littlefield was married to Little- Jonathan Wall, field, her,4 being a predeceased Certen Gurnet or Nose of who and was the compassed water, Littlefield, Land about with It mother of Jonathan John Stor- River, Littlefield, Littlefield, lijing vpon sayd on the South- er Samuel Clement of, Littlefield, abutting vpon ermost side there and Elizabeth Littlefield. Eliz- sea contayneing quantity Wall abeth Storer Littlefield died in 1823 and in her acquired about seauen or 8 Acers bee It more or her four sons interests % less, o/vpland property. with a Certen skirt or sea Littlefields,

4. There were three and Clement Littlefield was Jona- Jonathan Littlefield Boyle distinguished II, Mr. them as follows: The than son of Clement Littlefield was husband of Elizabeth Storer Littlefield was Jonathan 1. The brother of Samuel Storer Jonathan III. 1821, rule that boundaries are Littlefield con- as the familiar In Samuel [¶ 23] descending in order of control established interest to his brothers John veyed his monuments, courses, distances and Littlefield, Littlefield and Clement Storer Snyder Haagen, 679 A.2d quantity.” had so that and Clement then John % We find that each. Littlefield interests John Storer interpretation language court’s his to through conveyed his will interest % Knights to Storer deed described son, his Littlefield. Samuel Samuel Storer size, parcel, both as to location and 40-acre Littlefield acquired also his uncle Jonathan reasonable, sound, and consistent with is through giving share a deed Samu- [II]’s \ and the rules of the extrinsic evidence el his interest. % In we that particular, find construction. T. Augustus Littlefield [¶ 24] explanation seemingly the court’s Chaney the other inter- George acquired % the lot was inconsistent number of acres of Littlefield, Augus- est as follows: Clement proper: grandfather, tus’s deed dated Novem- grammatical suggests construction [T]he ber, conveyed to his son Jonathan eight more than a seven or acre salt that [III]: Littlefield because there being conveyed marsh is part upland is also a or seawall. moiety my undivided or half of skirt one of seawall, upland, and beach The terms dwell, lying farm I now home whereon imprecision with all of are used some aforesaid, being part one-half Wells documents, to these but it is reasonable in the real estate my all share or interest must language conclude that in 1674 my father, honored Jonathan Little- in reference to the land have been used [I], deceased, late said Wells field (on in front of the marsh the seaward my possession, consisting up- now in side) the ocean or intertidal running to marsh, according land and salt zone. reputed boundaries thereof.... added.) (Emphasis Based on this ratio- added.) (emphasis conveyed He the other nale, that correctly the court determined one half to his son Storer Littlefield. Jon- from though language even the deed conveyed athan Littlefield his interest [III] referenced seven or Knights to Storer son, Augustus T. Littlefield. his Storer marsh, conveyed forty eight acres of salt conveyed Littlefield his interest to his son up- it included the skirt of acres because Littlefield, conveyed it Joseph who land, and beach. seawall Chaney. George Moreover, analy- the same we find The trial court concluded seemingly inconsis- applies sis other in the deed from Ezekial language acreage Although amounts. the de- tent share from scription of Elizabeth Storer’s fairly in 1674 Knights to Samuel Storer parcels father of the two salt marsh her parcel ultimately the 40-acre as described acres and made no refer- only totalled five Eaton in 1892. “In conveyed to William upland, Knights Ezekial ence to the as the deed, interpreting give ‘a court should did, subsequent deed from her deed general ordinary meaning words their sons, ” a salt his referred to son Clement to any ambiguity.’ Syl they to see if create it can be in- upland. Thus marsh Properties Planning van v. State Co. Of marsh included the ferred that the salt ¶ 8, fice, 1998 ME Therefore, the court upland skirt as well. (citation omitted). “Examination of extrin interpretation not err in its did surrounding evidence execution sic con- they its conclusion that deeds and proper language when the only deed is subject premises. veyed and the intention of ambiguous the deed is Title Equitable III. “In the ab parties doubt.” Id. Adverse Possession evidence, of extrinsic the intent sence by resort parties should be ascertained The Town contends 27] [¶ deeds, upon the emi- relying erred in such the court to the rules of construction of

243 takings nent domain in 1983 and if 1989 eminent domain title is defective and deny the Town’s claim of title by contending adverse that is what it did. The court possession. found, however, party seeking by The title though that even possession prove by pre adverse must a position argued Town this at the time of ponderance “possession of the evidence trial, acknowledged the Town at the 20-year period actual, a open, that is visi takings time that the Eatons were ble, notorious, hostile, a claim under par- the record The Town as the owners. continuous, right, Dowley exclusive.” ty claiming possession adverse has the ¶ 137, 19, v. Morency, 1999 ME 737 A.2d prove burden to each element of the claim 1061, (citing 1068-69 v. Charles by preponderance a The evidence. Striefel -Keyt-Leaman 111, Partnership, ME 1999 prove court that the Town found did not ¶ 989) (footnote 6, 984, omitted). 733 A.2d that a title defect was the basis for the possession presents “Adverse a mixed takings 1983 and 1989. The Town’s question of law and Striefel, fact.” 1999 intent of fact finding and we defer to “ ¶ 111, 7, ME 733 A.2d at 989. ‘[W]hat credibility, the factfinder on issues of acts of dominion will result in creating title weight significance of evidence. Nei- by possession adverse question is a ther the condemnation order in 1989 nor law.... Whether those really acts were the letters sent to the Eatons cited a title done, and the circumstances under which defect or stated that the Town was reserv- ” done, they were questions raise of fact.’ ing any claim of title to the property “ (citation omitted). Id. though ‘Even question for said reason. Nor did the support evidence could an alternative fac Town introduce evidence of its intent tual finding, that alone does not compel during the takings. Although 1983 reversal of the findings they below when court could have found the Town used ” supported are by competent evidence.’ proceedings eminent domain because there Vernon, 161, S.D. Warren Co. v. 1997 ME title, was a defective the court need not ¶ 5, (citation omitted). 697 A.2d 1282 have found that was the reason. There- fore, the did in determining court not err

[¶ 28] The court denied the Town’s prove Town did not its claim of claim for possession adverse because the right on this basis. prove by failed “to preponderance of the evidence that it has in posses been The Town argues [¶ 30] next that ” sion of the land ‘under a claim right.’ evidence, as seen in findings, the court’s “ The claim right must be an ‘intent to acquired showed that the Town title own, claim the land as [its] and not in possession prior adverse to the 1983 and recognition of or subordination to [the] takings acquires 1989 and once the Town ” record title owner.’ v. Charles possession, title Striefel adverse cannot be Keyt-Leaman Partnership, 1999 ME divested of that right. See S.D. Warren ¶ 14, 733 A.2d (quoting 991 ¶ Vernon, Black’s 161, 11, Co. v. 1997 ME A.2d 697 (6th ed.1990)). 248 The Law DictionaRY PropeRty 1280, 1283; Restatement (3d) court determined that explicitly the Town (“[A] § simple 2.17 cmt. at 261-62 fee acknowledged the Eatons’ record interest persists person whom the estate parcel this through its actions forfeited.”); also see Pichen v. Richard 1983 and takings, which negated son, 29, 36, 191, 194 (1950) 146 Me. 77 A.2d Town’s claim of right to the fee. Butler, Sedgwick cited in Town ¶ (“[T]he ME argues Town first perfect legal common law rule ... is that a cannot, eminent domain takings as a mat abandonment.”). title cannot be lost law, ter of be recognition construed as interest, subordinate citing though 23 M.R.S.A. Even the trial court’s deci- (1992) § proposition specifically for the that a does ad- sion state when municipality may property through possession passed take would but for verse have ous, actions, involving Moody case yet separate, if it had

the 1983 and 1989 even Beach, justice the ripened before in which another of Su found that it would have rejected finding prescrip in- a of takings,5 perior the and 1989 it can be Court 1983 Wells, that findings from the court’s See Bell v. Town ferred tive easement. of takings that and 1989 were the found the 1983 557 A.2d 168 We review merely present reflective of the Town’s under- in the findings trial court’s factual prior and standing of title even to 1983 prescriptive case as to the elements negated right still the claim of for thus for error and will affirm easement clear possession. Because purposes of adverse findings competent if there is evi those determination, we defer to this is factual support in the them even dence record the trial court’s determination and find no support alterna though the evidence could error. findings. tive factual See S.D. Warren Co. Vernon, 161, ¶ 5, A.2d 1997 ME Equitable IV. Use Interests 1280, 1282. court in the Although the trial argue The Eatons that may have reached a Moody Beach case Town finding the court erred the of different conclusion based on facts an proving met its burden of easement case, the trial court in this case is not that prescription. party asserting the case. bound the trial court another (1) prove use easement must continuous a factual issue and The determination is (2) (3) years at least 20 under a claim for presented the court looks to evidence (4) owner, right adverse to the with his Contrary in the case before it. (5) knowledge acquiescence, and or a use contention, ample Eatons’ the court had visible, notorious, open, and uninter so evidence in this case. rupted acquiescence that knowledge presumed. will Co. v. be See S.D. Warren court made the follow 34] The [¶ ¶ Vernon, 1280, 161, 5, ME 697 A.2d Ea ing findings: Beginning with William 1282; Augusta Town Manchester v. through the continuing ton’s conduct and (Me. Club, 1124, Country 477 A.2d plaintiffs’ conduct in 1983 and 1984). When the land is wild and unculti acquiesced, gave per rather than Eatons vated, open applies Maine the rule that mission, public’s right to the to use Wells length requisite and continuous use for the range recreational Beach for broad presumption of time raises a rebuttable purposes, strolling from to sun ranging permissive. that the use was S.D. See all bathing, picnicking, swimming ¶ Co., 1997 ME 697 A.2d Warren activities other recreational beachfront 1284; Manchester, at at dry sand and the intertidal both on “ public 1130. ‘The test of a use is not no zone. There was evidence use, using number frequency of the or the permission obtained public sought ever way, by people who are not but its use purposes, and the to use the beach for said ” separable public generally.’ from the beach as its own for public has treated ¶ Co., 1997 ME S.D. Warren public in pxn-poses. The use recreational (citation omitted). at 1284 A.2d the Town built in the 1960s when tensified into the jetty inter that extends out Webhan argue,

[¶ The Eatons 33] At alia, in front of Wells Harbor. was devoid of materi net River the record point public could access the beach support any al of the elements this evidence at the end of from either the southern end previ that the facts were similar to a maintenance, i.e. prescriptive began routine beach purposes its 5. The court found beach, cleaning hiring police that the Town's routine beach main- officers and easement at tenance has continued since least advertising, lifeguards, in the 1950s and Therefore, ripened title could have before, 1960s. ripened have in the even title could Further, between 1980 and 1989. because as well. 1970s or before that the Town court said "at least” found Mile Road or from the Society, Images northern end at the Historical and author of Beach, jetty. Wells, Moody Unlike the users of America: Beaches testified from exception with the of the owners of the few public research that since has oeeanfront having ownership lots always used the beach for recreational Ocean, Atlantic all of the users of purposes, swimming, walking, Wells such as Beach, ball, cars, including the lot playing racing landing airplanes, owners on east Avenue, and west side of Atlantic parties, picnics. By were beach and school public landmarks, users. Even after the 1983 and identifying clothing, post- and 1989 takings, per- marks, the Town identify continued to was able she to and explain maintenance, form beach lifeguard such as postcards numerous her for collected stations, beach, cleaning policing the the showing people her book using Wells beach, and protecting piper plover pop- the subject premises Beach the area of the ulation, an endangered species. bird early Con- 1900s. testified She also from trary to the arguments, Eatons’ the court town records that as far back as 1901 did distinguish upland between por- put Town garbage pails out for health tions of property the Eatons’ in- concerns, and the in 1937 the beginning Town portions tertidal recognize beach, did police hired a officer patrol to 2200 feet up separate as made nonconti- that in 1938 the Town hired someone to guous parcels, beach, but found acquiescence of a clean the and that with increased broad range purposes of recreational “both century tourism in the twentieth the Town dry on the sand the intertidal zone” increased its summer maintenance to in- along and all the beach from the Mile life-saving equipment clude and toilet facil- jetty. Road to the advertising ities and also added and regu- latory activities. [¶ 35] The testimony court had the Wentworth, Brown, Alberta Hope Irene Littlefield, 81, 37] Robert age [¶ former Shelley, Littlefield, Robert and Edgar assessor, manager, town tax selectman Moore, each testifying to the uses of the 1949, planning beginning board member beach from the Mile jetty. Road to the testified Wells Beach is the lifeblood Alberta a lifelong resident Wentworth, of the town. He had observed a lot old, years Wells and 93 testified that for as people on the beach when a child he was long remember, as she could public has up teenage years. to his From always been free to use the beach from 1990, police the Town had lifeguards and sea walls in front cottages to the low beach, beach, for the cleaned the had Brown, water mark. Irene age born advertising budget an for the beach. The and raised on the Mile Road accessing regulated activity, Town also beach such as Beach, Wells testified to her memories of posting signs prohibiting alcohol and re- the beach. She remembered playing on .quiring dogs to be on leashes. He neither the beach from the time age she was four personally nor on behalf of the Town ever five, or through years, her teen from the trespass private saw no or property 1920s to the 1940s. She also observed signs sought per- on Beach or ever Wells people other on the picnicking, beach hav- mission to use the beach in years. He bonfires, ing parties. She remem- always regarded public it as a beach. Ed- bered the gypsies ponies with on the Moore, gar age assistant road commis- prevent- beach. never anything She saw resident, lifelong sioner and a testified that ing going her from on length the whole of he has used the beach for recreational the beach and has never sought permission purposes since his childhood when he used go always onto the beach. She treated night parties, to attend drag race on the public it as a beach. beach, up walk and down the beach. Hope Shelley, age town histo- He main- also testified how Town has rian, former curator of the Wells Beach tained the beach. bins, stands, trash etc. The 1983 addition, guard In Eaton testified 38] Lisle

[¶ right of accessways involved the trespass signs taking posted that he never no access, prescriptive easement whereas the gave never private property signs. He right Nor in this case does involve permission use the beach. public once right to use the beach permission to access but give he ever the Town did repre- stands, Town’s actions there. Even if the put garbage cans on the lifeguard the Ea- acknowledgement that maintain it. Fur- sented an or to otherwise beach beach, that, ther, the owners of the those since 1983 and tons are he was aware public or the actions did not mean that the Town to maintain the continued asking permission to use Town were beach. pur- or maintenance beach for recreational that, argue also be- 39] The Eatons [¶ Therefore, not err in poses. the court did they they cause did not know owned proved every ele- finding 1983, they until could not have property easement. Because prescriptive ment of a to the use. Because the court acquiesced concerning judgment we affirm the court’s public that the use was continuous found right to use public’s and the Town’s the Ea- years dating for 100 back to William through prescriptive ease- property the however, time, if even the court ton’s ment, the alternative we need not address plaintiffs they did not know found that the theory of dedication. 1980s, there property the until the owned Eaton ample was evidence that William argue Eatons also The ownership and ac- knew of his interest that, grant if the court did not err even Thus, the quiesced public use. easement, scope the of the ease ing an prescriptive could have found that a court ment, i.e., pur recreational general “for during been that easement had established does not poses,” overly vague, broad and that the period. There was also evidence trial, and presented the evidence at reflect maintain it Town’s use of the beach to property. overburdens the Eatons’ so early went back to the 1900s as well scope of the challenge Eatons also the prescriptive easement had also that its the for mainte right Town’s to use beach Ea- prior to the current been established Even, if had purposes. the Eatons nance ownership. tons’ their properly preserved argument, this property a The issue whether Finally, argue Eatons that the claim fails. 40] the [¶ fact. See question is a of finding right that a claim of for is overburdened court’s Becton, 585 A.2d Gutcheon v. purposes prescriptive of easement existed of an permissible uses finding “[T]he that is inconsistent with its other are nec acquired by prescription purposes of adverse easement right no claim of for essarily defined the use of the servient Eatons fail to possession existed. The Id. however, prescriptive period.” the during are land recognize, that the claims Vernon, v. cited in Warren Co. possession concerns S.D. distinct. “[A]dverse ¶ 1280, 1283. A.2d “When pres- of a ME chiefly acquisition with the itself overburdening estate, is, presented alleged with an simple that fee possessory ent easement, the factfinder prescriptive a Prescription, on the other of ... absolute right prior use of hand, acqui- must balance wholly concerns itself with the pe another, during prescriptive way established in the land of such rights sition of Property in the meth changes later against riod as easements.” Powell on Real (2000). unreasonably or unforesee condemnation od of use § The 1989 91.01[3] enjoyment of the ably interfere with laying pipe and stor- purposes Id. harbor, by its current owner.” servient estate use ing dredging sand from use, however, will in the changes Not all from the use for re- separate and distinct pres overburdening per main- result se the use for purposes creational change does “when the criptive life- easement placing in terms of taining the beach the trial greater 44] not manifest itself in some inde- We review [¶ rulings admissibility on of evidence pendent burden on the servient estate.” court’s or abuse of discretion. See argument description Id. As to the for clear error Assocs., broad, ME apply Moody Haymarket of the easement is too we also ¶17, 4, Contrary to the scope prescriptive the test that “the 875. pre- arguments, easement should be so limited Eatons’ because the issues as ownership clearly overburdening.” vent a foreseeable this case involve the and use Beach, in ex Id. at 823. Wells the court did not err cluding as irrelevant the evidence if ownership Even we look to the use of beaches outside during prescriptive period, contrary Moreover, even if court of Wells. argument, language to the Eatons’ should also have excluded evidence of the beaches, “general purposes” adequate recreational it use of other was harmless be ly during prescrip reflects the uses specifically cause the court noted its period tive unreasonably judgment rely and would not that it did not on that evi unforeseeably enjoy interfere with the dence for its decision. As for the exclusion Moody ment of the Beach in concerning servient estate its current evidence shows, particular, owner. the court did not abuse its dis As evidence above cretion in competent ruling court had its would allow support evidence to argue findings counsel to from the in the language. Although the court listed decision, Moody trial Beach court but it certain recreational examples, activities as compare presented would not the evidence only those were not the recreational uses in present that case with the case. As in given testimony. the As to the Town’s above, stated the court not bound is beach, right to maintain the all of the trial court in decisions other cases. provided uses ways were the Town used property during prescriptive peri Further, court did [¶ 45] not Further, od. even if maintaining the hab finding its discretion in abuse piper itat of the plover was not a use for faith, in Town had not acted bad see Lin years, the use not does manifest itself ¶¶ 17, Foy, scott v. 1998 ME in greater independent some burden on accordingly deny A.2d Thus, property. the Eatons’ the court’s ing attorney the Eatons’ claim for fees conclusions concerning scope of the incurred in defense of the Town’s motion easement were not plearly erroneous. injunction. preliminary Chiappetta See LeBlond, v. 544 A.2d Remaining arguments V. contention, Contrary the Eatons’ to argue brought [¶ 43] Eatons that the court court found that the Town pro in evidentiary rulings concerning request anticipation dredging erred Beach, Moody subject ject project’s which failure to be beach was the and that prior litigation. through v. of circum See Bell funded was series Wells, (Me.1989). They beyond anyone’s ar- control. This stances that, evidence al gue by finding that the court abused its discretion was based on anticipated, did not fund disparate parties: though Congress its treatment of the al- project. Nor the court abuse its lowing as relevant the Town’s historical did Eatons’ refusing grant evidence of the use of beaches in discretion other Maine, Wells, fact. England findings and in New but motion for See Sewall ¶ Saritvanich, 46, 10, 726 A.2d evi- 1999 ME disallowing as irrelevant the Eatons’ thoroughness 226. The of the find acquisition, ownership, dence of the devel- twenty-one-page fact in the court’s opment Moody ings and use of Beach and other in- basis to provided beaches in Maine. decision sufficient have been by publication than should reasoning underly- other parties form the of the id. ing the court’s conclusion. See attempted. any errors Nor were there [¶ 46] argu- Accordingly, the Eatons’ final clarifying in the court’s order its the location of concerning ment whether

judgment not establish the boundaries did property of the Eatons’ the boundaries lots that abut the concrete of the house abutting landowners was respect subject of the sand seawall to the west the abut- irrelevant because addressed is grant authority We had beach. in the not included ting lot owners were suspension appeal Town’s motion for Moreover, if had they even litigation. necessary Superi- to enable the the extent included, emphasis was on the been to hear and determine the Town’s or Court possible it “strip of sand beach.” While clarification, pursuant to M.R. motion for 73(f), Superior beach west of the sea- accordingly that there is sand Civ. P. authority pursuant to act to our wall, Court had finding that sand beach the court’s argue The Eatons that the abut order. that beach to the east of the seawall meant were named as defendants ting landowners de- supported by competent evidence following class: “all users of part as mark scribing the beach “from low water persons Property other than Plaintiffs’ Accordingly was to cement sea wall.” by, or interest claiming any right, title clearly erroneous. under an instrument recorded through, or Deeds”; County Registry in the York Trust Doctrine VI. Public unascertained, persons “... all other unknown, being, not in or or out of the or the trial court’s Because we affirm state, persons other whomsoever and all and the Town have public decision that the interest, title, or may right, who claim by prescription to use both an easement estate, by, through, or legal equitable, and the dry portion sand of the beach property.” under such users of Plaintiffs’ zone, need not accompanying intertidal we publication was They argue by that service that we ex- reach the State’s contention impos it have been proper because would public trust doctrine established pand the every person using the beach sible to name Wells, A.2d 168 in 667 Bell v. of identify to all current own impractical (Me.1989). that there has They argue ers. further the Town that of been no claim entry The is: unaware of the abutting those owners were affirmed. Judgment they be defaulted. suit and that should in actions “shall quiet title [¶ 47] Service sup- in other on all

be made as actions SAUFLEY, J., concurring. residing either in known claimants posed in in the I concur the result [¶ 50] State, and notice or outside the the State separate- I write reasoning of the Court. unascertained, not in to who are persons however, I overrule Bell ly, because would by publi- being given or unknown shall be Wells, 557 A.2d 168 publication in where v. Town cation as other actions of (1980) § 14 6653 required.” is M.R.S.A. judicial con unduly our narrow By [¶ 51] added). the Ea- Contrary to (emphasis public trust of the time-honored struction contention, owners of lots tons’ the the doctrine, holding in Bell restricted our “strip the of sand through abutting enjoyment of one right peaceful to public’s question in were identifiable beach” resources, interti major the of this state’s Therefore, in- to order ascertainable. Bell, holding in to our dal zones. Pursuant them, specifi- have been they should clude along a may the state walk a citizen of complaint, in the and service cally named possibility of carrying fishing gun6, against rod or a but forced to defend the beach may along emp not walk that prescriptive rights same beach the expanding ever ty-handed carrying This Moreover, surfboard. disputes public: such are interpretation public of the trust doctrine likely approximate- to rare. Maine has be clearly flawed. As the dissent so elo kilometers) (5600 of coast- ly 3480 miles up, public’s “the quently right summed coastline on the longest line.7 It is the upon even to lands stroll the intertidal of the United States.8 eastern seaboard hangs by the slender thread of the shor- multiple disputes, for potential J., (Wathen, eowners’ consent.” Id. at 192 uncertainty, for extensive continuing I dissenting). would conclude that the litigation is obvious. analysis the Bell dissent constitutes the Thus, interpretation scope acknowledge correct the we should the [¶ 53] zones, public trust intertidal see id. at problems holding our in Bell created 187-89, I apply analysis and would that public before landowners and the are proper intertidal zone on the Eaton’s through years uncertainty forced ty. upon a unworkable restrictions founded faulty legal analysis. Although is the Although principles of stare deci by precedent abide determining policy sis must be considered in the courts to give whether we should deference to the point, and not to disturb a settled Bell, holding in length expense require doctrine of stare decisis does not trial bring parties before us “mechanical formula of adherence today speak eloquently of the need ad Forge latest decision.” Adams v. Buffalo immediately. dress this issue As long as Co., (Me.1982) (citations 443 A.2d public's legally cognizable interest in omitted). Accordingly, in order to over- the intertidal artificially zones remains Bell, turn with Court’s “unease Bell, holding constricted each analysis undertaken that case must out- public time that the private and a landown compelling following weigh policy scope er clash over the of allowed recre judicial precedent.” Jendzejec, Shaw v. zones, ational use of intertidal the resolu ¶ ME 370. tion will disputes be uncertain. If such judicial I reach would conclude litigation, public required will be prove analysis with far outweighs actual historic unease the Bell use the interti dal zone at admittedly important policy issue for “recreational” of follow- pur poses. case, In each ing precedent.9 landowner will be The rule in Bell is a re- Elizabeth, carrying 6. gun Kittery Cape under these circum- tween south of directly activity sandy stances must be related to the Portland. A few miles of beaches "fowling.” also occur in midcoast Maine near mouth of the Kennebec River. Conservation, Department Maine Maine According 7. Department to the Maine of Con- Geological Survey, http://www. at state.me. Geological Survey, servation’s Maine mgs/marine/ marine.htm. us/doc/nrimc/ The coast of Maine has 5600 kilometers (3480 miles) tidally-influenced shoreline (48th ed.1995). 8. Almanac longest and is the third in the United States. are There about 3500 islands included in guiding principles 9. There are number of length. Mapping the shoreline has estimat- play that are called into when the Court is (120 ed that about of the coast km or 75 2% ap- deciding whether stare decisis should be miles) has beaches. half of dis- About this prior may plied or avoided. A decision be up sandy tance is made beaches and the overruled when: up gravel other half is made of coarser (1) category boulder court is convinced that the rule of beaches. The latter is beaches, operates harshly, unjustly commonly pocket prior of which there decision case-by- pocket erratically produce, in are over 200 barrier beaches that its large application, sandy front coastal results that are not conso- wetlands. Most case prevailing, along occur nant with well-established con- beaches southern coast be- interpretation of ME 178 cent creation of our own essence, In we deter- ambiguous an term. et al. Michael MILLETT public historically mined that the did not a right analogous own that was to “recre- In

ation” as addressed in the Public Trust et al. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. Legislature Intertidal Land Act.10The has response not taken action in Maine. Supreme Judicial Court of is, holding, Bell it has not revised Sept. 2000. Argued In Land Act to Public Trust Intertidal in the same narrowly define “recreation” 23, 2000. Decided Oct. Thus, holding manner that the Bell does. open judicial it has left the matter Furthermore, the Bell

correction. because

opinion only years rendered eleven that rule “will do

ago, overturning authority, will long

violence to line of nor with the reliance interests of interfere Adams, litigants.”

these or other

at 936. summary, In common sense and judicial policy

sound dictate that our hold- now, in

ing in Bell should be overruled preclude continuing uncertainty,

order to I

expense, disputes. Because would Bell, I would conclude that

overrule

public applies trust doctrine to the interti- zone at and that the Town’s

dal issue here

prescriptive only easement claim need be that it is

addressed to the extent asserted portion

regarding dry sand

beach at issue. rule, own definitive ceptions fairness and ra- mer established its of fundamental (2) tionally-based justice, spe- that conviction legitimate pronouncement either buttressed more than the commitment of acceptance, rejection or revision of the cific person- justices mere the individual to their court, rule as articulated former is, by policy preferences, the sub- al (5) severe the court can avoid the most concepts authori- stantial erosion of the upon overruling reli- impact of an decision upon which the former rule is founded ties and that erosion is may into have come ance interests disap- exemplified by being during of the former the existence

proval conceptions those and authorities temporal ef- by creatively shaping the rule in the better-considered recent cases and in rule articulated the hold- fect of new (3) scholarly writings, the for- authoritative overruling ing of the case. mer rule is the creation the court itself 9,¶ A.2d Jendzejec, ME Shaw v. legitimate performance of its function James, (quoting Myrick v. statutory filling the lan- interstices (Me. 1982)). interpretation guage by and construction of statutory vague, generic indefinite and terms, not, (4) (1994). Legislature has subse- §§ 10. 12 M.R.S.A. 571-573 quent for- to the court's articulation of the

Case Details

Case Name: Eaton v. Town of Wells

Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Date Published: Oct 20, 2000

Citation: 760 A.2d 232

Court Abbreviation: Me.