32 Vt. 58 | Vt. | 1859
I. The parties treated the transaction, in this case, as a sale directly from the plaintiffs to the defendant. The goods were so billed. If that is the proper view of the case, there was no credit, and of course no right to stop in transits For that right is made dependent upon the sale being upon credit. So far as the defendant is concerned, the case is the same as if the goods had been bought upon the sale of the note, or accepted bill of Barnes & Brothers, without any indorsement or guaranty by the defendant, or an indorsement without recourse. In that view there could be no pretence of any right to stop the goods in transitu.
II. And as a sale to Barnes & Brothers, and a resale by them, there seems to arise a difficulty in presuming any right of stoppage in transitu. For if the vendor consent to a resale or know the purchase is for that purpose, he is bound by the commencement of the new destination as a final and irrevocable delivery. The same as when the goods are sent abroad, upon an adventure. Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. 453, and cases cited. Stoveld v. Hughes, 14 East. 308, was a case where the goods were resold and marked by the second vendee, by the consent of the vendor, which is n ot stronger than the present case, viewed as a resale. For here the goods were purchased for the express purpose of resale to the defendant, and were delivered to the carrier not to be carried to Barnes & Brothers, or with any provision for any transit to them. This delivery then was final, and accomplished all the possession ever contemplated by Barnes & Brothers.
III. And if we attempt to maíre it a sale to Barnes & Brothers, and to find a journey or transit, there was in fact nothing of the kind contemplated, so far as the vendees were concerned. And the cases all require that fact to exist, in order to create the' right to stop in transitu. Upon the delivery to the carrier it had effect tually come to the possession of Barnes & Brothers as much as it ever was contemplated that it would come. This is expressly recognized in numerous cases. Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 214 ; Noble v. Adams, 7 Taunton 59.
B. & P. 320, which would seem to be altogether atvariance with the purpose for which he cites it, unless the two houses are treated as virtually one in interest, and the delivery at Lisbon as a delivery to the vendees themselves.
Judgment affirmed.