172 Conn. 451 | Conn. | 1977
In April, 1974, the plaintiff brought the present action to modify the provisions of a decree entered by the Superior Court of California, county of San Diego, on October 20,1972, dissolving the marriage of the parties. The decree provided for alimony payments by the defendant to the plaintiff in the amount of $100 per month until May 31, 1974, at which time the alimony payments were to be reduced to $1 per year and then to terminate altogether on May 31,1976. It also awarded custody of the three minor children of the parties to the plaintiff and ordered support payments by the defendant in the amount of $100 per child per month, the payments to be made by government allotment. Both parties are now residents of Con
After a hearing, the court found that the medical and dental needs and expenses of the children justified a modification of the California support decree and directed that in addition to the $100 monthly support for each child to be paid by .government allotment the defendant should pay their reasonable medical and dental expenses not exceeding $15 a month for each child. It denied the plaintiff’s claims for modification of the California alimony order, for an order with respect to payment of a claimed $90 arrearage in alimony payments, and for the costs incurred in bringing the present action aside from attorney’s fees since free legal services were provided by the iegal clinic of the University of Connecticut School of Law. From this judgment the plaintiff took the present appeal, assigning as error several conclusions of the court as unsupported by the finding of facts and the overruling of eight claims of law made by the plaintiff concerning the judgment to be rendered.
We find no merit to the first assignment of error. The finding of facts has not been attacked. Exercising the broad discretion which is vested in the trial court in such cases as this; deCossy v. deCossy, 172 Conn. 202, 204, 374 A.2d 182; Aguire v. Aguire, 171 Conn. 312, 314, 370 A.2d 948; LaBella v. LaBella, 134 Conn. 312, 318, 57 A.2d, 627; the court could reasonably and logically reach the conclusions which it did. While it is obvious that
The plaintiff’s other assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling several of her claims of law. The court found that the plaintiff had made fifteen claims of law with respect to the judgment to be rendered. Whether the claims were properly made before argument in the trial court as required by § 223 of the Practice Book is questionable since one of them is that “[t]he court abused its discretion in denying costs and fees to the plaintiff, where it was shown that she could not afford them.” Quite obviously, such a claim could be made only after a judgment the provisions of which the plaintiff could not know before closing her argument. Nevertheless, the court found that the fifteen claims of law
Among the claims of law “accepted” by the court were the following: California law and Connecticut law on the question of modification of alimony and child support orders are similar in all essential respects; a California decree of dissolution of marriage is subject to modification by a Connecticut court to the extent that it is modifiable in California; after the dissolution of the marriage, the obligation to support minor children rests upon both parents according to their respective abilities; under California law, an order of child support may be modified when a material change occurs in the circumstances of one or both of the parties; and, under California law, an alimony order may be modified when a material change occurs in the circumstances of one or both of the parties.
The claims of law overruled by the court are, in general, broad statements of law already included in the scope of the accepted claims, inapplicable to the facts found by the court, or insufficient. For example, as we have noted, the court accepted the claim that under California law an alimony order may be modified when a material change occurs in the circumstances “of one or both of the parties.” Nevertheless, the plaintiff claims that the court erred because in one instance it overruled a claim that such an order may be modified when a material change occurs “in the circumstances of the man,” and also erred in overruling another claim that it may be modified when a material change occurs “in the circumstances of the woman.” Quite obviously, neither of these separate overruled claims was a full or correct statement of the law, being in each
Unlike a jury case where the jury finds the facts and the court in its charge instructs the jury as to
The foregoing comment with respect to the applicability to the particular case of a claim of law also applies to the overruled claim made by the plaintiff that “[t]he court may award costs of service and court fees to the plaintiff woman in a domestic relations proceeding.” As an abstract principle of law, this statement is undoubtedly a correct one.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.