delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by the Southern Photo Materials Co., a Georgia corporation, in 1915, in the Federal District Court for Northern Georgia, against the Eastman Kodak Co., a New York corporation, to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff through the defendant’s violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
1
Proceeding under § 12 of the Clayton Act,
2
process was issued and served upon the defendant, pursuant to an order of the court, at Rochester, New York, where it had its principal place of business. The dеfendant, appearing specially, traversed the return, entered a plea to the jurisdiction, and moved to quash the service. The jurisdictional issues thus raised were tried by the judge, who overruled
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these defenses.
The plaintiff operates a photographic stock house in Atlanta and deals in photographic materials and supplies, which it sells to photographers in Georgia and other Southern States. The defendant is a manufacturer of photographic. materials and supplies, which it sells to dealers throughout the United States.
The case made by the allegations of the complaint was, in substance, this: The defendant, in violation of the Anti-Trust Act, had engaged in a combination to monopolize the interstate trade in the United States in photographic materials and supplies, and had monopolized the greater part of such interstate trade. This had been brought about by'purchasing and acquiring the control of competing companies engaged in manufacturing such materials, and the businesses and stock houses of dealers; by restraining the vendors from re-entering these businesses; by imposing on the dealers to whom it sold goods restrictive terms of sale fixing i the prices at which its goods could be resold and preventing them from handling competitive goods; and by other means of suppressing competition.
Prior to 1910 the plaintiff had dealt with the defendant, and purchased its goods on the same terms as'other dealers, with whom it was enabled to compete; but in that year thе defendant, having acquired the control of the' stock houses in Atlanta which were in competition with the plaintiff and unsuccessfully attempted' to purchase the plaintiff’s business, had, in furtherance of its purpose to *369 monopolize, thereafter refused to sell the plaintiff its goods at the dealers’ discounts, and would no longer furnish them except at the retail prices at which they were sold by other dealers and the agencies which the defendant owned and controlled, with whom the plaintiff could no longer compete. And, the plaintiff being thus deprived, by reason of the monopoly, of the ability to obtain the defendant’s goods and supply them to its trade, its business had been greatly injured and it had sustained large damages in the loss of the profits which it would have realized in the four years covered by the suit had it been able to continue the purchase and sale of such goods.
The answer denied that the defendant hаd combined to monopolize or monopolized interstate trade, or refused to sell its goods to the plaintiff at the dealers’ discounts in furtherance of a purpose to monopolize; and averred that the defendant had not only committed no actionable wrong, but that in any event the plaintiff had sustained no damages capable of ascertainment upon any legal basis.
While many errors were assigned, some of which were also sрecified, in general terms, in the defendant’s brief in this Court, we confine our consideration of the case in this opinion' to the controlling questions which are stated in that brief to present the chief issues here in controyersy, and to which alone the argument in the brief is directed. See
I. T. S. Co.
v.
Essex Rubber Co.,
1. Whether or not the jurisdiction of the District Court was rightly sustained — which resolves itself into a question whether the venue оf the suit was properly laid in that court — depends upon the construction and effect of § 12 of the Clayton Act and its application to the facts shown by the evidence set forth in the separate bill of exceptions relating to the hearing on the jurisdictional issues.
Dunlop
v.
Munroe,
It appears from this evidence that the defendant— which resides and has its principal place of business in New York — had not registered in Georgia as a non-resident corporatiоn for the purpose of doing business in that State, and had no office, place of business or resident agent therein. It had, however, for many years prior to the institution of the suit, in a continuous course of business, carried on interstate trade with a large number of photographic dealers in Atlanta and other places in Georgia, to whom it sold and shipped photographic materials from New York. A large part of this business was obtained through its travelling salеsmen who visited Georgia several times in each year and solicited orders from these dealers which were transmitted to its New York offices for acceptance or rejection. In furtherance of its business and to increase the demand for its goods, it also employed travel-ling “ demonstrators,” who visited Georgia several times in each year, for the purpose of exhibiting and explaining the superiority of its goods to photographers and оther *371 users of photographic materials. And, although these demonstrators did not solicit orders for the defendant’s goods, they took at times retail orders for them from such users, which they turned over to the local dealers supplied by the defendant.
It is clear that upon these facts this suit could not have been maintained in the Georgia district under the original provision im § 7 of the Anti-Trust Act that anyone injured in his person or property “by any other person or corporation ” by reason of anything, declared to be unlawful by the Act, might sue therefor “ in the district in which the defendant resides or is found.”
4
In
Peoples Tobacco Co.
v.
Am. Tobacco Co.,
Manifestly the defendant was not present in the Georgia district through officers or agents engаged in carrying on business of such character that.it was “found” in that district and was amenable to the local jurisdiction for the service of process.
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■ However, by the Clayton Act — which supplemented the former laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies of interstate trade — the local jurisdiction of the district courts was materially enlarged in reference to suits against corporations. By § 4 of that Act it was provided that any.person “injured in his business or proрerty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ” might sue therefor in the district “ in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent.” Whether, as applied to suits against corporations, as distinguished from those against individuals, the insertion of the words “ or has an agent ” in this section can be held, in the light of the decision in
the Peoples Tobacco Co.
case, to have enlarged to any extent the jurisdictional provision in § 7 of the Anti-Trust Act, we need not here determine. Be that as it may, it is clear that, such an enlargеment was made by § 12 .of the Clayton Act— dealing specifically with the venue and service of process in suits against corporations — under which the plaintiff proceeded in the present case. This provided that “ any suit, action, or proceeding, under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in.the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it máy be found
or transacts business;
and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhаbitant, or wherever it may be found.” That this section altered the venue provisions in respéct to suit under the anti-trust laws was pointed out in
General Inv. Co.
v.
Lake Shore Ry.,
We are further of opinion that a corporation is none the less engaged in transacting business in a district, within the meaning of this section — which deals with suits respecting unlawful restraints upon interstate trade — because of the fact that such business may be entirely interstate in character and be transacted by agents who do not reside within the district. And see
International Harvester
v.
Kentucky,
Thus construed, this section supplements the remedial provision of the Anti-Trust Act for the redress of injuries resulting from illegal restraints upon interstate trade, by-relieving thе injured person from the necessity of resorting for the redress of wrongs committed by a non-resident corporation, to a district, however distant, in which it *374 resides or may be “ found -often an insuperable obstacle — and enabling Him to institute the suit in a district, frequently that of his own residence, in which the corporation in fact transacts business; and bring it before the court by the service of process in a district in which it resides or may be “ found ”
To construe the words “ or transacts business ” as adding nothing of substance to the meaning of the words “ or is found,” ,as used in the Anti-Trust Act, and as still requiring that the suit be brought in a district in which the corporation resides or is “ found,” would to that extent defeat the plain purpose of this section and leave no occasion for the provision that the process might be served in a district in which the corporation resides or is found. And we find nothing in the legislative proceedings leading to its enactment which requires or justifies such a construction.
That Congress may, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, fix the venue of a civil action in a federal court in one district, and authorize the process to be issued to another district in which the defendant resides or is found, is not open to question.
United States
v.
Union Pacific R. R. Co.,
And, since it appears from the facts already stated that the defendant, in a continuous course of business, was engaged, not only in selling and shipping its goods to dealers within the Georgia district, but also in soliciting orders therein through its salesmen and promoting the demand for its goods through its demonstrators for the purpose of increasing its sales, we conclude that it was transacting business in that district, .within- the meaning of § 12 of the Clayton Act, in such sense as . properly established the venue of the suit; that it was duly brought before the court by the service of process in the New York district, in which it resided and was “ found ”■; and that its jurisdictional defenses were rightly overruled. '
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2. On the question whether the defendant’s refusal to •sell its goods to the plaintiff at dealers’ discounts was in furtherance of a purpose to monopolize and constituted an actionable wrong, the defendant contends not only that there was no direct evidence as to the purpose of such refusal overcoming the presumption that it was a lawful one, but that such refusal was justified by the fact that the plaintiff had previously undertaken to handle the goods of another manufacturer under a preferential contract. Aside from the plaintiff’s contention that this contract related merely to goods that did not conflict with the sale of those which it had been purchasing from the defendant, it was not shown that the defendant knew of this contract when it refused to sell its goods to the plaintiff. And for this reason, if for no other, we think that the trial court rightly declined to charge the jury to the effect that such taking over of other goods by the plaintiff in itself justified the defendant in its refusal to sеll to the plaintiff. And, although there was no direct evidence — as there could not well be — that the defendant’s refusal to sell to the plaintiff was in pursuance of a purpose to monopolize, we think that the circumstances disclosed in the evidence sufficiently tended to indicate such purpose, as a matter of just and reasonable inference, to warrant the submission of this question to the jury. “ Clearly,” as was said by the Court of Appeals, “ it could not bе held as a matter of law that the defendant was actuated by innocent motives rather than by an intention and desire to perpetuate a monopoly.” This question was submitted under proper instructions. And the weight of the evidence being in such case exclusively a question for the jury, its determination is conclusive upon this question of fact.
Crumpton
v.
United States,
*376 3. On the question.of the amount of damages, there was substantial evidence to the effect that prior to 1910 the plaintiff had an established business in selling supplies used by professional photographers, of which it carried a complete line, purchased in large part from the defendant; that the defendant sold to dealers such supplies only; that shortly before the defendant’s refusal to continue the sale of its goods the plaintiff also took on a complete line of goods used by amateurs, which did not conflict with its sales to professional photographers; that аfter the defendant’s refusal, the plaintiff was unable, by reason of the defendant’s monopoly, to obtain and supply the greater part of the goods necessary to professional photographers, and lost its established trade in such goods; that its'trade with professional photographers greatly decreased; and that its business was so organized that it would have been able to continue to handle the defendant’s goods during the period in suit with no incrеase in. its general expenses and no additional cost except that incident to the handling of such goods themselves — its business being operated during such period at only two-thirds of its capacity. The plaintiff’s claim' was that under these circumstances it was entitled to recover, as the loss of profits which it would .have realized had it been able to continue the purchase -of defendant’s goods, the amount of its gross profits on the defendant’s goods during the four years preceding the period in suit, which was shown, less the additional expense which it would have incurred in handling the defendant’s goods during the four years’ period in suit, which'was estimated.
The defendant — while conceding that the loss of anticipated profits from the destruction or interruption of an established business may be recovered where the amount of,- the loss is made reasonably certain by competent proof,
Central Coal & Coke Co.
v.
Hartman
(C. C. A.),
There was, as stated by the Court of Appeals, evidence from which the jury could justly reach the conclusion that the plaintiff was not a party to the monopoly in pari delicto with the defendant, and that the plaintiff had complied with the defendant’s restricted- terms of sale merely for the reason that otherwise it could not purchase or secure the goods necessary in the conduct of its business. There was also affirmative evidence, not contradicted, tending to show that under the defendant’s restricted terms of sale the dealers’ profits did not exceed those on the sale of goods of other manufacturers not parties to the monopoly.
The jury was instructed, in substance, that if, during the preceding'period in which the plaintiff had been a customer of the defendant, it had not merely bought goods from the defendant because of a business necessity, but, with a knowledge of the defendant’s purpose to monopolize, had knowingly and willfully helped to build up the monopoly, it was in pari delicto, and hence could nоt recover any damages whatever on account of the defendant’s refusal to continue to sell it goods; and, further, that even if the plaintiff had not been a party to the monopoly, it could not recover damages on the basis of the profits which it had earned while a customer of the defendant to the extent that they had been increased by the monopoly and exceeded those in a normal business, but that they must be reduced to the basis of normal profits,
We find,- under the circumstances of this case, nothing in these instructions of which the defendant may justly
*378
complain. See
Ramsay Co.
v.
Bill Posters Assn.,
The defendant further contends that, apart from this question the plaintiff’s damages were purely speculative, not proved by any facts from which they were logically and legally inferable, and not of an amount susceptible of expression- in figures,
Keogh
v.
C. & N. W. Ry. Co.,
As to this question the Court of Appeals — after stating that in its opinion the plaintiff’s evidence would have sup
*379
ported a mi7 eh larger verdiсt than, that returned by the jury — said: “ The plaintiff had an established business, and the future profits could be shown by past experience. It was permissible to arrive at net profits by deducting from the gross profits of an earlier period an estimated expense of doing business. Damages are not rendered uncertain because they, cannot be calculated with absolute exactness. It is sufficient if a reasonable basis of compu-lation is afforded, although the rеsult be only approximate.” This, we think, was a correct statement of the applicable rules of law. Furthermore, a defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible.
Hetel
v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,
We conclude that plaintiff’s evidence as to the amount of damages, while mainly circumstantial, was competent; and that it sufficiently showed the extent of the damages, as a matter of just and reasonable inference, to warrant the submission of this question to the jury. The jury was instructed, in effect, that the amount of the damages could not be determined by mere speculation or guess, but must be based on evidence furnishing daia from which the amount of the probable loss could be ascertained as a matter of reasonаble inference. And the question as to the amount of the plaintiff’s, damages having been properly submitted to the jury, its determination as to this matter is conclusive.
The judgment is accordingly
Affirmed.
Notes
Act of July 2,1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209. This Act makes it illegal, inter alia, to monopolize, or combine to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, § 2; and authorizes any person injured in his business or property by reason of anything declared to be unlawful by the Act, to sue therefor and recover three fold the damages sustained and a reasonable attorney’s fee, § 7.
Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730.
The plaintiff’s allegations in this respect were supported on the trial by a final decree that had been entered in 1916 in another District Court in a suit .in equity brought by the United States against the defendant and others, which the plaintiff introduced, under § 5 of the Clayton Act, as prima jade evidence of the defendant’s violation of the Anti-Trust Act.
A like provision was contained in the Tariff'Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 509, c. 349, which made illegal, combinations and trusts in restraint of import trade. §§ 73, 74.