Easterly v. . Barber

66 N.Y. 433 | NY | 1876

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] The first question presented upon these appeals is, whether it is competent in an action by one indorser against a prior indorser for the defendant to prove by parol an agreement between all the indorsers that they were, as between themselves, co-sureties where they are accommodation indorsers. In Barry v.Ransom (12 N.Y., 462) it was held that an agreement made between parties prior to or cotemporaneously with their executing a written obligation as sureties, by which one promises to indemnify the other from loss, does not contradict or vary the terms or legal effect of the written obligation, and it may be proved by parol evidence. It was said by DENIO, J., in the opinion, that an agreement among the sureties, arranging their eventual liabilities among themselves in a manner different from what the law would prescribe, in the absence of an express agreement, would not contradict any of the terms of the bond. It was also held, that the engagement among themselves had no necessary place in the instrument between them and the other contracting parties. The case cited referred to a joint and several bond, where the obligors were equally liable upon its face. No reason exists, however, why the same principle is not applicable to notes and bills of exchange. The terms of the contract contained in instruments of this character, which are within its scope to define and regulate, cannot be changed by parol; but the understanding between the indorsers is a distinct and separate subject, an outside matter, which may be properly proved independent of and without any regard to the instrument itself. This rule is distinctly established in reference to joint makers of promissory notes; and although the previous decisions had been somewhat uncertain it has been recently determined by the decision of this court that where a person signed, as surety, a joint and several promissory note, and it did not appear by the instrument itself that such relation existed, he might prove such fact by parol, and that such proof did not tend to alter the terms of the contract. (Hubbard v. Gurney.^*) It is not apparent that any such difference exists between the two classes of cases which prevents the application of the same principle to both of them.

An attempted distinction is sought to be maintained because the relation of indorsers to each other are fixed by law; while the relations and obligations of sureties and obligors are not fixed. As between the principal and the sureties they are fixed quite as much as between indorsers, and can only be settled as between sureties where the contract does not show the fact by parol proof of the same. In support of the same views is the case ofPhilips v. Preston (5 How. [U.S.], 278, 292), where the doctrine is laid down that proof of a collateral contract, by parol, may be given to show the liability of indorsers as between themselves. (See, also, McDonald v. Magruder, 3 Peters, 470;Aiken v. Barkly, 2 Speers, 747; Edelen v. White, 6 Bush. [Ky.], 408; Davis v. Morgan, 64 N.C. 570.) The indorsements upon bills of exchange or promissory notes rest upon the theory that the liability of indorsers to each other is regulated by the position of their names, and that the paper is transferred from the one to the others by indorsement. But this rule has no practical application to accommodation indorsers, where neither of them has owned the paper and no such transfer has been made. It is easy to see that the application of the rule contended for, in many cases, would work the most serious injustice. Suppose a person sign as accommodation maker of a promissory note, and the payee for whose benefit it is made indorses it and pays the note, and afterwards sues the maker to recover back the money, would it be seriously contended that proof could not be given to show that he was merely an accommodation maker? Clearly not; and yet such evidence would contradict the written instrument quite as much as it would to prove an agreement between indorsers in regard to their liability as between each other. Cases frequently arise where it is competent to prove that the indorsement is made for the accommodation of the maker; and a drawee may show, after acceptance, that he has no funds (3 N.Y., 423) in his hands, and that he was merely an accommodation acceptor. (Griffith v.Reed, 21 Wend., 502.) The cases to which we have been referred by the plaintiff's counsel do not, we think, sustain the position contended for; that parol proof cannot be given to show an arrangement between accommodation indorsers different from that which appears by the legal effect of the instrument, and a particular examination of them is not required. The uniform practice in this State has been in conformity to the views expressed in reference to proof of this character, and it would be establishing a new rule at this time to hold that such testimony was incompetent. There was, therefore, no error committed by the judge in the admission of the evidence to which objection was taken.

There is no force in the objection made by the plaintiff's counsel that the evidence failed to establish the agreement alleged in the answer to have been made in reference to the note in suit. It was purely a question of fact what the agreement actually made was. No request was made to take the case from the jury, and sufficient was shown to submit the question raised to their consideration. There is no ground for claiming that the defendant was estopped from setting up the verbal agreement alleged to have been made as a defence. The arrangement of the defendant with the bank for the prosecution of the note and the collection of the same of the plaintiff, and the security given thereupon do not contain the elements of an estoppel. The defendant was not the actual party in the suit, and the most which can be said in regard to it is, that the defendant preferred to have it collected of Easterly instead of himself, and to compel Easterly to sue him for the proportion which he was lawfully liable to pay. There was no assumption in this, we think, that estops the defendant.

We are also of the opinion that there was no error in that portion of the charge wherein the court instructed the jury that if former notes had been given under the agreement, with the understanding that they were to stand with a joint instead of a separate liability, and they were carried along until they came to this one, which, if it was signed with the arrangement and understanding resting upon their minds, they would have no doubt in coming to the conclusion that this agreement attaches to the last note. This was a necessary result of the facts proved and clearly right. The requests to charge upon this branch of the case in this connection were properly refused, as the propositions presented were sufficiently covered in the charge which had already been made. The discussion had leads to the conclusion that sufficient grounds are presented on the plaintiff's appeal for a reversal or modification of the judgment.

Other questions arise upon the defendant's appeal, which should be considered. It is claimed that an action at law by a surety for contribution must be against each of the sureties separately for his proportion, and that no more can be recovered, even where one or more are insolvent. In the latter case, the action must be in equity against all the co-sureties for contributions, and, upon proof of the insolvency of one or more of the sureties, the payment of the amount will be adjudged among the solvent parties in due proportion. The principle stated is fully sustained by the authorities. It is thus stated, in Parsons on Contracts (vol. 1, page 34): "At law, a surety can recover from his co-surety an aliquot part, calculated upon the whole number, without reference to the insolvency of others of the co-sureties; but in equity it is otherwise." (See, also, Browne v. Lee, 6 Barn. Cress., 689; 13 Eng. C.L., 394; Cowell v. Edwards, 2 B. Pull., 268;Beaman v. Blanchard, 4 Wend., 432, 435; Story's Eq. Juris., § 496; 1 Chitty on Con. [5th Am. ed.], 597, 598; Willard's Eq. Juris., 108.) There seems to be a propriety in the rule that where sureties are called upon to contribute, and some of them are insolvent, that all the parties should be brought into court and a decree made upon equitable principles in reference to the alleged insolvency. There should be a remedy decreed against the insolvent parties, which may be enforced if they become afterwards able to pay, and this can only be done in a court of equity and when they are parties to the action. The action here was not of this character; nor were all the proper parties before the court. It was clearly an action at law, and in that point of view, as we have seen, the plaintiff could only recover for one-fourth of the debt for which all the sureties were liable. The distinction between the two classes of actions is recognized by the decisions.

The remedies, the parties and course of procedure are each different. In the one, a jury trial is a matter of right; while in the other the trial is by the court. The costs are also in the discretion of the court. (Code, §§ 253, 306; 13 N.Y. [supra], 498.) As the judgment could not require each of the parties to pay his aliquot share and furnish a remedy over against those who were insolvent and the rights of the parties be finally determined and fixed, it was under the facts proven clearly erroneous. Although in many cases under the Code the pleadings, if necessary, may be made to conform to the facts, and the case disposed of upon the merits, the defects here are so radical as to strike at the very foundation of the action, and cannot thus be remedied. Besides, the proper parties are not before us, and cannot be brought in, except on motion in the court below. As the claim was alleged in the complaint, there was no such defect of parties apparent as required the defendant to take the objection by demurrer or answer.

It follows that the judgment must be affirmed upon the plaintiff's appeal, with costs of appeal to be paid by the plaintiff upon the final termination of the action, if the defendant succeeds; and if the plaintiff succeeds, to be set off against the plaintiff's costs. And the judgment must be reversed upon the defendant's appeal, with costs of the appeal in this court, and costs in the Supreme Court to abide the event.

All concur, except CHURCH, Ch. J., dissenting.

Ordered accordingly.

^* 64 N.Y., 457.