735 A.2d 371 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1998
This is a negligence action seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused when a golf cart in which the plaintiff, Donna J. East, was riding as a passenger operated by the named defendant, Lisa M. Labbe,1 allegedly went out of control, causing the plaintiff to be thrown from the golf cart. The plaintiff and the defendant were allegedly coworkers in the employ of Easter Seal Society, Inc. (Society). The accident occurred on a path of the property owned by the Society. The accident occurred in the course of employment. The plaintiff is entitled to workers' compensation benefits from Society, which is no longer a party defendant in this action.
The defendant moves for summary judgment in this action. The defendant claims that the provisions of General Statutes §
It is noted that this action, as presently pleaded, is in a single count alleging negligence. On March 1, 1996, a second count alleging reckless and wanton misconduct was stricken by this court, Hammer, J.
The Pinheiro court does not adopt a simplistic test or criteria based on the question of whether a specific individual vehicle is capable of being registered. The court states that "an automobile that is not registered because its equipment is in disrepair . . . is still a motor vehicle for purposes of [General Statutes] §
The defendant submits two affidavits in this case. John Yacavone, chief of legal services for the Connecticut department of motor vehicles states that "a golf cart is not registerable as a motor vehicle in the State of Connecticut, as a golf cart is not meant for on-the-road operation. Under the laws of the State of Connecticut a motor vehicle as defined in Connecticut General Statutes §
The second affidavit is by Charles Dickinson, assistant director of building and grounds for the Easter Seal Society's Camp Hemlock in Hebron. He affirms that the golf cart in question is not equipped with ten of the eleven items of equipment required by law for registration, as specified by Yacavone, listing each such deficiency, from head lamps through tail lamps.
The plaintiff files no counteraffidavit to take issue with the affidavit of either Yacavone or Dickinson. On the basis of the criteria set forth in Pinheiro, it is clear that this vehicle is not designed for use on the highway. There is no reason to believe that the necessary equipment was incorporated in this golf cart vehicle, but was merely not functioning, or in disrepair. *28
Hence, as determined in Pinheiro, this golf cart would not be a motor vehicle for the purposes of General Statutes §
The argument proceeds as follows. Because §
Following that line of reasoning, golf carts would be motor vehicles as they approach the public highway, would lose the character of motor vehicles as they cross the highway, and would then again become motor vehicles after they have crossed the highway. Hence, the fellow employee would have a cause of action against the fellow employee operator if the occurrence took place before or after crossing the highway, but not if the incident occurred on the highway. The court can *29 discern no indication from the legislative history of the applicable statutes that the legislature either contemplated or intended such an irrational result.
A review of the legislative history of §
Section
If there is any question as to why motor vehicle accidents are excluded from such immunity, which of course do not necessarily produce more severe injury than do other types of negligent conduct involving other types of mechanisms, such questions are answered by *30
the statute itself. "No insurance policy or contract shall be accepted as proof of financial responsibility of the owner and as evidence of the insuring of such person for injury to or death of persons and damage to property . . . if it excludes from coverage . . . any agent, representative or any employee of such owner from such policy or contract." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes §
In 1969 the legislature, through Public Acts 1969, No.
The legislative history reveals that the purpose of enacting that legislation was to allow golf carts to cross from one side of the golf course to another, and to allow them to be operated on the roads of state institutions. Representative Edgar King remarked: "[M]y town in Farmington has a golf course which is divided by a highway and presently those cars cannot cross from one part of the course to the other part unless they are registered by the Motor Vehicle department and the same problem is in many area of our state." Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Transportation, 1969 Sess., p. 243. *31
Similarly, because hospital roads were considered to be within the definition of "highway," Pauline Alfano spoke on behalf of the department of public health in favor of a 1983 bill because the department wanted to be able to use golf carts on the roads within their facilities for transportation purposes. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Transportation, Pt. 3, 1983 Sess., pp. 777-78. There is no indication in any of the legislative history that these amendments were intended to have any effect on the provisions of §
At that time, as is presently the case, motor vehicles were absolutely prohibited from being operated on the public highway unless the vehicle was registered with the commissioner of motor vehicles, or unless it was excluded from registration by virtue of it's being excluded as a "motor vehicle" under the definitions of §
General Statutes §
Many other types of motor vehicles, vehicles not "propelled or drawn by nonmuscular power," are determined by §
The purpose, the only purpose, of the golf cart exception contained in §
Finally, these statutes must be read in the context of the proof of financial responsibility requirements of §
This court can discern no statute or regulation that requires an employer to maintain any liability insurance whatsoever on any "motor vehicle" (a vehicle drawn or propelled by nonmuscular power) that is of a design that does not qualify for registration by the department of motor vehicles. It is only through the discipline of §
Nowhere does it appear that the legislature has determined that golf carts are motor vehicles which are or are intended to be exempt from protective provisions of §
It should be noted that this case deals with the interpretation of statutory provisions. Uninsured motorist claims under the provisions of insurance contracts deal with contract definitions. There is nothing to prevent insurance contracts providing first party benefits, from using nonstatutory terms in defining "motor vehicles." See Norfolk Dedham Mutual Fire Ins.Co. v. Wysocki,
The plaintiff appears to claim that the language of §
At most, the plaintiff may be in a position to claim that the language of the statute is ambiguous. "[W]here the words of a statute fail to indicate clearly whether the provision applies in certain circumstances, it must be construed by this court. . . . The rules of statutory construction dictate that this court is to be guided by the language, purpose and legislative history of the statute in question." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vanzant v. Hall,
"We must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Concept Associates, Ltd. v. Board of Tax Review,
It is clear that the legislative purpose of §
For the reasons set forth herein the motion for summary judgment is granted.