Lead Opinion
OPINION ON REHEARING
Louisa D. Reddic filed a motion for rehearing of our December 4, 2013 opinion. We overrule the motion for rehearing, withdraw our December 4, 2013 opinion, and substitute the following opinion in its place.
East Texas Medical Center Regional Health Care System, Individually and d/b/a East Texas Medical Center-Crockett (ETMC) filed a motion to dismiss Louisa D. Reddic’s claims against it because Red-dic failed to serve an expert report as required for a health care liability claim (HCLC). Reddic responded that her claims against ETMC were not HCLCs and thus no expert report was required. The trial court denied ETMC’s motion to dismiss. In two issues, ETMC contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss because Reddic’s claims against it are HCLCs. We reverse and remand.
Background
In March 2012, Reddic sued ETMC for damages caused by injuries she sustained when she fell in the hospital’s lobby. Red-dic alleged that she had fallen while walking from the main entrance to the front desk of the hospital, and she blamed her fall on a mat saturated with water. She contended that ETMC acted negligently because it failed to (1) conduct adequate inspections of the floor from the main entrance to the front desk, (2) properly warn of a dangerous condition on the floor around the front desk, (3) clean up water that had soaked through floor mats around the front desk, (4) maintain the mats inside the hospital in a reasonably safe condition, and (5) replace floor mats inside the entrance area to the hospital that had become saturated with water.
In November 2012, long after 120 days had passed from the filing of Reddic’s suit, ETMC filed a motion to dismiss Reddic’s claims against it. In its motion, ETMC argued that Reddic’s claims constituted HCLCs and therefore Reddic was required to serve an expert report within 120 days of filing suit. Because Reddic failed to serve ETMC with an expert report, ETMC’s argument continued, the trial court had only one option: to award ETMC its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and dismiss Reddic’s claims against ETMC.
In Reddic’s response to ETMC’s motion to dismiss, she did not contend that she served ETMC with an expert report. Instead, she argued that she was not required to provide an expert report to
The trial court denied ETMC’s motion to dismiss, and this interlocutory appeal followed.
Adequacy of Expert Report
In its two issues, ETMC argues that Reddic’s claims were HCLCs. Thus, ETMC contends further, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied ETMC’s motion to dismiss because Reddic failed to provide an expert report. Because ETMC’s two issues are related, we address them together.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a Section 74.351 motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios,
Applicable Law
1. Expert Report Requirement
Under the TMLA, when a claimant asserts an HCLC, the claimant must comply with the TMLA’s requirements, including serving an expert report upon the health care provider within 120 days of filing suit. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351 (West 2011); Psychiatric Solutions, Inc. v. Palit,
2. Classification of Claims as HCLCs
An HCLC includes a cause of action against a health care provider “for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care.... ” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.001(a)(13) (West Supp.2012). To determine whether a claimant is making an ordinary negligence claim as opposed to an HCLC, we examine the acts or omissions causing the claimant’s injuries and “whether the events are within the ambit of the legislated scope of the TMLA.” Williams,
3. “Safety” Claims as HCLCs
Safety is not defined by the TMLA, and thus, is given its ordinary, commonly understood meaning. Williams,
That a claimant is not a patient of the health care provider is of no consequence in determining whether the claimant has brought an HCLC under the safety prong of the TMLA. Williams,
Discussion
Few details are presented in the record concerning the basis of Reddic’s claims. However, the record shows that she was walking from the entrance to the front desk when she slipped and fell. The record does not clearly indicate whether Reddic was a patient or a visitor at the hospital. For purposes of our analysis, we assume that Reddic was a visitor. Reddic contends that her allegations against ETMC do not relate directly to the provision of health care. She further contends that ETMC was negligent in that it failed to keep the floor around the front desk safe for patrons to traverse. ETMC contends that Reddie’s claims are HCLCs because they fall under the safety prong of the TMLA.
Two of our sister courts have examined slip and fall claims made by nonpatients against a health care provider. See Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., No. 14-12-00885-CV,
We agree with Ross that a fall, even by a visitor, in a hospital lobby meets the TMLA’s safety prong so that Reddic’s claims in this case are properly classified as HCLCs. In deciding whether the safety prong of the TMLA was satisfied, we focus on the gravamen of the claims against ETMC, not on Reddic’s status as a •visitor or a patient. See Williams,
Reddic also relies heavily on our sister court’s opinion in Good Shepherd, but such reliance is misplaced because the facts are distinguishable from those present here. In Good Shepherd, the court determined that an employee who suffered injuries from two falls, one from a ladder attached to the hospital building and another over a mound of hardened cement on the hospital’s property, did not make an HCLC against the hospital. Good Shepherd,
In Good Shepherd, the court was examining injuries that occurred outside the hospital. Id. at 783-84. There is no indication that patients, or visitors for that matter, were ever in the areas where the hospital’s employee was injured. Id. In fact, the court classified the claims in Good Shepherd as encompassing “safety claims that are completely untethered from health care.” Id. at 788. That simply is not true of Reddic’s claims against ETMC because, at the very least, Reddic’s claims have a strong indirect relationship to the safe provision of health care for patients. Much as in Harris Methodist, ETMC’s duty to furnish a floor around the front desk free of hazards is a safety claim that meets the fundamental needs of both its patients and visitors. See Harris Methodist,
Disposition
Having sustained ETMC’s first and second issues, we reverse the trial court’s order denying ETMC’s motion to dismiss and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including its consideration of ETMC’s request for reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(b).
Notes
. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann § 51.014(a)(9) (West Supp.2012) (allowing interlocutory appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss under Section 74.351(b)).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s denial of East Texas Medi
East Texas Medical Center Regional Health Care System, Individually and d/b/a East Texas Medical Center-Crockett, filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of ETMC’s motion to dismiss Louisa D. Reddic’s lawsuit because Reddic failed to serve an expert report, which ETMC contended was required under the Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code regulating the filing and prosecution of medical liability lawsuits. Reddic responded that, because her claim was a premises liability claim, not a health care liability claim (HCLC), she was not required to file an expert report.
A court is not bound by the plaintiffs pleadings to determine whether a claim is an HCLC. Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie,
The facts are simple: Reddic approached the front reception desk at ETMC-Crockett and slipped on a wet rug. ETMC-Crockett, in its Original Answer, “assertfed] Plaintiff was a licensee on Defendants’ premises without Defendants’ express or implied invitation to enter, such as through business or contractual relations .... ” Thus, there is no indication that Reddic was a patient nor was she in any manner seeking any health care services at ETMC-Crockett; indeed ETMC-Crockett’s Answer’s affirmative pleadings admitted she was not.
However, ETMC-Crockett’s position is that Reddic’s status as a patient is of no consequence. Rather, focusing on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams, ETMC-Crockett noted that Texas West Oaks Hospital’s definition of a health care liability claim has five prongs, the fourth of which is an alleged departure from accepted standards of safety.
I would affirm the trial court’s assessment that, because Reddic was approaching the reception desk of the hospital when she slipped on a wet rug, she would be an invitee at ETMC-Crockett. Thus, the law regarding a business owner’s duty to an invitee determines the contours of this lawsuit, not Chapter 74’s requirements for litigating an HCLC.
There are a number of essential terms necessary to analyze the issues now before the court. These terms are defined in the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA), which is found in Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 74.001-.507 (West 2011 & Supp.2013).
“Health care” means “any act or treatment performed or furnished, or that should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s medical care, treatment, or confinement.” Id. § 74.001(a)(10) (West Supp.2013).
“Health care liability claim” means “a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care,
I discern, in the opinions of the supreme court as well other appellate courts, a difference between a claim arising where the plaintiff is a patient receiving health care from the defendant medical fácility or a person providing such health care, on the one hand, and a situation where the plaintiff is a nonpatient, nonemployee of the health care facility. Compare Ollie,
In Diversicare, the Texas Supreme Court explained that the critical difference between a liability claim from a hospital patient and a hospital visitor in a health care facility is that the cause of action of a hospital patient, by virtue of the TMLA, is controlled by the TMLA, but the nonpa-tient continues to have his common law causes of action.
There is an important distinction in the relationship between premises owners and invitees on one hand and health care facilities and their patients on the other. The latter involves health care.
The obligation of a health care facility to its patients is not the same as the general duty a premises owner owes to invitees. Health care staff make judgments about the care, treatment, and protection of individual patients and the patient populations in their facilities based on the mental and physical care the patients require. The health care standard applies the ordinary care of trained and experienced medical professionals to the treatment of patients entrusted to them, [citation omitted] Premises owners similarly owe a duty of care to their residents and invitees, but the duty is of ordinary care with no general medical duty to diagnose and treat their residents.
Diversicare,
In Loaisiga v. Cerda, two patients sued Dr. Loaisiga for groping and fondling their breasts while examining them for sinus and flu symptoms.
ETMC-Crockett heavily bases its argument on Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams. Plaintiff Williams was an employee at Texas West Oaks Hospital.
Of key significance to the present case, the supreme court also specifically noted that “[wjhile the ‘any act’ language of the ‘health care’ definition is certainly expansive, it is limited by the requirement that health care be rendered ‘for, to, or on behalf of the patient during the patient’s medical care, treatment, or confinement.” Tex. W. Oaks Hosp.,
Our majority opinion in the present case notes that Texas West Oaks Hospital stated the TMLA does not require that a claimant be a patient of the health care provider to be within the ambit of the act. See Tex. W. Oaks Hosp.,
By contrast, in Good Shepherd Medical Center-Linden, Inc. v. Twilley, a maintenance supervisor employed by the Good Shepherd Medical Center, Twilley, was injured, first falling from a ladder attached to the hospital, and then later, falling over a mound of hardened cement on the hospital premises.
Here, because Ms. Reddic was neither a patient nor a person involved in rendering medical care to a patient, her claim is not within the ambit of the TMLA. Therefore, she was not required to file an expert report. Further, the supreme court in Loaisiga was confounded as to how an expert report by a doctor explaining proper procedure and protocol for examining women with sinus and flu symptoms would address the issue in Loaisiga, the defendant physician’s groping the breasts of the women. See Loaisiga,
Because I perceive Reddic’s claim not within the ambit of the TMLA, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of ETMC’s motion to dismiss.