EAST ST. LOUIS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1220, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Appellee, v. EAST ST. LOUIS SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 189 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, Appellant.
No. 81077
Supreme Court of Illinois
October 17, 1997
399
JUSTICE HEIPLE
Opinion filed October 17, 1997.
Pearson C.J. Bush, of East St. Louis (Robert L. Merriwether, Jr., of counsel), for appellee.
Charles J. Kolker, of Belleville, for intervenor Geraldine Jenkins.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
Dr. Geraldine Jenkins, superintendent of East St. Louis School District No. 189, and the District No. 189 board of education filed separate complaints for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The parties sought to enjoin the Financial Oversight Panel for District No. 189 from removing the members of the school board from office and sought a declaratory judgment that section 1B-20 of the School District Financial Oversight Panel and Emergency Financial Assistance Law (Emergency Financial Assistance Law) (
BACKGROUND
In 1988 East St. Louis School District No. 189 (District No. 189) was certified by the State Board of Education as a district in financial difficulty under section 1A-8 of the Emergency Financial Assistance Law, which is part of the School Code (
The instant controversy arose over the contract of Dr. Geraldine Jenkins, who became superintendent of the school district in 1994. The renewal of Dr. Jenkins’ contract was up for consideration in 1996, and on March 18, 1996, the board of education of School District No. 189 (the school board), a seven-member elected body, voted to renew her contract. At a meeting on March 20, the Panel reviewed Dr. Jenkins’ contract, and subsequently issued a notice to the school board, stating that
On March 28, the school board voted to refuse to follow the Panel‘s directive to inform Dr. Jenkins that her contract would not be renewed. Pursuant to section 1B-20 of the Emergency Financial Assistance Law, which authorizes the Panel to remove school board members from office for failure to follow a valid order of the Panel, on April 1 the Panel voted to remove the entire school board pursuant to section 1B-20. The Panel justified its decision by citing numerous instances where the school board refused to follow the Panel‘s directives, including the refusal to inform Dr. Jenkins that her contract would not be renewed. The Panel did not deliver written charges to the board members or conduct a hearing before dismissing the school board members, actions which are not required by the statute. The Panel forwarded notification of the school board members’ removal to Jed Deets, the regional superintendent of schools, instructing him to fill the vacancies on the school board by May 1. At the time of these events, the terms of the seven school board members were due to expire in either November 1997 or November 1999.
The day after the Panel‘s vote to remove the school board, the school board filed a second amended complaint in an ongoing lawsuit against the Panel. Count I of the school board‘s second amended complaint requested a declaratory judgment that section 1B-20, by which the Panel purported to dismiss the school board, was unconstitutional in that it violated the due process
Dr. Jenkins was granted permission to intervene, and on April 19 Dr. Jenkins, in her capacity as superintendent of schools of District No. 189 and as a resident and qualified voter of District No. 189, filed a complaint for injunctive relief. Dr. Jenkins’ complaint asserted that the Panel lacked the authority to approve her contract, and that the Panel‘s decision not to allow her contract to be renewed unconstitutionally interfered with her property interest in her job and her liberty interest in her reputation. Dr. Jenkins further contended that the Panel‘s action removing the elected members of the school board under section 1B-20 was unconstitutional in that it violated her right to vote. Dr. Jenkins sought an injunction to prohibit the Panel from replacing her and removing the school board. She also sought a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of section 1B-20.
On April 29, 1996, the circuit court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining any acts to replace the members of the school board. In a written order entered on May 7, 1996, the circuit court determined that section 1B-20 was unconstitutional on its face insofar as it violated substantive and procedural due process and
We allowed this direct appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (
ANALYSIS
I. Statutory Claims
The State commences by asserting that the circuit
We initially consider whether the Panel acted within its statutory authority when it ordered the school board not to renew Dr. Jenkins’ contract. When Dr. Jenkins’ two-year contract came up for renewal in 1996, the school board opted to renew. The Panel reviewed the contract, and in a letter to the school board, it stated that it believed that “the current contract does not meet the needs of the District under the situation and needs of the District today.” The Panel directed the school board not to renew Dr. Jenkins’ contract. The Panel further instructed that prior to approval of any contract for the superintendent of schools, the Panel would “work with the [school board] in developing guidelines for a new contract and duties for the Superintendent as well as qualifications and expectations of [the] Superintendent. The Panel wants to review the entire position of Superintendent in light of the financial areas of the Oversight Panel‘s responsibility and the current needs of the District.” The Panel‘s ongoing concern regarding Dr. Jenkins’ qualifications is evidenced by the minutes of a Panel meeting on September 28, 1995, which contain statements where the Panel expressed concern that Dr. Jenkins did not have sufficient financial expertise to keep the district‘s budget balanced. The
Under the School Code, the Panel does not have the authority to appoint the superintendent of schools; that power is reserved for the school board.
The Emergency Financial Assistance Law defines the scope of the Panel‘s authority as encompassing all powers necessary to meet its responsibilities and to carry out its purposes and the purposes of the Emergency Financial Assistance Law. The Panel‘s purpose is to “exercise financial control over the board of education, and *** to furnish [the school board with] financial assistance” (
We find that the Panel acted within its authority under the Emergency Financial Assistance Law when it
The school board also raises issues of statutory interpretation. It argues that the Panel acted outside the authority of the statute when it ordered the regional superintendent to remove the school board members, and that the regional superintendent lacks the power to carry out that order. Whether the school board‘s interpretation of the statute is accurate is immaterial, however, because an examination of the record belies the school board‘s contention that the regional superintendent removed the school board members in the instant case. It was the Panel itself that performed the task. The regional superintendent was merely notified of the Panel‘s action and was ordered to fill the vacancies as provided for under section 10-10 of the School Code.
The school board next contends that the Panel itself did not have the authority to remove the school board. In support of this assertion, the school board refers to section 1B-20(d), which provides that school board members who fail to follow a valid order of the Panel or commit the school board to an unauthorized obligation are subject to “appropriate administrative discipline,”
We agree with the State. Section 1B-20 in its entirety states:
“Sanctions. (a) No member, officer, employee, or agent of the board shall commit the board to any contract or other obligation or incur any liability on behalf of the board for any purpose if the amount of such contract, obligation or liability is in excess of the amount authorized for that purpose then available under the financial plan and budget then in effect.
(b) No member, officer, employee or agent of the board shall commit the board to any contract or other obligation on behalf of the board for the payment of money for any purpose required to be approved by the Financial Oversight Panel unless such contract or other obligation has been approved by the Panel.
(c) No member, officer, employee or agent of the board shall take any action in violation of any valid order of the Panel or shall fail or refuse to take any action required by any such order or shall prepare, present, or certify any information (including any projections or estimates) or report for the Panel or any of its agents that is false or misleading, or, upon learning that any such information is false or misleading, shall fail promptly to advise the Panel or its agents.
(d) In addition to any penalty or liability under any other law, any member, officer, employee or agent of the board who violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Section shall be subject to appropriate administrative discipline, including, if warranted, suspension from duty without pay, removal from office, or termination of employment.”
105 ILCS 5/1B-20 (West 1994).
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, which should be construed primarily from the language
II. Constitutional Claims
Turning to the constitutionality of section 1B-20, we observe at the outset that a statute challenged as unconstitutional enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 304 (1996). Parties who wish to challenge the constitutionality of a statute bear the burden of rebutting the presumption and establishing a constitutional violation. People v. Blackorby, 146 Ill. 2d 307, 318 (1992). Accordingly, a court will construe a statute as constitutional where it can do so reasonably. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 397.
In addressing the appellees’ constitutional claims, it is first important to clarify the capacity in which the appellees may assert them. A school board as an entity is a governmental agency, or “municipal corporation,” cre-
A. Right to Vote
Appellees initially argue that section 1B-20 unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right to vote because it authorizes the summary removal of duly elected officials from office. They contend that section 1B-20 must therefore be subjected to strict scrutiny, which requires that a statute be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest to pass constitutional muster. Tully, 171 Ill. 2d at 304-05. Section 1B-20 fails this test, appellees assert, and must be struck down. The State responds that the discipline provision in section 1B-20, including the possibility of dismissal, is narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve the State‘s goal of financially sound school districts.
We find it unnecessary to resort to the parties’ “strict scrutiny” analytical framework. A school board is a municipal corporation, subject to the will of the legislature. Cronin, 66 Ill. 2d at 55. The legislature has the discretion to formulate the character, function, and
Appellees cite Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297 (1996), to support their argument that section 1B-20 unconstitutionally infringes on the right to vote. Tully involved a public act that changed the selection process of the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois from an elective to an appointive system. The act further provided that the then-serving, duly-elected members of the Board of Trustees would be supplanted midterm by appointed replacements. This court found that the act in question violated the electorate‘s right to vote, in that it nullified the voters’ choice by eliminating, midterm, the right of the elected officials to serve out the balance of their terms. Tully, 171 Ill. 2d at 312.
Appellees assert that Tully controls the case at bar because section 1B-20 similarly allows the state to remove elected officials midterm. Appellees, however, fail to acknowledge a crucial distinction between Tully and the instant case. In Tully, the public act removing the trustees from office was enacted after the trustees were elected. When the voters elected the trustees, they were electing a candidate to serve for six years. The public act in Tully removed the trustee from office before the six-year terms had expired, and thus altered the effect of the electorate‘s vote in a constitutionally impermissible manner. In the case at bar, however, the
B. Procedural Due Process
1. School Board Members
Appellees next assert that section 1B-20 violates procedural due process. Procedural due process claims concern the constitutionality of the specific procedures employed to deny a person‘s life, liberty, or property interest. People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342 (1989); Tiller v. Klincar, 138 Ill. 2d 1, 13-14 (1990); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property. People v. Lang, 113 Ill. 2d 407, 444 (1986); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). Courts considering procedural due process questions conduct a three-part analysis: the first asks the threshold question whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such an interest through the procedures already in place, while considering the value of additional safeguards; and the third addresses the effect the administrative and monetary burdens would have on the state‘s inter-
As a threshold matter, then, we consider whether a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Tiller, 138 Ill. 2d at 13. While earlier in this opinion we determined that the school board as an entity could not assert due process rights against the state, we did not consider whether the school board members as individuals could assert such a claim. We consider the question now. While the school board members as individuals have no property or liberty right to their offices secured by the federal due process clause, an elected official may have a property right in his office if such an interest is given to him under state law. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944); Brown v. Perkins, 706 F. Supp. 633, 634 (N.D. Ill. 1989). An interest is a property right subject to due process protections if that interest is secured by rules or mutually explicit understandings that support the claim of entitlement. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972), citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The question, then, is whether state law creates a property right in elected office. In our case, section 10-10 of the School Code provides that each member of the school board shall serve a term of four years.
In opposition to this proposition, the State cites two Illinois Supreme Court cases, Donahue v. County of Will, 100 Ill. 94 (1881), and People ex rel. Malley v. Barrett, 203 Ill. 99 (1903), both of which held that office holders have no property rights in their offices. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the term “property” had a narrower meaning than currently. Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1404 (7th Cir. 1988). The conception of a property right as embodied in procedural due process analysis, however, has evolved considerably over the latter half of this century and has extended into the area of public employment. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Perry, 408 U.S. 593. This court has likewise recognized that a public employee may have a property right in that employment, entitled to due process protection, depending upon the surrounding circumstances, including existing rules and understandings. Powell v. Jones, 56 Ill. 2d 70, 77 (1973).
Statutes providing that an elected officer shall serve for a certain number of years and shall be removed only upon certain events are akin to circumstances that create property rights in public employment, because they
We recognize, however, that the school board members’ right to serve for four years is not absolute, for when the state creates a public office it may also create standards of conduct for that office. Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 1976). For example, any elected official may be removed from office for official misconduct.
Having determined that the due process clause applies, the question remains as to what process is due. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 503, 105 S. Ct. at 1492. The first step in determining what process is due is to consider the risk of erroneous deprivation of one‘s property interest in office through the procedures already existing in the statute. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33, 96 S. Ct. at 903. Our analysis is simplified because
With no procedure already in place, we must consider what procedure would be constitutionally adequate. While due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands (Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, 1236, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 1748 (1961); R.G., 131 Ill. 2d at 354), its fundamental requirement is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 32, 96 S. Ct. at 902). Indeed, before the individual may contest the
We also hold that the school board members are entitled to a pretermination hearing. Such a hearing would minimize the risk of unfair or mistaken deprivation of their protected rights by enabling them to contest the state‘s basis for depriving them of those rights. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252, 262, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1050 (1978); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 570, 92 S. Ct. at 1994. The “root requirement” of due process is that an individual be given the opportunity to respond before he is deprived of a protected right. Villegas v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 167 Ill. 2d 108, 119 (1995), citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 503-04, 105 S. Ct. at 1493. Holding a pretermination hearing, however brief, would insure that a school board member who had not violated the conditions attendant to his office would not be unjustifiably removed from office. The pretermination hearing need not be elaborate, rather, it need only give the school board members an opportunity to respond to the charges. The pretermination hearing‘s simplicity, however, should not mask its importance. Such a procedure is crucial to curb abuses of discretion and to insure that mistaken deprivations of protected rights do not occur.
Indeed, we find that some manner of process is required notwithstanding the state‘s interest in the mat
Next, we must determine whether the procedural due process requirements delineated above are fatal to the statute before us today insofar as the statute does not provide for them. We reiterate that we must interpret statutes as constitutional if we can do so reasonably. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 397. We note that the language in
2. Voters
Appellees also assert that they have a liberty interest in the right to vote that may not be taken away without procedural due process protections. Procedural due process rights are triggered when a fundamental right is being denied. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d at 342; Tiller, 138 Ill. 2d at 13-14; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 503, 105 S. Ct. at 1493. While the right to vote is certainly a fundamental right (Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 74 (1990)), we have just held that
C. Equal Protection
The circuit court held, and appellees maintain, that
D. Improper Delegation of Legislative Authority
Appellees next assert that
E. Unconstitutionally Vague
The school board makes its own argument that
The question of vagueness and the question of delegation of legislative authority are intertwined (People v. Gurell, 98 Ill. 2d at 210) insofar as both address the standards given in the statute to guide the conduct the statute regulates and the administrative body that oversees that conduct. The two concepts, however, use different tests to judge the adequacy of those standards. While the improper delegation of legislative authority concept employs a three-part test
We conclude that
F. Improper Delegation of Judicial Authority
In a one-paragraph argument, Dr. Jenkins asserts that
CONCLUSION
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority opinion, except for its
As the majority notes elsewhere in its opinion, the dismissal provisions of
In support of its conclusion, the majority points to the provision of a specified term of office for school board members and to a gradual evolution in constitutional law, which has come to recognize greater rights in public employment and office. Neither ground is persuasive. Providing for a defined term of office does not by itself establish a vested property right in the office. See Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (7th Cir. 1974). In Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs, 84 Ill. 2d 42, 52 (1981), this court expressed some doubt, but did not decide, whether unpaid, part-time officials appointed to serve fixed terms of office—like the school board members here—were entitled to a trial-type proceeding prior to their removal from a public body.
As to the evolution of this area of law, it should be noted that modern cases from other jurisdictions continue to recognize that a property right does not
The cases cited by the majority in support of its holding are not to the contrary. In Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1979), state law provided that the incumbent‘s term of office as alderman was for four years and until a successor could be duly elected and qualified. The incumbent had obtained a court order invalidating the results of the election at which he was defeated, and that order was still in effect later, when he attempted to remain in office. In those circumstances, the court found that no successor had been duly elected and qualified, and the court concluded that under state law the incumbent was entitled to continue to serve in office. In Collins v. Morris, 263 Ga. 734, 735-36, 438 S.E.2d 896, 897 (1994), also cited by the majority, the court stated that an elected official has a property interest in the office that is entitled to due process protection. The court went on to acknowledge, however, that “it is also true that an official takes his office subject to the conditions imposed by the terms and nature of the political system in which he operates.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Collins, 263 Ga. at 735, 438 S.E.2d at 897. In Foley v. Kennedy, 885 P.2d 583 (Nev. 1994), another case cited by the majority, the court‘s reference to an elected officer‘s property interest in the office came in the context of a discussion of recall proceedings under state law and
I believe that resolution of this issue must proceed on a case-by-case basis, and a court faced with this question must carefully examine the terms and conditions of the particular office involved. The present board members took office subject to the measures contained in