East Side Construction Co. v. Town of AdamsEast Side Construction Co. v. Town of Adams
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Wilkins
The town of A dams voted that a high school building be constructed in accordance with certain plans. O. D. Purington Co., Inc. (hereinafter called Purington), was awarded the general contract. East Side Construction Co., Inc. (hereinafter called East Side), an unsuccessful subbidder for the performance of the work of demolition, excavation, and rough grading (hereinafter referred to as demolition), brings a bill in equity,‘a petition for a writ of certiorari, and a petition for a writ of mandamus against the town, Purington, the members of the school committee, and the members of the school building committee of the town. In another case not less than ten taxable inhabitants of the town bring a petition to restrain certain expenditures.
The Taxpayers’ Suit.
We first give the substance of the allegations of the petition. On May 25, 1950, the town meeting appropriated $1,100,000 to erect and furnish the new high school building, and on May 4, 1951, made an additional appropriation of $250,000. On March 16, 1951, the school building committee advertised for bids by general contractors and by subbidders, including subbids for demolition. The specifications provided that the “project mentioned is to be
*349
carried out according to”
The general contract for the construction of this public building by the town at a cost of more than $1,000 is admittedly within
If Purington, as is alleged, did not customarily perform demolition work, it was not eligible to file a subbid for that work. Any] such ineligibility, however, ceases to be of major importance, because Purington, in fact, filed no sub-bid and, therefore, could not be selected as a subcontractor. The effect is that Purington did not file a general bid in accordance with the statute, and was not properly selected as the general contractor. “Bids from general contractors shall be for the complete project as specified and shall include the names of all principal and such minor sub *351 contractors as are designated in the proposal form, and the general contractor shall be selected on the basis of such bid.” § 44C (A) (1), inserted by St. 1939, c. 480. Similar provisions in statutes relating to the awarding of contracts for public work have been construed as mandatory. Bowditch v. Superintendent of Streets of Boston, 168 Mass. 239. Warren v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 181 Mass. 6. Morse v. Boston, 253 Mass. 247. Safford v. Lowell, 255 Mass. 220. Fluet v. McCabe, 299 Mass. 173, 178. The town was without authority to waive this requirement. Bay State Street Railway v. Woburn, 232 Mass. 201, 203. Burt v. Municipal Council of Taunton, 272 Mass. 130, 133.
The next question is whether a taxpayers’ suit rfiay be brought when a contract for demolition was awarded to Purington at a figure more than $7,000 less than that of the lowest subbidder which qualified. It is urged that a suit can lie only where the action sought to be restrained will result in an increased burden upon the taxpayers. Enhance is placed on
Richards
v.
Treasurer & Receiver General,
319 Mass. 672, 675-677, but as was pointed out in
Sears
v.
Treasurer & Receiver General,
327 Mass. 310, 319, in the
Richards
case provision had been made for reimbursing the Commonwealth for the alleged illegal expenditures and no part of the ultimate burden was to fall on the taxpayers. The plain language of c. 40, § 53, which should be given “a somewhat liberal construction”
(Prince
v.
Crocker,
166 Mass. 347, 358), contains no exception. The words are that a petition will lie where a town is about to expend money “in any manner other than that for and in which such town has the legal and constitutional right and power to raise or expend money or incur obligations.”
It has been argued that the controversy has become moot. No facts on this issue appear in the record. They have not been presented by affidavit. Hubrite Informal Frocks, Inc. v. Kramer, 297 Mass. 530, 532-533. No agreement among counsel was elicited by questions from the court during the arguments before us. Brown v. City Council of Cambridge, 289 Mass. 333, 334. It is stated in the town’s brief that the demolition work has been completed. We do not know to what extent it has been paid for. In any event, the general contract was not lawfully awarded. As to this, the town’s brief states the superstructure is sixty-five per cent completed. For the present, it is enough to say that nothing appears to make applicable the principle of such a case as Fuller v. Trustees of Deerfield Academy, 252 Mass. 258.
The interlocutory decree sustaining the demurrers is reversed, and instead an interlocutory decree is to be entered overruling the demurrers. The final decree dismissing the bill is reversed.
So ordered.
The Cases Brought by East Side.
It is unnecessary to consider separately the three cases brought by East Side. All are based on the theory that its proposal was the lowest qualified bid submitted by any responsible and eligible subbidder for the demolition work, and as such should have been accepted by Purington. But there is no statutory requirement that in every case the lowest subbid must be accepted. A subbidder’s proposal is addressed to the general contractor. § 44C, inserted by St. 1939, c. 480, as amended by St. 1941, c. 699, § 7. When accepted, a subbidder enters into no contractual relation with the town, but becomes bound to the general contractor. *354 A general contractor is free to include in his bid the subbid of any subcontractor, however high, although in so doing he, of course, takes the chance of not becoming “the lowest responsible and eligible bidder.” § 44A, as appearing in St. 1941, c. 699, § 1. A subbidder has no right to insist that his subbid, however low, be accepted by a general contractor, any more than has a general contractor a right to force an unwilling subbidder to allow his subbid to be included in item 2 of the general contractor’s general bid. § 44C (B), as appearing in St. 1941, c. 699, § 2.
This result not only is reasonable, but seems necessary from the statutory procedure. “No recorded sub-bids shall be opened by the awarding authorities until after the selection of the general contractor.” § 44C (B). The general contractor must be the “lowest responsible and eligible bidder,” a term defined in the act as “the bidder whose bid is the lowest of those bidders possessing the skill, ability and integrity necessary to the faithful performance of the work in case no substitution of sub-contractors is made in accordance with section forty-four C, or whose original or adjusted bid is the lowest of such bidders in the event of such substitution or substitutions.” § 44A, as appearing in St. 1941, c. 699, § 1. It would be surprising to allow the selection of the general contractor before the subbids were opened if their opening were to be so vital a factor in determining the eligibility of the general contractor.
It is also significant that in § 44C (E), inserted by St. 1939, c. 480, as amended by St. 1941, c. 699, § 4, the express provision for the substitution of subcontractors mentions but two grounds for such action, neither of which concerns an omission to use a lowest subbid. Both the enumerated grounds have to do with matters which necessarily could not arise until after the opening of the subbids and áre unrelated to the contents of the subbids. “If a subcontractor who has been selected and included in the general contract fails to sign the sub-contract ... or fails to furnish a performance bond to the general contractor ... if required so to do,” he may be replaced, “and the general contractor *355 shall select., from the sub-bidders who have conformed to the bidding procedure, the next lowest bidder at the amount named in such sub-bid, and the total contract price shall be revised . . . .” The reference to “the next lowest bidder” is puzzling. We, however, are not called upon to conjecture what may have been the legislative intent in enacting this provision, which is not now relevant, or to guess how it should be applied in an appropriate case. We need merely say that, viewing the general scheme of the entire statute, we are unable to deduce from this provision alone an intent to require the selection of the “lowest responsible and eligible bidder” on each subcontract.
The contrary conclusion could lead to strange results. If the lowest subbid must be accepted on each subcontract designated in the proposal form, the one who has been selected as the lowest- bidder on the general contract nevertheless could not properly be selected unless in each case he had been given the consent to use, and had in fact used, the subbid of the lowest subbidder on each subcontract. There thus might arise a stalemate of indefinite duration in the construction or repair of public buildings.
In case numbered 297, the interlocutory decree sustaining the demurrers and the final decree dismissing the bill of complaint are affirmed. In cases numbered 298 and 299, the petitions for a writ of certiorari and for a writ of mandamus, respectively, the orders sustaining the demurrers are affirmed, and in each case judgment is to be entered dismissing the petition.
So ordered.
Notes
Section 53 reads in part: “If a town or any of its officers or agents are about to raise or expend money or incur obligations purporting to bind said town for any purpose or object or in any manner other than that for and in which such town has the legal and constitutional right and power to raise or expend money or incur obligations, the supreme judicial or superior court may, upon the petition of not less than ten taxable inhabitants of the town, determine the same in equity . . ..”