East Orange Educational Support Professionals’ Association v. East Orange Board of EducationEast Orange Educational Support Professionals’ Association v. East Orange Board of Education
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
Argued February 2, 2026 -- Decided August 5, 2026
JUSTICE HOFFMAN, writing for the Court.
In this appeal, the Court reviews an arbitrator’s decision that the East Orange Board of Education (Board) violated a collective bargaining agreement provision when, pursuant to
The East Orange Educational Support Professionals’ Association (EOESPA) represents custodians employed by the Board. EOESPA and the Board were subject to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), dating back to 2011. According to Article XXIII(B)(2) of the CBA: “Custodians who do work on any day when schools are closed for an emergency shall be paid 1 1/2 times their salary in addition to their regular day of pay.”
In March 2020, Governor Philip D. Murphy declared a public health emergency and state of emergency in response to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and ordered that all schools would be closed to students. In April 2020, the Legislature amended
When Governor Murphy first declared the COVID-19 state of emergency, the Board paid custodial employees appearing for work in-person two hundred and fifty percent of their regular pay. However, in accordance with
EOESPA filed a grievance with the Public Employment Relations Commission, alleging violations of additional-pay provisions in the CBA. The
HELD: The arbitrator’s decision is contrary to the express and unequivocal mandate for employee pay outlined in
- In the public sector, an arbitrator’s award will be confirmed so long as the award is reasonably debatable. But when an award causes direct contradiction with law or public policy, that award cannot stand. Here, the parties dispute whether the arbitral award conformed to
N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(1) , which was added to the statute governing State aid to school districts in April 2020. The subsection consists of two sentences. The first discusses the relationship between subsections (b) through (d) of the statute and collective bargaining agreements, providing that “[n]othing in subsection b., c., or d. of this section shall be construed to limit, supersede or preempt the . . . compensation . . . afforded to public school employees . . . under . . . a [CBA].” The second sentence addresses compensation for employees of a school district that is closed “for a period longer than three consecutive school days” “due to a declared state of emergency” or other emergent reason and mandates that employees be paid as if the schools remained open. That sentence contains an exception for the negotiation of additional compensation based on additional work performed. (pp. 13-15) - The arbitrator’s decision that the custodial employees should be paid as if the schools were closed instead of “open” is not reasonably debatable under the plain language of
N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(1) . Here, the statutory prerequisites for treating the schools as “open” are met: (1) the schools were closed “due to a declared state of emergency [and] declared public health emergency” “for a period longer than three consecutive school days,” and (2) the custodial employees are “covered by a collective negotiations agreement.”N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(1) . Thus,N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(1) -- by its express language -- applies, and the plain language of this statute dictates that the custodians “shall be entitled to compensation . . . as provided in the collective negotiations agreement as if the school facilities remained open for any purpose” -- i.e., their standard salary, not their standard salary plus an additional one hundred and fifty percent. The arbitrator’s public policy determination is also not reasonably debatable. The arbitrator’s interpretation that the statute only protects employees from losses directly contravenes the clear dictates of the statute, which expressly provide for additional compensation for employees under certain circumstances. Noting that the custodians do not contend they engaged in anysubsequent negotiations or that they performed any “additional work” during the timeframe at issue, the Court sees no reason to depart from the Appellate Division’s reasonable interpretation that the statute “both ensured school employees would be compensated as if school facilities remained open . . . and limited the financial exposure of school districts for extra compensation arising from school facility closures.” (pp. 16-18) - Because the plain language of
N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(1) is clear, the Court does not consider contradictory legislative history noted by the dissent that states, very generally, that “[n]othing in the bill” limits, supersedes, or preempts compensation under a CBA, and that does not distinguish the statutory subsections as the statute does. No party raised this legislative history, and it is not mentioned in any prior decision. Citing the interpretive principle that expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, the Court finds clear legislative intent that subsection (e), unlike the other listed subsections, must be followed over contrary CBA provisions. In response to an argument raised by an amicus, the Court explains why it does not agree that the statute was meant to apply only to employees unable to work in-person. (pp. 19-22)
AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, dissenting, expresses the view that
JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE HOFFMAN’s opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a dissent.
Ramon E. Rivera argued the cause for respondent (Antonelli Kantor Rivera, attorneys; Ramon E. Rivera, of counsel and on the brief, and Madelaine P. Hicks, and Zohar C. Hasson, on the brief).
Richard A. Friedman argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Education Association (Zazzali, attorneys; Richard A. Friedman, of counsel and on the brief, and Wesley B. Friedman, on the brief).
Arnold Shep Cohen submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae IFPTE Local 195 (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys; Arnold Shep Cohen, of counsel and on the brief).
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we review an arbitrator’s decision that the East Orange Board of Education (Board) violated a collective bargaining agreement provision when, pursuant to
The East Orange Educational Support Professionals’ Association (EOESPA) represents custodians employed by the Board. EOESPA and the Board were subject to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), dating back to 2011, which memorializes the terms and conditions of employment for custodians in the East Orange school district. According to Article XXIII(B)(2) of the CBA: “Custodians who do work on any day when schools are closed for an emergency shall be paid 1 1/2 times their salary in addition to their regular day of pay.” The CBA does not define the terms “closed” or “closed for an emergency.”
A.
Starting in March 2020, Governor Philip D. Murphy, in response to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, signed a series of executive orders. On March 9, 2020, Governor Murphy declared a public health emergency and a state of emergency.
The State Legislature likewise acted in the wake of COVID-19. Relevant here, in April 2020, the Legislature amended
On August 13, 2020, Governor Murphy superseded his previous orders on school closures and ordered that schools could reopen for in-person instruction subject to certain health and safety standards.
When Governor Murphy first declared the COVID-19 state of emergency in March 2020, the Board paid custodial employees appearing for work in-person two hundred and fifty percent of their regular pay. However, in accordance with
B.
In response, the Unions -- EOESPA, on behalf of custodial employees, and the East Orange Maintenance Association (EOMA), on behalf of security and maintenance employees -- filed grievances with the Public Employment Relations Commission, alleging violations of additional-pay provisions in their respective CBAs. The grievances were consolidated into one arbitration.
The arbitrator held a hearing on September 20, 2021, and issued an opinion and award on January 16, 2022. The arbitrator determined, as relevant here, that the Board violated the custodial CBA when it stopped paying employees in accordance with Article XXIII(B)(2).
The arbitrator concluded that the schools were “closed” because, from the arbitrator’s perspective, the school facilities were not open to students as they typically would be:
When you and your kids wake up at 6am to snow falling outside your window, you call the school to see if it’s open; so too do the teachers. They are hardly curious about whether the office staff and the principal will be in the building. They want to know if school is open for the kids. If not, it’s closed.
The arbitrator was not persuaded by the Board’s reliance on the language of
Based on the arbitrator’s determination that the schools should, instead, be treated as if they were “closed,” the arbitrator decided that the Board
The arbitrator further determined the security employees who worked during the state of emergency were entitled to time and one-half of their pay, and that the maintenance employees were not entitled to extra pay, under their respective CBAs.
C.
The Unions filed an action in the Chancery Division to confirm the arbitration award in its entirety.2 On June 16, 2022, the Chancery Division heard oral argument and confirmed the arbitration award, finding the
But I really find it to be much more than reasonably debatable . . . . I find that the arbitrator looked at the language of each distinct collective bargaining agreement that he assessed the language, that he applied the language to the facts, that he interpreted the language. He made a decision that the interpretation should be by plain language.
The court never referenced the operative statute,
D.
The Board appealed the Chancery Division’s judgment.3 In an unpublished opinion dated February 25, 2025, the Appellate Division reversed
The Appellate Division found the express language of
The appellate court was “not persuaded by the Unions’ argument [that] the statute is intended only to prevent employee losses associated with a state of emergency,” finding that “[n]othing in the plain language of the statute supports” such a reading. It also noted that the statute expressly permits employees to “negotiate[]” “additional compensation” for “additional work performed” but that the custodial employees did not contend they performed any additional work.
The Appellate Division concluded that the arbitrator’s award to custodial employees was “directly contrary to
E.
This Court granted the Unions’ petition for certification on July 10, 2025. 261 N.J. 168 (2025). We also granted amicus curiae status to the New Jersey Education Association; the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 195; and the Attorney General of New Jersey.
II.
A.
The Unions request that the Chancery Division’s decision be reinstated, arguing that the Appellate Division failed to analyze this case under the deferential reasonably debatable standard. Further, the Unions assert that the Appellate Division held that
Amicus International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 195 (IFPTE) also supports the Unions and asks this Court to reverse the Appellate Division’s decision. The IFPTE contends that, because the Chancery Division agreed with the arbitrator’s determination, “it is obviously reasonably debatable.” Further, the IFPTE argues that the Appellate Division’s policy findings, including that the statute is meant to limit the financial exposure of schools, are speculative.
B.
The Board contends that the Appellate Division correctly found that the arbitration award is not reasonably debatable. It argues that the arbitrator “was
Amicus the Attorney General supports the Board and asks this Court to affirm the Appellate Division. The Attorney General notes that although the statute says “[n]othing in subsection b., c., or d. of this section shall be construed to limit, supersede or preempt” provisions of CBAs, it specifically excludes subsection (e) -- the subsection at issue in this case -- from that provision. Consequently, the Attorney General argues that the Legislature intended that subsection (e) would override contrary provisions of CBAs. Further, the Attorney General asserts that the statute sets both a floor and a cap on employee pay -- the latter of which is clear because “additional compensation” is available, but only “for additional work performed,” subject to a subsequent negotiated agreement by the parties. According to the Attorney General, “[i]t makes sense that the Legislature would thus try to help
III.
A.
“In the public sector, an arbitrator’s award will be confirmed ‘so long as the award is reasonably debatable.’” Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010) (quoting Middletown Twp. PBA Local 124 v. Township of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1, 11 (2007)). To be “reasonably debatable,” the arbitrator’s findings and conclusions must be “justifiable” or “fully supportable in the record.” PBA Local No. 11 v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422, 431 (2011) (quoting Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 223-24 (1979)). Under this deferential standard, a “court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of the court’s view of the correctness of the arbitrator’s interpretation.” N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546, 554 (2006). The reasonably debatable standard applies to an arbitrator’s interpretation of contracts and statutes, as well as resolution of public policy questions. See Borough of East Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 202-03, 206-07 (2013).
B.
Here, the parties dispute whether the arbitral award conformed to
Nothing in subsection b., c., or d. of this section shall be construed to limit, supersede or preempt the rights, privileges, compensation, remedies, and procedures afforded to public school employees or a collective bargaining unit under federal or State law or any provision of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the school district. In the event of the closure of the schools of a school district due to a declared state of emergency, declared public health emergency, or a directive by the appropriate health agency or officer to institute a public health-related closure for a period longer than three consecutive school days, public school employees covered by a collective negotiations agreement shall be entitled to compensation, benefits, and emoluments as provided in the collective negotiations agreement as if the school facilities remained open for any purpose and for any time lost as a result of school closures or use of virtual or remote instruction, except that additional compensation, benefits, and emoluments may be negotiated for additional work performed.
[
N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(1) .]
The subsection consists of two sentences. The first discusses the relationship between subsections (b) through (d) of the statute and collective bargaining agreements. The second addresses compensation for employees of a school district that is closed “for a period longer than three consecutive school days” “due to a declared state of emergency” or other emergent reason and mandates that employees be paid as if the schools remained open. That sentence contains an exception for the negotiation of additional compensation based on additional work performed.
IV.
With those principles in mind, we turn to the text of
A.
The arbitrator’s decision that the custodial employees should be paid as if the schools were closed instead of “open” is not reasonably debatable under the plain language of
Here, the arbitrator decided that employees should be paid as if schools were not “open.” Because the arbitrator’s decision directly contradicts
B.
The arbitrator’s public policy determination is, similarly, not reasonably debatable. After simply stating that
The Appellate Division -- following the language of the statute -- aptly observed that the statute “both ensured school employees would be compensated as if school facilities remained open . . . and limited the financial exposure of school districts for extra compensation arising from school facility closures.” We see no reason to depart from this reasonable interpretation of a
C.
The dissent makes much of the legislative history. See post at ___ (slip op. at 2, 5, 12, 16-17). However, the dissent concedes that “[w]hen a case involves the direct review of a statute, courts do not consider legislative history if the text of the statute is clear.” Post at ___ (slip op. at 16).
The plain language of
D.
We are not persuaded by the NJEA‘s argument (elaborated upon by the Unions at oral argument) that the statutory provision “and for any time lost as a result of school closures or use of virtual or remote instruction” shows that the statute was only meant to apply to employees unable to work in-person.4 Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests such a reading. Instead,
The plain language of the statute indicates that it was meant to apply to employees generally, not only to those unable to work in-person. The provision broadly applies to “public school employees covered by a collective negotiations agreement.”
We cannot and should not write a distinction into the statute that the Legislature chose not to create. See Craster v. Bd. of Comm‘rs of Newark, 9 N.J. 225, 230 (1952) (“The court should not write in an additional qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment.“); O‘Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002) (“A court may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.“). In fact, even the arbitrator recognized that the statute does not solely apply to employees unable to work in-person, broadly stating that the statute‘s “purpose would appear to be to protect bargaining unit employees.”
E.
Because this case can be resolved using the reasonably debatable standard, we need not reach the parties’ arguments on this Court‘s preemption jurisprudence. See In re Local 195, 88 N.J. 393, 404-05 (1982).
The arbitrator‘s opinion and award regarding custodial employees are contrary to the express dictates of
JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE HOFFMAN‘s opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a dissent.
Under collective bargaining agreements in place at the time, custodial and security staff were entitled to additional pay if they worked when schools were closed for an emergency. The parties disagreed about the impact of the new law on that benefit. They submitted their dispute to an arbitrator, who ruled in the unions’ favor in part. The trial court confirmed the award.
Notwithstanding the above language and the deferential standard of review that applies to arbitration awards, the Appellate Division rejected the arbitrator‘s award, as the majority does now. The appellate court found that the law eliminated benefits protected by existing collective bargaining agreements. In doing so, the court, in effect, held that the law stood for exactly the opposite of what the legislative history plainly states.
For a court to override an arbitration award, it must find the award is not “reasonably debatable.” Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass‘n, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021). Among other reasons, because the majority fails to follow that principle and overlooks a clear statement of legislative intent, I respectfully dissent.
A.
The majority sets forth relevant background facts to this appeal. The Governor declared a public health emergency and a state of emergency on March 9, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Exec. Order No. 103 (Mar. 9, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 549(a) (Apr. 6, 2020). The public health emergency was initially terminated on June 4, 2021. Exec. Order No. 244 (June 4, 2021), 53 N.J.R. 1131(a) (July 6, 2021). During that time, public schools were generally closed, and students were taught remotely. See Exec. Order No. 104 (Mar. 16, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 550(a) (Apr. 6, 2020) (closing schools to students with limited exceptions for the provision of food and other select services). Although teachers worked remotely, custodial, security, and maintenance employees reported to work in person. The state of emergency ended at a later time.
Prior to the pandemic, the defendant, East Orange Board of Education, had entered into collective bargaining agreements with different bargaining groups including custodial employees (represented by plaintiff East Orange Education Support Professionals’ Association), as well as security and maintenance employees (represented by plaintiff East Orange Maintenance Association).
The Board paid all three groups of employees 2.5 times their regular pay until July 13, 2020. The Board did so for several months even after the Legislature amended
B.
To qualify for State aid, the preexisting statute required districts to “provide[] public school facilities for at least 180 days during the . . . school year.”
The amendment made clear that teachers working remotely would be paid during the COVID-19 crisis. Less clear, as the history of this case demonstrates, is how other staff members would be paid during an emergency. A Statement appended to the Assembly and Senate bills sheds light on the issue. It reads as follows:
Nothing in the bill may be construed to limit, supersede or preempt the rights, privileges, compensation, remedies, and procedures afforded to public school employees or a collective bargaining unit under federal or State law or any provision of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the school district. The bill also provides that public school employees covered by a collective negotiations agreement will be entitled to compensation, benefits, and emoluments as provided in the collective negotiations agreement as if the school facilities remained open for any purpose and for any time lost as a result of school closures or use of virtual or remote instruction, except that additional compensation, benefits, and emoluments may be negotiated for additional work performed.
[Sponsors’ Statement to A. 3904 6 (L. 2020, c. 27); Sponsors’ Statement to S. 2337 8 (L. 2020, c. 27).]
The Board required custodial and security employees to continue to work in person during the emergency. After the school district stopped paying them additional compensation, the unions filed grievances. They were combined into a single arbitration proceeding.
C.
The arbitrator issued an opinion on January 16, 2022 in favor of the custodial and security employees. He framed the question simply: “Did the Board of Education violate the CBAs [collective bargaining agreements] when, on July 13, 2020, it ceased paying additional pay to employees covered by this grievance?”
The arbitrator first focused on the parties’ arguments about whether schools were “closed” within the meaning of the CBAs. He declined to adopt the Board‘s position that they were open because staff members were present in the building and the district continued to provide lunch for certain students. Applying the ordinary meaning of “closed,” he concluded that when schools were not open to students for learning, they were, in fact, “closed” under the CBAs.
[Nothing in subsection b., c., or d. of this section shall be construed to limit, supersede or preempt the rights, privileges, compensation, remedies, and procedures afforded to public school employees or a collective bargaining unit under federal or State law or any provision of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the school district.] In the event of the closure of the schools of a school district due to a declared state of emergency[, declared public health emergency, or a directive by the appropriate health agency or officer to institute a public health-related closure] for a period longer than three consecutive school days[,] public school employees covered by a collective negotiations agreement shall be entitled to compensation[, benefits, and emoluments as provided in the collective negotiations agreement] as if the school facilities remained open for any purpose and for any time lost as a result of school closures [or use of virtual or remote instruction, except that additional compensation, benefits, and emoluments may be negotiated for additional work performed].
The arbitrator‘s response was direct and to the point once again: “[T]he provision is not entirely clear to me.” Nonetheless, he found that “its purpose would appear to be to protect bargaining unit employees from losses -- not additional pay -- sustained due to closures longer than three days.”
II.
Because the parties agreed to arbitration, courts do not serve as the first line of review of their dispute. The parties bargained for the arbitrator‘s judgment, and it is entitled to “considerable deference.” Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013).
Courts have authority to vacate arbitration awards in the following situations: (1) when an “award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means“; (2) when there was “evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators“; (3) when “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct“; and (4) when “the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award . . . was not made.”
An award that resolves a public sector dispute will stand so long as it is “reasonably debatable.” Carteret, 247 N.J. at 211. Under that standard, a “court may not substitute its own judgment for” the arbitrator‘s, “regardless of
In rare situations, courts may vacate an arbitration award if it “plainly violates a clear mandate of public policy.” N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Local 196, 190 N.J. 283, 294 (2007) (citing Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 143 N.J. 420, 443 (1996)); Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 364-65 (1994).
III.
The trial court applied those principles and confirmed the arbitrator‘s award. “[A]t minimum,” the court found, the award was “reasonably debatable.” The court went further, though, and found the award “to be much more than reasonably debatable.”
The trial court tracked the arbitrator‘s opinion, point by point, and upheld it. The court added that there were no public policy grounds that justified vacating the award.
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court‘s order in part and vacated its confirmation of the arbitration award for custodial employees. In
The Appellate Division concluded the “award of extra compensation . . . to custodial employees conflicts with the public policy embodied in
For support, the Appellate Division cited “common knowledge” and the text of the Amendment, which (a) “ensured school employees would be compensated as if school facilities remained open,” and (b) “limited the financial exposure of school districts for extra compensation arising from” the unexpected, lengthy closure of schools as a result of COVID-19.
The Appellate Division therefore found the arbitration award in favor of custodians was “directly contrary to” the Amendment “and its embodiment of
IV.
I respectfully disagree with the above analysis. In April 2020, the Legislature acted swiftly when it amended existing law at a time of fear and uncertainty. With limited knowledge of the unfolding health crisis, the Legislature took prompt action to ensure that children continued to receive an education, that districts could continue to qualify for state aid without being onsite for 180 calendar days in a year, and that teachers offering remote instruction would know they would continue to be paid as before. The question here relates to the effect of the Amendment on compensation owed to staff members who continued to work onsite under existing CBAs.
A.
The Board and the Attorney General maintain the Amendment not only established a floor but also set a ceiling for employee salaries. They correctly note that evidence of the floor is clear from the language of the Amendment: “employees shall be entitled to compensation . . . as provided in the collective negotiation agreement as if the school facilities remained open for any . . . use of virtual or remote instruction.”
Had the Legislature actually intended to limit compensation during an emergency, it could have done so clearly. It could have said, for example, that “notwithstanding any provision of a collective bargaining agreement, no additional compensation shall be paid for work performed during a state of emergency.” But it did not. Instead, the Sponsors’ Statement says just the opposite: “Nothing in the bill may be construed to limit . . . compensation . . . or any provision of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the school district.” Sponsors’ Statement to A. 3904 6; Sponsors’ Statement to S. 2337 8.
B.
The majority places weight on the Amendment‘s introductory phrase -- “Nothing in subsection b., c., or d. shall be construed to limit . . .
Those two concepts do not conflict with one another. The parties could negotiate for new additional services at the same time employees were to be paid under the terms of their existing CBAs. For example, custodians working onsite during a state of emergency could negotiate for additional compensation if they were asked to provide lunch for certain students as well.
In any event, faced with an ambiguous provision of law, and more than one plausible way to interpret it, an arbitrator‘s judgment is “at least reasonably debatable” and entitled to deference. Carteret, 247 N.J. at 212. Courts reviewing the award “may not substitute [their] own judgment” even if they disagree with the arbitrator. Local 275, 213 N.J. at 201-02. When, as here, the arbitrator‘s award is “reasonably debatable,” it “must” be confirmed. Local 196, 190 N.J. at 301.
“[I]n rare circumstances[,] a court may vacate an arbitration award” if it is contrary to public policy. Tretina, 135 N.J. at 364; accord Local 196, 190 N.J. at 294; East Rutherford, 213 N.J. at 202.
In this case, the Appellate Division concluded that the arbitrator‘s award of extra compensation to custodial employees “conflicts with public policy.” The appellate court found that subsection (e) itself is the Legislature‘s “embodiment of public policy” and was intended to “limit[] the financial exposure of school districts for extra compensation” during the extended “COVID-19 state of emergency.” The majority agrees with that interpretation. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 18).
To vacate an arbitration award on public policy grounds, the award must “plainly violate[] a clear mandate of public policy.” Local 196, 190 N.J. at 294 (citing Weiss, 143 N.J. at 443); Tretina, 135 N.J. at 364-65. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that “[s]uch a public policy . . . must be well defined and dominant” “by reference to ‘laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.‘” W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
The Amendment moved from introduction on March 23, 2020, to passage on April 13, 2020. There is no record of any committee hearings, and no legislators offered comments on the bill before they cast voice votes remotely. See N.J. Legislature, Bill A. 3904, https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/billsearch/2020/A3904 (last visited July 13, 2026); N.J. Legislature, Assembly Session March 25, 2020 -- 2 p.m., https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/prior-session-agenda?date=2020-03-25-14:00:00&committee=A&agenda=Session&session=2020; N.J. Legislature, Senate Session April 13, 2020 -- 10 a.m., https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/prior-session-agenda?date=2020-04-13-10:00:00&committee=S&agenda=Session&session=2020. Although the Senate made some changes to other aspects of the bill, no changes were made to the sections relevant to this appeal. Compare A. 3904 (introduced Mar. 23, 2020), with A. 3904 (passed Apr. 13, 2020) (L. 2020, c. 27).
When a case involves the direct review of a statute, courts do not consider legislative history if the text of the statute is clear. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). But it isn‘t in this instance. It invites questions that the Sponsors’ Statements directly answer. It does not matter whether the parties raised the Statements. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 19). What‘s important is that the Court not overlook the clarity and force of the Sponsors’ words.
In addition, even when an “award implicates a clear mandate of public policy, the deferential ‘reasonably debatable’ standard still governs.” Local 275, 213 N.J. at 203 (citing Weiss, 143 N.J. at 443). In any event, to determine
VI.
For the reasons set forth above, the arbitrator‘s award, at a minimum, is reasonably debatable. It is therefore entitled to deference. It is also supported by a clear statement of legislative policy that the Amendment preserved existing collective bargaining agreements. For those and other reasons, I respectfully dissent.