65 Tenn. 466 | Tenn. | 1873
delivered the opinion of the court.
In October, 1871, E. J. Eason was put upon his
The first error relied on is assigned upon the proceedings in the formation of the jury. It appears that ten jurors were summoned, who, being challenged for cause, stated on their voir dire that they and each of them had formed and expressed an , opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant; that the newspaper account on which their opinion was based purported to give an account of the facts of the case, but did not purport to give the testimony in the case; and that, if accepted and sworn as jurors in this case, they believed they could give a fair and impartial verdict on the law and the testimony. Each one stated that his impressions as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant were derived solely from newspaper accounts, but each said he felt that he could lay aside any opinion thus formed and be governed by the law and evidence exclusively. One of the jurors stated that the newspaper account had made such an impression on his mind as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant as would require full testimony to remove, but if sworn, as a juror, he believed that he could render a fair and impartial verdict according to the law and testimony exclusively, without reference to what he had read. This juror was then challenged for bias, and the challenges to
It is obvious that the proceedings in the formation of the jury were governed by the act of 1870-71, ch. 51 (Shankland, 159). This act is as follows:
“That hereafter no citizen, .in any criminal prosecution in this State, shall be adjudged incompetent to act as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion touching the guilt or innocence of the accused upon information derived exclusively from any published account of the facts of the offense with which the defendant stands charged, unless the writer of said statement in said article professed to have been a witness to the same at the time of their occurrence, which must affirmatively appear; and provided that said juror will state, upon the law and the testimony, on trial, he believes he can give the accused a fair and impartial verdict”
It is manifest that the jury was formed in accordance with this act; and if the act is not in contravention of the Constitution of the State, the defendant. was tried by an “'impartial jury.”
It is insisted for defendant that the act is in violation of art. 1, see. 9, of the Constitution of the State, which secures to the accused in all criminal prosecutions “ a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the crime shall have been committed.”
According to the definition of our standard lexicographer, a man who is “impartial” is one “who is not biased in favor of one party more than another;” who is “indifferent; unprejudiced; disinterested; as an impartial judge or arbitrator.” The primary idea contained in this definition, is freedom from personal bias, indifference between the parties as persons; “not prejudiced” against one or the other; “disinterested” as between them. But it is. clear that the word was not used exclusively in its primary sense, but in its secondary or more general sense — as- freedom from any bias, or indifference, or disinterestedness—for we find that Sir Edward Coke, in enumerating the principal causes of challenge propter de fectum, specifies the following: “That a juryman is of kin to either party within the ninth degree; that he has an interest in
We proceed to ascertain this meaning by referring to the several eases in which the words have been-interpreted.
In the case of Rice v. State, 1 Yer., 432, the court held that “a juror who declares he has formed and expressed an opinion from having heard the witness or testimony touching the alleged crime, is incompetent to sit as a juror upon the trial, and therefore subject to peremptory challenge.” In this case the jurors, upon stating that they had formed their opinion from having conversed with the witnesses, or from hearing them converse, were asked whether, notwithstanding that opinion, they were in a condition to try the cause impartially, and upon answering in the affirmative, they were put to the prisoner as competent. This raised the exact question, whether a juror thus presented was an impartial juror under the Constitution. The court held that the rule is, that jurors should be omnia exceptione majores, and that jurors who had formed and expressed opinions, although they believed they could act impartially, were not competent, because they were under “prejudice or partiality.” Therefore, the court laid down the rule quoted.
In the case of McGowan v. State, 9 Yer., 192,
In the case of Paine v. State, 3 Hum., 375, the jurors, on their examination, stated that from rumor and from the reports in their neighborhood they had formed their opinions. They were put to the prisoner as competent jurors. The court, after quoting the rule as laid down in McGowan v. State, proceeded to say: “We do not know that a rule can be laid down on this subject more clear, explicit, and free from ambiguity. We have given it a careful reconsideration, and believe that in all its parts it is an accurate and just determination of the grounds and principles upon which the impartiality of a juror may be tested. On the other hand, vague and floating r.umors, although they put on the form of a narative and circumstantial detail of facts, will not produce such an impression on a juror’s mind as to affect his impartiality.”
In the case of Norfleet v. State, 4 Sneed, 340, one of the jurors, on his examination, stated that he had said, soon after the killing, that the prisoner ought to be hung, but at that time he had no opinion as to tne guilt or innocence of the prisoner. He was put to the prisoner as competent. The court held that this was error, saying that by the admission, that he had said the prisoner ought to be hung, the juror was incompetent, having prejudged the prisoner’s case.
Without reviewing the cases further, we have cited enough to establish beyond controversy the proposition that, during the existence of the Constitution of 1796 and 1834, the legal meaning of “an impartial jury,” was one which had neither formed nor expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, whether from conversing with the witnesses, or hearing them converse, or hearing a narrative and detail
It is not an unreasonable presumption that a juror who goes into the box with prepossessions in his mind, “will,” as Chief Justice Marshall observes, “listen with more fervor to that testimony which confirms, than to that which would change his opinion. It is not to be expected that he will weigh the testimony as well as one whose opinion is not made up in the ease.” 1 Burr’s Trial, 419.
When the Constitution guarantees to the accused, an impartial jury, it necessarily means that he is entitled to a jury which can enter upon the examination of his case, conceding to him the full benefit of that presumption of innocence which the law gives to every prisoner as a matter of right. This presumption entitles him to an acquittal until it has been overturned by plenary proof. In the formation of the jury under the statute in question, the prisoner