49 Ga. App. 275 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
Lead Opinion
Luther Easley was indicted for the offense of assault with intent to murder, L. H. Satterfield being the victim. The defendant was convicted, and, his motion for a new trial being overruled, he excepted. The indictment charged that the defendant “did, with an automobile, assault, strike and'injure L. H. Satterfield, and did drive said automobile over, against and upon the said L. H. Satterfield, with a reckless disregard for human life and
The intent to do an act, where no provocation or motive appears, is necessarily hard of proof and is generally only provable by cir
Aside from the elements that we have pointed out above that go to show intent to do a certain act, our courts have adopted and sanctioned the rule of law that "there are wanton or reckless states of mind which are sometimes the equivalent of a specific intention to kill, and which may and should be treated by the jury as amounting to such intention when productive of violence likely to result in the destruction of life though not so resulting in the given instance.” Gallery v. State, 92 Ga. 463 (17 S. E. 863). This principle was applied in Dennard v. State, 14 Ga. App. 485 (81 S. E. 378). The facts in that case showed that the person as
We have been extremely doubtful whether such a rule of law as announced in the Dennard case, supra, should be applied in a case where practically all the evidence shows that the accident was merely unfortunate. However, the jury were authorized to take the testimony of the prosecutor as being the truth of the transaction, and his evidence shows that the accused was operating his automobile in a reckless and unlawful manner, from which facts we think, under the rule above stated, the jury would be authorized to find the circumstances of the occasion illustrated a wanton and reckless disregard for human life, which 'would supply the intent necessary to a conviction of assault with intent to murder. Had we been among the members of the jury we might have held to a different verdict, but, the duties of our office are different from
There is no merit in any of the amended grounds of the motion for new trial. The court, therefore, did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. “A specific intent to kill is an essential ingredient of the offense of assault with intent to commit murder, and the indictment should allege such intent.” Wright v.