64 N.Y.S. 848 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
This action was commenced by one Benjamin Weeks to recover from Ellen O’Brien the amount unpaid under a contract by which the plaintiff was to erect a building upon certain premises belonging to the defendant. Upon the first trial the complaint was dismissed upon the ground that there was no allegation or proof that the certificate of the architect required by the contract had been given, and no allegation that such certificate had been demanded and unreasonably refused. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that, as it had been proven that the defendant had given notice under the 4th section of the contract and had proceeded thereunder to complete the contract, the provision requiring the architect’s.signature was rendered inapplicable; that when the owner .proceeds himself under the contract to complete the work he needs no architect’s signature to apprise him whether the contractor has performed his contract. (Weeks v. O'Brien, 141 N. Y. 204.) Subsequently the plaintiff was appointed receiver of Weeks in supplementary proceedings and was substituted as plaintiff in the action. The -original defendant died and her executor was substituted as defendant; and the complaint seems also to have been amended by alleging that the defendant had given the notice required by the 4th subdivision of the contract, and had taken such work out of the plaintiff’s hands and assumed to complete certain
The plaintiff testified that a complete set of the plans for this building was shown to him by the architect, both before and after the making of the contract, and that subsequently the architect delivered to him, from time to time, working drawings which were taken from the plans; and the witness produced a certain drawing
In this contract there is nothing said about the depth of the layer of asphalt and pitch between the two inches of concrete and the
There can be no doubt from this testimony that Lumbye never did complete his contract with the plaintiff; that he never finished ' the work, but that before the -work was finished and the cellar floor was completed the water had burst through it, and that it was in this condition that the plaintiff left the work and refused the repeated demands of the architect to complete the cellar floor. It is true a floor was put upon the cellar by a sub-contractor of the plaintiff, but before that floor was completed the water had burst through and'substantially destroyed it. The plaintiff does not allege that, according to his construction of these plans, this cellar floor as laid by his contractor was in accordance with the plans. He says it
It is not necessary to determine as to the rights of the parties in case the sub-contractor had completed his contract. Plaintiff testified that he- did. not do, and made no attempt to do, what the sub-contractor failed in doing. The plaintiff relies upon the case of MacKnight Flintic Stone Co. v. Mayor (160 N. Y. 81); but the ques
After the plaintiff had failed to complete the contract the owner, through the architect, gave to the plaintiff the notice, as provided for by the 4th article of the contract, that if thexplaintiff did not go
I think that the defendant was entitled to deduct from the amount, due to the .plaintiff the necessary expense that he incurred in completing this cellar and making the floor watertight. ^
On: submitting the case to the jury the' learned trial judge charged as follows : “ It is true that in the specifications appeared the following: ‘The whole of the basement floor to be made perfectly watertight with concrete ’or asphaltum, and must be warranted, and the-■floor to. be laid on top in Portland Cement.’ How, that on its face is. a guaranty on the part of Weeks that he would construct a cellar-floor that would be absolutely watertight. But you must bear in •mind that the architect should have known what'kind of a floor was-needed. He is presumed to have known; and when lie-prepared a. plan which, called for a six-inch floor it was. equivalent to a representation to Mr. Weeks that a six-inch floor constructed of the -best material and best workmanship was • sufficient to make the floor-watertight. That was equivalent to a statement on the part of Mettam to Weeks : ‘ That if you put down a six-inch floor of the. best material and the best, workmanship, then I say to you that. that, is sufficient to make the floor watertight,’ and'then the contractor the guaranty on the part of Mr. Weeks was equivalent to. this :. ‘ If you undertake with me that a six-incli floor, constructed in that-manner, will be sufficient and watertight, then. I will guarantee to-put down a watertight floor six inches thick with the best material- and the best workmanship.’ So yon will see, in order to ascertain whether Mr. Weeks performed his contract, it is very essential to-ascertain the kind of floor the' contract called for. On the other hand, if this contract or the plans which are part of the-contract,, called for a foundation of two feet and then a floor on top of it, then the guaranty on the part of Mr. Weeks was this: That he-would put on a floor two feet thick and a floor that would in that case be watertight. . How, you arc..to • determine that question from, the evidence which has been produced before you and from the plan which they put in evidence, and it is for yon to say whether
I have before discussed the effect of these plans and specifications, and the' view that I take of the contract, considering the plans and specifications as apart of the contract, is, as before stated, that the plaintiff undertook to construct a waterproof cellar floor and was not relieved from this obligation because of anything that appeared upon these plans.
Without discussing the other questions presented in the case, it follows that the judgment must be reversed and anew trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event, unless the plaintiff consents to deduct from the amount of the verdict the sum of $2,804.38 and interest, thus reducing' the judgment as entered to' the sum of $10,422.12, in which case the judgment as .so reduced-must be affirmed, without costs of this appeal.
Patterson, Rumsey, McLaughlin and Hatch, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event, unless plaintiff shall consent to reduce the judgment as entered to the sum of $10,422.12, in which case judgment as so reduced affirmed; without costs of appeal.