91 Ind. 27 | Ind. | 1883
Lead Opinion
— This is a proceeding instituted by appellant ■to have a decree of divorce, procured by appellee, set aside and vacated.
The question for decision is presented by the ruling of the court below in sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. The following abstract of the complaint, as we find it in the brief
Appellant filed her bill in this cause in July, 188-2, stating, among other things, that on the 19th of April, 1854, in the county of Lake and State of Indiana, she intermarried with appellee, and with him lived until August 1st, 1866, when the appellee causelessly filed his petition in the common pleas court of Lake county, Indiana, for a divorce; that, on September 4th, 1866, a rule was had on appellant herein to answer, and that, from a transcript of the record, it appeal's that she appeared and withdrew her appearance, when she was defaulted ; that an affidavit was filed to set aside the default and continue the cause; that the affidavit is missing, and that on January 7th, 1867, the cause was dismissed on motion of plaintiff; that of this proceeding appellant never heard until within a few days before the filing of the bill in this cause ; that, on April 9th, 1867, appellee filed another like petition in the same court; that summons issued and was, on April 25th 1867, returned, showing personal service, and that proof was taken and preparations were made to try this cause; and that about August 1st, 1867, three months later, appellee, in the circuit court of Kosciusko county, filed his third petition for divorce, identical in its allegations with its predecessors, one of which was pending, desertion being the ground alleged. On September 16th, 1867, the second bill, filed on April 25th,, 1867, was dismissed. Sammons issued on the filing of the petition in Kosciusko county, on August 1st, 1867, and, as it is fraudulently pretended and asserted, said summons, on August 9th, 1867, came into the hands of the sheriff of Lake county, and a false, fraudulent, and pretended return is made in these words: “ By leaving a certified copy at the last named place of residence of Miriam H. Earle. Signed Andrew Krinbill, sheriff of Lake county, per J. R. Uptigrove, deputy.” That appellant was never served personally or cbnstructively; that she did not appear, nor did she know of the pendency of the proceeding in Kosciusko county until long after the same
Whether all or any of the matter’s stated in the complaint are, in fact, true, we can not tell. The demurrer admits the
The case, as presented in the complaint, is one calling loudly for relief, if it may be granted in accordance with well settled rules of the law.
It is a principle as old as the laws of civilized communities, that a party shall not be condemned without a hearing or notice, and thus an opportunity to be heard. It is true, that in this State, the policy has been not to review or disturb decrees of divorce. This rule has been adopted by the Legislature and the courts from considei’ations of public policy. But such considerations do not sanction the upholding of decrees rendered in fraud of the courts. Every consideration demands that fraud upon parties shall bo rebuked; that the laws shall be honestly and faithfully administered, and that the courts, which are the conservators of society, shall purge their records of all judgments and decrees procured by deception, fraud, or perjury. While considerations of public policy may forbid the review of decrees of divorce, they apply only when decrees are, in fact, rendered, the court
The courts of this State can not review judgments of divorce ; this is prohibited by statute. In some of the earlier cases it seems to have been held that, in order to obtain relief from a judgment, the statute must be followed, and that the mode therein pointed out is exclusive of all oihers, and that •as it is provided that j udgments of divorce can not be reviewed, there is no remedy.
In the case of McJunkin v. McJunkin, 3 Ind. 30, an application was made to open up a decree of divorce for the purpose of defending upon the merits. It was held that the provisions of the statute in relation to opening decrees for a defence in certain cases, did not apply to decrees of divorce, and the application was denied upon an affidavit being filed by the petitioner in the divorce case, that since the decree he had remarried. This, it will be seen, was not an application to vacate the decree for fraud.
In the case of Woolley v. Woolley, 12 Ind. 663, an application was made under the section of the statute authorizing the court in certain cases to relieve parties within a year from judgments taken against them, through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The court below set aside the judgment, so far as alimony was concerned, after the expiration of the year. The judgment seems to have been reversed for this reason. As to whether or not a decree might be vacated for fraud was not decided, but left in doubt.
In the case of McQuigg v. McQuigg, 13 Ind. 294, an application seems to have been made to vacate and set aside a judgment of divorce for fraud in obtaining it; what the fraud was does not appear in the opinion. From the brief of appellee’s counsel we learn that the fraud charged was that, at the time the decree of divorce was rendered, the petitioner was not a bona fide resident of this State, but of the State of New York, and made a temporary sojourn in Indiana for the sole purpose
The case of Hoffman v. Hoffman, 15 Ind. 278, was decided upon the authority of the McQuigg case, without comment.
The case of Quick v. Goodwin, 19 Ind. 438, was an action against an executor, asking that a sale of lands by him beset aside on account of fraud. The doctrine of the Woolley and McQuigg cases was applied to the case before the court, and upon the authority of those cases-it was held that the remedy pointed out by the statute should be pursued in the form and manner therein indicated. The court added: “ We suppose, under an application to review, etc., fraud in obtaining a judgment may be shown, as a cause, etc.”
In the case of Rindge v. Rindge, 22 Ind. 31, a quasi consent was given to the doctrine of the Woolley and McQuigg cases.
In the case of Gage v. Clark, 22 Ind. 163, which was an action in the common pleas court to vacate a judgment rendered before a justice of the peace, and to obtain a temporary injunction, Perkins, J., rendering the opinion, approved the doctrine of the McQuigg case, holding that the mode of vacating j udgments pointed out by the statute must be followed,
In the case of Ewing v. Ewing, 24 Ind. 468, the Woolley case, in 12 Ind., supra, was approved, and it was held that a new trial or rehearing could not be had in a divorce case under sections 99 and 356 of the code of 1852.
It may be said that the uniform ruling of this court has been that a judgment of divorce can not be reviewed under the section of the code authorizing such a proceeding in ordinary actions, and that new trials after the term at which decrees may have been rendered, can not be had in divorce cases under the section of the code authorizing such new trials in ordinary civil actions.
From the cases above examined, the former rulings seem to have been that no relief could be had from judgments in any case, except in the manner pointed out in the code, and that as no mode is provided by statute in divorce cases, no relief from such judgments could be had. Scattered through the reports, there are quasi recognitions of the rule that judgments may be vacated for fraud, independent of the mode provided in the code, and possibly there may be direct rulings to that effect, which we have overlooked in our present research.
The later, and, we think, better considered eases have departed very materially from some of the cases above examined. In the case of Willman v. Willman, 57 Ind. 501, the rule that judgments in divorce cases can not be reviewed under the code, is recognized, but it is limited to cases of valid and subsisting judgments, and a distinction is drawn between a preceding to review a judgment, and one to vacate and set it aside. It was accordingly held in that case that the decree, appearing to have been rendered without jurisdiction of the defendant, was void, and should be vacated and set aside. In the case of Nealis v. Dicks, 72 Ind. 374, it was held that the statute concerning the review of judgments does not restrict the power of the courts to set aside judg
The case of McQuigg v. McQuigg, 13 Ind. 294, is not noticed, but the doctrine announced, we think, is in conflict with it, so far as it relates to the power of the courts to vacate and set aside judgments obtained by fraud. Equally as strong as the case cited from 72 Ind., supra, is the late and well considered case of Cavanaugh v. Smith, 84 Ind. 380.
These late cases, supported as they are by reason and a very full citation of authorities, establish the doctrine in this State that judgments obtained by fraud upon the court may be successfully assaulted for that r.eason, and that in such assault the grounds and mode pointed out in the statute are not exclusive. See also Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (44 Am. R. 29), and the authorities cited. That judgments thus obtained may be overthrown, vacated and set aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose, is well settled by the law-writers and the adjudicated cases. Bigelow Frauds, 175; Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590 (11 Am. R. 393); Allen v. Maclellan, 12 Pa. St. 328; Johnson v. Coleman, 23 Wis. 452; Singer v. Singer, 41 Barb. 139; Adams v. Adams, 51 N. H. 388, 399 (12 Am. R. 134); Boyd’s Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 241.
It will be noticed, that among the above citations are included a number of divorce cases. No distinction is made in the application of the rule between divorce cases and others, and there is no reason that there should be. Nor is there any reason for a distinction in this State. As we have seen, the statute makes a distinction, so far as relates to the review of judgments, and this distinction has been maintained in the granting of new trials after the term, etc. But -where,
We think, therefore, that when such a wrong has been consummated in the obtaining of decrees of divorce, the courts have the right and owe the duty to set them aside and declare them null and void, and that so far as the case of McQuigg v. McQuigg, supra, and the cases following it, conflict with the conclusion reached, they should be overruled. Very much good, we think, will come from the adoption of the rule in divorce cases, and no harm, provided the injured party is not negligent in moving, upon the discovery of the fraud. Possibly, in some cases, a second husband or wife may innocently be made to suffer, but, with proper restriction, this is not more likely than in the reversal of decrees on appeal to this court.
It is proper and right in the administration of the law to protect innocent third parties, who may' marry a divorced man or woman, but it is quite as proper and important to protect the husband and wife and innocent children from fraudulent divorces. Some of the cases in this State, in which relief has been denied, are forcible illustrations of the necessity of the rule here adopted. The adoption of the rule is essential to the complete'administration of justice, will tend to protect the courts and the family from fraud and wrong, and will serve as a warning to those inclined to practice such fraud.
This brings us to another branch of the controversy, which, in this case, will prevent the granting of the relief asked. It appears from the averments in the complaint that the decree of divorce was rendered in August, 1867. The bill in this case was not filed until July, 1882. Appellant thus allowed near fifteen years to pass without informing the court of the fraud, or making any effort to have the de
It will be observed, too, that it is not averred in the complaint in unqualified terms, that the party who made the pretended service of the summons had no authority to make a valid service. It is said that he was not a regular deputy sheriff, and that the sheriff of Lake county had no power by deputation to clothe him with authority to serve the writ. These allegations are somewhat argumentative in form, and include in them an error of law. The sheriff has authority to appoint a deputy to serve a particular writ. Proctor v. Walker, 12 Ind. 660.
The allegations of the complaint do not exclude the idea that this was done by the sheriff of Lake county; rather, the assumption is, that it was, but was void for want of authority on the part of the sheriff to make such an appointment. Such being the case, the law is well settled, we think, that in order to have such decrees set aside for fraud in obtaining them, the complaining party must move without unreasonable delay, upon the discovery of the fraud, so that innocent parties may not be made to suffer. No excuse is offered by appellant for the long delay except that she has been poor, and has waited until her son should attain his majority. This we think is not sufficient. For aught that appears, she was as well able from the first as now, to move in the matter, and we are not
It is the general rule that parties seeking relief from fraud must move promptly upon the discovery of such fraud, and this rule may, with reason, be applied to a case like this.
In the case of Moon v. Baum, 58 Ind. 194, this court said:
“A party seeking to set aside a judgment for fraud in obtaining it, or an agreement for fraud in its execution, must proceed promptly upon the discovery of the fraud. An unexplained delay, without valid excuse, for more than five years, as in the present case, will defeat an action seeking a remedy against fraud.”
In the case of Singer v. Singer, 41 Barb. 139, the court said:
“Independent of any other considerations, if the motion was properly made, and in due season, the court would order any judgment of divorce obtained by collusion or fraud to be set aside, not from any regard to the parties concerned, but from motives of public policy. In such a case, however, it should be made apparent, that the party so moving was acting from good motives, and not for any expected personal advantage. But where the judgment of divorce has been acquiesced in for a period of several years, and the plaintiff has again been married, some better reason than the mere gratification of personal feeling, or the desire to obtain a further sum of money from the plaintiff, should be made clearly to appear, before the court would be warranted in granting such an application. As I have already said, the ground on which such an order could be made would be one of public policy, but no such reason should suffice where, after the acquiescence of both-the parties in the judgment for three years, an innocent person has become involved by marriage, and the opening of the judgment would involve her in distress, and perhaps disgrace. This reason alone would be sufficient to justify me in denying the motion, if there were no other reasons for doing so.”
In Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N. J. Eq. 60, the Chancellor uses the following language,'on page 65:
*40 “ Further, the complainant returned to New Jersey in July, 1868, immediately after the divorce was granted. The defendant, at about the same time, settled in Brooklyn. In 1870, he was married to the woman with whom, in the bill of complaint' in this cause, the adultery is charged to have been committed, and that alleged adultery is the connubial intercourse between them. By her he has a child, the fruit of their marriage. The complainant filed her bill in July, 1872, four years after the decree of divorce was made, and over two years after her husband had contracted the second marriage. No reason or excuse is given or appears, for this delay in applying for relief against the proceedings of which she complains. * * Here is a longer delay, wholly unexplained. •* * * Public policy does not require the intervention of this court between these parties. It rather forbids.”
Yorston v. Yorston, 32 N. J. Eq. 495. In this case Chancellor Runyon uses the following language, page 505 :
“ For seven years she ” (complainant) “ acquiesced in it and in the marriage which supervened upon it, and in those years three children have been born of that marriage, two of which are living. If the decree of divorce were set aside, the subsequent marriage would thus substantially be declared illegal,, and the children thereof illegitimate. The complainant gives no good reason, and there appears to be none, for her long delay in seeking the aid of this court against the decree. * * * She must be adjudged to have acquiesced in the divorce and subequent marriage.”
The same rule is recognized in the case of Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590, already cited. Smith v. Smith, 3 Phila. 489; Fidelity Ins. Co.’s Appeal, 93 Pa. St. 242; 2 Bishop Marriage and Divorce, section 753b. The author says: “And the party defrauded must, if he would be heard, make his application with reasonable promptness after he has acquired knowledge of the fraud.” Zoellner v. Zoellner, 46 Mich. 511.
In this case, the parties were residents of Detroit in the
It follows, from what we have said, that, on account of appellant’s laches, the court below did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, and that the judgment must be affirmed.
The judgment is affirmed at the costs of appellant.
Rehearing
On Petition foe a Reheaeing.
— The elaborate argument of the learned counsel in support of the petition for a rehearing is based mainly, upon the assumption that the decree of divorce was and is
The record in this case does not contain a copy of the decree and proceedings in the Kosciusko Circuit Court. * The infirmities in those proceedings, so far as shown by the complaint, are not such as appear upon the face of the record. They are such as render the judgment voidable, but not void. As we said in the recent case oí Smith v. Hess, post, p.424, which was decided after a very full and careful examination: “Some confusion has been brought into the cases by the use of the terms void and voidable as applied to j udgments. J udgments are frequently spoken of as void, because they may be so de^ dared in a proper proceeding. The general and correct rule, as established by the weight of authority, is, that a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is not void, unless the thing lacking, or making it so, is apparent upon the face of the record. If the infirmity do not so appear, the judgment is not void, but voidable. One is a nullity, a mere brutum fuhien, and may be so treated by all persons, in collateral as well as direct attacks. The other, except in certain cases of fraud, is binding upon third parties, and upon the parties to it, as against ■a strictly collateral attack. Freeman Judg., section 116; Allen v. Huntington, 16 Am. Dec. 702; Gall v. Fryberger, 75 Ind. 98; Bloomfield R. R. Co. v. Burress, 82 Ind. 83; Coan v. Clow, 83 Ind. 417; Cain v. Goda, 84 Ind. 209 ; Krug v. Davis, 85 Ind. 309; Pressler v. Turner, 57 Ind. 56; Evans v. Ashby, 22 Ind. 15.”
The Kosciusko Circuit Court is one of record and general jurisdiction, with full power to hear and render decrees in cases for divorce. It had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and, so far as shown by the record, of the persons of the pe