Defendant Earl appeals his conviction of two counts of the of-mse of armed robbery, five counts of the offense of aggravated as-lult, and one count of the offense of possession of a sawed-off shot-un. Held:
1. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to author-:e his conviction and maintains that no evidence was presented hich corroborates the testimony of an accomplice concerning de-mdant’s participation in the crimes of which he was convicted, inhere an accomplice is the sole witness upon whose testimony the tate relies, a felony conviction is not to be had unless the testimony f the accomplice is corroborated by some slight evidence from an xtraneous source identifying the accused as a participant in the riminal act.
Kesler v. State,
All of the offenses arise from two incidents which occurred min-tes apart during the early morning hours of August 23, 1992. The rst incident occurred when four victims leaving a nightclub in Mari-tta were approached outside the club by three armed black males ho threatened and ordered the victims to get down on the ground, ad took the wallet of one victim. A short time later the second indent occurred in the City of Smyrna when a single victim walking ome from a party was robbed at gunpoint and beaten by five black tales who emerged from a passing car. Defendant was indicted along ith four alleged accomplices. Two of the accomplices pled guilty rior to trial and one of these individuals testified for the State at ial. The accomplice stated that during the Marietta robbery, de-mdant and one other accomplice waited in the car, that the car was sfendant’s, and that after the Marietta robbery they went to Smyrna *892 where the second robbery occurred. The accomplice's description o the events suggested that defendant was an active participant in th< robberies. None of the victims was able to identify any of the perpe trators.
On the same day as the robberies, while being questioned on ai unrelated charge, defendant volunteered that he had knowledge o both robberies in this case and told police where to find the gun use< in the robberies. He also admitted to an investigator that he drov the car to the scene of the first robbery, stayed in the car during tb robbery, and heard the discharge of the shotgun during the robbery The victim of the second or Smyrna robbery provided a description o the car driven by the robbers which corresponded with defendant' car, in which defendant and a co-defendant were stopped by polic later during the day of the robberies.
“ ‘On appeal of a criminal conviction, the appellant is no longe indulged with the presumption of innocence, for the jury has ren dered its verdict; (this court does) not weigh the evidence or deter mine the witness’ credibility but construe(s) the evidence to uphoL the verdict. (Cit.)’
Clark v. State,
2. Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jui regarding the State’s burden of proof in that the charge given did n< accurately convey to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt becaui
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it included this language: “Moral and reasonable certainty is all that san be expected in a legal investigation.” However, while the Supreme Dourt of Georgia has stated that the better practice is to omit this phrase from a jury charge, it has also held that it is not reversible srror when considered in the context of a correct charge on reasonable ioubt.
Marion v. State,
3. Defendant contends the trial court erred in conditioning the probated portions of his sentence upon the payment of restitution for ;he fee of his court-appointed attorney without conducting a hearing ;o determine his ability to pay. “ ‘OCGA §§ 17-14-8 through 17-14-10 contemplate a hearing and specific written findings by the court in ietermining whether it will order restitution and, if so, the amount ;hereof.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Bridges v. State,
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and case remanded.