105 Mass. 193 | Mass. | 1870
The plaintiff puts his right to recover on the ground that there existed a legal obligation upon the defendants to erect and maintain convenient gates, bars or other barriers, across the open way between his house and the highway, where it crossed the railroad. There was no evidence that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care, and none that the defendants were negligent in any other respect.
The defendants acquired their title to the location over the plaintiff’s land by deed reserving the way in question. We do not find anything in the terms of the reservation, which imposes upon the corporation the duty alleged. It is to be construed by the condition of things at the time the deed was made. And although, strictly speaking, the way across the land conveyed was then first created by the reservation, (because a man cannot have an easement on his own land,) yet it is to be considered that the travelled path existed, long before, had practically defined limits, and was appropriated to a known use as a passageway. In common acceptation, it was an open and unobstructed way, and is referred to in the reservation itself as a way then existing. In the absence of express stipulation, the parties must be deemed to have intended to preserve and continue a way for the plaintiff’s use, as it then was, open and unobstructed; and this has been the construction put upon its terms, apparently, by the acquiescence of the parties, from the time the railroad was built.
Nor is there anything in the St. of 1846, c. 271, reenacted in the Gen. Sts. e. 63, § 43, which requires the closing of this way
The case finds that the defendants had constructed such cattle guards across their track, on both sides of the way in question; and there is nothing to show that they had not complied in this instance with the reasonable requirements of the statute.
Judgment on the verdict.