Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marylin Diamond, J.), entered November 21, 2001, which denied defendant and third-party defendant Eurotech’s cross motion to the extent it sought summary judgment on the third-party complaint and related cross claims, and which granted in part defendant and third-party plaintiff J.T. Hagen’s cross motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claims against Eurotech, unanimously modified, on the law, J.T. Hagen’s cross motion denied, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Defendant Hagen was the general contractor, and defendant Eurotech was one of Hagen’s subcontractors, at a work site where plaintiff was injured. Hagen commenced a third-party action against Eurotech sounding in common-law and contractual indemnification arising from a purported agreement between the parties, and for breach of contract arising from Eurotech’s failure to procure and maintain insurance coverage naming Hagen as an additional insured. The narrow issue, at this juncture, is whether there existed such a binding enforceable contract as between these defendants. A Hagen employee testified at his deposition that a specified purchase order constituted a binding written agreement, that work had commenced under the agreement, albeit prior to execution, and that he had signed the agreement on behalf of Hagen, after which work under the agreement continued. A Eurotech employee whose responsibilities included contracts testified, to the contrary, that he did not believe there had been a written agreement. Eurotech’s president submitted an affidavit avering that the course of dealings between the parties was to orally arrange for work to be performed, and that, in fact, there had been no written agreement on this job as to such work. The record copy of the purchase order states by its terms that it
