36 P. 702 | Idaho | 1894
The plaintiff brought action against the 'defendant county to recover certain sums of money claimed to be due to him from said county for services rendered as sheriff. By stipulation or agreement the case was heard at a term of the ■district court for Latah county. The ease was heard before the ■court without a jury upon an agreed statement of facts, and a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. Motion for new ■trial was made by plaintiff, and overruled, and it is from the ■order of the district court overruling said motion that this appeal is taken.
The first cause of action is set out in the complaint in the following words: "3. That on or about the 1st of April, 1893, there was a state warrant issued by S. J. Isaman, probate judge, in the name of the state of Idaho, against Jingle Brothers, and placed in the hands of this plaintiff, as such sheriff, for service And arrest of said Jingle Brothers; that, pursuant to said war
It is conceded that a portion of the services set forth in the first cause of action were rendered in the state of Washington. In reference to claims presented to the board of commissioners of counties, section 1775 of the Eevised Statutes of Idaho provides as follows: “The board may allow the claim in part and draw a warrant for the portion allowed, on the claimant filing a receipt in full for his account.” In Yavapai Co. v. O’Neil (Ariz.), 29 Pac. 430, the supreme court of Arizona, construing a statute identical with that of Idaho, say: “It is a salutary rule that requires the claimant, if he be dissatisfied with the al
We might, and perhaps it would be better for us to, close this decision here; but a question is presented in the second cause of action in plaintiff’s complaint, which counsel claim is one of such general interest, and about which there seems to be such a diversity of views among the officials interested therein, as to warrant us in giving it our consideration at this time. The. second cause of action presented in the plaintiff’s complaint is for attendance upon the terms of the district court for his county, for which he charges the county five dollars per diem. The board allowed thirty-three dollars of this claim, upon what principle, or by what authority, we are unable even to conjecture. It is contended by counsel for appellant that, as the statute (Idaho Rev. Stats., see. 1871, subd. 4.) requires the sheriff to attend all terms of the district court, he must be entitled to compensation therefor. From a strictly scriptural standpoint,