48 W. Va. 364 | W. Va. | 1900
On the 26th of January, 1852, James Ferrell and wife conveyed by deed of that date to Simeon H. Hawkins two tracts of land in Tyler County, one for three hundred and forty-five, the other for three hundred and five acres. By deed of date September 20, 1815, said Simeon conveyed the said tract of three hundred and five acres of land to Joshua T. A. Hawkins in consideration of two thousand dollars. Simeon died in 188-, leaving surviving his children and heirs at law, Isaac N. Hawkins, B. F. Hawkins, Acena S. Keller, W. C. Hawkins, Delila Pipes and Joshua T. A. Hawkins. By deed of date April 17, 1883, Joshua T. A. Hawkins, Benjamin E. Hawkins, Acena S. Keller, W. C. Hawkins and Delila E. Pipes conveyed to Isaac N. Hawkins thirty acres of land. By deed of lease dated December 13,
The demurrer was filed to the amended bill which contains all the material allegations of the original bill. Is the bill sufficient, if its allegations are true, to'entitle plaintiffs to any relief in the cause? Simeon H. Hawkins conveyed to Joshua T. A. Hawkins three hundred and five gcres of land, which the bill alleges was conveyed in trust, to be by said grantee conveyed to the other heirs of said Simeon, in partition as an inheritance from him, said Simeon. This is an attempt to reform a deed executed in September, 1875, which is plain and unambiguous in its terms. The consideration for the tract of land is two thousand dollars, for which the land is conveyed in fee to Joshua T. A. Hawkins and not a word in it indicated that the
The defendant Isaac N. Hawkins only having a life estate in the thirty acres, by reason of the limitation in the deed of April 17, 1883, from Joshua T. A. Hawkins and others, he is yet entitled to an interest in the oil and gas in the tract of land as life tenant under the leases made by B. F. Hawkins as committee and guardian, of August 20 and December 14, 1897, whenever the property should be developed and operated and the oil
Appellees contend that the court erred in permitting the amended bill to be lodged in the papers; the original bill having been answered; that it was lodged in the papers without notice, that no excuse is set up 'or given in the amended bill why all the matters alleged therein could not have been set up in the original bill, that the amended bill makes an entirely different suit by introducing new matters and new parties, and cite Piercy v. Beckett, 15 W. Va. 444, where it is held that “amendments can only be granted when the bill is defective in parties, or in prayer for relief, or in the omission of or mistake as to a fact or a circumstance connected with the substance, but not forming the substance itself, or for putting in issue new matter to meet proper allegations in the answer.” The 'amendment in the bill is principally in the prayer that if they fail in securing the one-half of the one-eighth of the oil under the conveyance to Fluharty by Isaac H. Hawkins of June 3, 1896, by reason of the limitation of the estate vested in Isaac by the deed of April 17, 1883, then that they may have the one-half of the interest of said Isaac whatever it may be, and in making new parties, they make no new case by their amended bill. Appellee in his addendum to his brief says: “I contend that while the complainants may argue that they are not bound by the decree of the circuit court of Tyler County (in the proceedings to sell the interest of the insane person and the infants in the oil) it makes no difference, they' and all persons are bound, complainants having no interest in the oil and gas had no lights which we were bound to respect,” and cites South Penn Oil Co. v. McIntyre, 44 W. Va. 296. This is true as far as it concerned alone the interest of thp insane person and the infants, but if
Appellee contends that the court erred in refusing to dissolve the injunction awarded in this cause on May 17, 1898, when the cause was heard on motion to dissolve after due notice of such motion, upon .the original bill and answer, with replication thereto, and affidavits in support of said motion and affidavits for plaintiff in opposition thereto, and upon the amended bill lodged in the hands of the court, and cites Hayslett v. McMillen, 11 W. Va. 464; Shank v. Knight, 12 W. Va. 667; 42 W. Va. 10; Cox v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 175, and Burosen v. Vaughn, 44 W. Va. 406. In these cases the general rule in equity is laid down, “that an injunction will be dissolved at the hearing of the motion to dissolve it on bill and answer sworn to, if the answer fully, fairly, plainly, distinctly and positively denies the allegations of the bill, on which the injunction was granted, and the material allegations of the bill are not supported by proof other than the affidavit verifying the truth of its allegations.” 'In Shank v. Knight, cited, it is held in syl. pt. 3: “There are some exceptions to this general rule, but it ought to be followed when great injury would result to the defendant, if the injunction was continued till the hearing and no serious loss would be sustained by the plaintiff if it were dissolved, even if the cause should be decided in his favor.” There were several affidavits in support of the allegations of the bill in addition to the verification of the bill, touching the leading point in the case, the soundness of mind' of the defendant, Isaac N. Hawkins, at the time of making the contracts set out in the bill. “The presumption of law is that the grantor in a deed was sane and competent to execute it at the time of its execution.” Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612. This presumption of law is supported by the
The decree will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings to be had thereon.
Reversed.