Lead Opinion
[¶ 1] Matthew Eagleman appealed from district court orders summarily dismissing his application for post-conviction relief and his motion for new, trial. We
I
[¶2] In 2002, Eagleman pied guilty,to gross sexual imposition and harboring a runaway. After twice violating his probation, the district court revoked Eagleman’s probation and sentenced him in, 2011. This 2011 sentence included a third probationary term. . In 2012, the State moved to correct this sentence because, under State v. Stavig,
[¶ 3] In December 2013, Eagleman moved the district court to correct what he argüed was an illegal sentence. This motion contained arguments similar to those we rejected in his 2013 appeal. In February 2014, the district court dismissed the motion. Eagleman appealed that order. In May 2014, Eagleman withdrew1 the appeal. In Juñe 2014, Eagle-man filed an application for post-conviction relief,'arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel 'at the October 2012 sentencing hearing because, among other alleged deficiencies, his counsel failed to request a recent risk assessment concerning his classification as a sexually dangerous individual. In April 2015, the district court summarily dismissed the application, concluding Eagleman already exercised his right to post-conviction relief, the application was a reiteration of previously adjudicated claims, and the statute of limitations barred the application.
[¶ 4]' Eagleman moved for a new trial on May 7, 2015, again arguing he'received ineffective assistance of counsel at the 2012 sentencing hearing.' On May 8, 2015, Ea-gleman appealed the district court’s April 2015 order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. On June 5, 2015, we temporarily remanded Eagleman’s appeal from the order dismissing Eagleman’s application so the district court could rule on Eaglemaris motion for new trial, which the district court denied on June 16, 2015. On June 28,2015, Eagleman filed a consolidated appeal from the order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief and from the order denying his motion for new trial.
11
. [¶ 5] The. district court dismissed Ea-glemaris application for post-conviction relief because the court concluded Eagleman previously exercised his right to post-conviction relief, the application was a reiteration of previously adjudicated claims, and the statute of limitations barred the application,
A
[¶ 6] Although not citing a specific statutory provision, by dismissing Ea-gleman’s application as a reiteration -of previous claims and because Eagleman already exercised his right to post-conviction relief, the district court presumably dismissed Eaglemaris' application under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1). Section 29-32.1-12(1), N.D.C.C., provides: • “An application for post-conviction relief may be denied on the ground that the same claim or claims were fully and. finally determined in a previous proceeding.” “Petitioners are not entitled to .-post-conviction relief when their claims are variations of previ
[¶7] In Eagleman’s prior appeals, we considered issues different from those presented by the current appeal. In the 2005 appeal, we considered whether Eagleman received ineffective assistance of counsel during an April 2004 evidentiary hearing, whether there was previously unheard evidence, and whether he was coerced into withdrawing an earlier application for post-conviction relief. Eagleman,
B
[¶ 8] The district court also dismissed Eagleman’s application as untimely under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2). The State fleetingly argues the two year statute of limitations under N.D.G.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) began at entry of the 2002 judgment of conviction, making the application untimely. This requires us to determine when Eagleman’s conviction became “final” for the purposes of N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2). “Statutory interpretation is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.” Teigen v. State,
Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined in the code or unless the drafters clearly intended otherwise. Statutes are construed as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to different, rational meanings. If the language is ambiguous or doubtful in meaning, the court may consider extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to determine legislative intent.
State ex rel. North Dakota Dep’t of Labor v. Matrix Props. Corp.,
[¶9] The Uniform 'Post-Conviction Procedure Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1, governs all post-conviction proceedings. “The purpose of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is ‘to develop a com-
[¶ 10] The ' legislature codified these limitations at N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2), under which “an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final.” A conviction becomes “final” when:
a. The timé for appeal of the conviction to the North Dakota supreme court expires; b. If an appeal was taken to the North Dakota supreme court, the time for petitioning the United States su- , preme court for review expires; or c. If review was sought in the United States supreme court, the date the supreme court issues a final order in the case.
Id, Section 29-32.1-01(3), N.D.C.C., provides three exceptions to when a conviction becomes “final.” .Eagleman does not argue any of these exceptions apply to his case and they are not part of our consideration.
[¶ 11] A person convicted and sentenced for a crime may seek post-conviction relief on a number of grounds allowed by the legislature. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(1). An applicant may seek post-conviction relief for an unlawful -conviction or where a court without jurisdiction rendered the judgment of - conviction. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(l)(a), (b), (c). An applicant may seek post-conviction relief for sentences not authorized by law, imposed- in violation of the state or federal constitutions, or imposed by a court without jurisdiction. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(l)(a), (c), (d). Additionally, an applicant may seek post-conviction relief relating to the unlawful revocation of probation. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(l)(g). The ability to seek post-conviction relief from both an original conviction and from a revocation of probation, which are independent of one another, recognizes an error relating to the revocation of probation and accompanying sentence would be independent and subsequent to any error regarding the original conviction and accompanying sentence. See also N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06(2) (providing the statutory right to appeal from a final judgment of conviction); State v. Causer,
[¶ 12] Other states have recognized this distinction for purposes of post-conviction relief statutes of limitations. In Idaho, “[i]f the post-conviction claims arise from matters that occurred after judgment in the criminal case and that led to a post-judgment order from which the petitioner seeks relief, then the limitations period commences upon the expiration of the time for appeal from the post-judgment order.” Green v. State,
[¶ 13] This distinction is consistent with how we interpret N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2). Regarding orders revoking probation, a conviction becomes “final” under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) once the applicant forgoes, whether in whole or in part, or exhausts the appeals process relating to the order revoking probation. After that date, an applicant has two years to seek post-conviction relief for allowable claims under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(1) concerning the revocation of probation. This finality of the order revoking probation is independent of when the original conviction became “final” for the purposes of N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) because the order revoking probation is distinct from the original judgment of conviction. However, any application relating to the revocation of probation is necessarily limited to issues relating to the order revoking probation, unless other issues are otherwise properly before the court. This does not allow the applicant to litigate or relitigate issues unrelated to the order revoking probation. . •
[¶ 14] We recognize other states apply their respective statute -of limitations for -post-conviction, relief from the date of the original judgment. See, e.g., People v. McPherson,
[¶ 15] We accordingly reject the State’s argument the date of the original judgment of conviction controls N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) regarding orders revoking probation. The 'State’s interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) would limit post-conviction relief for orders revoking probation to the same time frame allowed for an applicant to seek relief from the original conviction. For a number of reasons, orders revoking probation may occur years, if not decades, after the time to seek post-conviction relief from the original conviction has tolled. Eagleman’s case is illustrative in this regard, with the district court entering its corrective order in October 2012, over a decade after entry of the original judgment in May 2002. Under the State’s interpretation, N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) would have barred Eagleman’s application sometime in 2004, eight years before the alleged grounds for post-conviction'relief occurred. Nothing in the legislative history concerning N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) indicates- the legislature intended to limit post-conviction relief for orders revoking probation in this manner. Rather, the legislative recognition of the differences between problems related to an original conviction and problems related to a
[¶ 16] Applying our above interpretation, Eagleman’s claim was timely under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2). The district court revoked ' Eagleman’s probation in 2011 and entered a sentence containing a third probationary period. 'However, because this sentence was illegal under Star vig, the court entered a corrective order on October 31, 2012. Eagleman appealed and we affirmed on June 19, 2013. Section 29-32.1-01(2), N.D.C.C., required Eagle-man to file his application within two years. Eagleman filed his application in June 2014, rendering his application timely under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2). The district court erred with its contrary conclusion.
Ill ‘
[¶ 17] Eagleman argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his motion- for new trial. In his motion, Eagletaan argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the October 2012 sentencing hearing. The court summarily dismissed the motion under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(2), concluding Eagleman failed to provide any documentation supporting his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.
[¶ 18] Eagleman’s May 2015 motion was labeled a motion for new trial. “We are not bound by ... a party’s label, and may look to the substance of the motion to determine its proper classification. ‘Improper labels are not binding on appeal.’” In re N.C.C.,
[¶ 19] “We treat motions for reconsideration as either motions to alter or amend a judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j), or as motions for relief from a judgment or order under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b).” Greywind v, State,
[¶ 20] Eagleman’s motion for reconsideration is, in large part, derivative of his application for post-conviction relief, with the majority of the motion again alleging how his counsel, was ineffective. However, Eagleman also asserted the application was not á reiteration of old claims already addressed by the courts, a justification the court used in dismissing his application. The district éourt did not address this argument before it dismissed the motion on grounds that Eagleman failed to provide proper documentation. As discussed above, the district court
[IT 21] Our May 23, 2014 dismissal of Eagleman’s 2014 appeal did not reach the merits of the appeal and the appeal did not concern whether Eagleman received ineffective assistance of counsel at the revocation of probation hearing. The procedural posture of this case does not support the State’s res judicata argument regarding the motion for reconsideration because no court has addressed whether Eagleman received ineffective assistance of counsel at the 2012 sentencing hearing, despite the voluminous amount of motions before the district court and this Court.
IV
[¶ 22] We do not address the other arguments or issues raised because they are either unnecessary to the decision or are without merit. We reverse the district court’s orders and remand for an eviden-tiary hearing.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
[¶ 24] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 25] The majority opinion’s statute of limitations analysis is contrary to the plain and unambiguous words of- the statute:
Except as provided in subsection 3, an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final. A conviction becomes final for purposes of this chapter when:
a. The time for appeal of the conviction to the North Dakota supreme court expires;
b. If an appeal was taken to the North Dakota supreme court, the time for petitioning the United States supreme court for review expires; or
c. If review was sought in the United States supreme court, the date the supreme court issues a final order in the case.
N.D.C.C, § 29-32.1-01(2) (emphasis added).
[¶ 26] Post-conviction relief must be filed within two years of the conviction becoming final. Although probation revocation in some circumstances might be raised under the statute, it must be within two years of the conviction becoming final. Our cases make clear that probation revocation is not conviction. E.g., State v. Wetzel,
[¶27] The statute is a post-conviction relief statute, not a post-probation-revocation statute. A defendant may directly appeal probation revocation. He may not collaterally attack probation beyond two years after the conviction became final.
[¶ 28] “When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it.is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05. Here the majority’s disregard of the plain wording of the statute is also contrary to the spirit of the provision enacted by the 2013 legislative assembly. See S.B. 2227.