14 N.M. 271 | N.M. | 1907
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The judge who heard the cause found that the letters from Hamilton to the appellant' or its officers in relation to the subject matter, which were apparently not questioned by them at the time, established an express trust. That such writings are legally sufficient for that purpose is well settled. Perry on Trusts, Sec. 82; Uran v. Coats, 109 Mass. 581; Steers v. Steers, 5 Jones Ch. 1.
That being the ease, it was for him to decide what were the terms of the agreement from the evidence. He found that the appellant agreed to furnish to Hamilton $15,000. which was to include the purchase price of the interests in land conveyed by the two deeds first above referred to, his pay for making the purchase and compensation for giving up the claim against E. S. Parsons above named, but not for other services rendered by him. In fact, there remained an amount, after deducting the purchase price, which would seem to be more than a liberal compensation for the services probably performed by Hamilton, but that is judging after event. It might have proved to be necessary to pay the entire $15,000 for the interests acquired, and in that case Hamilton would have been entitled to nothing for his services to the appellant in that matter, and nothing on account of his claim against E. S. Parsons. The Trial Judge found, too, that Hamilton was not .bound to give up the title to the property in question until he received the amount to which he was entitled from the appellant for services rendered in the purchase of it; in effect, that he had a lien on it for that sum. That was in accordance with repeated statements in writing made by Hamilton to officers óf the appellant corporation, and not questioned by them.
The appellant alleges error in the admission of the correspondence between Hamilton and Tilden, its president, and Sturgeon, its secretary and treasurer, on the ground that the statements in Hamilton’s letter were self-serving. and that it did not appear that the officers named had any authority from the board of directors or otherwise to bind the corporation in the matter in question, especially since, as the appellant claims, it was a past trans- • action. The correspondence related to co-temporary transactions, to the trust which had not been terminated by per-formanee of its conditions, and to the services of Hamilton which were then being rendered.
No such application was made by the appellant, although the court had made the same omission in a memorandum opinion filed in the cause during its progress, to which the appellant had filed numerous specific objections without mentioning the failure to refer to the tax title, which could hardly have escaped notice.
The appellant claims that there was error in allowing interest on the sum found to be due the defendant under the terms of the trust, on the ground especially that “he can make no profit of his office.” The claim of Hamilton was for services in obtaining deeds of the property to himself, and not for anything done after he became trustee. The Trial Court found that at a certain date he had done all that he had agreed to do for the appellant in relation to the property he held in trust, except to convey* that property to it, and that he was ready and offered to make conveyance on the compliance by it with the terms of the trust, and on that state of facts found, we think correctly, that he was entitled to interest on the compensation he -was to receive from the time it became due. Armijo v. Abeytia, 5 N. M. 533; Cyc. 22, 1495.
Judgment sustained.