717 N.Y.S.2d 351 | N.Y. App. Div. | 2000
OPINION OF THE COURT
We are asked to determine the validity of a retroactive cancellation of a policy of automobile insurance issued in the State of Virginia by the appellant, Integon Insurance Company (hereinafter Integon). The retroactive cancellation, while permitted under Virginia law, is not permitted under New York law. Resolving the conflict of law question presented in favor of applying the law of Virginia, we find that the retroactive cancellation was valid.
Francis M. Singletary was allegedly injured in New York State when a vehicle in which he was a passenger was struck from the rear by a vehicle owned by Naser Hashem Suleiman and driven by Talat F. Zaza. At the time, Singletary’s vehicle was insured by the petitioner Eagle Insurance Company (hereinafter Eagle), and the Suleiman vehicle was insured by Integon. After learning that Integon had denied coverage for the accident, Singletary made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under his policy with Eagle, and demanded arbitration. Eagle thereafter commenced this proceeding to permanently stay arbitration and to add Integon as an additional respondent. Eagle argued that the accident did not involve an uninsured motorist because, inter alia, the policy issued by Integon to Suleiman provided coverage for the accident. Integon did not dispute that it had issued a policy to Suleiman that was in effect at the time of the accident. Rather, Integon argued that it had properly cancelled the policy retroactively under Virginia law after it discovered that Suleiman made material misrepresentations in his application for insurance. In his application, Suleiman represented that he resided in Virginia
There is no dispute that there is a conflict between the law of New York and the law of Virginia (see, Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. [Stolarz—New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.], 81 NY2d 219). Under Virginia law, a policy of insurance may be cancelled retroactively if it was secured by a misrepresentation that was “material to the risk when assumed” (Va Code Annot § 38.2-309; see, Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v National Indem. Co., 210 Va 769, 173 SE2d 855; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Butler, 203 Va 575, 125 SE2d 823). New York law does not allow retroactive cancellation (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313; Matter of Insurance Co. v Kaplun, 274 AD2d 293; Olivio v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 46 AD2d 437). This conflict of law, although arising in the context of a motor vehicle accident, must be resolved by the conflict of law rules relevant to contracts, not torts (see, Zurich Ins. Co. v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 84 NY2d 309; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. [Stolarz—New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.], supra).
Traditionally, conflict of law questions relating to contracts were resolved by application of the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made or was to be performed (see, Zurich Ins. Co. v Shearson Lehman Hutton, supra; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. [Stolarz—New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co ], supra). Currently, the courts apply the more flexible “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” inquiry, which permits consideration of the “spectrum of significant contacts” in order to determine which State
Further, on the facts presented, this conclusion is not altered by inquiry into the respective governmental interests implicated. The grouping of contacts inquiry is the “primary analytical tool” to be used in resolving conflict of law issues relating
Ordered that the appeal from the order entered October 6, 1999 is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying re-argument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated August 4, 1999 is reversed insofar as appealed from, and that branch of the petition which was to add Integon Insurance Company as an additional respondent is denied; and it is further,
Ordered that the appellant is awarded one bill of costs.