73 Pa. Commw. 155 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1983
Opinion by
Before us is the motion for summary judgment
Both parties agree that the central issue in this dispute is purely one of law; namely, whether or not a harness racing licensee may accept wagering on simulcasts of out-of-state thoroughbred horse races.
The resolution of this issue, of course, depends upon the statutory construction
Interstate simulcastings of horse races
Each commission may, upon request by any licensed corporation, grant permission for electronically televised simulcasts of horse races to be operated by the licensed corporation at the race track enclosure where a horse race meeting is being conducted during, between, be*158 fore or after posted races for that racing day. The simulcasts shall be limited to horse races conducted at facilities outside this Commonwealth and televised to race track enclosures within this Commonwealth. All simulcasts of horse races from outside this Commonwealth shall also comply with the provisions of the Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1811, 15 USC 3001 et seq. All forms of parimutuel wagering as described under section 221 shall be allowed on horse races to be televised by simulcasting. Each commission may promulgate rules or regulations to regulate the wagering and the operation of these horse races. All moneys wagered by patrons on these horse races shall be computed in the amount of money wagered each racing day for purposes of taxation under Section 222. (Emphasis added.)
The petitioners argue that under this Section the respondent harness racing associations or operators are licensed to conduct and accept wagering only for simulcasts of harness (as opposed to thoroughbred) races. The petitioners point to Section 201(a) of the Act
*159 The State Horse Racing Commission shall have the power to supervise all thoroughbred horse race meetings at which pari-mutuel wagering is conducted. The State Harness Racing Commission shall have the power to supervise all harness horse racing meetings at which parimutuel wagering is conducted. The commission may adopt rules and regulations to effect the purposes and provisions of this act.
Thus, according to the petitioners, the General Assembly’s establishment of separate regulatory bodies, one for thoroughbred and one for harness racing indicates the intent of Section 216 of the Act to be that wagering on interstate simulcasts of horse races may be permitted only for races of the same kind as those being conducted at the particular track concerned.
Inarguably, a harness licensee cannot conduct live thoroughbred races or accept wagering thereon. The respondents maintain, however, that the operation of a thoroughbred simulcast under Section 216 of the Act is not the equivalent of conducting a thoroughbred race, and that in granting permission to simulcast thoroughbred races to its licensees, the Harness Commission did not, under Section 201 of the Act, assert any jurisdiction over thoroughbred racing activities nor did it, under Section 202(a) of the Act, thereby supervise a thoroughbred horse race meeting.
Our examination of the language in Section 216 of the Act discloses that the Act contemplates: that simulcasts as being operated (not conducted) by the licensee; that the races which are simulcast are considered as conducted at facilities outside the Com
"We must hold, therefore, that Section 216 of the Act does not preclude
Accordingly, we will enter judgment in favor of the respondents.
Order
And Now, this 28th day of March, 1983, the petitioners’ motion for summary judgment and a declaratory judgment in the above-captioned matter is hereby denied and it is further ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the respondents.
Summary judgment may be entered when a case is clear and free from doubt, and when the moving party has established that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing the record most favorably to the non-moving party. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Bar Ass’n v. Thornburgh, 62 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 88, 434 A.2d 1327 (1981) (summary judgment available in declaratory judgment action) ; Laspino v. Rizzo, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 625, 398 A.2d 1069 (1979) (summary judgment available in action in equity).
Washington Trotting Association, Inc., Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., and Pocono Downs, Inc.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is in the nature of a demurrer and the moving party’s right to prevail must be so clear that a trial would be a fruitless exercise. Board of Pensions and Retirement v. Bradley, 65 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 154, 442 A.2d 26 (1982).
“The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” Section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 3 Pa. C. S. §1921 (a).
4 P.S. §325.201(a).
4 P.S. §325.201 (b).
4 P.S. §325.202(a).
We specifically reject the petitioners’ contention that to interpret Section 216 of the Act as the respondents urge would allow the Harness Commission to usurp the State Horse Racing Commission’s jurisdiction in other areas such as track admission fees. Control over wagering simply is not the equivalent of control over the race meeting itself.
We need not, therefore, consider the respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.