Lead Opinion
A рolice officer of Eastman, Georgia received information from a reliable informant two or three days before the last Sunday in April 1974, that illegal drugs would be flown into the Eastman airport. No sеarch warrant was obtained, but the airport was put under surveillance on that Sunday. A state trooper, who was on "radar alert,” arrived at the airport and was told of the suspected criminal activity. The trooper agreed to observe the road leading away from Eastman and the airport. The suspect arrived by plane, and was observed in an automobile which turned in the direсtion of the state trooper. The suspect was stopped by the trooper for a routine check of licenses. He was first arrested for an expired tag, and upon the immediate arrival of the Eastman officers thereafter, the drugs were observed in plain view in a box inside the automobile.
The defendant was indicted separately for two offenses of possession of dangerous drugs. His motions to suppress this evidence were denied. Defendant appeals. Held:
1. A limited right to stop automobiles on the highway is allowed under the state’s police power. Anderson v. State,
2. Having recеived reliable information from the Eastman police officers that illegal drugs would arrive at the Eastman airport, and having been alerted as to the automobile in question, the state trooper had sufficient probable cause to stop the moving vehicle and search for the suspected illegal drugs, all of which was based upon information to the officers by a reliable informant that the drugs would arrive on that particular Sunday. Register v. State,
3. The drugs were then observed after the defendant was stopped for a routine traffic check, who was then arrested for driving with an expired tag. The рolice officers who arrived immediately saw the drugs in plain view. See Anderson v. State,
4. Under the circumstances set out above, there was not an illegal search and seizure of the illegal drugs, and the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The motion to suppress should have been sustained for the following reasons:
First. There is no evidence that the Eastman police received information from a reliable informant two or three days before the last Sunday in April, 1974, that illegal drugs would be flown into the Eastman-Dodge County airport by the defendant. Officer Darrell Oliver
While the transcript is replete with evidence that the Eastman police officers had the airport under surveillance all day Sunday awaiting the defendant’s arrival by airplane carrying drugs, there is no evidence that they received any information from a reliаble informant that the defendant would be bringing in illegal drugs.
Second. There is no evidence in the record as to how the anonymous informer obtained his information or when his information was obtained so as to enable the officers to distinguish the information received from just another rumor circulating in the underworld. Moreland v. State,
Third. Assuming that the Eastman police officers did have sufficient information to justify a stakeout of the Eastman-Dodgе County airport and to reasonably suspect that the defendant would be flying in illegal drugs, there is absolutely no excuse for their failure to obtain a search warrant for the defendant’s airplanе and automobile. The factual situation presented sub judice bears no resemblance to that presented in Anderson v. State,
Fourth. In the absence of a search warrant, there was no justification for stоpping the defendant’s automobile and the subsequent observation of the suspected drugs. The record shows that the Eastman police officers were
Fifth. The officers did not have the right to seize the suspected drugs on the "plain view” theory as expressed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
"The rationale for the 'plain view’ exception is evident if we keep in mind the two distinct constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. First, the magistrate’s scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause. The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a carеful prior determination of necessity . . . [cits.] The second, distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil is the 'general warrant’ abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in á person’s belongings. . . [cits.] The warrant accomplishes this second objеctive by requiring a 'particular description’ of the things to be seized.
"The 'plain view’ doctrine is not in conflict with the first objective because plain view does not occur until a search is in progress. In each case, this initial instrusion is justified by a warrant or by an exception such as 'hot pursuit’ or search incident to a lawful arrest, or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer’s presеnce. And, given the initial intrusion, the seizure of an object in plain view is consistent with the second objective, since it does not convert the search into a general or exploratory one. As against the minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections, there is a major gain in effective law enforcement. Where, once an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the police inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it would often be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous — to the evidence or to the police themselves — to require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant particularly describing it.
"The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale. The first of these is that plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence . . .
"The second limitation is that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent... But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it,
The "plain view” doctrine applies where an item is in plain view in the automobile when it comes into the possession of the law enforcement authorities "inadvertently and unmotivated by any desire to locate incriminating evidence by any unlawful search and seizure.” (Emphasis supplied.) Lowe v. State,