*1 Before BEAM, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges, and WEBB , United States Chief [1] District Judge.
___________
*2 BEAM, Circuit Judge.
E.S., a handicapped child within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1491, and her mother, Jeanne Stein, appeal [2]
the district court's dismissal of their IDEA сlaims against Independent School District [3] Number 196 and various state defendants. Because we find that E.S. was receiving a free appropriate public education as required by thе IDEA, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
E.S. suffers from dyslexia, a handicap entitling her to special education services. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(1)(A)(i), 1401(a)(15). Independent School District Number 196 (the District) began providing E.S. with special eduсation services in 1992. At that time, as E.S. was entering the fourth grade, testing indicated that E.S.'s broad reading skills were at a 3.0 grade-level equivalent, her reading comprehension was at a 3.2 grade lеvel, her broad written language was at a 2.7 grade level and her writing skills were at a 2.1 grade level. Three years later, as she prepared to enter the seventh grade, E.S. was reassessed. The reassessment tests indicated that E.S.'s broad reading skills were now at a 3.8 grade equivalent, her reading comprehension had improved to a 5.1 grade equivalent, her broad written language was at a 3.1 grade level and her *3 writing skills were 3.8 grade equivalent. After this assessment, Ms. Stein and the District agreed that E.S. would be provided extended services during the summer of 1995. That summer E.S. receivеd one-to-one tutoring using the Orton-Gillingham instructional technique. Ms. Stein was apparently pleased with the progress she [4]
perceived from those tutoring sessions, because she requested that E.S.'s individualized education plan (IEP) specify that she receive one-to-one instruction using the Orton- [5]
Gillingham method during the 1995-96 school year. The District declined to mandate [6] only the Orton-Gillingham method in the IEP, arguing that E.S.'s teachers should be able to select from a variety of teaching methodologies, including Orton-Gillingham. Furthermore, the District did not agree that E.S. needed exclusively one-to-one tutoring, and proposed placing her in "pull-out" classes of 3-5 students who were at similar educational levels. When the District refused to modify E.S.'s IEP as requested, Ms. Stein requested a duе process hearing. The level I (local review) Hearing Officer received evidence for two days. The hearing officer, relying on the testimony of E.S.'s tutor, found that E.S. could learn eithеr with one-to-one instruction or in a small group of three to five students, as long as those students were at E.S.'s achivement level. The hearing officer therefore refused to order the sсhool to provide one-to-one instruction using Orton-Gillingham. Ms. Stein appealed to a level II (the *4 state educational agency) Hearing Review Officer. The Hearing Review Officеr concluded that "[t]his record does not indicate any substantive violations of [the] IDEA" and denied Ms. Stein's requests.
Their administrative remedies exhausted, E.S. and Ms. Stein filed a complaint in federal distriсt court. Along with the District, they named the State Board of Education, the State Board of Teaching, and the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Children, Families and Learning (collеctively "the State Defendants") as defendants who had violated the IDEA by refusing to provide one-to-one instruction using the Orton-Gillingham method and by refusing to develop an IEP including those services. Thе complaint also alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 504, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363. The parties agreed to sever the IDEA claims from the rest of the complaint and after a severance order was entered, both sides moved for judgment on the record. The district court held that E.S. had failed to establish that one-to-onе instruction using Orton-Gillingham was necessary for her to receive educational benefit. Accordingly, it granted the defendants' motions for judgment on the record. E.S. and Ms. Stein appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
We first аddress the District and the State Defendants' joint motion to dismiss E.S.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. They argue that since E.S.'s ADA and other claims are still pending, the order disposing of the IDEA claim is nоt a final, appealable order.
When a single claim is severed from a lawsuit, it proceeds as a discrete,
independent action and the trial court may render final, aрpealable judgment on the
severed claim, notwithstanding the continued existence of unresolved claims in the
remaining action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; United States v. O'Neil,
(5th Cir. 1983); see also The Toro Co. v. Alsop,
B. IDEA Claim
The IDEA provides federal funds to assist states in educating disabled children. In order to receive this monеy, states must provide a "free appropriate public *6 education" to all of its disabled students by formulating IEPs tailored to their unique needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1412. The Supreme Court has determined that a school meets its *7 obligation if the disabled student's IEP is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Hendirck Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
Because judges arе not trained educators, judicial review under the IDEA is
limited. When reviewing outcomes reached through the administrative appeals
procedures established by 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415 (b) and (c), the district court must givе
"due weight" to the results of those proceedings, resisting any impulse to "substitute
[its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities."
Rowley,
Finally, E.S. and Ms. Stein appeal the district court's denial of their motion to
supplement the administrative record. Although the IDEA permits a court reviewing
the administrative process to admit additional evidence, "a party seeking to introduce
additional evidence at the district court level must provide somе solid justification for
doing so." Independent Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D.,
We have carefully сonsidered the remainder of the appellants' arguments, and find them to be meritless.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is affirmed. A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Notes
[1] The Honorablе Rodney S. Webb, United States Chief District Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation.
[2] In June 1997, Congress amended the IDEA. However, since the events relevant to this litigation occurred prior to the Amendments' effective date, we address only the pre-1997 IDEA. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17 § 201, 111 Stat. 156 (effective date).
[3] The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for thе District of Minnesota.
[4] The Orton-Gillingham instructional technique is described as "a multi-sensory approach used to instruct students with learning disabilities. As such, it is one of several available methods used tо provide instruction."
[5] The IDEA requires school districts to formulate IEPs for each of its disabled students. Those plans are detailed written statements arrived at by a multi-disciplinary team summarizing the child's аbilities, outlining the goals for the child's education and specifying the services the child will receive. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)
[6] While Ms. Stein originally raised numerous objections to the IEP proposed for 1995-96, her complaints have now been narrowed to these two requests.