E.R.J. v. T.L.B.
No. 20220199
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
MAY 9, 2023
2023 ND 85
FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF SUPREME COURT MAY 9, 2023 STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
E.R.J., Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
T.L.B., Defendant and Appellant
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.
Carrie L. Francis, Minot, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.
Thomas J. Corcoran, Williston, N.D., for defendant and appellant; submitted on brief.
Tufte, Justice.
[¶1] T.L.B. appeals from a district court judgment changing the surname of her child from T.L.B.‘s surname to a hyphenated surname under
I
[¶2] T.L.B. and E.R.J., the child‘s father, were never married. E.R.J. initiated this action by petitioning the court to alter the child‘s surname. H.R.B. was one year old at the time the district court issued its
II
[¶3] A district court‘s decision regarding whether a name change under the Uniform Parentage Act is in a minor‘s best interest is subject to clearly erroneous review. Edwardson v. Lauer, 2004 ND 218, ¶ 4, 689 N.W.2d 407. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. In re Berger ex rel. K.C.F., 2010 ND 28, ¶ 8, 778 N.W.2d 579.
[¶4] The statute at issue in Edwardson was
III
[¶5] T.L.B. argues the district court erred in finding thаt she changed her surname upon her recent marriage. T.L.B. testified that she had not changed her name, nor did she intend to do so. She testified, however, that she had entered a hyphenated name on her marriage license, which was a combination of her maiden name and her new husband‘s surname.
[¶6] A “person‘s surname does not automatically change upon marriage,” but parties to a marriage may change their name after solemnization “by entering the new surname in the spacе provided on the marriage license application.”
[¶7] T.L.B. also argues the district court erred in finding that no one in T.L.B.‘s household shares a surname with H.R.B and this error requires this Court to reverse the order. Because there was no clear error in finding T.L.B. had changed her name upon marriage, there is no clear error in the finding that H.R.B. does not share a surname with anyone in T.L.B.‘s household.
IV
A
[¶8] T.L.B. argues the district court erred because it changed H.R.B.‘s name solely under
[¶9] These two sections differ in the findings of fact they require a district court to make before it has authority to change a minor‘s surname.
B
[¶10] T.L.B. argues the district court erred by not considering emotional injury—the sort of injury that precludes a finding of “proper and reasonable cause” under
V
A
[¶11] T.L.B. argues the district court erred because it relied on insufficient evidence to support a finding that hyphenating H.R.B.‘s surname would be in the child‘s best interests. “On request of a party and for good cause shown, the court may order that the name of the child be changеd.”
[¶12] Texas has adopted Uniform Parentage Act § 636(e).
B
[¶13] The Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth, determined that “good cause” and “best interests of the child” were separate concepts. In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891, 894-95 (Tex. App. 2003) (separately analyzing “good cause” and “best interest“). The court first defined “good cause” as a legally sufficient reason. M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d at 896 (citing Black‘s Law Dictionary 213 (7th ed. 1999)). “Good cause is often the burden placed upon a litigant ... to show why a request should be granted or an action excused.” Id. The court then looked to definitions of “good cause” in other legal contexts from Texas law and law from other states. Id. at 896-97. The court concluded the “good cause” standard was not met because there was a “complete absence of evidence.” Id. at 897.
[¶14] The Court of Appeals оf Texas, Dallas, concluded that a petitioner had the burden to separately establish both standards. In re S.M.V., 287 S.W.3d 435, 447-48 (Tex. App. 2009). Finding no case law defining good cause, the court turned to Black‘s Law Dictionary and interpreted it to require a “legally sufficient reason.” Id. at 448. The court concluded there was a legally sufficient reason based on the trial court‘s finding that after the surname change, the child shared a surname with the child‘s joint managing conservator and named biological parent. Id. at 448. In addition, good cause was supported by evidence that the name change “clarifie[d] S.M.V.‘s identity and avoid[ed] potential future confusion that might be caused by S.M.V. possibly having a name different from either biological parent.” Id.
C
[¶15] The Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston, considered the “good cause” standard to be subsumed in the “best interest” analysis. In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 81 n.2 (citing S.M.V., 287 S.W.3d at 447). The court explained that it would “evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence for the best interest finding and presume that the trial court found good cause on the same ground” because the best interests of a child were good cause for changing a child‘s name. Id. In other words, under the statute a petitioner has the burden to show there is good cause to change a child‘s name, and a finding that the child‘s best interests favored a name change would satisfy this good cause standard. See also Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at 151 n.1 (citing H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 81 n.2).
[¶16] Alabama‘s court of civil appeals also interpreted the “good cause” provision under
D
[¶17] We are persuaded that a district court‘s findings that changing a child‘s name is in the best interests of a child satisfies the good cause standard under
We look at the language of the statute and give words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless a contrary intention plainly appears or the wоrds are specifically defined. When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. This Court construes statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted.
State v. Davison, 2017 ND 188, ¶ 8, 900 N.W.2d 66 (cleaned up). Although “good cause” and “best interests of a child” are distinct concepts, M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d at 894-95, we agree that under the Uniform Parentage Act, a finding that a name change is in the best interests оf the child satisfies the required showing of good cause under the Act.
[¶18] Under the Act, “good cause” is simply “a legally sufficient reason.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 274 (11th ed. 2019). “Good cause is often the burden placed on a litigant (usu. by court rule or order) to show why a request should be granted or an action excused.” Id. A synthesis of the other states’ cases informs us that to demonstrate good cause under the Uniform Act, a petitioner has the burden to provide the court with evidence that changing a child‘s name would provide some bеnefit to the child. See S.M.V., 287 S.W.3d at 448-49; H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 81 n.2; J.M.V., 149 So. 3d at 1105-06. There is good cause to change a child‘s name if a district court finds, without error, that changing a child‘s name is in the best interests of the child. See J.M.V., 149 So. 3d at 1105.
E
[¶19] The district court analyzed the best interests of the child factors from
- the name that would best avoid anxiety, embarrassment, inconvenience, confusion, or disruption for the child, which may include consideration of parental misconduct and the degree of community respect (or disrespect) associated with the name;
- the name that would best help the child‘s associational identity within a family unit, which may include whether a change in name would positively or negatively affect the bond between the child and either parent or the parents’ families;
- assurances by the parent whose surname the child will bear that the parent will not change his or her surname at a later time;
- the length of time the child has used one surname and the level of identity the child has with the surname;
- the child‘s preference, along with the age and maturity of the child; and
- whether either parent is motivated by concerns other than the child‘s best interest—for example, an attempt to alienate the child from the other parent.
Interest of C.M.V., 479 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tex. App. 2015). We have previously affirmed a child‘s name change where the district court assessed the child‘s best interests in terms of the effect on the parental relationships, concerns about name differеnces, the age of the child and the impact on school enrollment and other potential benefits and challenges in the future. Edwardson v. Lauer, 2004 ND 218, ¶¶ 7-8, 689 N.W.2d 407. This is a fact specific inquiry and each child‘s best interests may require consideration of a different combination of factors. Because a child‘s best interests with respect to a name change will differ from the child‘s best interests with respect to residential responsibility, we encourage parties to present evidence of the nonexclusive factors listed above rather than the statutory factors largely inapplicable to this distinct inquiry.
[¶20] When considering the love, affection, and emotional ties between H.R.B. and her parents, the district court found that hyphenating H.R.B.‘s surname was in her best interest because it would facilitate her relationship and emotional ties with her father and her paternal extended family. The court found that both parents have an appropriate relationship with H.R.B.
[¶21] In weighing the stability of the parents’ home environment and the impact of extended family, the district court found that because T.L.B. has legally assumed her husband‘s surname, H.R.B. no longer shares a surname with any of the members of T.L.B.‘s household. The district court reasoned that “it may become confusing to H.R.B. why she does not share the same legal surname with her mother or half-brother.” In addition, the court found that hyphenating H.L.B.‘s surname would increase the familial bond with the paternal side of her family.
[¶22] In its findings regarding the willingness of each parent to facilitate H.R.B.‘s relаtionship with the other parent, the district court expressed concerns about T.L.B.‘s willingness to facilitate E.R.J.‘s paternal relationship with H.L.B. The court expressed no concern about
[¶23] Regarding H.R.B‘s home, school, and community records, the court found that changing H.L.B.‘s name would not adversely affect her but would facilitate her paternal relationship because she would share her father‘s surname. Berger, 2010 ND 28, ¶ 13. The “primary factor” relied on by the court was avoiding scrutiny from H.R.B.‘s peer group and community that may result from having a different surname from everyone else in her household. The court also found the surname change would not adversely affect any of H.R.B.‘s peer relationships because H.R.B. is still very young and has not developed significant school relationships or understanding of her name‘s meaning. Id.
[¶24] The factors considered by the district court were relevant and appropriate to determine H.R.B.‘s best interests regarding the proposеd name change. The court‘s findings are supported by the record, and its choice between permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous.
VI
[¶25] T.L.B. argues the court erred in hyphenating H.R.B.‘s surname because the suggestion to give the child a hyphenated surname was raised for the first time sua sponte by the court at the evidentiary proceeding. T.L.B. also asserts that there was no testimony or evidence to support why a hyphenated name would be in the child‘s best interest. If the court finds good сause, the court “may order that the name of the child be changed.”
While the court‘s ultimate decision of a petition for a change of name is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, in situations where the name change is for a minor child, the court‘s analysis must incorporate the best interest of the child. These are findings of fact and overturned only if found to be clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.
Id. (cleaned up). In Klundt v. Benjamin, neither party petitioned the court to change the child‘s namе, and the district court acted sua sponte. This Court reversed for abuse of discretion because the non-moving party did not have notice or an opportunity to respond to the name change. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.
[¶26] Here, the first time either party suggested hyphenating H.R.B.‘s surname was at the hearing on the petition. Unlike Klundt, E.R.J. petitioned the district court to change H.R.B.‘s surname to his surname. At the hearing, the court asked E.R.J. whether he had any alternative preferences for his child‘s surname other than his own surname. E.R.J. stated that if the court did not give the child his surname, his preferred alternative would be a hyphenated surname. T.L.B. cites no authority suggesting that a district court errs under these circumstances by ordering a hyphenated surname combining the two names requested by the parties. Klundt does not apply to the current case, because both parties were on notice and
VII
[¶27] We affirm the judgment of the district court.
[¶28] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Crothers, Justice concurring in the result.
[¶29] The statute controlling disposition of this case provides, “On request of a party and for good cause shown, the court may order that the name of the child be changed.”
[¶30] Child name changes were permitted under the prior version of the Uniform Parentage Act. This Court explained:
Under North Dakota‘s enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act,
N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17 , district courts are implicitly granted the authority to change a minor child‘s surname, assuming such a change is in the minor‘s best interest. Interest of C.J.C., 2000 ND 27, ¶ 5, 606 N.W.2d. 117. The specific statutory authority for this conclusion comes fromN.D.C.C. § 14-17-14(3) , which provides, “the judgment or order of the district court in an action brought under the Uniform Parentage Act may contain any other provision ... concerning ... any other matter in the best interest of the сhild.”
Edwardson v. Lauer, 2004 ND 218, ¶ 3, 689 N.W.2d 407.
[¶31] The prior Act,
[¶32] The current Act does not expressly require a best interest analysis, and plaсes a burden on the movant to prove “good cause.” This Court has defined “good cause” in a number of contexts, including unemployment law, Esselman v. Job Service ND, 548 N.W.2d 400, 402 (N.D. 1996), workers compensation law, Inwards v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Ins., 2014 ND 163, ¶ 22, 851 N.W.2d 693, termination of dealership contracts, Williston Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Steiger Tractor, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 545 n.3 (N.D. 1993), and child guardianship cases, Interest of Guardianship of G.V., 2023 ND 19, ¶ 19, 985 N.W.2d 655; Interest of Guardianship of J.O., 2021 ND 76, ¶ 16, 958 N.W.2d 149 (defining “good cause” as “a legally sufficient reason“) (citing good cause, Black‘s Law Dictionary 274 (11th ed. 2019)).
[¶33] North Dakota law directs that “Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears, but any words explained in this code are to be understood as thus explained.”
[¶34] When interpreting the phrase “good cause,” I question whether deep review of the split in Texas court of appeals’ decisions and two Alabama court of appeals’ decisions furthers either of these goals, other than to confirm some of the foreign state holdings equate “good cause” to “best interest” and others do not. See majority opinion, ¶¶ 12-16.
[¶35] Our guardianship cases provide a serviceable definition of “good cause” that is consistent with the purpose of the statute at issue in this case. See Interest of Guardianship of G.V., 2023 ND 19, ¶ 19; Interest of Guardianship of J.O., 2021 ND 76, ¶ 16. That definition of “good cause” also is consistent with at least some of the Texas courts defining the phrase during their construction of words used in the Uniform Parentage Act. Indeed, the majority ultimately comes to this conclusion by adopting the Black‘s Law Dictionary definition we used in our guardianship cases, and holding, “Under the Act, ‘good cause’ is simply ‘a legally sufficient reason.‘” Majority opinion, ¶ 18.
[¶36] I agree that “good cause” means “a legally sufficient reason.” I also agree with the majority that “legally sufficient reason” in the context of a name change under
[¶37] By providing clear, non-exclusive factors, we will do more than “encourage” parties to present evidence of the nonexclusive factors. Majority opinion, ¶ 19. Rather than encourage, I would state with clarity that the residential responsibility best interest factоrs from
[¶38] Instead of suggesting that primary reliance on the
[¶39] Here, the district court relied exclusively on
[¶40] Daniel J. Crothers
Douglas A. Bahr