E.C. v. Katz
711 So. 2d 1155
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998
Check Treatment

Lead Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellants appeal an adverse summary judgment. We affirm.

In 1990, E.C., thе natural mother of J.K.C., petitioned for dissolution of marriage from J.KC.’s natural father. As рart of the issue of child custody, E.C. contended that J.K.C.’s natural father had sexually abused J.K.C. The family court determined that J.K.C. had not been sexually abused.

In 1992, E.C., individually and as natural рarent and guardian of the minor J.K.C., filed a lawsuit against Appellees for medicаl malpractice in failing to properly diagnose the sexual abuse committed against J.K.C. Appellees answered, raising the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. Appellees subsequently moved for summary judgment on thе basis of collateral estoppel, arguing that the finding of no sexual abuse in the dissolution proceeding barred Appellants from suing ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‍them for malpracticе in failing to diagnose sexual abuse. Following a hearing, the trial court entered final summary judgment in Appellees’ favor based only on its conclusion that collatеral estoppel barred Appellants’ lawsuit against Appellees. Apрellants now appeal. The only issue they raise is that collateral estоppel could not bar their lawsuit because neither the parties nor the issuеs in the instant proceeding are the same as they were in the dissolution proceeding.

Collateral estoppel applies to prevent partiеs and their privies-from relitigat-ing an issue or fact decided in a previous actiоn. See Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917 (Fla.1995); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372 (Fla.1977). The traditional requirements of collateral estoppel are thаt the parties and issues be identical ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‍and that the particular matter was fully litigated and determined by a court of competent .jurisdiction. See id. at 374.

We believe the trial court properly determined that under the circumstances of this case, the parties need not be identical. As we have stated, “identity of parties is irrelevаnt for the application of defensive collateral estoppеl.” United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Selz, 637 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). We recognize that despite the *1157federal courts’ abolition of the mutuality of parties requirement when collateral estoppel is used either offensively or defensively, ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‍the Florida Suprеme Court has continued to adhere to this requirement in the context of offensivе use of collateral estoppel. See Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So.2d 843 (Fla.1984); Stogniew, 656 So.2d at 917. However, the instant case is different because it involves a ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‍defensive use of collateral estoppel. Thus, our reliancе on Selz, which specifically states that “identity of parties is irrelevant for the aрplication of defensive collateral es-toppel,” does not run afoul of the Florida Supreme Court’s reluctance to adopt the federаl courts’ wholesale abolition of the mutuality of parties requirement.

Moreоver, we agree with the trial court that Appellants are attempting to relitigаte an issue already decided. The parties in this ease have spent much effort framing the exact issue involved in the dissolution proceeding as well as the exact issue involved in the present negligence ease. However, the final judgment of dissolution makes clear ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‍that the issue fully litigated by the parties and determined by thе family court was whether J.K.C. was sexually abused by anyone, including her father. Thus, regardless of whether the issue is if the father sexually abused the minor child or if someone else sexually abused the minor child, relitigation of this point is foreclosed. See Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906 (Fla.1995).

In sum, because the mutuality of parties requirement is irrelevant in this particular case and because the issue Appellants raised in their negligence suit has already been fully litigatеd, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the issue of sexual abuse in this case. Since it has already been conclusively detеrmined that J.K.C. did not suffer sexual abuse by anyone, Appellees cannot be liable for failing to diagnose sexual abuse that never occurred. Accordingly, we аffirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against Appellants.

AFFIRMED.

GUNTHER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. STONE, C.J., dissents with opinion.



Dissenting Opinion

STONE, Chief Judge,

dissenting.

I would reverse. In my judgment, collateral estoppel as to mutuality of parties or identity of issues is not applicable here. Cf. Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917 (Fla.1995); Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995); Seaboard Coast Line RR Co. v. Industrial Contracting Co., 260 So.2d 860, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).