OPINION
' 1 Appellant E.B. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights. She argues that: (1) the juvenile court erred in determining that she was an unfit parent and that her children were neglected, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings, (8) the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her motion to strike the testimony of Ms. Jo-Anne Collier, and (4) the juvenile court failed to specifically consider the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-82a-409 (Supp.2001).
BACKGROUND
T2 Mother is the natural mother of six children: G.B., C.B., LB., E.S.B., B.B., and J.B. The two older children, G.B. and C.B., were removed from the State's termination
T3 This family has an extensive history with the Division of Child and Family Serviсes (DCFS). Between December 1986 and November 1998, DCFS received approximately eighteen referrals of child abuse and neglect by the parents, at least ten of which were substantiated on grounds of sexual abuse, physical abuse, physical neglect, failure to protect, emotional maltreatmеnt, and medical neglect. In 1996, the children were first placed in foster care after being adjudicated as neglected children. The children were returned home in November 1997.
T4 On or about October 9, 1998, E.S.B. disclosed to her therapist that she had recently been sexually abused by a male friend of her parents who had been living with and caring for the children in her parents' home. Mother believed the friend would never do such a thing and told DCFS that she thought E.S.B. had made up the story. Because Mother refused to ensure that this friend would be kept away from E.S.B., the child was placed into shelter care. On October 18, 1998, the other four children were rеmoved from the family home. At a shelter hearing, Mother again asserted her belief that E.S.B. had made up the story. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to return the children to their home that day. Prior to their return, however, the children were interviewed at the Children's Justice Center. During the interview, E.S.B. asserted that her siblings, C.B., LB., and B.B., had also been sexually inappropriate with her. C.B. and L.B. admitted touching each other's and E.S.B.'s genitalia on a frequent or regular basis. Based upon this new information, the children were not returned home, but instead were placed in shelter care.
15 At a hearing on October 16, 1998, DCFS was given temporary custody of the children. Custody аnd guardianship was granted to DCFS on December 9, 1998, after the juvenile court determined that the children had been abused and neglected by both parents. The two oldest children, G.B. and C.B., remain in foster care with long-term foster care as the permanency goal. Pending the outcome of this appeal, L.B., E.S.B., and B.B. are in foster homes awaiting adoption.
16 Over the many years DCFS was involved with this family, the parents were provided with numerous services. These services included homemaking; nutrition; hygiene; parent advocacy; peer parenting; parenting classes; caseworker involvement; individual, couple, and family therаpy; sex abuse treatment; handicapped and medical assistance; an attachment evaluation; psychological evaluations; visitation; Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) support; transportation; and special education. In addition, family preservation services wеre provided on a nearly ongoing basis since 19983.
17 The State filed a verified petition for termination of parental rights on August 13, 1999. Trial on the State's petition concluded on September 11, 2000.
18 The court also found that DCFS had provided numerous services to this family. However, because Mother was unable or unwilling to recognize the family's problems, they were of little benefit. Accordingly, on October 28, 2000, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §. 78-8a-407 (Supp.2001), Mother's pa
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
19 First, Mother asserts that the evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings and ultimate decision to terminate her parental rights was insufficient. Mother challenges the evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings of: (1) unfitness, (2) neglect, (8) failure of parental adjustment, and (4) best interest. " Findings of fact in a parental rights termination proceeding are overturned only if they are clearly erroneous." In re S.L.,
110 Next, Mother alleges that the juvenile court erred in allowing Ms. Jo-Anne Collier to testify as an expert witness. This court has "repeatedly recognized that trial courts have considerable discretion over the admission of expert testimony." In re G.Y.,
§11 Mother's final argument is that the juvenile court failed to consider, or improperly applied, the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-409 (Supp.2001). Application of statutory law to the facts presents a mixed question of fact and law. We review the juvenile court's findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court "some discretion in applying the law to the facts." In re C.B.,
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
€ 12 In reviewing the entire record in this case, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the challenged findings. "We note again that we ... defer to the juvenile court's ability to observe the witnesses and weigh their credibility, in this case, over a period of [several years]." S.L.,
113 Mother first challenges the juvenile court's findings of unfitness and neglect. Following the termination trial, the juvenile court made numerous findings regarding Mother's unfitness as a parent and her continual neglect of her children. Mother's argument, however, is based solely upon the findings regarding Mother's knowledge of and response to the sexual abuse of E.S.B. by her father. Mother does not challenge the findings regarding her children's repeated sexual victimization, their sexual activity with each other, her ongoing failure to protect the children, her continued denial of the abuse, and her failure tо change despite the numerous services provided. These findings alone support the juvenile court's determination.
{14 Nonetheless, after careful review of the record, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support the juvenile court's finding regarding Mother's knowledge of the abusе. We cannot overlook the great weight of evidence supporting the finding that Mother knew of the abuse merely because one witness testified that Mother was asleep during some of the father's abuse of E.S.B. The evidence included testimony that Mother knew that the father showered with E.S8.B., that abuse occurred on camping trips, that the father was caught "smooching" with E.S.B., and that E.S8.B. made an attempt to tell Mother about the abuse. In addition, Mother's argument that she may have been sleeping during some of the abuse incidents does not obviate Mother's repeated denial that abuse was occurring or her inability to protect her children from further abuse over the years, despite the numerous services pro
{15 Mother next challenges thе juvenile court's findings that she failed to remedy the cireumstances causing out-of-home placement of her children under Utah Code Aun. § 78-3a-407(4)
116 Next, we must consider whether Mother "substantially neglected, wilfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] the child[ren] to be in an out-of-home placement." Id.
11 17 In In re C.Y.,
118 Finally, Mother challenges the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Mother has continued to fоster a relationship with the father and has no intention of leaving him, has continually denied the occurrence of any abuse, and has failed to internalize or implement any of the many services provided to her by DCFS. Given this evidence, the juvenile court was correct in determining it was in the children's best interest that Mother's parental rights be terminated.
II. Qualification of Expert Witness
119 Mother claims that because Ms. Collier was not a lHeensed psychologist, the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting her testimony. Whether a witness qualifies as an expert is governed by Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. When applying rule 702, Utah courts have noted that the "'criticаl factor in determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it"" G.Y.,
[ 20 During the trial, Ms. Collier testified that she had a master's degree in psychology, was a registered psychologist in Australia, and had practiced for eight years as a psychologist. Ms. Collier further testified that she had worked since 1997 as the primary therapist at the Trauma Treatment and Awareness Center in Utah. The focus of her employment involved working with children who were abused, neglected, abandoned, or
11 21 Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court рroperly qualified Ms. Collier as an expert witness and did not err in admitting her testimony.
III. Application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-409
122 Finally, Mother claims the juvenile court failed to consider the requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-409.
The statute requires courts, in determining whether parental rights should be terminated, to consider the reunification services offered; the children's physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs; and the parent's efforts to change conduct, conditions, or cireumstances to make it in their children's best interest to return home.
In re S.T.,
CONCLUSION
1 23 We conclude that the there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's termination of Mother's parental rights. In addition, the juvenile court properly qualified Ms. Collier as an expert witness and did not err in admitting her testimony. Finally, the juvenile court properly considered each statutory factor prior to terminating Mother's parental rights.
«I 24 The juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parental rights is affirmed.
11 25 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge.
Notes
. For convenience, we cite to the most recent version of the statute. .There has been no significant change to the statute that would affect our analysis.
. The father signed a petition to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights to thrеe of the children-L.B., E.B., B.B.-on February 10, 2000. The petition was stayed until the termination of Mother's parental rights became effective on October 23, 2000.
. The State correctly points out in its brief that the juvenile court's findings inaccurately label the basis for the second ground under which Mother's parental rights were terminated as "failure of parental adjustment." Although failure of parental adjustment is a ground for termination enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(5) (Supp.2001), this ground was not relied upon by the juvenile court. Instead, the substance of the findings and conclusions support a determination under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(4) for failure to remedy circumstancеs causing out-o[-home placement.
. Midway through trial, after Ms. Collier had been qualified as an expert, Mother's counsel raised the issue of licensure for the first time. The parties agreed to an investigation and that depending on the status of her licensure the defense would be permitted to file any motions with thе court regarding the legal effect of non-licensure on expert status. After the investigation had been performed and the status of Ms. Collier's licensure was known, counsel for Mother did not pursue the issue. In addition, no memorandum or motion was filed. Because Mother did not pursue the issue and the juvenile court did not rule on it, that issue on appeal has been waived. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n,