PROSTROLLO v. BOWEN ET AL.
No. 74-6200
C. A. 8th Cir.
952
SCHLESINGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL. v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 74-1142
C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would grant certiorari.
DYKE v. GEORGIA
No. 74-903
Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, being of thе view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obsсenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508-514 (1957) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (1973) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
Petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Cоurt of Fulton County, Ga., of exhibiting an allegedly obscene film in violation of
“(a) A person commits the offense of distributing obscene materials when he . . . exhibits or otherwise disseminates to any person any obsсene material of any description, knowing the obscene nаture thereof. . . .”
“Obscene” is defined in
“(b) Material is obscene if considered as a whоle, applying community standards, its predominant appeal is tо prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and ut
terly without redeeming social value and if, in addition, it goes substantiаlly beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such mаtters.”
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.
It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or оbtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments рrohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegеdly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, the definition of “obscene” contained in
Finally, it does not appear that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Bаsed on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, рetitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case deсided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate
DACHSTEINER v. UNITED STATES
No. 74-5911
C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District оf California of using the mails to distribute allegedly obscene materiаls in violation of
“Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vilе article, matter, thing, device, or substance; . . .”
“Is declared to bе nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or dеlivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
“Whoеver knowingly uses the mails for the mailing . . . of anything declared by this section . . . to be nonmailable, . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years. . . .”
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of