89 Mo. 81 | Mo. | 1886
This is an action of ejectment for certain-real estate in the city of St. Louis, described in the amended petition, upon which the case was tried. Suit was commenced in May, 1878. The defence is the statute of limitations of twenty-four years. R. S., sec. 3222. The reply is, that in the year 1838 the mother of the plaintiffs was the owner of the land in fee-simple, having inherited it from her father; that she was, at the time, the wife of Abner W. Dyer, their father; that there was issue born alive of the marriage in 1837; that their marital relation continued until 1869, when it was dissolved by the death of the mother ; that the father survived and died in 1870 ; that the plaintiffs are the only surviving issue of the marriage, and claim the premises as heirs of their said mother.
At the trial evidence was given tending to support this reply. The court, under appropriate evidence, in that behalf, offered by the defendants, gave the following, declaration- of law, which drove the plaintiffs to a non-suit :
“The court, of its motion, declares the law to be, that if defendants, or those under whom they claim, entered upon a tract of land, embracing the premises described in the petition herein, in the year 1846, claim
After an unsuccessful motion to set aside- non-suit, the plaintiffs took the case, by writ of error, to the St. Louis court of appeals, where the ruling and judgment ■of the circuit court was affirmed, from which the plaintiffs bring the case here by writ of error. Prom this record it appears that the plaintiffs claim the property in question as the heirs of their mother,, who, at and before 1846, when the adverse possession, under which the defendants claim, first commenced, was the owner in fee of said real estate, and a married woman, with issue born alive of that marriage ; that the said marriage continued until 1869, when it was dissolved by the death of the mother; that the father survived the mother and died in 1870; and that this suit was commenced in 1878, and within ten years after the death of the father, but not until thirty-two years after said adverse possession had •commenced, and thirty-one years after the date of the present statute of limitations of 1847, and more than three years after the death of their father. The defence is the twenty-four years statute of limitation. Under this state of facts, the only question is, are the plaintiffs barred of their right of action under a proper construction of the statute of limitation of 1847, invoked by defendants, for their protection.
The first section of that act — now section 3219 of the Revised Statutes of 1879 — on its face declares in sub
Section 4 (now section 3222, of the Revised Statutes,. 1879) declares that: “If any person entitled to commence any action, in this article specified, or to make an entry, be, at the time such right or title shall first descend or accrue, either within the age of twenty-one years, or insane, or imprisoned on any criminal charge, or in execution upon some conviction of a criminal offence for any time less than life, or a married woman, the time during-which such disability shall continue shall not be deemed any portion of the time, in this article limited, for the commencement of such action or the making such entry; but such person may bring such action, or make such entry after the time so limited, and within three years after such disability is removed; provided, that no such action shall be commenced, had, or maintained, or entry made, by any person laboring unde! the disabilities specified in this section, after twenty-four years after the cause of such action, or right of entry shall have accrued.”
Section 3224, Revised Statutes 1879, reads that: “Iff any person, entitled to commence such action or to make such entry, die during the continuance of any disability specified in section three thousand two hundred and
The question before us, it may be remarked, is determinable, of course, by the state of the common law, as it stood at that date, unaffected by subsequent statutes, limiting the common law rights of the husband in the fee-simple estates of the wife. The material and decisive question for determination in this case, therefore, is to whom, by the common law as it stood at that date, did the right of actio'n or cause of entry accrue, by reason of the adverse possession or disseisin, under which the defendants claim title. The solution of that question depends upon another, to-wit, who, under tbe law and the facts had, or was entitled to the seisin and possession of the premises when the adverse possession first commenced.
The court of appeals, in their opinion affirming the ruling and judgment of the circuit court (14 Mo. App. 52), held that the case was governed by that of Valle v. Obenhause, 62 Mo. 81, as modified and explained by Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391, 442, adjudicating upon this very title. That case (Valle v. Obenhause, supra) held that: “ The husband is understood to be jointly seized of his wife’s estate, and during the existence of coverture he is not tenant by the curtesy, but only seized by right of his wife, and if there be a disseisin it is of the joint estate, and they must jointly bring an action to recover the possession. Under this view of the title of husband and wife in the lands of the wife, the statute of limitation will begin to run from the date of the disseisin against both.” If that ruling be accepted as the present state of the law in this state on this question, the plaintiffs are unquestionably barred. It has been
In the first place it may be remarked that the opinion in that case was that of a majority of the court, one of its members being absent and another delivering a dissenting opinion to the effect, “That the wife had no right of action or entry after the disseisin until the death of the husband, and that her grantee, the plaintiff, in that event, was not barred by the statute of limitations.” It may also be added that one member of the majority placed his concurrence in that opinion on grounds somewhat different from those stated in the opinion proper. It may be further remarked that the case, when decided, was regarded by the court as a new one in regard to the proper construction of our statute of limitation, and for that reason, as well as its own merits, was carefuüy considered by the several judges in their respective opinions. In that of the court proper, as well as that of the dissenting judge, the two “opposing theories” are elaborately discussed, and numerous authorities cited in support of the respective positions, so that but little, if anything, remains to be said on the question itself beyond a few remarks, the citation, perhaps, of some additional authorities, and a consideration of subsequent decisions of this court, in which the question itself, or the legal propositions on which the question at issue rests, are stated and recognized with more or less distinctness, or else more elaborately considered, and in one case, at least, where the Valle v. Obenhause case is directly questioned, and its construction of the statute of limitation, in this behalf, expressly challenged. The Valle v. Obenhause case itself, in speaking of the effect of the
It may be conceded, also, as claimed in the concur-, ring opinion in that case, that the statute was designed to operate with uniformity, and exclude all alike whether
But passing from that decision, the next case in which this question came before the court, is that of Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 420 to 423, and especially 422, which a|>pears to be an adjudication upon this very title involved in this case. 14 Mo. App. 54; 2 Mo. App. 432. The opinion in this case, as I -understand it, seriously impairs, if it does not virtually overrule that in Valle v. Obenhause. While it in terms evidently recognizes the
In the case of Kanaga v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 214, the court states the common law rights of the husband in the wife’s fee-simple lands, iu the following pointed language: “The husband, during the marriage, has the exclusive right to the possession of her real estate not held to her sole and separate use, and is the only proper party plaintiff in a suit to recover possession thereof.” If this be true, the ruling in Valle v. Obenhause, supra, cannot be correct. In the still later case of Gray v. Dryden, 79 Mo. 106, Martin, C., uses this equally pointed language: “This was-an action for an injury to the .actual possession of real estate. The possession of the wife was the possession of the husband. I do not well see how their possession can be joint or common under our law. Certainly this is not so in respect to her general real estate, which is placed by the law in the exclusive possession of her husband. Where he is in possession of it, the fact that she is on it with him gives her no possession any more than to any other member of his family whose actions are subject to his control. She is not in joint possession with him because she is there, and she is not a necessary party to any suit to vindicate the possession against trespassers and wrong doers.” In a still later case, that of Mueller v. Kaessman, 84 Mo. 318, 324, 330, it was held that, “In this state a wife is not a
This case, also says the Kanaga Case, 76 Mo. 214, “In so far as it conflicts with the views herein expressed, should be no longer adhered to.” But this, as I understand the case, does not affect or overrule anything therein said as to the common law rights of husband and wife, anterior to the enactment of the statute (section 3295) limiting such rights, but only his rights to his wife’s land, since the passage of the statute under construction. In a still later case, that of Harris v. Ross,
In the late case of Campbell v. The Laclede Gas Co., 84 Mo. 352, at pages 376 -7, the commissioner, after showing that the plaintiffs were clearly barred by the ten-year statute of limitation, adds this further paragraph: ‘1 Under the rule approved in Valle v. Obenhause, 62 Mo. 81, the plaintiffs would be barred by the absolute limitation of twenty-four years, which runs through all these disabilities, excepting only the suspension of the right to sue, by reason of an existing tenancy by curtesy.” This, at least, is a recognition by the commissioner who wrote that opinion, of the rule laid down in Valle v. Obenhause. The authority of that case, so far as this one is concerned, however, may well be questioned for two reasons: 1. As it appears that the plaintiffs were clearly barred by the ten-year law, it would seem that there was nothing left for the twenty-four-year proviso to operate on, and its potency was not at all needed, as it only operates when the ten-year law fails to destroy plaintiff’s title. 2. As it appears that the disability under which the parties labored, through whom the plaintiffs claim, at the time the adverse possession was first taken, was that of infancy, and not coverture, as in the case at bar, their subsequent disability of coverture'would afford no protection, as cumulative disabilities are not allowed. Rut
The last case in which reference is made to the ruling in Valle v. Obenhause, 62 Mo. 81, is that of Johns v. Fenton, 88 Mo. 64, which was a suit by the wife and her •second husband for the admeasurement of dower in the real estate of her first husband. The doctrine of that case, as I understand it, in treating of the scope and operation of the statute of limitations, is to the effect that, “The right limited is a present existing right of action or of entry ; that the wife’s right to dower is not of that sort, and for that reason not barred by the statute, and that it is obvious that cases like Valle v. Obenhause, 62 Mo. 81, can have no application to such a case.” This, manifestly, is the correct doctrine. The court, there, speaking of the assignment of dower, holds that the statute begins to run from the period of its assignment, and if assigned before her second marriage, her
The law on the question at issue is well stated in strong and pointed language in Sedgwick and Wait on Trial of Title to Land, at page 117 and 118, section 219, where it is said: “A tenant by the curtesy initiate-may sue alone for the possession of his wife’s land, and for damages for withholding it. * * * At common law the husband’s interest in the estates of which the wife was possessed at the time of the marriage, was a freehold, he alone having the right of entry and the present right of exclusive enjoyment. The wife could not recover the lands from a stranger, even though her husband was joined as defendant, and disclaimed title, and admitted the wife’s right to possession.” To the-same effect, also, is the case of Clark v. Clark, 20 O. St. 128, where it is said that during’ coverture the right of possession of the wife’s fee-simple lands is in the husband,, and the wife cannot maintain an action to recover the same from a stranger. Wilson v. Arentz, 70 N. C. 670, is also a case in point. In that State it seems they have-a statute substantially like section 3895, Revised Statutes-1879, and it was there held that, “ A tenant by the curtesy initiate has a right to sue alone for - the possession, of his wife’s land, and for damages for the detention of it, * * * and the fact that the act of 1848 (Battle’s Rev., ch. 69, sec. 33) deprives him of the power to lease-
To the same effect are the cases of Bledsoe v. Sims, 53 Mo. 305; and Kanaga v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 207; Cooper v. Ord, 60 Mo. 421, 430. In the North Carolina case of Wilson v. Arentz et al., supra, it is said that, “For an injury done to the inheritance his wife must have joined in the suit, for a trespass to the possession he could sue-alone.” This, I apprehend, is the true criterion for determining when the wife is, or not, a necessary or proper party to a suit, affecting the wife’s feessimple lands.
The objection that the construction here given section 3222 of the statute of limitations, renders the same nugatory and senseless, so far as a married woman is concerned, is not, we think, well taken. A married woman during coverture may have a right of action for an injury done to the inheritance or integrity of her fee-simple lands, or to the possession of her sole and separate estate in lands to which the husband’s marital rights. are excluded, just as any other person, and these rights of actions of hers, and others of a like character, are just as much within the operation of that section as any other of the parties therein named. Whenever and wherever she has a right of action during coverture, she is as fully within the operation of that section, twenty-four years and all, as any other party therein mentioned, and equally barred whenever they are barred. This objection, therefore, is without force or merit, and is fully met-and refuted in the dissenting opinion of Judge'. Hough in the case of Valle v. Obenhause, 62 Mo. 81, and the argument need not be here re-stated.
The contention and point in judgment in this case is that, the wife, during coverture by reason of the husband’s curtesy initiate, had no right of action,- and that
This leads to the conclusion that, upon the facts of this case, the plaintiffs herein are not barred of their right of action, and for these reasons the'judgment of the St. Louis court of appeals is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceeding in conformity to the views here expressed;