6 Ga. App. 390 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1909
Counsel for plaintiff in error frankly admits that his only legal claim to a judgment of reversal rests upon the exception taken to the charge of the court upon the subject of venue. For this reason we omit any reference to the other, grounds of the motion for new trial; but we remark in passing that the verdict finding the defendant guilty was amply supported by the evidence. That the evidence upon the subject of the venue is sufficient to support the verdict is decided by the ruling in Smiley v. State, 66 Ga. 754, which is controlling upon that point. In that case it was held: “Where the proof was that an owner kept his hogs at his home in Miller county, and turned them out into the open country, calling them up at night, that suddenly they were missing therefrom, and that about the same time defendant, who lived near by, though in an adjoining county, sold them some distance away, and there was no proof that the hogs ever ‘used’ or ever were over the line, a verdict of guilty of larceny, found in the county of the owner’s residence, will not be set aside for want of sufficient proof of venue.” In the instant case the cow in question was seen on Sunday, grazing where it was accustomed to stay in Walker county, and on Monday following it was found in the possession of the defendant, whose contradictory explanation of his possession was not satisfactory to the jury. There was no evidence that the cow “used” or had ever been over the line of Walker county on any previous occasion, and the prosecution was carried on in the county of the owner’s residence; so that, so far as the facts are concerned, the case is practically identical with the Smiley case. The real question that arises, therefore, is not whether there was sufficient evidence of the venue, but whether the court had the right to tell the jury that they would be authorized to find that there was sufficient proof of the venue, if the evidence satisfied them that the animal was last seen in this county prior to the-time that it was stolen. We think it is unquestionably tnie that if' the animal was found in the unlawful possession of the defendant (deemed to be unlawful because not satisfactorily explained), and
Further objection is made that the instruction of the judge permitted the jury to infer that the larceny was committed in Walker county if the cow was last seen there at any time by any person. If we were engaged in a microscopic investigation for error, there might seem to be some point in this objection, but when it is to be considered that it is not mere error, but harmful error, which requires the grant of a new trial, the objection appears to be without force. It is inconceivable that the jury, presumably men of at least ordinary intelligence, having before them uncontradicted testimony that the cow was last seen the day before the theft was discovered, could have apprehended that the judge was referring to some period in the indefinite past. And so far as the identity of the person who may have seen the cow there is concerned, it would be entirely immaterial who saw the cow in Walker county, provided it was shown to have been there immediately prior to the unlawful posession by the thief. Judgment affirmed.