Plаintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred because defendant’s easement should be strictly construed as an easement for ingress and egress, and not for other activity. We reverse and remand.
The Crane family owned a sеction of the land abutting Lake Fenton. The easement in question was originally created in a September 1955 deed from Edith Crane to George Crane, which provided in relevant part, “The Easterly 16 feet of the above-described premises being reserved for the use of those parties, *700 their heirs, assigns, and successors, owning lots in Cranewood Nо. 1 Subdivision . . . for the purpose of ingress and egress to and from the premises in which they may have an interest to the water’s edge of Lake Fenton.” In April 1960, the Crane family deeded a parcel of that property to Sonia Newland and her husband. The deed was recorded in May 1960, and included in the deed was this language: “[s]ubject to the easterly 16.0 feеt being reserved for an easement for access to the lake for the [back] lot owners in ‘Cranewood No. 1.’ ”
Newland granted part of the property to plaintiffs, making plaintiffs riparian owners of property contiguous to Lake Fenton. Newland also deeded part of the property to defendant, who is not a riparian оwner, but was in Cranewood No. 1, which enjoys a dominant estate with regard to the easement. An affidavit of Bonnie Mathis, a resident on Lake Fenton since before 1950, states that a dock could have been in place at the end of the easement since the 1950s. Defendant stated in an affidavit that he personally observed the dock starting in 1968. Aсcording to Newland’s deposition, defendant obtained permission from her to install a dock on the property that she eventually sold to plaintiffs. Defendant claims that this is untrue. Since 1987, defendant has used the dock for mooring his boat.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment setting forth limitations to defendant’s use of the easemеnt and requesting a permanent injunction restraining defendant from improper use. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendant wrongfully abused the easement and interfered with plaintiffs’ quiet possession by installing and maintaining a dock, *701 using the premises for temporary storage of boating equipment, using the premises for recreational purposes, and by attempting to exercise general dominion over the subject premises.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary disposition, pursuant MCR 2.116(B) and (C)(10), requesting that the trial court grant a permanent injunction providing that defendant be ordered to remove his dock from plaintiffs’ property and be enjoined from further abuse of the easement, and requested that the trial court declare the subject easement to be for ingress and egress only. In addition, plaintiffs contended that access grants only the right of ingress and egress to the lake and no other right. In response, defendant requested that the motion be denied because the factual circumstances existing at the time the easement was created show the original grantor’s intent to include the use and placement of a dock at the end of the easement within the scope of the easement. The trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed.
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for summary dispositiоn contending that the factual circumstances existing at the time of the creation of the easement show the original grantor’s intent to include not only the right of ingress and egress, but also to include use and placement of the dock located in Lake Fenton at the end of the easement. Defendant further contended that the scope of an easement is defined by both the language of the easement and the circumstances existing at the time of the creation of the easement. Defendant requested that the trial court enter a judgment declaring the easement in question *702 to include riparian rights for the benefit of the dominant tenement holders and reflecting the right tо continue the historical placement of the dock at the end of the easement and that defendant has the right to store the dock on the easement. In response, plaintiffs filed a position statement contending defendant’s motion should be denied because riparian rights only attach to riparian land and cannot be conveyed separate from riparian land, and because easements should be construed according to language within the four comers of the grant.
A hearing was held on defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Defendant argued that no material fact was in question because the creator of the easement intended the easement holder to have use of the dock, which was there and was being used at the time the easement was granted. Plaintiffs argued that the easement was limited to ingress and egress. The trial court made the following findings:
I think the Little case that has recently come out, again, indicates to us that we should consider not only the language but the surrounding circumstances. . . .
[T]hе Court believes the intent of the parties was to have a dock, not 10 docks, a dock. So the ruling of the Court today based on everything submitted is that Mr. Lennox may have a dock at the end of the easement here. I’m not prepared to go further and add on that he can store the dock, that he can have picnic tables or anything elsе. But he does have an easement for ingress and egress including, but not limited to the right to maintain the dock, have a boat on the end of the dock, and use this during the seasons as is appropriate.
The trial court entered a judgment reflecting its findings that the intent of the original grantor of the easement, Edith Crane, was to include riparian rights for *703 the use by the dоminant tenements of the easement and that this was shown by the language of the reservation creating the easement and the use and existence of a dock on the lake end of the easement at the time of the creation of the easement. Therefore, the trial court entered a judgment that the easement was for ingress аnd egress, and included riparian rights, not limited to the right to maintain a dock on the lake end of the easement.
Plaintiffs’ first issue on appeal is that because the language of the easement was unambiguous the trial court should not have considered the circumstances existing at the time the easement was granted in determining the intent of the grantor of the easement. We agree.
In
Little v Kin,
The extent of a party’s rights under an easement is a question of fact for the trial court, which we review for clear error. Dobie v Morrison,227 Mich App 536 , 541-542;575 NW2d 817 (1998). However, we review de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition in a declaratory judgment action. Michigan Educational Employees Mut Ins Co v Turow,242 Mich App 112 , 114;617 NW2d 725 (2000); Dobie, supra at 538. We also review de novo a trial court’s rulings on equitable issues, including the grant of injunctive relief. Cipri v Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc,235 Mich App 1 , 9;596 NW2d 620 (1999); Dobie, supra at 541-542.
This Court in
Little I, supra
at 511-512, indicated that the rights of nonriparian owners should be determined by examining the language of the easement and the circumstances existing at the time of the
*704
grant. In
Little v Kin,
Pursuant to Little II, supra, we must first examine whether the text of the easement grant is unambiguous, because, if the text is unambiguous, the trial court erred in taking into account the circumstances existing at the time of the grant. The grant of the easement provides that it is “for the purpose of ingrеss and egress to and from the premises in which they may have an interest to the water’s edge of Lake Fenton.” A later deed in the chain of title conveys an easement “for access to the lake for the [back] lot owners in ‘Cranewood No. 1.’ ” Plaintiffs contend that the plain language, clearly, does not grant defendant the right to construct or maintain a dock or to permanently moor a boat. While defendant contends that the use of the term “to the water’s edge” creates an ambiguity regarding whether riparian rights were granted to defendant because this is traditional phrasing for the creation of riparian rights, defendant cites *705 no applicable authority for this contention. 1 We find that the easement grant is stated in plаin and unambiguous language and, thus, the trial court was not permitted to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the grant of the easement or existing at the time the easement was granted.
Erecting or maintaining a dock near the water’s edge is a riparian or littoral right.
2
McCardel v Smolen,
In Little I, supra, the dispute involved a riparian property owner and neighboring nonriparian property “backlot” owners regarding the scope of the backlot owners’ right to enjoy the lake. Id. at 504. The original owner granted an easement to backlot owners with full riparian rights, and the riparian property owners argued that they had superior rights in an attemрt to limit the nonriparian owners’ use of the easement. Id. In Little I, supra, the easement was not limited to ingress and egress, but rather provided “ ‘for access to and use of the riparian rights to Pine Lake.’ ” Id. at 505 (emphasis omitted). This Court determined that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the defendant’s rights were limited to access, and remanded to the triаl court to determine the scope of the easement. Id. at 514-516. 3
In
Delaney v Pond,
“[T]he extent of the easement is limited by specific words to the right of access .... This right of access is clearly intended to permit the plaintiffs to exercise their right to enjoy the waters .... however, to enjoy the use of the adjacent waters cannot logically be construed as a right to use the lands . . . for purposes other than those related to the use of the water itself.
“[Plaintiffs do have an unrestricted right of access to the use of the waters . . . for the purpose of swimming, fishing, bathing, wading and boating. It does not follow that the plaintiffs have the right to sun bathe on the defendants’ property, for it cannot be said that sun bathing is a use of the adjacent waters, nor can it be said that permanent mooring a boat is included in the right to fish and boat. Obviously plaintiffs have the right to use the easemеnt for the purpose of carrying their boats to the waters of the river and lake, but they cannot store them permanently on the easement way, nor attach them to stakes driven into the land.” [Id. at 687-688 (quoting the lower court opinion).]
In
Thies v Howland,
Persons who own an estate or have a possessory interest in riparian land enjoy certain exclusive rights. These include the right to erect and maintain docks alоng the owner’s shore, and the right to anchor boats permanently off the owner’s shore. Nonriparian owners and members of the public who gain access to a navigable waterbody have a *708 right to use the surface of the water in a reasonable manner for such activities as boating, fishing and swimming. An incident of the public’s right of navigation is the right to аnchor boats temporarily. [Id. at 288 (citations omitted).]
But the Thies Court also noted that frontlot owners could not prevent the backlot owners from erecting a dock or permanently anchoring their boats if these activities were within the scope of the plat’s dedication. Id. at 289. “The intent of the plattors must be determined from the language they used and the surrounding circumstаnces.” Id. at 293. The Thies Court determined, upon examination of the plattor’s intent, that the backlot owners had only an easement interest, a dock was not within the scope of the dedication and, thus, the backlot owners could not maintain a dock. Id. at 294-295.
We find that the plain and unambiguous language of the easement in question does not grant defendant riparian rights and, as such, does not grant defendant the rights enjoyed by riparian owners. Defendant’s argument that the language “to the water’s edge of Lake Fenton” raises a question of fact regarding whether riparian rights were granted is misguided. The plain language of the easement does not suggest that the right to maintain a dock is within the scope of the еasement. See Thom, supra at 612. The terms ingress and egress to the water’s edge do not show an intent to grant a right to construct and maintain a dock, a right typically reserved to riparian owners. See Thies, supra at 294. Defendant’s allowed use of the land, pursuant to the easement, is clearly defined by the terms of the easement and must be confined to the plain and unambiguous terms of the easement. The plain and unambiguous terms of the easement do *709 not grant the dominant estate the right to maintain a dock or permanently moor a boat. The trial court, in making its determination, took into account the circumstances existing at the time of the grant and, therefore, erred. See id. Even if the trial court was only interpreting the language of the easement, its findings were clearly erroneous because nothing in the plain and unambiguous language of the easement permits or grants defendant the right to erect and maintain a dock or to permanently moor a boat at the end of the easement. See Little I, supra at 507. The easement was creatеd for access or ingress and egress to the lake and cannot be expanded. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to defendant and denying plaintiffs’ motion to have the subject of the easement declared for access, 4 and ingress and egress only. 5
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
We note that defendant does cite
Hilt v Weber,
“Strictly speaking, land which includes or abuts a river is definеd as riparian, while land which includes or abuts a lake is defined as littoral.”
Thies v Howland,
As noted, the Supreme Court affirmed this case, but modified a directive of this Court with regard to determining the scope of an easement. Little II, supra at 700 n 2.
We note that access includes “a right to use the surface of the water in a reasonable maimer for such activities as boating, fishing and swimming,” and a right to temporarily anchor boats. Thies, supra at 288.
Because of our resolution, it is unnecessary to address plaintiffs’ remaining issues on appeal.