“The other one рart so partitioned and divided and one-half of all other property, goods and moneys, I do give and bequeath to the St. Louis Trust Company of St. Louis, Mo., In Trust, However, For The Under-Mentioned Purpose, to-wit:
*485 “To pay over all income, earnings and profits arising from snefi one-lialf of my property so bequeathed to my daughter Cornelia, For The Maintenance And Su-P-port Of Herself And Her Family; and after her death the said property, and the undisposed of earnings and increase thereof to be divided equally, share and share alike, among the children of my said daughter Cornelia, Living At The Time Of Her Death if the youngest of her said children has reached the age of 21 years, but if the youngest of said children has not reached that age, then this trust shall continue In Favor Of And For The Support Maintenance And Education Or Advancement In Life Until The Youngest Of Said Children Becomes Of That Age, Then To Be Divided Equally Between Those Living At That Date, male and female, share and share alike.”
Conrad died in 1900, and thе St. Louis Trust Co. began the administration of the trust. In 1902 the St. Louis Trust Company changed its name to the St. Louis Union Trust Company, and by that name the trustee has continued its duties to this date., The presеnt suit is one to determine that trust,- and the plaintiffs are Mrs. Worrall, and her five children, and the defendant, the present trustee of the estate. Mrs. Worrall had but five children, and they arе all adults, and living and to them she had conveyed (or attempted to convey) all her interest in the trust property. These conveyances are in this record. The trust property consists of some land in Ste. Genevieve County, Missouri, some land in Mc-Cracken County, Kentucky, and some $8,500 in personal securities and cash, in the hands of defendant, as trustee.
In behalf of plaintiff it was shown that Mrs. Worrall was 56 years old, and had long since reached and passed that period in a woman’s -life, commonly called the “changе of life.” By a physician it was shown that she could bear no more children, for this and other physical reasons. No evidence was introduced by defendant, and upon those facts, the court entered a judgment or de *486 cree in favor of defendant, from which plaintiffs prose-. cnted this appeal. The case is largely one of law, аlthough it might be added that there is no evidence, showing the procreative organs of Mrs. Worrall to be diseased, or injured, save and except by the flux of time on the life of a woman as above detailed.
It has been said that remainders are the outgrowth of wills or contracts, and reversioners come from the operations of law. In this case the interest given to the children of Mrs. Worrall might never materialize. Whilst they are all living now, аll might predecease the mother, and then there would be reversioners by operation of law. In other words the beneficial interest in the trust property would go to the lawful heirs of Peter Conrad, and the trustee of this trust would have to account to these reversioners for the corpus of this estate. This is important in view of the fact, that, in equity, attemрt is being made to terminate this active trust, in the interest of parties who might never have the slightest interest in the trust estate. Their present interest is purely contingent, and the contingеncy may not happen: i. e. they may not be living at the death of Mrs. Worrall.
By the brief we are cited to 39 Cyc. p. 99, where the following general rule is thus stated:
“By virtue of its supervisory jurisdiсtion over trusts and trustees, a court of equity has power, in a proper case, to terminate an express trust, in whole or in part, even before the expiratiоn’ of the term for which it was created, although, in such case, exceptional circumstances must exist. The court will exercise this power and decree a termination when all the objects and purposes of the trust have been accomplished, the cestuis que trustent are all sui juris, and application is made by all of them. On the other band, the court will not decree a termination when some of the cestuis que trustent do not consent, or where the trust is still an active, con- *488 tinning one, with some of its purposes unaccomplished and not shown to be.impossible of accomplishment.”
We have nо fault to find with this general rule. There are cases in which courts have terminated trusts in advance of the time fixed in the trust instrument. The courts have done so with discrimination, and cautiоn, but if the cases cited to support the general pronouncement be examined, it will be found that the facts do not fit the case at bar.
Suppose in the instant case under the facts alleged, a decree should be entered terminating the trust, and this property be turned over to the five present children of Mrs. Worrall where would the trustеe stand at the death of Mrs. Worrall; if all of her children had predeceased hers. The proof shows that there are several grandchildren, and these, as the reversioners might malee claim for the estate. There is no vested estate in their parents, and if their parents all predecease the grandmother, they take from the grandfather. This contingency alone is sufficient to justify the judgment nisi. They are not parties to the instant suit, and have not consented in anyway to a divesting of their reversionary interests.