62 F. 265 | 5th Cir. | 1894
Laura P. Duval and Mary D. Maddox, joined by her husband, John W. Maddox, brought their separate suits against the Pullman Palace-Car Company in the district court of Travis county, Tex., and upon petition of defendant in error the cases were removed to the United States circuit court for the fifth circuit and western district of Texas, at Austin, where they were consolidated by agreement; and at the trial, upon a peremptory instruction from the court, the jury found for the defendant company, and judgment was entered accordingly. The two cases arose out of the same state of facts, which, briefly stated, are as follows:
Plaintiff Duval, on September 27, 1891, was in Denver, in a crippled and helpless condition, unable to walk, and suffering from an accident, and was then 75 years of age. Plaintiff Mary D. Maddox was her daughter, and was with her mother on the day named, and also had with her a little daughter just recovering from a spell of fever. The parties desired to return to their home, in Austin, Tex., but would not attempt the journey unless they could procure the drawing-room of one of defendant’s sleeping cars, because of their suffering and helpless condition, and so informed defendant’s agent at Denver, when and from Avhom they bought their ticket. On the day named the plaintiffs, together, bought a ticket from defendant’s agent at Denver, paying $20 therefor, which entitled them to the exclusive use of the drawing-room of defendant’s car Ysadora, then attached to a train of the Union Pacific Railway Company en route to Ft. Worth, Tex., upon which train plaintiffs had purchased and held first-class tickets, entitling them to transportation by the railroad company from Denver, Colo., to Ft. Worth, Tex. On the ticket procured from the de
This suit claims damages for a breach of contract. The complaint avers that the defendant was engaged in the business of carrying passengers, as a common carrier for hire, by means of railroad cars running between the cities of Denver, in the state of Colorado, and Ft. Worth, in the state of Texas; that the plaintiffs, on the 27th of September, 1891, engaged passage and purchased tickets over the line of railway traversed by defendant’s cars, from Denver to Ft. Worth; that defendant entered into a contract to convey them over said line of road comfortably and securely. . That defendant, in violation of its contract with plaintiffs, and in violation of their rights and privileges in the premises, refused to convey them beyond the town of Texline on said line of railroad between Denver and Ft. Worth, and did so under such circumstances as to entitle the plaintiffs not only to actual, but exemplary, damages. The proof shows that plaintiffs did not malee any contract with the defendant to convey them from Denver to Ft. Worth, and it shows that the defendant was not engaged in the business of carrying-passengers, as a common carrier for hire, between said cities. But it shows that plaintiffs, on the day named, purchased and held first-class tickets entitling them to transportation by the Union Pacific Railroad Company from Denver, Colo., to Ft Worth, Tex., and that on the same day they procured from defendant a ticket good for that date and car in the drawing-room of defendant’s car Ysadora, which was a part of the Union Pacific Railroad train going from Denver to Ft. Worth, on which plaintiffs were to be transported. It shows that the train was turned back at Texline, by command of the Union Pacific Railroad officials, because of a washout further down the road, and that it was under the orders of the train conductor that the plaintiffs were turned out of the car Ysadora, and against the objection or protest of the conductor of the car. The proof also shows that the defendant’s said drawing-room or sleeping car was operated by, and was under the direction and control of, the Union Pacific Railroad Company. The plaintiffs objected to the evidence introduced to show that the defendant’s drawing-room or sleeping cars used ■by the said railroad company were operated and controlled by the railroad company, and subject exclusively to its direction, and that this particular car was so operated and controlled, and also objected to the evidence that the railroad officials ordered the said car to be turned back, and the plaintiffs to be put out, at Texline. The trial court overruled plaintiffs’ said objections, to which they excepted, and now, among other things, assign the same as error.
As we understand it, the purpose of the evidence objected to was to show the character and extent of the control of the movements and management of the defendant’s car attached to the Union Pacific Railroad train, and operated by the railroad company. It did not in any way alter or vary the written contract in evidence, but, in substance and effect, was that the’ car Ysadora was controlled by the railroad company, in its operation and movements,
The only other assignment of error we consider it necessary to notice is that presented on the court’s peremptory instruction to the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. The allegations of the complaint were not sustained by the evidence. The defendant company is not liable as a earner. It made no contract to carry. The plaintiffs had paid their fare to the railroad company, and were provided with first-class tickets entitling them to be carried from Denver to Ft. Worth by it. It was the duty of the railroad company to convey them over its line, and they were being earned by it. The defendant’s sleeping car constituted a part of the carrier’s train. The plaintiffs secured the privilege of riding in this car by paying an additional sum to the defendant. The obligation of the defendant, under its contract with the plaintiffs, was to accommodate them with the drawing-room in its car, constituting a part of the carrier’s train, as long as the carrier would convey it. If the carrier refused to convey it beyond Texline, and turned the car back to Denver, these were not the acts of the defendant company, and they would form no basis for the complaint against it in this suit. Railroad Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451.
Our opinion is that there was no error in the instruction given, and therefore none in the refusal to charge the jury as requested by the plaintiffs. Judgment is affirmed.