OSCN navigation
- Home
- Courts
- Court Dockets
- Legal Research
- Calendar
- Help
- Previous Case
- Top Of Index
- This Point in Index
- Citationize
- Next Case
- Print Only
DUTTON v. CITY OF MIDWEST CITY
Case Number: 113170
Decided: 06/30/2015
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Cite as:
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
RODNEY DUTTON, Petitioner,
v.
THE CITY OF MIDWEST CITY, and THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondents.
APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
¶0 Petitioner sought an extraordinary writ in the Oklahoma Supreme Court and challenged his convictions in three criminal proceedings in the municipal court for The City of Midwest City. He also requested an alternative remedy that would compel the District Court to provide him with a new appeal of his convictions in the District Court. We assume original jurisdiction for the sole purpose of determining our jurisdiction to review Petitioner's allegations. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner's cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AND ALL
REQUESTS FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO PETITIONER SEEKING RELIEF IN THE APPROPRIATE COURT
Rodney Dutton, Midwest City, Oklahoma, Petitioner Pro se.
David F. Howell and J. Steven Coates, Midwest City, Oklahoma, for Respondent, City of Midwest City.
EDMONDSON, J.
¶1 We assume original jurisdiction on the question whether this Court has original jurisdiction to adjudicate both the merits of the claim or cause of action that the Dutton (or Petitioner) has pled in this Court and the associated remedies he requests. We decline to assume original jurisdiction on either the merits of Dutton's cause of action or his requests for relief as pled by him in this Court.
¶2 Dutton pleads a cause of action challenging the correctness of a judgment and sentence in three municipal criminal matters. He seeks an adjudication on the legal correctness of these judgments and sentences in this proceeding, and in the alternative he requests an extraordinary remedy to compel the District Court to provide him a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions in the District Court. We conclude that the pled cause of action and remedy sought by him involve criminal matters that are not within the original jurisdiction of this Court. We conclude that Dutton's action in this Court should be dismissed without prejudice to him seeking appropriate relief in the proper court.
I. Pleadings of Dutton and The City of Midwest City
¶3 Dutton alleges that on April 15, 2013, he was convicted in the municipal court of the City of Midwest City, Oklahoma, of the charges of assault, public intoxication, and domestic assault and battery. He states that he was sentenced to thirty days in jail. He states that he was incarcerated for a felony charge on November 24, 2011, which was ultimately dismissed, and he "was released on his own recognizance on about March 7, 2013," and then transferred to the Midwest City jail for trial on his municipal charges. He alleges that he was released from the Midwest City jail on May 10, 2013. He states that while he was incarcerated on the felony charge he was represented by a "public defender."
¶4 He states that he filed three applications for post-conviction relief in the District Court after his release. He alleges that the District Court dismissed the applications for the reason that they should have been filed with the municipal court in Midwest City. His application for this Court to assume original jurisdiction was filed on August 29, 2014, approximately one year and three months after his release.
¶5 Dutton alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied counsel at trial and was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. He alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied (1) advance notice of the municipal charges against him, (2) a fair trial due to insufficient evidence, and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (3) counsel for an appeal, (4) a direct appeal, (5) "out-of-time appeal," (6) an adequate post-conviction remedy, and (7) counsel for a post-conviction appeal. In his filing herein entitled "Motion to Provide Relief," he alleges that he was "denied his 6th and 14th Amendments rights to counsel and a fair trial and subsequently denied his right to an appeal of wrongful convictions by the city of Midwest City, Oklahoma."
¶6 Dutton alleges that shortly prior to his trial in municipal court he was provided with a written notice of one of the charges against him. He states that the judge refused his request to have a lawyer appointed for him. He states that after the City's prosecutor failed to appear for his trial, the judge questioned the witnesses and refused Dutton's request to cross-examine the witnesses.
¶7 Dutton alleges that the District Court of Oklahoma County:
. . . has delayed and denied the Petitioner in his pursuit of relief in this matter . . . and while "the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals provide him some relief at first and then declined to hear his appeal when the court reporter or court clerk failed to provide him a stamp-filed certified copy of the District Court's order dismissing two of his three post-conviction applications under the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals own rules.
Application to Assume, Aug. 29, 2014, at pg. 2, material omitted.
Dutton's appendix of exhibits, and his other filings in this Court, fail to contain photocopies of any the orders allegedly issued by the District Court of Oklahoma County about which he complains. He alleges that he sought relief in the District Court by filing applications for post-conviction relief pursuant to Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
¶8 Dutton's Appendix does contain purported uncertified photocopies of orders issued by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Three orders, which show docket designations for post-conviction appeals, state that the Court of Criminal Appeals declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matters because Dutton failed to attach to his petition in error a certified copy of the District Court order being appealed, as required by the rules for the Court of Criminal Appeals.1
¶9 Dutton's Appendix also contains a purported photocopy of an order of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing his motion for the court to reconsider "declining jurisdiction of his post-conviction appeals from Oklahoma County." The court explains that a petition for rehearing that challenges the court's decision in post-conviction appeal is not allowed.
¶10 Midwest City's response states that Dutton's allegations relate to three different factual episodes resulting in a criminal prosecution for assault and battery on his wife, prosecutions for assault on a police officer and public intoxication, and then an arrest for felony possession of incendiary devices. He was released from jail, awaiting trial on the felony charge, and returned to the municipal jail for prosecution of the misdemeanors.
¶11 The response states that Dutton and his wife filed two civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claimed that his constitutional rights were violated by Midwest City and its officials in the context of Dutton's arrests, convictions, and sentence of incarceration. The federal court's order dismissing, in part, Dutton's claims lists the violations of constitutional rights as alleged by Dutton and his wife in the federal proceeding.
Mr. Dutton's claims, construed liberally because of his pro se status, appear to be as follows: 1) a First Amendment violation, based upon an alleged retaliation for the comment he made while leaving the courtroom ["I'll see you in federal court."]; 2) a Fourth Amendment claim, based on his arrest and prosecution without probable cause; 3) denial of due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 4) denial of assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 5) an Eighth Amendment claim, based on failure to protect him from abuse by a fellow inmate; and 6) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, both plaintiffs assert First and Fourteenth Amendment claims for loss of consortium and violation of their "right to pursue life and happiness together in their marriage and individually without wrongful interference by officials of [the] government."
Order, Jan. 3, 2014, at p. 3, Rodney Dutton and Shirley Dutton v. City of Midwest City, et al., No. CIV-13-0911-HE, U. S. Dist. Crt., W. D. Okla., (explanation added).
The federal court concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based upon allegations of an unconstitutional conviction when state law provided a means for challenging the conviction.2 Midwest City states that Dutton's appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit was determined by that court to be premature due to Dutton's claims still pending before the federal District Court. Midwest City states that Dutton's claims against it remain pending in the federal court. Midwest City's appendix filed herein also contains uncertified photocopies of two orders by The District Court of Oklahoma County dismissing, without prejudice, Dutton's applications for post-conviction relief.
¶12 Dutton filed a reply to the city's response. He states his innocence of the crimes for which he was convicted. He argues: (1) his municipal arrest was illegal, (2) the trial in the municipal court was not fair because he was not provided with an attorney, and (3) his municipal convictions are void because no record exists of the evidence used against him at the municipal trial. He also objects to the appearances made in this proceeding by two attorneys who filed a response for Midwest City. He requests that this Court "dismiss" these two attorneys from this proceeding.
¶13 In his reply, Dutton requests this Court adjudicate his convictions to be "invalid, null, and void" and to also grant the relief as set forth in his Application filed with this Court. In his Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, he requests an order of this Court directing the District Court of Oklahoma County "provide him a direct appeal with appointed counsel from Midwest City Municipal Cases docketed as #2011-4369 - Domestic Violence, #2011-5808 - public intoxication, and #2011-5808 - assault and/or any other relief that is appropriately just."3 Dutton also states he seeks an order "overturning, vacating, and barring" the municipal convictions, or alternatively the Court provide him with a direct appeal of his convictions in the District Court with appointed counsel.4
II. The Court's Original Supervisory Civil Jurisdiction
¶14 This Court issued an order and requested Midwest City brief the issue whether this Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims made by Petitioner.5 The city's response argues that (1) the matter before this Court is criminal in nature, (2) "Petitioner has an adequate remedy available under the Post-Conviction Relief Act" (22 O.S. §§ 1080-1089), (3) the Court of Criminal Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to review orders issued pursuant to the Post-Conviction Act, and (4) this Court should not exercise jurisdiction over Dutton's claims.
¶15 A court has a duty to inquire into whether it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action that has been brought before the court.6 This Court has stated a similar rule in various contexts.7 One application of this rule is found in explanations stating a court has an inherent power to adjudicate whether it possesses jurisdiction in the particular matter before that court,8 and this Court has the constitutional duty to determine whether a matter is within this Court's jurisdiction or within the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.9
¶16 Subject matter jurisdiction is the "power to deal with the general subject involved in the action"10 or the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.11 The Court has explained that subject matter jurisdiction of a court is invoked by pleadings filed by a party with a court and which show that the court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented, or power to grant the relief sought.12 Our inquiry requires us to examine the nature of Dutton's pled cause of action and the remedy he seeks in this Court and determine whether that cause of action and remedies for that action are within the jurisdiction of this Court.
¶17 The Legislature has authorized a municipality to create a municipal court not of record.13 A municipal court not of record has original jurisdiction to hear and determine prosecutions based upon an alleged violation of a municipal ordinance.14 The City of Midwest City has a municipal court not of record.
¶18 A final judgment of a municipal court not of record may be appealed by filing a notice of appeal in both the municipal court and in the District Court in the county where the municipal government is located.15 The notice of appeal is to be filed "within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment" of the municipal court.16 The appellate proceeding in the District Court is a trial de novo with a right to a jury trial in certain circumstances.17 A District Court adjudicates an appeal from a final judgment of the municipal court not of record, and the form of the District Court's adjudication is a "final judgment or order of a District Court," and that final judgment or order of the District Court may be appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.18
¶19 The Oklahoma Constitution states that the appellate jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court "shall be coextensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity; except that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases until otherwise provided by statute...."Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4 (emphasis added). We have explained that the Oklahoma Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction to provide appellate review of a judgment on a criminal cause of action upon creation of the Criminal Court of Appeals,19 and we have recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters.20 The statutes relating to municipal courts not of record and appeals to both a District Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals contain no provision for the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction in these matters. Additionally, the Legislature has provided that "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction, coextensive with the limits of the state, in all criminal cases appealed from the district, superior and county courts, and such other courts of record as may be established by law."21 In City of Elk City v. Taylor, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that a prosecution of a cause of action in a municipal court imposing criminal penalties of incarceration, fines, or both, is considered as a criminal cause of action.22
¶20 Dutton's pleadings fail to distinguish this Court's jurisdiction in civil matters from the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal appeals when it adjudicates a criminal cause of action, e.g., personal criminal liability, defenses thereto, and the imposition and execution of a criminal sentence. Secondly, his pleadings do not distinguish claims within the civil jurisdiction of this Court when they are based upon institutional deficiencies apart from a judicial adjudication of a criminal judgment and sentence in a particular case. Thirdly, Dutton does not distinguish our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority. Fourthly, he does not show how his request is encompassed within other various circumstances where civil jurisdiction exists in this Court, although its exercise may involve a criminal proceeding in a different court.
¶21 The first distinction involves the issue defining civil and criminal matters for the purpose of defining a civil matter within this Court's supervisory civil jurisdiction and a criminal matter which is not. We have often explained that if a petitioner's claim is of such a nature that it is normally reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a properly filed proceeding in that Court such as a direct appeal or post-conviction appeal, then the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not assume jurisdiction on that claim.23 The scope of claims that are criminal-jurisdiction in nature includes those previously brought by a criminal defendant when using the form of a common-law writ to challenge his or her criminal judgment and sentence.24 This is so because the Legislature created a post-conviction remedy that supplanted the common-law writs and redefined what post-conviction claims may be made.25 Under the Constitution and statutes of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, all other appellate courts and the District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody."26 But "the traditional right to writs of habeas corpus in criminal cases has been incorporated into and amplified by Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Relief Act . . . and is therefore considered to be a criminal action" when used to challenge a criminal judgment and sentence.27 Dutton's pleadings may not be construed as properly seeking declaratory relief against a criminal judgment.28 In summary, when a petitioner files an application in this Court seeking a common-law extraordinary writ, that request does not transform a criminal matter into a civil matter, and we must examine the substantive nature of the petitioner's claims to determine whether the matter is criminal or civil.
¶22 Dutton claims that he was imprisoned without benefit of counsel, and that Midwest City failed to follow the U. S. Supreme Court opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, which guarantees counsel for indigent defendants imprisoned by municipal court process.29 The Response by Midwest City states that Argersinger "appears to apply to municipal courts." Although we do not decide this issue, we must note: (1) The authority before us provided by both Dutton and the city indicates that a municipality's power to imprison an indigent person must be exercised in the context of providing that person counsel for the process which results in his or her imprisonment;30 and (2) Our Court of Criminal Appeals has applied Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, for more than thirty years in criminal proceedings involving Oklahoma municipalities.31 Dutton's action in this Court is a challenge to criminal convictions based upon his personal constitutional rights.32 Challenges to a criminal judgment and sentence based upon personal constitutional rights possessed by a defendant in a criminal proceeding are claims that the Court of Criminal Appeals addresses every day, including a claim based upon the absence of a required attorney for the criminal defendant.33 This Court does not assume original supervisory jurisdiction on this type of claim.
¶23 The second distinction is when an alleged institutional deficiency is raised and the proper functioning of a governmental entity is to be adjudicated. These adjudications do not include an adjudication of the elements of a defendant's criminal offense, defenses, and personal rights a defendant possesses in his or her criminal proceeding as they relate to the criminal cause of action, judgment, or sentence. For example, in State v. Lynch, this Court properly assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate the institutional and constitutional deficiency arising when attorneys who represented criminal defendants were unconstitutionally compensated.34 Similarly, in Sanders v. Followell, the Court properly assumed original jurisdiction when a trial judge incorrectly applied a statute setting a lawyer's fee for representing a criminal defendant. The controversy adjudicated by this Court did not involve a part of the criminal cause of action, defenses thereto, or issues relating to the propriety or enforcement of a sentence upon a criminal judgment.35
¶24 An additional example of this distinction is found in Walters v. Ethics Commission.36 The litigation before this Court in Walters included both a supervisory writ proceeding and an appeal from the District Court.37 In the supervisory writ proceeding, we issued a writ to prevent the District Court from reviewing any action of the Ethics Commission in making a referral of a matter under its investigatory power to a District Attorney.38 A referral by the Commission was for the purpose of a prosecutor exercising discretion involving the institution of a criminal cause of action in the District Court. In the appeal, we explained the requirements for the proper functioning of the Ethics Commission and we addressed a party's specific claim that statutes were facially unconstitutional.39 This party also brought a specific allegation concerning the Commission's application of statutes as to him, and we also addressed that claim in the context of Ethics Commission proceedings that occur prior to institution of a criminal proceeding.40 On the issue whether the party's conduct at issue had been a criminal act, we declined to adjudicate that issue. We observed that the Commission's actions were preparatory to a criminal action being filed in a separate proceeding, and were not proper for adjudication at that time in either the District Court or this Court.41 Justice Opala's concurring opinion, joined by Simms, J., explained that the Court appropriately reversed the District Court's order while addressing the issues concerning the proper procedure to be used by the Ethics Commission, and had also wisely abstained from addressing whether the party's conduct was a violation of a statute: "Because violators of the Act's pertinent provisions are liable to criminal penalties, . . . [and] the decision regarding criminal liability for one's conduct must always be left to the court with cognizance over the offense charged."42 In summary, in Walters the Court distinguished between (1) a claim to adjudicate that a government entity was not functioning according to law and (2) a claim to adjudicate whether one or more elements to a criminal cause of action had been committed by a party to the proceeding. The present action requires the Court to determine if Dutton brought any type of proceeding other than a challenge to a criminal conviction, and we conclude that no request within our supervisory or superintending jurisdiction is made by him.
¶25 The third distinction involves our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority in a particular case. For example, when the Court of Criminal Appeals acts in a controversy where no appellate jurisdiction is vested in that Court, then this Court may assume jurisdiction and delineate that Court's jurisdiction.43 Dutton's purported photocopy of the order by the Court of Criminal Appeals states that the court declines jurisdiction and dismisses his case because: "Petitioner failed to attach to the Petition in Error a certified copy of the District Court Order being appealed as required by . . . [the rules of the court]. As Petitioner has provided an insufficient record for review, this Court declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matter." Similarly, this Court has stated that filing the judgment appealed in this Court is a necessary predicate for appellate review, and its absence may result in a dismissal.44 This Court has similarly dismissed a proceeding due to a party's failure to follow the rules of this Court.45 No excess of jurisdiction appears on either the face of the order of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the record submitted by Dutton herein.
¶26 Fourthly, the Legislature has created civil claims as well as Supreme Court jurisdiction in certain matters although our exercise of jurisdiction may have an impact on a criminal proceeding,46 and there are a few proceedings involving our appellate jurisdiction in matters which are related to a lower court criminal proceeding.47 If the Legislature has properly created a legal cause of action as a civil jurisdiction matter then this Court has the constitutional and legislatively-mandated responsibility to recognize it as within the jurisdiction of this Court.48 Dutton does not show how his request is encompassed within other various specific circumstances where civil original jurisdiction is exercised by this Court, although our exercise may involve or affect a lower court criminal proceeding.
III. Original Superintending Jurisdiction
¶27 Dutton filed pleadings in this Court invoking this Court's original jurisdiction. The Oklahoma Constitution vests this Court with original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs and a general superintending control over all inferior courts, agencies, commissions, and boards created by law.49 The Court's supervisory writ jurisdiction over lower courts is not identical to this Court's superintending-control jurisdiction over all courts, agencies, commissions, and boards.50 We have explained that "It is not always easy or necessary to note the line of demarcation between the two."51 Confusion between the two types of jurisdiction may arise because superintending-control jurisdiction is usually exercised by the use of writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari.52 However, the form of our superintending-control remedial order is not limited to the specified constitutional writs.53 The Court has used its superintending control when fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities in various contexts, such as supervising the practice of law pursuant to the Court's Art. 7 § 1 power,54 enforcing rules of procedure for courts,55 and deciding publici juris issues involving a serious conflict between different governmental agencies or branches of government.56 There is no clear legal right to a writ of superintending control and the issuance of such a writ is in the discretion of the Court.57
¶28 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has been granted statutory authority by the Legislature to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of article 27 of the Municipal Code; and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, it has the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts.58 This statute is consistent with the Supreme Court's civil jurisdiction because it authorizes the Court to create procedures and practices of statewide application.
¶29 The type of corrective relief within the jurisdiction conferred by this statute is one to correct institutional deficiencies and not one to adjudicate individual proceedings determining criminal liability. Nowhere in the statute is this Court given the power to issue writs of either supervisory or superintending control to review an individual criminal proceeding in a municipal court. One reason for this is that the authority to issue writs to a municipal court not of record lies in the District Court, which court also has the statutory appellate criminal jurisdiction over the municipal court criminal case.59 Appeals from criminal convictions in municipal courts of record are filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals using the procedures authorized for appeals from district courts.60 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has no general superintending power over the lower courts, the writs it issues are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,61 and the scope of the relief afforded by those writs involves criminal matters. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters and jurisdiction to issue supervisory writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, that Court is the court which uses a writ power to supervise a criminal matter in a criminal controversy or action that is proceeding in the District Court.
¶30 Relief from a criminal judgment and sentence in a municipal court not of record lies in the municipal court, District Court, and Court of Criminal Appeals.62 Dutton's pleadings do not seek relief against an institution and the imposition of state-wide rules.63 He seeks relief in the form of an order vacating his convictions or an order directing the District Court to provide him with a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions.
¶31 We have also used "superintending control" in the context of (1) issuing prohibition to prevent a trial court from denying a person's fundamental right of notice and an opportunity to be heard in a judicial proceeding,64 and (2) noting the publici juris issue presented by a state-wide procedure for collecting jury fees as implemented by a particular District Court Clerk.65 We have also assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate "an arguable claim" that a violation of a federal constitutional right had occurred by application of specific state statutes.66
¶32 Dutton's claim is that he was imprisoned without the benefit of counsel appointed to represent him, and that he was denied a federal constitutional right. The constitutional grant of superintending control in this Court is not an unlimited power, but a power that is exercised within the definition of "judicial power" as vested in this Court by Article 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution. If a party files a pleading in this Court and requests a determination of his or her legal rights, then a particular type of Article 7 judicial power is invoked in a particular context and the Court acting on that pleading is functioning in the role of an "adjudicator" and not, for example, legislatively or administratively.67 In summary, Dutton is asking the Court to adjudicate a case. In the exercise of our original supervisory or superintending jurisdiction, when we "adjudicate a case" we must possess both subject matter jurisdiction68 and a justiciable controversy69 as shown by the parties' pleadings; and our adjudication is limited by the parties pleadings70 unless the scope of the adjudication is expanded by one of the few well-known exceptions. Additionally, this expanded adjudication in the context of an exercise of superintending control jurisdiction is itself circumscribed by the usual principles of law applicable to remedies, such as an alternate exclusive remedy defeating the exercise of such jurisdiction.71 Examples of adjudicatory superintending control jurisdiction being dependent upon application of subject-matter and justiciability principles are found in opinions such as Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley,72 Democratic Party v. Estep,73 and Ethics Commission v. Cullison,74 and more recent opinions such as Coates v. Fallin.75
¶33 Our superintending control jurisdiction is created by Article 7 §§ 1 and 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution and that jurisdiction must be construed in harmony with the constitutional exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters that is vested in the Court of Criminal Appeals via enactments of the Legislature.76 Dutton is requesting that we adjudicate the legality of his criminal convictions by an exercise of our superintending control in the context of this Court lacking a general constitutional power for appellate review of final judgments and sentences in criminal cases.77 It is correct that the historic division between civil and criminal appellate-review jurisdiction has not been a rigid line and this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have had a shared responsibility in specific circumstances.78 That shared responsibility has usually occurred because this Court has been required to define a "criminal case" or matter for purpose of appellate review when the court for such review was not expressly stated in the statute,79 or when a statutory scheme incorporates both criminal and civil matters or power,80 or when we have explained sui generis proceedings and a shared appellate-review jurisdiction exists.81 Dutton's controversy is not one within the shared responsibility of this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals or a controversy where no appeal has been provided by statute.
¶34 The Court of Criminal Appeals is constitutionally vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases" as implemented by legislation.82 The Legislature has provided an appellate procedure for an appeal from a municipal court to the District Court and then an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. There is no appeal or writ of error from the Court of Criminal Appeals to this Court.83 There is no doubt that this Court may correct a deficient statutory remedy in the context of an adjudication.84 But adjudicatory jurisdiction of appeals from Dutton's criminal convictions does not lie in this Court. Dutton may not circumvent the statutory appellate procedures by seeking appellate review of his criminal conviction in this Court.85
¶35 It is nothing new for this Court to examine the scope and effect of a party's requested relief to determine whether this Court is impermissibly intruding upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals. For example, in State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, the Department of Corrections was statutorily required to apply earned credit days towards a prisoner's sentence of incarceration. We explained that the scope of the statute in the controversy applied to alter a criminal judgment and sentence and was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.86 The issue of attorney representation of an indigent criminal defendant is a criminal matter by its nature, and thus proper for adjudication within a District Court criminal proceeding and appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.87
¶36 We conclude that Dutton's pleadings attempt to invoke an original supervisory or superintending adjudicatory jurisdiction of this Court for the purpose of providing him with an appellate review of his municipal criminal judgments and sentences, and we decline to assume original jurisdiction on such claims.
IV. Alternative Remedies
¶37 Dutton has ten filings in this supervisory proceeding.88 None of these filings show that he is without remedies in the District Court or subsequent appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. More than forty years ago, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Relief Act (22 O.S. §§ 1080-1089) "contains no requirement that an applicant be in custody, under any form of restraint or supervision, or that the sentence be unsatisfied in any respect."89 Dutton's release from confinement would appear to present no theoretical bar to seeking post-conviction relief.90
¶38 The orders are not before us, but we may take judicial notice of the dockets of District Courts.91 In the three District Court actions, 2013-1619, 2013-1620, and 2013-1622, the first and last were "Dismissed without prejudice" and in 1620 its current status appears to be "pending." All of his applications for post conviction relief were filed with the docket designation "CV" for "Civil Misc.: OTHER - CIVIL NO DAMAGES
¶39 The concept of an adequate remedy appears in several areas of the law with slightly different and overlapping meanings. In the context of creating a remedy and providing equitable relief, we have indicated that when a party has an action at law an equitable remedy will not be available.92 Similarly, equity is not invocable when an adequate statutory remedy exists.93 In the context of challenging a judgment, a statutory remedy will preclude a party from successfully invoking equity.94 Of course, in these contexts the available remedies must be adequate, but adequacy is not measured by whether Dutton obtains the exact relief he desires, i.e., his convictions are voided or he gets a new appeal in this proceeding. Adequacy of a remedy in this context is determined by whether the law provides a means for complete relief for a person with the type of claims Dutton is raising, i.e., a reasonable opportunity to obtain the relief he seeks.
¶40 Generally, in the context of a civil proceeding when the federal constitution requires this State to provide an adequate remedy for a person claiming the denial of a federal constitutional right by the State, the adequacy of an available remedy at law is not measured by that particular party's eventual success on the merits of his or her litigation, but whether a person in that party's circumstances is provided with a clear and certain opportunity for obtaining complete relief at law.95 For example, if a state exacts a tax in violation of the federal constitution, then it must provide an opportunity to recover those taxes because "a denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment."96 But even in the context of a deprived federal constitutional right, a State may require a person to comply with a clear and certain state procedure when seeking a legal remedy for that deprived federal right.97 Dutton's action raising federal constitutional claims does not exempt him from using available statutory or common-law proceedings to vindicate his claims. The District Court has stated that his applications for post-conviction relief were denied without prejudice to him seeking relief in the municipal court. Dutton has failed to show why he should not be required to pursue relief in accordance with state statutes and the orders of the District Court.
V. Motion for Counsel, Oral Argument and an Evidentiary Hearing
¶41 Dutton filed a motion requesting the Court appoint counsel to represent him in this proceeding. This Court has noted a right to counsel possessed by a defendant in a criminal prosecution, and that the right is expressly conferred by Art. 2 § 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.98 Dutton's proceeding in this Court does not subject him to either criminal fine or punishment, and it is not a criminal prosecution or a statutorily authorized direct appeal from his criminal judgments and sentences. His proceeding in this Court is not a statutorily authorized direct attack on his convictions, but a collateral attack 99 in a civil proceeding seeking an extraordinary superintending writ to review judgments based upon criminal causes of action that were rendered in criminal proceedings.
¶42 There is no doubt that the assistance of a legal practitioner is fundamental to due process "in certain types of civil litigation, aspects of which are analogous to criminal proceedings."100 We have concluded that legal authority clearly demonstrates that this Court has no authority in this collateral civil proceeding to either void Dutton's convictions or direct the District Court to provide him with an appeal of his criminal convictions. We note the District Court has denied his applications for criminal post-conviction relief without prejudice. We conclude that appointed counsel would not be of assistance in this proceeding and deny Dutton's application for appointed counsel.101 Because we decline to assume original jurisdiction on the merits of Dutton's claims and because such relief is appropriate in a different court, we deny his motion for an oral argument and an evidentiary hearing.
V. Conclusion
¶43 We assume original jurisdiction solely on the issue of our jurisdiction to hear Dutton's claims. Dutton has failed to show that he lacks adequate remedies in either a municipal court or the District Court. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner's cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court. We conclude that Dutton's claims are criminal matters and we decline to assume original jurisdiction on his claims or grant him relief on them without prejudice to him presenting them, in the proper court.102
¶44 COMBS, V. C. J., WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, and GURICH, JJ, concur.
¶45 REIF, C. J., KAUGER, and COLBERT, JJ., concur in result.
FOOTNOTES
1 Appendix, Aug. 29, 2014, exhibit 5, page 3, orders of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dutton v. City of Midwest City, Nos. PC 2014-0632, PC 2014-0633, and PC 2014-0634.
2 The federal court based its conclusion on Heck v. Humphrey,
3 Petitioner's Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 113,170 (Aug. 29, 2014) pp. 16-17.
4 Petitioner's Motion to Provide Relief, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 113,170 (Nov. 14, 2014) pp. 11-12.
5 Although The City of Midwest City is not a named party in the style of this proceeding as filed by Dutton, The City of Midwest City entered an appearance herein and we requested a response addressing Dutton's allegations. The Court also provided an opportunity for the District Attorney for Oklahoma County to file a response to Dutton's pleadings.
6 Sanders v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission,
7 See, e.g., Hall v. Geo Group, Inc.,
8 See, e.g., Miller v. Fortune Insurance Co.,
9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction to determine whether it or the Court of Criminal Appeals exercises jurisdiction in a particular controversy. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4: ". . . and in the event there is any conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final." See, e.g., Smith v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections,
10 Hobbs v. German-American Doctors,
11 Cooper v. Reynolds,
12 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed,
13 11 O.S.2011 § 27-101: "A municipality may create a municipal court, as provided in this article, which shall be a court not of record. This court may be created in addition to a municipal criminal court of record. References in Sections 27-101 through 27-131 of this title to the municipal court shall mean the municipal court not of record established under the authority of the provisions of this article."
14 11 O.S.2011 § 27-103: "The municipal court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all prosecutions wherein a violation of any ordinance of the municipality where the court is established is charged."
15
A. An appeal may be taken from a final judgment of the municipal court by the defendant by filing in the district court in the county where the situs of the municipal government is located, within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment, a notice of appeal and by filing a copy of the notice with the municipal court. In case of an appeal, a trial de novo shall be had, and there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) and costs.
B. Upon conviction, at the request of the defendant, or upon notice of appeal being filed, the judge of the municipal court shall enter an order on the docket fixing an amount in which bond may be given by the defendant, in cash or sureties for cash in an amount of not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than twice the amount of such fine. Bond shall be taken by the clerk of the court wherein judgment was rendered. Any pledge of sureties must be approved by a judge of the court.
C. Upon appeal being filed the judge shall within ten (10) days thereafter certify to the clerk of the appellate court the original papers in the case. If the papers have not been certified to the appellate court, the prosecuting attorney shall take the necessary steps to have the papers certified to the appellate court within twenty (20) days of the filing of the notice of appeal, and failure to do so, except for good cause shown, shall be grounds for dismissal of the charge by the appellate court, the cost to be taxed to the municipality. The certificate shall state whether or not the municipal judge hearing the case was a licensed attorney in Oklahoma.
D. All proceedings necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be had in the appellate court.
16 See note 15 supra, at 11 O.S.2011 § 27-129 (A).
17 See note 15 supra, at 11 O.S.2011 § 27-129 (A). Section 27-129(A) was amended by 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws Ch. 2, § 1 (eff. Nov. 1, 2015), and which states in part that "... there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), plus costs, fees, and assessments."
18 11 O.S. § 27-132: "An appeal may be taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals from the final judgment or order of a district court in an appeal from a final judgment of a municipal court in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are taken from a district court to the Court of Criminal Appeals."
19 In re Opinion of the Judges,
20 In the Matter of M.B.,
21 20 O.S.2011 § 40: "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction, coextensive with the limits of the state, in all criminal cases appealed from the district, superior and county courts, and such other courts of record as may be established by law."
22 City of Elk City v. Taylor,
23 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
24 See State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, supra, note 20, observing that "As the Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly stated, in a criminal case the 'essential part of the judgment is the punishment and the amount thereof.'" Cf. Lockett v. Evans,
25 Paxton v. State,
26 State v. Powell,
27 State ex rel. Coats v. Hunter,
28 An action for a declaratory judgment will not lie "to launch an impermissible collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence in a criminal case." Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington,
29 Argersinger v. Hamlin,
30 Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra; Scott v. Illinois,
31 Jackson v. City of Oklahoma City,
We also note that two authors have stated that in 1997 the State of New Jersey became the first state to enact legislation requiring every municipal court to have at least one municipal public defender appointed by the governing body of the municipality to represent an indigent defendant accused of an offense, which if convicted, would subject the defendant to imprisonment. Robert J. Martin and Walter Kowalski, "A Matter of Simple Justice": Enactment of New Jersey's Municipal Public Defender Act, 51 Rutgers L.Rev. 637, 676-677, 694 (1999).
32 See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb,
33 See, e.g., Hinsley v. State,
34 State v. Lynch,
35 Sanders v. Followell,
36 Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Comm'n,
37 Walters,
38 Walters,
39 Walters,
40 Walters,
41 Walters,
42 Walters,
43 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
44 Willitt v. ASG Industries,
45 See, e.g., Rugg v. Layton,
46 See, e.g., Courtney v. State,
47 An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. Dunn v. State,
48 In Oklahoma, a right to appeal from an exercise of judicial discretion in cases of law and equity, excluding criminal matters, is a constitutional right subject to legislative requirements for the manner invoking that appellate jurisdiction. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4; Wells v. Shriver,
49 Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4, provides in part that: "The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law."
50 Board of Commissioners of Harmon County v. Keen,
51 Board of Commissioners of Harmon County v. Keen,
52 Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison,
53 Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison,
54 The Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 7 § 1, vests "judicial power" in the Supreme Court and that vesting "gives it the right to regulate the matter of who shall be admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court and inferior courts, and also gives it the right to regulate and control the practice of law within its jurisdiction." In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma,
The Court's Art. 7 § 4 superintending power over "inferior courts" includes an authority to control and regulate the practice of law. State v. Lynch,
55 State ex rel. Freeling v. Kight,
56 Ethics Commission v. Cullison,
57 Butler v. Breckinridge,
58 11 O.S.2011 § 27-131:
"The Supreme Court is authorized to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of this article, and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, shall have the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts of Oklahoma to consider matters calculated to bring about a speedier and more efficient administration of justice."
59
The district court in each county wherein a municipal court is established shall have the same jurisdiction to issue to the municipal court writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari as the Supreme Court now has to issue such writs to courts of record.
60 11 O.S.2011 § 28-128:
Appeals may be taken from a judgment or order of a municipal criminal court of record to the Court of Criminal Appeals in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are now taken from the district courts to the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters, and no appeals other than those herein provided shall be allowed.
61 Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon,
62 See, e.g., Houghton v. City of Wewoka,
63 Because his pleadings do not raise this issue we need not address the type of factual support or record in an original jurisdiction proceeding that is needed for a request that the Court create court rules for state-wide application.
64 Muggenborg v. Kessler,
65 Naylor v. Petuskey,
66 Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Board,
67 Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n,
68 The focus of a subject matter jurisdiction analysis is on the nature of the pled action in relation to the power of a court to adjudicate and grant relief in an action of that nature. The phrase subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to deal with the general subject involved in the action or the nature of the cause of action, and this jurisdiction is present when a court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed,
69 Generally, the focus of a justiciability analysis is on the parties and the nature of their adverse legal interests in the particular pled controversy, and not on the nature of the pled cause of action as it relates to the power of the court to address that type of action. See, e.g., Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation,
This focus on the interests of the parties has been present when we addressed a justiciable controversy in the context of declaratory relief and have said that justiciability is present when there is: (1) a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Chrysler Corp. v. Clark,
District Courts possess "unlimited jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article . . . ." Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 7(a). Reeds v. Walker,
70 Generally, the Court's adjudicatory judicial power in an original action is limited to the facts and issues framed by the pleadings and as amended by the partes' briefs in this Court. La Bellman v. Gleason & Sanders, Inc.,
71 For example, one of the well-known exceptions occurs in a public-law controversy where the Court may grant corrective relief upon any applicable legal theory, raised by a party or sua sponte, when that theory is dispositive of the controversy and is supported by the record. Lincoln Farm, L.L.C. v. Oppliger,
72 In Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley,
73 Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep,
74 Ethics Commission v. Cullison,
75 Coates v. Fallin,
76 In re Initiative Petition No. 314,
77 In re Opinion of the Judges,
78 See, e.g., Hale v. Board of County Commissioners of Seminole County,
79 See, e.g., State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
80 See, e.g., Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoenas v. Powers,
81 Contempt proceedings are sui generis, Henry v. Schmidt,
82 Jackson v. Freeman,
83 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
84 Farris v. Cannon,
85 Darnell v. Higgins,
86 State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
87 See, e.g., Griffin v. State,
88 Dutton filed: (1) Entry of Appearance (August 29, 2014); (2) Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, (August 29, 2014); (3) An Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (August 29, 2014); (4) Motion to Appoint Counsel, (August 29, 2014); (5) Appendix of Citations of Authority and Exhibits, (August 29, 2014); (6) Proof of Service (August 29, 2014); (7) Motion to Provide Relief (Nov. 14, 2014); (8) Notice of Change of Contact Information (December 30, 2014); (9) Petitioner's Objections and Legal Argument, etc. (March 10, 2015); and (10) Petitioner's motion for evidentiary hearing, oral argument, and aid of counsel (April 17, 2015).
89 Battle v. State,
90 22 O.S.2011 § 1080, states that:
Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(a) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state;
(b) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(c) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(d) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(e) that his sentence has expired, his suspended sentence, probation, parole, or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
(f) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy;
may institute a proceeding under this act in the court in which the judgment and sentence on conviction was imposed to secure the appropriate relief. Excluding a timely appeal, this act encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods of challenging a conviction or sentence.
91 Collier v. Reese,
92 Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.,
93 Muskogee Fair Haven Manor Phase I, Inc. v. Scott,
94 Denning v. Van Meter,
95 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,
96 Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
We note that a federal constitutional requirement for a State court providing a remedy for a constitutional deprivation is not a rule of universal application. While Congress does not possess the power, under Article I of the U. S. Constitution, to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts, Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to the enforcement power of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Alden v. Maine,
97 Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
98 Towne v. Hubbard,
99 A direct attack is an attempt to avoid or correct a judicial proceeding in some manner provided by law, such as by an appeal, or motion for new trial. House v. Town of Dickson,
A collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or to deny its force and effect in some manner not provided by law; that is, in some other way than by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or motion for a new trial. In re Hyde,
100 Towne v. Hubbard,
101 We also deny Dutton's motion for hearing and oral argument because the authorities clearly show that this Court has no authority to adjudicate the merits of Dutton's claims.
102 A limited adjudication on the question of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits of the controversy. State v. Herndon,
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|
| None Found. |
| Cite | Name | Level | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| HOUGHTON v. CITY OF WEWOKA | Discussed | ||
| PAXTON v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. COATS v. HUNTER | Discussed | ||
| BLADES v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| CITY OF ELK CITY v. TAYLOR | Discussed | ||
| HINSLEY v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| MURRAH v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY | Discussed | ||
| HARGROVE v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| GRIFFIN v. STATE | Discussed at Length | ||
| SMITH v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| CAMPBELL v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| JACKSON v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| LUNA v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| BATTLE v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Chrysler Corp. v. Clark | Discussed | ||
| Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Com'n | Discussed at Length | ||
| State ex rel. Turpen v. A 1977 Chevrolet Pickup Truck | Discussed | ||
| In re INTEGRATION OF STATE BAR OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler | Discussed at Length | ||
| State v. Lynch | Discussed at Length | ||
| Naylor v. Petuskey | Discussed | ||
| Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in Multicounty Grand Jury Case No. CJ-92-4110 Before Dist. Court of Oklahoma County v. Powers | Discussed | ||
| Ethics Com'n of State of Okl. v. Cullison | Discussed at Length | ||
| STATE ex rel. CRAWFORD v. CORPORATION COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| OKLAHOMA CITY v. ROBINSON | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. FREELING v. KIGHT | Discussed at Length | ||
| Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington | Discussed | ||
| Stallings v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n | Discussed | ||
| Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd. | Discussed | ||
| HINKLE v. KENNY | Discussed | ||
| DUNN et al. v. STATE. | Discussed | ||
| DENNING v. VAN METER | Discussed | ||
| SMITH v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS | Discussed | ||
| GLACKEN v. ANDREW | Discussed at Length | ||
| WELLS v. SHRIVER | Discussed | ||
| JETER v. DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY | Discussed | ||
| In re OPINION OF THE JUDGES. | Discussed at Length | ||
| IN RE HESS' ESTATE | Discussed | ||
| GORDON v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed | ||
| LA BELLMAN v. GLEASON & SANDERS, INC. | Discussed | ||
| RUGG v. LAYTON Co. Supt. | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. BLANKENSHIP v. FREEMAN | Discussed | ||
| BUTLER v. BRECKINRIDGE | Discussed | ||
| Jackson v. Freeman | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO. v. BROWN | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. YOUNG v. WOODSON | Discussed | ||
| STATE v. TORRES | Discussed | ||
| HENRY v. SCHMIDT | Discussed | ||
| REEDS v. WALKER | Discussed | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF M.B. | Discussed at Length | ||
| HOUSE v. TOWN OF DICKSON | Discussed | ||
| MOVANTS TO QUASH MULTICOUNTY GRAND JURY SUBPOENA v. DIXON | Discussed | ||
| COLLIER v. REESE | Cited | ||
| STATE v. POWELL | Discussed | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF HYDE | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. MOTHERSHED | Discussed at Length | ||
| COURTNEY v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley | Discussed | ||
| LINCOLN FARM, L. L. C. v. OPPLIGER | Discussed | ||
| KRUG v. HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC. | Discussed | ||
| COATES v. FALLIN | Cited | ||
| HALL v. THE GEO GROUP, INC | Discussed | ||
| LOCKETT v. EVANS | Cited | ||
| SANDERS v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed | ||
| WILLITT v. ASG INDUSTRIES, INC. | Discussed | ||
| STATE v. ex rel. COMM'N OF LAND OFFICE v. CORPORATION COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| CARDER v. COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS | Discussed at Length | ||
| Draper v. State | Discussed | ||
| HALE v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF SEMINOLE CTY. | Discussed at Length | ||
| Initiative Petition No. 314, In re | Discussed | ||
| Towne v. Hubbard | Discussed at Length | ||
| Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n | Cited | ||
| Muggenborg v. Kessler | Discussed | ||
| Berry v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co. | Cited | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF INCOME TAX PROTEST OF REDBIRD | Discussed at Length | ||
| State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., Application of | Discussed | ||
| Farris v. Cannon | Discussed | ||
| Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep | Cited | ||
| DARNELL v. HIGGINS Co. Supt. | Discussed | ||
| SANDERS v. OKLAHOMA EMPL. SEC. COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| MUSKOGEE FAIR HAVEN MANOR v. SCOTT | Discussed at Length | ||
| In re Oklahoma Boll Weevil Eradication Organization | Discussed | ||
| HOBBS v. GERMAN-AMERICAN | Discussed at Length | ||
| BOARD OF COM'RS OF HARMON CTY. v. KEEN | Discussed at Length | ||
| HERNDON v. HAMMOND | Discussed | ||
| BUCK v. DICK | Discussed at Length | ||
| STATE ex rel. IKARD v. RUSSELL | Discussed | ||
| Johnson v. Johnson | Discussed | ||
| Title 11. Cities and Towns | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Creation of Municipal Court Not of Record | Cited | ||
| Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari | Cited | ||
| Appeals | Discussed at Length | ||
| Orders Relative to Procedures and Practices by Supreme Court | Cited | ||
| Appeal to Court of Criminal Appeals | Cited | ||
| Appeals | Cited | ||
| Title 20. Courts | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Title 21. Crimes and Punishments | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Repealed by Laws 1991, HB 1612, c. 238, § 37, emerg. eff. July 1, 1991 | Cited | ||
| Title 22. Criminal Procedure | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Post-Conviction Procedure Act - Right to Challenge Conviction or Sentence. | Discussed at Length | ||
| Accusation Presented by Grand Jury | Cited | ||
| Presentation of Accusation by County Commissioners or Judge and Treasurer -Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Title 28. Fees | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Civil Actions - Charge in Addition to Flat Fee | Cited | ||
| Title 51. Officers | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Attorney General - Duties | Cited | ||
OSCN navigation
- Home
- Courts
- Court Dockets
- Legal Research
- Calendar
- Help
- Previous Case
- Top Of Index
- This Point in Index
- Citationize
- Next Case
- Print Only
DUTTON v. CITY OF MIDWEST CITY
Case Number: 113170
Decided: 06/30/2015
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Cite as:
RODNEY DUTTON, Petitioner,
v.
THE CITY OF MIDWEST CITY, and THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondents.
APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
¶0 Petitioner sought an extraordinary writ in the Oklahoma Supreme Court and challenged his convictions in three criminal proceedings in the municipal court for The City of Midwest City. He also requested an alternative remedy that would compel the District Court to provide him with a new appeal of his convictions in the District Court. We assume original jurisdiction for the sole purpose of determining our jurisdiction to review Petitioner's allegations. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner's cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AND ALL
REQUESTS FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO PETITIONER SEEKING RELIEF IN THE APPROPRIATE COURT
Rodney Dutton, Midwest City, Oklahoma, Petitioner Pro se.
David F. Howell and J. Steven Coates, Midwest City, Oklahoma, for Respondent, City of Midwest City.
EDMONDSON, J.
¶1 We assume original jurisdiction on the question whether this Court has original jurisdiction to adjudicate both the merits of the claim or cause of action that the Dutton (or Petitioner) has pled in this Court and the associated remedies he requests. We decline to assume original jurisdiction on either the merits of Dutton's cause of action or his requests for relief as pled by him in this Court.
¶2 Dutton pleads a cause of action challenging the correctness of a judgment and sentence in three municipal criminal matters. He seeks an adjudication on the legal correctness of these judgments and sentences in this proceeding, and in the alternative he requests an extraordinary remedy to compel the District Court to provide him a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions in the District Court. We conclude that the pled cause of action and remedy sought by him involve criminal matters that are not within the original jurisdiction of this Court. We conclude that Dutton's action in this Court should be dismissed without prejudice to him seeking appropriate relief in the proper court.
I. Pleadings of Dutton and The City of Midwest City
¶3 Dutton alleges that on April 15, 2013, he was convicted in the municipal court of the City of Midwest City, Oklahoma, of the charges of assault, public intoxication, and domestic assault and battery. He states that he was sentenced to thirty days in jail. He states that he was incarcerated for a felony charge on November 24, 2011, which was ultimately dismissed, and he "was released on his own recognizance on about March 7, 2013," and then transferred to the Midwest City jail for trial on his municipal charges. He alleges that he was released from the Midwest City jail on May 10, 2013. He states that while he was incarcerated on the felony charge he was represented by a "public defender."
¶4 He states that he filed three applications for post-conviction relief in the District Court after his release. He alleges that the District Court dismissed the applications for the reason that they should have been filed with the municipal court in Midwest City. His application for this Court to assume original jurisdiction was filed on August 29, 2014, approximately one year and three months after his release.
¶5 Dutton alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied counsel at trial and was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. He alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied (1) advance notice of the municipal charges against him, (2) a fair trial due to insufficient evidence, and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (3) counsel for an appeal, (4) a direct appeal, (5) "out-of-time appeal," (6) an adequate post-conviction remedy, and (7) counsel for a post-conviction appeal. In his filing herein entitled "Motion to Provide Relief," he alleges that he was "denied his 6th and 14th Amendments rights to counsel and a fair trial and subsequently denied his right to an appeal of wrongful convictions by the city of Midwest City, Oklahoma."
¶6 Dutton alleges that shortly prior to his trial in municipal court he was provided with a written notice of one of the charges against him. He states that the judge refused his request to have a lawyer appointed for him. He states that after the City's prosecutor failed to appear for his trial, the judge questioned the witnesses and refused Dutton's request to cross-examine the witnesses.
¶7 Dutton alleges that the District Court of Oklahoma County:
. . . has delayed and denied the Petitioner in his pursuit of relief in this matter . . . and while "the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals provide him some relief at first and then declined to hear his appeal when the court reporter or court clerk failed to provide him a stamp-filed certified copy of the District Court's order dismissing two of his three post-conviction applications under the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals own rules.
Application to Assume, Aug. 29, 2014, at pg. 2, material omitted.
Dutton's appendix of exhibits, and his other filings in this Court, fail to contain photocopies of any the orders allegedly issued by the District Court of Oklahoma County about which he complains. He alleges that he sought relief in the District Court by filing applications for post-conviction relief pursuant to Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
¶8 Dutton's Appendix does contain purported uncertified photocopies of orders issued by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Three orders, which show docket designations for post-conviction appeals, state that the Court of Criminal Appeals declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matters because Dutton failed to attach to his petition in error a certified copy of the District Court order being appealed, as required by the rules for the Court of Criminal Appeals.1
¶9 Dutton's Appendix also contains a purported photocopy of an order of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing his motion for the court to reconsider "declining jurisdiction of his post-conviction appeals from Oklahoma County." The court explains that a petition for rehearing that challenges the court's decision in post-conviction appeal is not allowed.
¶10 Midwest City's response states that Dutton's allegations relate to three different factual episodes resulting in a criminal prosecution for assault and battery on his wife, prosecutions for assault on a police officer and public intoxication, and then an arrest for felony possession of incendiary devices. He was released from jail, awaiting trial on the felony charge, and returned to the municipal jail for prosecution of the misdemeanors.
¶11 The response states that Dutton and his wife filed two civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claimed that his constitutional rights were violated by Midwest City and its officials in the context of Dutton's arrests, convictions, and sentence of incarceration. The federal court's order dismissing, in part, Dutton's claims lists the violations of constitutional rights as alleged by Dutton and his wife in the federal proceeding.
Mr. Dutton's claims, construed liberally because of his pro se status, appear to be as follows: 1) a First Amendment violation, based upon an alleged retaliation for the comment he made while leaving the courtroom ["I'll see you in federal court."]; 2) a Fourth Amendment claim, based on his arrest and prosecution without probable cause; 3) denial of due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 4) denial of assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 5) an Eighth Amendment claim, based on failure to protect him from abuse by a fellow inmate; and 6) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, both plaintiffs assert First and Fourteenth Amendment claims for loss of consortium and violation of their "right to pursue life and happiness together in their marriage and individually without wrongful interference by officials of [the] government."
Order, Jan. 3, 2014, at p. 3, Rodney Dutton and Shirley Dutton v. City of Midwest City, et al., No. CIV-13-0911-HE, U. S. Dist. Crt., W. D. Okla., (explanation added).
The federal court concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based upon allegations of an unconstitutional conviction when state law provided a means for challenging the conviction.2 Midwest City states that Dutton's appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit was determined by that court to be premature due to Dutton's claims still pending before the federal District Court. Midwest City states that Dutton's claims against it remain pending in the federal court. Midwest City's appendix filed herein also contains uncertified photocopies of two orders by The District Court of Oklahoma County dismissing, without prejudice, Dutton's applications for post-conviction relief.
¶12 Dutton filed a reply to the city's response. He states his innocence of the crimes for which he was convicted. He argues: (1) his municipal arrest was illegal, (2) the trial in the municipal court was not fair because he was not provided with an attorney, and (3) his municipal convictions are void because no record exists of the evidence used against him at the municipal trial. He also objects to the appearances made in this proceeding by two attorneys who filed a response for Midwest City. He requests that this Court "dismiss" these two attorneys from this proceeding.
¶13 In his reply, Dutton requests this Court adjudicate his convictions to be "invalid, null, and void" and to also grant the relief as set forth in his Application filed with this Court. In his Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, he requests an order of this Court directing the District Court of Oklahoma County "provide him a direct appeal with appointed counsel from Midwest City Municipal Cases docketed as #2011-4369 - Domestic Violence, #2011-5808 - public intoxication, and #2011-5808 - assault and/or any other relief that is appropriately just."3 Dutton also states he seeks an order "overturning, vacating, and barring" the municipal convictions, or alternatively the Court provide him with a direct appeal of his convictions in the District Court with appointed counsel.4
II. The Court's Original Supervisory Civil Jurisdiction
¶14 This Court issued an order and requested Midwest City brief the issue whether this Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims made by Petitioner.5 The city's response argues that (1) the matter before this Court is criminal in nature, (2) "Petitioner has an adequate remedy available under the Post-Conviction Relief Act" (22 O.S. §§ 1080-1089), (3) the Court of Criminal Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to review orders issued pursuant to the Post-Conviction Act, and (4) this Court should not exercise jurisdiction over Dutton's claims.
¶15 A court has a duty to inquire into whether it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action that has been brought before the court.6 This Court has stated a similar rule in various contexts.7 One application of this rule is found in explanations stating a court has an inherent power to adjudicate whether it possesses jurisdiction in the particular matter before that court,8 and this Court has the constitutional duty to determine whether a matter is within this Court's jurisdiction or within the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.9
¶16 Subject matter jurisdiction is the "power to deal with the general subject involved in the action"10 or the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.11 The Court has explained that subject matter jurisdiction of a court is invoked by pleadings filed by a party with a court and which show that the court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented, or power to grant the relief sought.12 Our inquiry requires us to examine the nature of Dutton's pled cause of action and the remedy he seeks in this Court and determine whether that cause of action and remedies for that action are within the jurisdiction of this Court.
¶17 The Legislature has authorized a municipality to create a municipal court not of record.13 A municipal court not of record has original jurisdiction to hear and determine prosecutions based upon an alleged violation of a municipal ordinance.14 The City of Midwest City has a municipal court not of record.
¶18 A final judgment of a municipal court not of record may be appealed by filing a notice of appeal in both the municipal court and in the District Court in the county where the municipal government is located.15 The notice of appeal is to be filed "within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment" of the municipal court.16 The appellate proceeding in the District Court is a trial de novo with a right to a jury trial in certain circumstances.17 A District Court adjudicates an appeal from a final judgment of the municipal court not of record, and the form of the District Court's adjudication is a "final judgment or order of a District Court," and that final judgment or order of the District Court may be appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.18
¶19 The Oklahoma Constitution states that the appellate jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court "shall be coextensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity; except that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases until otherwise provided by statute...."Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4 (emphasis added). We have explained that the Oklahoma Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction to provide appellate review of a judgment on a criminal cause of action upon creation of the Criminal Court of Appeals,19 and we have recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters.20 The statutes relating to municipal courts not of record and appeals to both a District Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals contain no provision for the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction in these matters. Additionally, the Legislature has provided that "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction, coextensive with the limits of the state, in all criminal cases appealed from the district, superior and county courts, and such other courts of record as may be established by law."21 In City of Elk City v. Taylor, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that a prosecution of a cause of action in a municipal court imposing criminal penalties of incarceration, fines, or both, is considered as a criminal cause of action.22
¶20 Dutton's pleadings fail to distinguish this Court's jurisdiction in civil matters from the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal appeals when it adjudicates a criminal cause of action, e.g., personal criminal liability, defenses thereto, and the imposition and execution of a criminal sentence. Secondly, his pleadings do not distinguish claims within the civil jurisdiction of this Court when they are based upon institutional deficiencies apart from a judicial adjudication of a criminal judgment and sentence in a particular case. Thirdly, Dutton does not distinguish our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority. Fourthly, he does not show how his request is encompassed within other various circumstances where civil jurisdiction exists in this Court, although its exercise may involve a criminal proceeding in a different court.
¶21 The first distinction involves the issue defining civil and criminal matters for the purpose of defining a civil matter within this Court's supervisory civil jurisdiction and a criminal matter which is not. We have often explained that if a petitioner's claim is of such a nature that it is normally reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a properly filed proceeding in that Court such as a direct appeal or post-conviction appeal, then the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not assume jurisdiction on that claim.23 The scope of claims that are criminal-jurisdiction in nature includes those previously brought by a criminal defendant when using the form of a common-law writ to challenge his or her criminal judgment and sentence.24 This is so because the Legislature created a post-conviction remedy that supplanted the common-law writs and redefined what post-conviction claims may be made.25 Under the Constitution and statutes of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, all other appellate courts and the District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody."26 But "the traditional right to writs of habeas corpus in criminal cases has been incorporated into and amplified by Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Relief Act . . . and is therefore considered to be a criminal action" when used to challenge a criminal judgment and sentence.27 Dutton's pleadings may not be construed as properly seeking declaratory relief against a criminal judgment.28 In summary, when a petitioner files an application in this Court seeking a common-law extraordinary writ, that request does not transform a criminal matter into a civil matter, and we must examine the substantive nature of the petitioner's claims to determine whether the matter is criminal or civil.
¶22 Dutton claims that he was imprisoned without benefit of counsel, and that Midwest City failed to follow the U. S. Supreme Court opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, which guarantees counsel for indigent defendants imprisoned by municipal court process.29 The Response by Midwest City states that Argersinger "appears to apply to municipal courts." Although we do not decide this issue, we must note: (1) The authority before us provided by both Dutton and the city indicates that a municipality's power to imprison an indigent person must be exercised in the context of providing that person counsel for the process which results in his or her imprisonment;30 and (2) Our Court of Criminal Appeals has applied Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, for more than thirty years in criminal proceedings involving Oklahoma municipalities.31 Dutton's action in this Court is a challenge to criminal convictions based upon his personal constitutional rights.32 Challenges to a criminal judgment and sentence based upon personal constitutional rights possessed by a defendant in a criminal proceeding are claims that the Court of Criminal Appeals addresses every day, including a claim based upon the absence of a required attorney for the criminal defendant.33 This Court does not assume original supervisory jurisdiction on this type of claim.
¶23 The second distinction is when an alleged institutional deficiency is raised and the proper functioning of a governmental entity is to be adjudicated. These adjudications do not include an adjudication of the elements of a defendant's criminal offense, defenses, and personal rights a defendant possesses in his or her criminal proceeding as they relate to the criminal cause of action, judgment, or sentence. For example, in State v. Lynch, this Court properly assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate the institutional and constitutional deficiency arising when attorneys who represented criminal defendants were unconstitutionally compensated.34 Similarly, in Sanders v. Followell, the Court properly assumed original jurisdiction when a trial judge incorrectly applied a statute setting a lawyer's fee for representing a criminal defendant. The controversy adjudicated by this Court did not involve a part of the criminal cause of action, defenses thereto, or issues relating to the propriety or enforcement of a sentence upon a criminal judgment.35
¶24 An additional example of this distinction is found in Walters v. Ethics Commission.36 The litigation before this Court in Walters included both a supervisory writ proceeding and an appeal from the District Court.37 In the supervisory writ proceeding, we issued a writ to prevent the District Court from reviewing any action of the Ethics Commission in making a referral of a matter under its investigatory power to a District Attorney.38 A referral by the Commission was for the purpose of a prosecutor exercising discretion involving the institution of a criminal cause of action in the District Court. In the appeal, we explained the requirements for the proper functioning of the Ethics Commission and we addressed a party's specific claim that statutes were facially unconstitutional.39 This party also brought a specific allegation concerning the Commission's application of statutes as to him, and we also addressed that claim in the context of Ethics Commission proceedings that occur prior to institution of a criminal proceeding.40 On the issue whether the party's conduct at issue had been a criminal act, we declined to adjudicate that issue. We observed that the Commission's actions were preparatory to a criminal action being filed in a separate proceeding, and were not proper for adjudication at that time in either the District Court or this Court.41 Justice Opala's concurring opinion, joined by Simms, J., explained that the Court appropriately reversed the District Court's order while addressing the issues concerning the proper procedure to be used by the Ethics Commission, and had also wisely abstained from addressing whether the party's conduct was a violation of a statute: "Because violators of the Act's pertinent provisions are liable to criminal penalties, . . . [and] the decision regarding criminal liability for one's conduct must always be left to the court with cognizance over the offense charged."42 In summary, in Walters the Court distinguished between (1) a claim to adjudicate that a government entity was not functioning according to law and (2) a claim to adjudicate whether one or more elements to a criminal cause of action had been committed by a party to the proceeding. The present action requires the Court to determine if Dutton brought any type of proceeding other than a challenge to a criminal conviction, and we conclude that no request within our supervisory or superintending jurisdiction is made by him.
¶25 The third distinction involves our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority in a particular case. For example, when the Court of Criminal Appeals acts in a controversy where no appellate jurisdiction is vested in that Court, then this Court may assume jurisdiction and delineate that Court's jurisdiction.43 Dutton's purported photocopy of the order by the Court of Criminal Appeals states that the court declines jurisdiction and dismisses his case because: "Petitioner failed to attach to the Petition in Error a certified copy of the District Court Order being appealed as required by . . . [the rules of the court]. As Petitioner has provided an insufficient record for review, this Court declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matter." Similarly, this Court has stated that filing the judgment appealed in this Court is a necessary predicate for appellate review, and its absence may result in a dismissal.44 This Court has similarly dismissed a proceeding due to a party's failure to follow the rules of this Court.45 No excess of jurisdiction appears on either the face of the order of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the record submitted by Dutton herein.
¶26 Fourthly, the Legislature has created civil claims as well as Supreme Court jurisdiction in certain matters although our exercise of jurisdiction may have an impact on a criminal proceeding,46 and there are a few proceedings involving our appellate jurisdiction in matters which are related to a lower court criminal proceeding.47 If the Legislature has properly created a legal cause of action as a civil jurisdiction matter then this Court has the constitutional and legislatively-mandated responsibility to recognize it as within the jurisdiction of this Court.48 Dutton does not show how his request is encompassed within other various specific circumstances where civil original jurisdiction is exercised by this Court, although our exercise may involve or affect a lower court criminal proceeding.
III. Original Superintending Jurisdiction
¶27 Dutton filed pleadings in this Court invoking this Court's original jurisdiction. The Oklahoma Constitution vests this Court with original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs and a general superintending control over all inferior courts, agencies, commissions, and boards created by law.49 The Court's supervisory writ jurisdiction over lower courts is not identical to this Court's superintending-control jurisdiction over all courts, agencies, commissions, and boards.50 We have explained that "It is not always easy or necessary to note the line of demarcation between the two."51 Confusion between the two types of jurisdiction may arise because superintending-control jurisdiction is usually exercised by the use of writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari.52 However, the form of our superintending-control remedial order is not limited to the specified constitutional writs.53 The Court has used its superintending control when fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities in various contexts, such as supervising the practice of law pursuant to the Court's Art. 7 § 1 power,54 enforcing rules of procedure for courts,55 and deciding publici juris issues involving a serious conflict between different governmental agencies or branches of government.56 There is no clear legal right to a writ of superintending control and the issuance of such a writ is in the discretion of the Court.57
¶28 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has been granted statutory authority by the Legislature to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of article 27 of the Municipal Code; and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, it has the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts.58 This statute is consistent with the Supreme Court's civil jurisdiction because it authorizes the Court to create procedures and practices of statewide application.
¶29 The type of corrective relief within the jurisdiction conferred by this statute is one to correct institutional deficiencies and not one to adjudicate individual proceedings determining criminal liability. Nowhere in the statute is this Court given the power to issue writs of either supervisory or superintending control to review an individual criminal proceeding in a municipal court. One reason for this is that the authority to issue writs to a municipal court not of record lies in the District Court, which court also has the statutory appellate criminal jurisdiction over the municipal court criminal case.59 Appeals from criminal convictions in municipal courts of record are filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals using the procedures authorized for appeals from district courts.60 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has no general superintending power over the lower courts, the writs it issues are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,61 and the scope of the relief afforded by those writs involves criminal matters. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters and jurisdiction to issue supervisory writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, that Court is the court which uses a writ power to supervise a criminal matter in a criminal controversy or action that is proceeding in the District Court.
¶30 Relief from a criminal judgment and sentence in a municipal court not of record lies in the municipal court, District Court, and Court of Criminal Appeals.62 Dutton's pleadings do not seek relief against an institution and the imposition of state-wide rules.63 He seeks relief in the form of an order vacating his convictions or an order directing the District Court to provide him with a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions.
¶31 We have also used "superintending control" in the context of (1) issuing prohibition to prevent a trial court from denying a person's fundamental right of notice and an opportunity to be heard in a judicial proceeding,64 and (2) noting the publici juris issue presented by a state-wide procedure for collecting jury fees as implemented by a particular District Court Clerk.65 We have also assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate "an arguable claim" that a violation of a federal constitutional right had occurred by application of specific state statutes.66
¶32 Dutton's claim is that he was imprisoned without the benefit of counsel appointed to represent him, and that he was denied a federal constitutional right. The constitutional grant of superintending control in this Court is not an unlimited power, but a power that is exercised within the definition of "judicial power" as vested in this Court by Article 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution. If a party files a pleading in this Court and requests a determination of his or her legal rights, then a particular type of Article 7 judicial power is invoked in a particular context and the Court acting on that pleading is functioning in the role of an "adjudicator" and not, for example, legislatively or administratively.67 In summary, Dutton is asking the Court to adjudicate a case. In the exercise of our original supervisory or superintending jurisdiction, when we "adjudicate a case" we must possess both subject matter jurisdiction68 and a justiciable controversy69 as shown by the parties' pleadings; and our adjudication is limited by the parties pleadings70 unless the scope of the adjudication is expanded by one of the few well-known exceptions. Additionally, this expanded adjudication in the context of an exercise of superintending control jurisdiction is itself circumscribed by the usual principles of law applicable to remedies, such as an alternate exclusive remedy defeating the exercise of such jurisdiction.71 Examples of adjudicatory superintending control jurisdiction being dependent upon application of subject-matter and justiciability principles are found in opinions such as Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley,72 Democratic Party v. Estep,73 and Ethics Commission v. Cullison,74 and more recent opinions such as Coates v. Fallin.75
¶33 Our superintending control jurisdiction is created by Article 7 §§ 1 and 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution and that jurisdiction must be construed in harmony with the constitutional exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters that is vested in the Court of Criminal Appeals via enactments of the Legislature.76 Dutton is requesting that we adjudicate the legality of his criminal convictions by an exercise of our superintending control in the context of this Court lacking a general constitutional power for appellate review of final judgments and sentences in criminal cases.77 It is correct that the historic division between civil and criminal appellate-review jurisdiction has not been a rigid line and this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have had a shared responsibility in specific circumstances.78 That shared responsibility has usually occurred because this Court has been required to define a "criminal case" or matter for purpose of appellate review when the court for such review was not expressly stated in the statute,79 or when a statutory scheme incorporates both criminal and civil matters or power,80 or when we have explained sui generis proceedings and a shared appellate-review jurisdiction exists.81 Dutton's controversy is not one within the shared responsibility of this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals or a controversy where no appeal has been provided by statute.
¶34 The Court of Criminal Appeals is constitutionally vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases" as implemented by legislation.82 The Legislature has provided an appellate procedure for an appeal from a municipal court to the District Court and then an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. There is no appeal or writ of error from the Court of Criminal Appeals to this Court.83 There is no doubt that this Court may correct a deficient statutory remedy in the context of an adjudication.84 But adjudicatory jurisdiction of appeals from Dutton's criminal convictions does not lie in this Court. Dutton may not circumvent the statutory appellate procedures by seeking appellate review of his criminal conviction in this Court.85
¶35 It is nothing new for this Court to examine the scope and effect of a party's requested relief to determine whether this Court is impermissibly intruding upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals. For example, in State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, the Department of Corrections was statutorily required to apply earned credit days towards a prisoner's sentence of incarceration. We explained that the scope of the statute in the controversy applied to alter a criminal judgment and sentence and was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.86 The issue of attorney representation of an indigent criminal defendant is a criminal matter by its nature, and thus proper for adjudication within a District Court criminal proceeding and appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.87
¶36 We conclude that Dutton's pleadings attempt to invoke an original supervisory or superintending adjudicatory jurisdiction of this Court for the purpose of providing him with an appellate review of his municipal criminal judgments and sentences, and we decline to assume original jurisdiction on such claims.
IV. Alternative Remedies
¶37 Dutton has ten filings in this supervisory proceeding.88 None of these filings show that he is without remedies in the District Court or subsequent appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. More than forty years ago, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Relief Act (22 O.S. §§ 1080-1089) "contains no requirement that an applicant be in custody, under any form of restraint or supervision, or that the sentence be unsatisfied in any respect."89 Dutton's release from confinement would appear to present no theoretical bar to seeking post-conviction relief.90
¶38 The orders are not before us, but we may take judicial notice of the dockets of District Courts.91 In the three District Court actions, 2013-1619, 2013-1620, and 2013-1622, the first and last were "Dismissed without prejudice" and in 1620 its current status appears to be "pending." All of his applications for post conviction relief were filed with the docket designation "CV" for "Civil Misc.: OTHER - CIVIL NO DAMAGES
¶39 The concept of an adequate remedy appears in several areas of the law with slightly different and overlapping meanings. In the context of creating a remedy and providing equitable relief, we have indicated that when a party has an action at law an equitable remedy will not be available.92 Similarly, equity is not invocable when an adequate statutory remedy exists.93 In the context of challenging a judgment, a statutory remedy will preclude a party from successfully invoking equity.94 Of course, in these contexts the available remedies must be adequate, but adequacy is not measured by whether Dutton obtains the exact relief he desires, i.e., his convictions are voided or he gets a new appeal in this proceeding. Adequacy of a remedy in this context is determined by whether the law provides a means for complete relief for a person with the type of claims Dutton is raising, i.e., a reasonable opportunity to obtain the relief he seeks.
¶40 Generally, in the context of a civil proceeding when the federal constitution requires this State to provide an adequate remedy for a person claiming the denial of a federal constitutional right by the State, the adequacy of an available remedy at law is not measured by that particular party's eventual success on the merits of his or her litigation, but whether a person in that party's circumstances is provided with a clear and certain opportunity for obtaining complete relief at law.95 For example, if a state exacts a tax in violation of the federal constitution, then it must provide an opportunity to recover those taxes because "a denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment."96 But even in the context of a deprived federal constitutional right, a State may require a person to comply with a clear and certain state procedure when seeking a legal remedy for that deprived federal right.97 Dutton's action raising federal constitutional claims does not exempt him from using available statutory or common-law proceedings to vindicate his claims. The District Court has stated that his applications for post-conviction relief were denied without prejudice to him seeking relief in the municipal court. Dutton has failed to show why he should not be required to pursue relief in accordance with state statutes and the orders of the District Court.
V. Motion for Counsel, Oral Argument and an Evidentiary Hearing
¶41 Dutton filed a motion requesting the Court appoint counsel to represent him in this proceeding. This Court has noted a right to counsel possessed by a defendant in a criminal prosecution, and that the right is expressly conferred by Art. 2 § 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.98 Dutton's proceeding in this Court does not subject him to either criminal fine or punishment, and it is not a criminal prosecution or a statutorily authorized direct appeal from his criminal judgments and sentences. His proceeding in this Court is not a statutorily authorized direct attack on his convictions, but a collateral attack 99 in a civil proceeding seeking an extraordinary superintending writ to review judgments based upon criminal causes of action that were rendered in criminal proceedings.
¶42 There is no doubt that the assistance of a legal practitioner is fundamental to due process "in certain types of civil litigation, aspects of which are analogous to criminal proceedings."100 We have concluded that legal authority clearly demonstrates that this Court has no authority in this collateral civil proceeding to either void Dutton's convictions or direct the District Court to provide him with an appeal of his criminal convictions. We note the District Court has denied his applications for criminal post-conviction relief without prejudice. We conclude that appointed counsel would not be of assistance in this proceeding and deny Dutton's application for appointed counsel.101 Because we decline to assume original jurisdiction on the merits of Dutton's claims and because such relief is appropriate in a different court, we deny his motion for an oral argument and an evidentiary hearing.
V. Conclusion
¶43 We assume original jurisdiction solely on the issue of our jurisdiction to hear Dutton's claims. Dutton has failed to show that he lacks adequate remedies in either a municipal court or the District Court. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner's cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court. We conclude that Dutton's claims are criminal matters and we decline to assume original jurisdiction on his claims or grant him relief on them without prejudice to him presenting them, in the proper court.102
¶44 COMBS, V. C. J., WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, and GURICH, JJ, concur.
¶45 REIF, C. J., KAUGER, and COLBERT, JJ., concur in result.
FOOTNOTES
1 Appendix, Aug. 29, 2014, exhibit 5, page 3, orders of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dutton v. City of Midwest City, Nos. PC 2014-0632, PC 2014-0633, and PC 2014-0634.
2 The federal court based its conclusion on Heck v. Humphrey,
3 Petitioner's Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 113,170 (Aug. 29, 2014) pp. 16-17.
4 Petitioner's Motion to Provide Relief, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 113,170 (Nov. 14, 2014) pp. 11-12.
5 Although The City of Midwest City is not a named party in the style of this proceeding as filed by Dutton, The City of Midwest City entered an appearance herein and we requested a response addressing Dutton's allegations. The Court also provided an opportunity for the District Attorney for Oklahoma County to file a response to Dutton's pleadings.
6 Sanders v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission,
7 See, e.g., Hall v. Geo Group, Inc.,
8 See, e.g., Miller v. Fortune Insurance Co.,
9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction to determine whether it or the Court of Criminal Appeals exercises jurisdiction in a particular controversy. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4: ". . . and in the event there is any conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final." See, e.g., Smith v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections,
10 Hobbs v. German-American Doctors,
11 Cooper v. Reynolds,
12 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed,
13 11 O.S.2011 § 27-101: "A municipality may create a municipal court, as provided in this article, which shall be a court not of record. This court may be created in addition to a municipal criminal court of record. References in Sections 27-101 through 27-131 of this title to the municipal court shall mean the municipal court not of record established under the authority of the provisions of this article."
14 11 O.S.2011 § 27-103: "The municipal court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all prosecutions wherein a violation of any ordinance of the municipality where the court is established is charged."
15
A. An appeal may be taken from a final judgment of the municipal court by the defendant by filing in the district court in the county where the situs of the municipal government is located, within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment, a notice of appeal and by filing a copy of the notice with the municipal court. In case of an appeal, a trial de novo shall be had, and there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) and costs.
B. Upon conviction, at the request of the defendant, or upon notice of appeal being filed, the judge of the municipal court shall enter an order on the docket fixing an amount in which bond may be given by the defendant, in cash or sureties for cash in an amount of not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than twice the amount of such fine. Bond shall be taken by the clerk of the court wherein judgment was rendered. Any pledge of sureties must be approved by a judge of the court.
C. Upon appeal being filed the judge shall within ten (10) days thereafter certify to the clerk of the appellate court the original papers in the case. If the papers have not been certified to the appellate court, the prosecuting attorney shall take the necessary steps to have the papers certified to the appellate court within twenty (20) days of the filing of the notice of appeal, and failure to do so, except for good cause shown, shall be grounds for dismissal of the charge by the appellate court, the cost to be taxed to the municipality. The certificate shall state whether or not the municipal judge hearing the case was a licensed attorney in Oklahoma.
D. All proceedings necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be had in the appellate court.
16 See note 15 supra, at 11 O.S.2011 § 27-129 (A).
17 See note 15 supra, at 11 O.S.2011 § 27-129 (A). Section 27-129(A) was amended by 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws Ch. 2, § 1 (eff. Nov. 1, 2015), and which states in part that "... there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), plus costs, fees, and assessments."
18 11 O.S. § 27-132: "An appeal may be taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals from the final judgment or order of a district court in an appeal from a final judgment of a municipal court in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are taken from a district court to the Court of Criminal Appeals."
19 In re Opinion of the Judges,
20 In the Matter of M.B.,
21 20 O.S.2011 § 40: "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction, coextensive with the limits of the state, in all criminal cases appealed from the district, superior and county courts, and such other courts of record as may be established by law."
22 City of Elk City v. Taylor,
23 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
24 See State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, supra, note 20, observing that "As the Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly stated, in a criminal case the 'essential part of the judgment is the punishment and the amount thereof.'" Cf. Lockett v. Evans,
25 Paxton v. State,
26 State v. Powell,
27 State ex rel. Coats v. Hunter,
28 An action for a declaratory judgment will not lie "to launch an impermissible collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence in a criminal case." Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington,
29 Argersinger v. Hamlin,
30 Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra; Scott v. Illinois,
31 Jackson v. City of Oklahoma City,
We also note that two authors have stated that in 1997 the State of New Jersey became the first state to enact legislation requiring every municipal court to have at least one municipal public defender appointed by the governing body of the municipality to represent an indigent defendant accused of an offense, which if convicted, would subject the defendant to imprisonment. Robert J. Martin and Walter Kowalski, "A Matter of Simple Justice": Enactment of New Jersey's Municipal Public Defender Act, 51 Rutgers L.Rev. 637, 676-677, 694 (1999).
32 See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb,
33 See, e.g., Hinsley v. State,
34 State v. Lynch,
35 Sanders v. Followell,
36 Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Comm'n,
37 Walters,
38 Walters,
39 Walters,
40 Walters,
41 Walters,
42 Walters,
43 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
44 Willitt v. ASG Industries,
45 See, e.g., Rugg v. Layton,
46 See, e.g., Courtney v. State,
47 An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. Dunn v. State,
48 In Oklahoma, a right to appeal from an exercise of judicial discretion in cases of law and equity, excluding criminal matters, is a constitutional right subject to legislative requirements for the manner invoking that appellate jurisdiction. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4; Wells v. Shriver,
49 Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4, provides in part that: "The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law."
50 Board of Commissioners of Harmon County v. Keen,
51 Board of Commissioners of Harmon County v. Keen,
52 Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison,
53 Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison,
54 The Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 7 § 1, vests "judicial power" in the Supreme Court and that vesting "gives it the right to regulate the matter of who shall be admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court and inferior courts, and also gives it the right to regulate and control the practice of law within its jurisdiction." In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma,
The Court's Art. 7 § 4 superintending power over "inferior courts" includes an authority to control and regulate the practice of law. State v. Lynch,
55 State ex rel. Freeling v. Kight,
56 Ethics Commission v. Cullison,
57 Butler v. Breckinridge,
58 11 O.S.2011 § 27-131:
"The Supreme Court is authorized to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of this article, and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, shall have the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts of Oklahoma to consider matters calculated to bring about a speedier and more efficient administration of justice."
59
The district court in each county wherein a municipal court is established shall have the same jurisdiction to issue to the municipal court writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari as the Supreme Court now has to issue such writs to courts of record.
60 11 O.S.2011 § 28-128:
Appeals may be taken from a judgment or order of a municipal criminal court of record to the Court of Criminal Appeals in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are now taken from the district courts to the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters, and no appeals other than those herein provided shall be allowed.
61 Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon,
62 See, e.g., Houghton v. City of Wewoka,
63 Because his pleadings do not raise this issue we need not address the type of factual support or record in an original jurisdiction proceeding that is needed for a request that the Court create court rules for state-wide application.
64 Muggenborg v. Kessler,
65 Naylor v. Petuskey,
66 Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Board,
67 Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n,
68 The focus of a subject matter jurisdiction analysis is on the nature of the pled action in relation to the power of a court to adjudicate and grant relief in an action of that nature. The phrase subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to deal with the general subject involved in the action or the nature of the cause of action, and this jurisdiction is present when a court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed,
69 Generally, the focus of a justiciability analysis is on the parties and the nature of their adverse legal interests in the particular pled controversy, and not on the nature of the pled cause of action as it relates to the power of the court to address that type of action. See, e.g., Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation,
This focus on the interests of the parties has been present when we addressed a justiciable controversy in the context of declaratory relief and have said that justiciability is present when there is: (1) a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Chrysler Corp. v. Clark,
District Courts possess "unlimited jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article . . . ." Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 7(a). Reeds v. Walker,
70 Generally, the Court's adjudicatory judicial power in an original action is limited to the facts and issues framed by the pleadings and as amended by the partes' briefs in this Court. La Bellman v. Gleason & Sanders, Inc.,
71 For example, one of the well-known exceptions occurs in a public-law controversy where the Court may grant corrective relief upon any applicable legal theory, raised by a party or sua sponte, when that theory is dispositive of the controversy and is supported by the record. Lincoln Farm, L.L.C. v. Oppliger,
72 In Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley,
73 Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep,
74 Ethics Commission v. Cullison,
75 Coates v. Fallin,
76 In re Initiative Petition No. 314,
77 In re Opinion of the Judges,
78 See, e.g., Hale v. Board of County Commissioners of Seminole County,
79 See, e.g., State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
80 See, e.g., Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoenas v. Powers,
81 Contempt proceedings are sui generis, Henry v. Schmidt,
82 Jackson v. Freeman,
83 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
84 Farris v. Cannon,
85 Darnell v. Higgins,
86 State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
87 See, e.g., Griffin v. State,
88 Dutton filed: (1) Entry of Appearance (August 29, 2014); (2) Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, (August 29, 2014); (3) An Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (August 29, 2014); (4) Motion to Appoint Counsel, (August 29, 2014); (5) Appendix of Citations of Authority and Exhibits, (August 29, 2014); (6) Proof of Service (August 29, 2014); (7) Motion to Provide Relief (Nov. 14, 2014); (8) Notice of Change of Contact Information (December 30, 2014); (9) Petitioner's Objections and Legal Argument, etc. (March 10, 2015); and (10) Petitioner's motion for evidentiary hearing, oral argument, and aid of counsel (April 17, 2015).
89 Battle v. State,
90 22 O.S.2011 § 1080, states that:
Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(a) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state;
(b) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(c) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(d) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(e) that his sentence has expired, his suspended sentence, probation, parole, or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
(f) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy;
may institute a proceeding under this act in the court in which the judgment and sentence on conviction was imposed to secure the appropriate relief. Excluding a timely appeal, this act encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods of challenging a conviction or sentence.
91 Collier v. Reese,
92 Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.,
93 Muskogee Fair Haven Manor Phase I, Inc. v. Scott,
94 Denning v. Van Meter,
95 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,
96 Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
We note that a federal constitutional requirement for a State court providing a remedy for a constitutional deprivation is not a rule of universal application. While Congress does not possess the power, under Article I of the U. S. Constitution, to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts, Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to the enforcement power of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Alden v. Maine,
97 Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
98 Towne v. Hubbard,
99 A direct attack is an attempt to avoid or correct a judicial proceeding in some manner provided by law, such as by an appeal, or motion for new trial. House v. Town of Dickson,
A collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or to deny its force and effect in some manner not provided by law; that is, in some other way than by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or motion for a new trial. In re Hyde,
100 Towne v. Hubbard,
101 We also deny Dutton's motion for hearing and oral argument because the authorities clearly show that this Court has no authority to adjudicate the merits of Dutton's claims.
102 A limited adjudication on the question of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits of the controversy. State v. Herndon,
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|
| None Found. |
| Cite | Name | Level | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| HOUGHTON v. CITY OF WEWOKA | Discussed | ||
| PAXTON v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. COATS v. HUNTER | Discussed | ||
| BLADES v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| CITY OF ELK CITY v. TAYLOR | Discussed | ||
| HINSLEY v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| MURRAH v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY | Discussed | ||
| HARGROVE v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| GRIFFIN v. STATE | Discussed at Length | ||
| SMITH v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| CAMPBELL v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| JACKSON v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| LUNA v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| BATTLE v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Chrysler Corp. v. Clark | Discussed | ||
| Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Com'n | Discussed at Length | ||
| State ex rel. Turpen v. A 1977 Chevrolet Pickup Truck | Discussed | ||
| In re INTEGRATION OF STATE BAR OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler | Discussed at Length | ||
| State v. Lynch | Discussed at Length | ||
| Naylor v. Petuskey | Discussed | ||
| Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in Multicounty Grand Jury Case No. CJ-92-4110 Before Dist. Court of Oklahoma County v. Powers | Discussed | ||
| Ethics Com'n of State of Okl. v. Cullison | Discussed at Length | ||
| STATE ex rel. CRAWFORD v. CORPORATION COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| OKLAHOMA CITY v. ROBINSON | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. FREELING v. KIGHT | Discussed at Length | ||
| Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington | Discussed | ||
| Stallings v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n | Discussed | ||
| Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd. | Discussed | ||
| HINKLE v. KENNY | Discussed | ||
| DUNN et al. v. STATE. | Discussed | ||
| DENNING v. VAN METER | Discussed | ||
| SMITH v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS | Discussed | ||
| GLACKEN v. ANDREW | Discussed at Length | ||
| WELLS v. SHRIVER | Discussed | ||
| JETER v. DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY | Discussed | ||
| In re OPINION OF THE JUDGES. | Discussed at Length | ||
| IN RE HESS' ESTATE | Discussed | ||
| GORDON v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed | ||
| LA BELLMAN v. GLEASON & SANDERS, INC. | Discussed | ||
| RUGG v. LAYTON Co. Supt. | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. BLANKENSHIP v. FREEMAN | Discussed | ||
| BUTLER v. BRECKINRIDGE | Discussed | ||
| Jackson v. Freeman | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO. v. BROWN | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. YOUNG v. WOODSON | Discussed | ||
| STATE v. TORRES | Discussed | ||
| HENRY v. SCHMIDT | Discussed | ||
| REEDS v. WALKER | Discussed | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF M.B. | Discussed at Length | ||
| HOUSE v. TOWN OF DICKSON | Discussed | ||
| MOVANTS TO QUASH MULTICOUNTY GRAND JURY SUBPOENA v. DIXON | Discussed | ||
| COLLIER v. REESE | Cited | ||
| STATE v. POWELL | Discussed | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF HYDE | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. MOTHERSHED | Discussed at Length | ||
| COURTNEY v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley | Discussed | ||
| LINCOLN FARM, L. L. C. v. OPPLIGER | Discussed | ||
| KRUG v. HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC. | Discussed | ||
| COATES v. FALLIN | Cited | ||
| HALL v. THE GEO GROUP, INC | Discussed | ||
| LOCKETT v. EVANS | Cited | ||
| SANDERS v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed | ||
| WILLITT v. ASG INDUSTRIES, INC. | Discussed | ||
| STATE v. ex rel. COMM'N OF LAND OFFICE v. CORPORATION COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| CARDER v. COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS | Discussed at Length | ||
| Draper v. State | Discussed | ||
| HALE v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF SEMINOLE CTY. | Discussed at Length | ||
| Initiative Petition No. 314, In re | Discussed | ||
| Towne v. Hubbard | Discussed at Length | ||
| Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n | Cited | ||
| Muggenborg v. Kessler | Discussed | ||
| Berry v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co. | Cited | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF INCOME TAX PROTEST OF REDBIRD | Discussed at Length | ||
| State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., Application of | Discussed | ||
| Farris v. Cannon | Discussed | ||
| Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep | Cited | ||
| DARNELL v. HIGGINS Co. Supt. | Discussed | ||
| SANDERS v. OKLAHOMA EMPL. SEC. COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| MUSKOGEE FAIR HAVEN MANOR v. SCOTT | Discussed at Length | ||
| In re Oklahoma Boll Weevil Eradication Organization | Discussed | ||
| HOBBS v. GERMAN-AMERICAN | Discussed at Length | ||
| BOARD OF COM'RS OF HARMON CTY. v. KEEN | Discussed at Length | ||
| HERNDON v. HAMMOND | Discussed | ||
| BUCK v. DICK | Discussed at Length | ||
| STATE ex rel. IKARD v. RUSSELL | Discussed | ||
| Johnson v. Johnson | Discussed | ||
| Title 11. Cities and Towns | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Creation of Municipal Court Not of Record | Cited | ||
| Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari | Cited | ||
| Appeals | Discussed at Length | ||
| Orders Relative to Procedures and Practices by Supreme Court | Cited | ||
| Appeal to Court of Criminal Appeals | Cited | ||
| Appeals | Cited | ||
| Title 20. Courts | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Title 21. Crimes and Punishments | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Repealed by Laws 1991, HB 1612, c. 238, § 37, emerg. eff. July 1, 1991 | Cited | ||
| Title 22. Criminal Procedure | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Post-Conviction Procedure Act - Right to Challenge Conviction or Sentence. | Discussed at Length | ||
| Accusation Presented by Grand Jury | Cited | ||
| Presentation of Accusation by County Commissioners or Judge and Treasurer -Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Title 28. Fees | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Civil Actions - Charge in Addition to Flat Fee | Cited | ||
| Title 51. Officers | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Attorney General - Duties | Cited | ||
OSCN navigation
- Home
- Courts
- Court Dockets
- Legal Research
- Calendar
- Help
- Previous Case
- Top Of Index
- This Point in Index
- Citationize
- Next Case
- Print Only
DUTTON v. CITY OF MIDWEST CITY
Case Number: 113170
Decided: 06/30/2015
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Cite as:
RODNEY DUTTON, Petitioner,
v.
THE CITY OF MIDWEST CITY, and THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondents.
APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
¶0 Petitioner sought an extraordinary writ in the Oklahoma Supreme Court and challenged his convictions in three criminal proceedings in the municipal court for The City of Midwest City. He also requested an alternative remedy that would compel the District Court to provide him with a new appeal of his convictions in the District Court. We assume original jurisdiction for the sole purpose of determining our jurisdiction to review Petitioner's allegations. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner's cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AND ALL
REQUESTS FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO PETITIONER SEEKING RELIEF IN THE APPROPRIATE COURT
Rodney Dutton, Midwest City, Oklahoma, Petitioner Pro se.
David F. Howell and J. Steven Coates, Midwest City, Oklahoma, for Respondent, City of Midwest City.
EDMONDSON, J.
¶1 We assume original jurisdiction on the question whether this Court has original jurisdiction to adjudicate both the merits of the claim or cause of action that the Dutton (or Petitioner) has pled in this Court and the associated remedies he requests. We decline to assume original jurisdiction on either the merits of Dutton's cause of action or his requests for relief as pled by him in this Court.
¶2 Dutton pleads a cause of action challenging the correctness of a judgment and sentence in three municipal criminal matters. He seeks an adjudication on the legal correctness of these judgments and sentences in this proceeding, and in the alternative he requests an extraordinary remedy to compel the District Court to provide him a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions in the District Court. We conclude that the pled cause of action and remedy sought by him involve criminal matters that are not within the original jurisdiction of this Court. We conclude that Dutton's action in this Court should be dismissed without prejudice to him seeking appropriate relief in the proper court.
I. Pleadings of Dutton and The City of Midwest City
¶3 Dutton alleges that on April 15, 2013, he was convicted in the municipal court of the City of Midwest City, Oklahoma, of the charges of assault, public intoxication, and domestic assault and battery. He states that he was sentenced to thirty days in jail. He states that he was incarcerated for a felony charge on November 24, 2011, which was ultimately dismissed, and he "was released on his own recognizance on about March 7, 2013," and then transferred to the Midwest City jail for trial on his municipal charges. He alleges that he was released from the Midwest City jail on May 10, 2013. He states that while he was incarcerated on the felony charge he was represented by a "public defender."
¶4 He states that he filed three applications for post-conviction relief in the District Court after his release. He alleges that the District Court dismissed the applications for the reason that they should have been filed with the municipal court in Midwest City. His application for this Court to assume original jurisdiction was filed on August 29, 2014, approximately one year and three months after his release.
¶5 Dutton alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied counsel at trial and was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. He alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied (1) advance notice of the municipal charges against him, (2) a fair trial due to insufficient evidence, and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (3) counsel for an appeal, (4) a direct appeal, (5) "out-of-time appeal," (6) an adequate post-conviction remedy, and (7) counsel for a post-conviction appeal. In his filing herein entitled "Motion to Provide Relief," he alleges that he was "denied his 6th and 14th Amendments rights to counsel and a fair trial and subsequently denied his right to an appeal of wrongful convictions by the city of Midwest City, Oklahoma."
¶6 Dutton alleges that shortly prior to his trial in municipal court he was provided with a written notice of one of the charges against him. He states that the judge refused his request to have a lawyer appointed for him. He states that after the City's prosecutor failed to appear for his trial, the judge questioned the witnesses and refused Dutton's request to cross-examine the witnesses.
¶7 Dutton alleges that the District Court of Oklahoma County:
. . . has delayed and denied the Petitioner in his pursuit of relief in this matter . . . and while "the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals provide him some relief at first and then declined to hear his appeal when the court reporter or court clerk failed to provide him a stamp-filed certified copy of the District Court's order dismissing two of his three post-conviction applications under the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals own rules.
Application to Assume, Aug. 29, 2014, at pg. 2, material omitted.
Dutton's appendix of exhibits, and his other filings in this Court, fail to contain photocopies of any the orders allegedly issued by the District Court of Oklahoma County about which he complains. He alleges that he sought relief in the District Court by filing applications for post-conviction relief pursuant to Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
¶8 Dutton's Appendix does contain purported uncertified photocopies of orders issued by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Three orders, which show docket designations for post-conviction appeals, state that the Court of Criminal Appeals declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matters because Dutton failed to attach to his petition in error a certified copy of the District Court order being appealed, as required by the rules for the Court of Criminal Appeals.1
¶9 Dutton's Appendix also contains a purported photocopy of an order of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing his motion for the court to reconsider "declining jurisdiction of his post-conviction appeals from Oklahoma County." The court explains that a petition for rehearing that challenges the court's decision in post-conviction appeal is not allowed.
¶10 Midwest City's response states that Dutton's allegations relate to three different factual episodes resulting in a criminal prosecution for assault and battery on his wife, prosecutions for assault on a police officer and public intoxication, and then an arrest for felony possession of incendiary devices. He was released from jail, awaiting trial on the felony charge, and returned to the municipal jail for prosecution of the misdemeanors.
¶11 The response states that Dutton and his wife filed two civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claimed that his constitutional rights were violated by Midwest City and its officials in the context of Dutton's arrests, convictions, and sentence of incarceration. The federal court's order dismissing, in part, Dutton's claims lists the violations of constitutional rights as alleged by Dutton and his wife in the federal proceeding.
Mr. Dutton's claims, construed liberally because of his pro se status, appear to be as follows: 1) a First Amendment violation, based upon an alleged retaliation for the comment he made while leaving the courtroom ["I'll see you in federal court."]; 2) a Fourth Amendment claim, based on his arrest and prosecution without probable cause; 3) denial of due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 4) denial of assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 5) an Eighth Amendment claim, based on failure to protect him from abuse by a fellow inmate; and 6) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, both plaintiffs assert First and Fourteenth Amendment claims for loss of consortium and violation of their "right to pursue life and happiness together in their marriage and individually without wrongful interference by officials of [the] government."
Order, Jan. 3, 2014, at p. 3, Rodney Dutton and Shirley Dutton v. City of Midwest City, et al., No. CIV-13-0911-HE, U. S. Dist. Crt., W. D. Okla., (explanation added).
The federal court concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based upon allegations of an unconstitutional conviction when state law provided a means for challenging the conviction.2 Midwest City states that Dutton's appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit was determined by that court to be premature due to Dutton's claims still pending before the federal District Court. Midwest City states that Dutton's claims against it remain pending in the federal court. Midwest City's appendix filed herein also contains uncertified photocopies of two orders by The District Court of Oklahoma County dismissing, without prejudice, Dutton's applications for post-conviction relief.
¶12 Dutton filed a reply to the city's response. He states his innocence of the crimes for which he was convicted. He argues: (1) his municipal arrest was illegal, (2) the trial in the municipal court was not fair because he was not provided with an attorney, and (3) his municipal convictions are void because no record exists of the evidence used against him at the municipal trial. He also objects to the appearances made in this proceeding by two attorneys who filed a response for Midwest City. He requests that this Court "dismiss" these two attorneys from this proceeding.
¶13 In his reply, Dutton requests this Court adjudicate his convictions to be "invalid, null, and void" and to also grant the relief as set forth in his Application filed with this Court. In his Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, he requests an order of this Court directing the District Court of Oklahoma County "provide him a direct appeal with appointed counsel from Midwest City Municipal Cases docketed as #2011-4369 - Domestic Violence, #2011-5808 - public intoxication, and #2011-5808 - assault and/or any other relief that is appropriately just."3 Dutton also states he seeks an order "overturning, vacating, and barring" the municipal convictions, or alternatively the Court provide him with a direct appeal of his convictions in the District Court with appointed counsel.4
II. The Court's Original Supervisory Civil Jurisdiction
¶14 This Court issued an order and requested Midwest City brief the issue whether this Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims made by Petitioner.5 The city's response argues that (1) the matter before this Court is criminal in nature, (2) "Petitioner has an adequate remedy available under the Post-Conviction Relief Act" (22 O.S. §§ 1080-1089), (3) the Court of Criminal Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to review orders issued pursuant to the Post-Conviction Act, and (4) this Court should not exercise jurisdiction over Dutton's claims.
¶15 A court has a duty to inquire into whether it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action that has been brought before the court.6 This Court has stated a similar rule in various contexts.7 One application of this rule is found in explanations stating a court has an inherent power to adjudicate whether it possesses jurisdiction in the particular matter before that court,8 and this Court has the constitutional duty to determine whether a matter is within this Court's jurisdiction or within the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.9
¶16 Subject matter jurisdiction is the "power to deal with the general subject involved in the action"10 or the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.11 The Court has explained that subject matter jurisdiction of a court is invoked by pleadings filed by a party with a court and which show that the court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented, or power to grant the relief sought.12 Our inquiry requires us to examine the nature of Dutton's pled cause of action and the remedy he seeks in this Court and determine whether that cause of action and remedies for that action are within the jurisdiction of this Court.
¶17 The Legislature has authorized a municipality to create a municipal court not of record.13 A municipal court not of record has original jurisdiction to hear and determine prosecutions based upon an alleged violation of a municipal ordinance.14 The City of Midwest City has a municipal court not of record.
¶18 A final judgment of a municipal court not of record may be appealed by filing a notice of appeal in both the municipal court and in the District Court in the county where the municipal government is located.15 The notice of appeal is to be filed "within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment" of the municipal court.16 The appellate proceeding in the District Court is a trial de novo with a right to a jury trial in certain circumstances.17 A District Court adjudicates an appeal from a final judgment of the municipal court not of record, and the form of the District Court's adjudication is a "final judgment or order of a District Court," and that final judgment or order of the District Court may be appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.18
¶19 The Oklahoma Constitution states that the appellate jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court "shall be coextensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity; except that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases until otherwise provided by statute...."Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4 (emphasis added). We have explained that the Oklahoma Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction to provide appellate review of a judgment on a criminal cause of action upon creation of the Criminal Court of Appeals,19 and we have recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters.20 The statutes relating to municipal courts not of record and appeals to both a District Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals contain no provision for the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction in these matters. Additionally, the Legislature has provided that "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction, coextensive with the limits of the state, in all criminal cases appealed from the district, superior and county courts, and such other courts of record as may be established by law."21 In City of Elk City v. Taylor, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that a prosecution of a cause of action in a municipal court imposing criminal penalties of incarceration, fines, or both, is considered as a criminal cause of action.22
¶20 Dutton's pleadings fail to distinguish this Court's jurisdiction in civil matters from the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal appeals when it adjudicates a criminal cause of action, e.g., personal criminal liability, defenses thereto, and the imposition and execution of a criminal sentence. Secondly, his pleadings do not distinguish claims within the civil jurisdiction of this Court when they are based upon institutional deficiencies apart from a judicial adjudication of a criminal judgment and sentence in a particular case. Thirdly, Dutton does not distinguish our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority. Fourthly, he does not show how his request is encompassed within other various circumstances where civil jurisdiction exists in this Court, although its exercise may involve a criminal proceeding in a different court.
¶21 The first distinction involves the issue defining civil and criminal matters for the purpose of defining a civil matter within this Court's supervisory civil jurisdiction and a criminal matter which is not. We have often explained that if a petitioner's claim is of such a nature that it is normally reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a properly filed proceeding in that Court such as a direct appeal or post-conviction appeal, then the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not assume jurisdiction on that claim.23 The scope of claims that are criminal-jurisdiction in nature includes those previously brought by a criminal defendant when using the form of a common-law writ to challenge his or her criminal judgment and sentence.24 This is so because the Legislature created a post-conviction remedy that supplanted the common-law writs and redefined what post-conviction claims may be made.25 Under the Constitution and statutes of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, all other appellate courts and the District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody."26 But "the traditional right to writs of habeas corpus in criminal cases has been incorporated into and amplified by Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Relief Act . . . and is therefore considered to be a criminal action" when used to challenge a criminal judgment and sentence.27 Dutton's pleadings may not be construed as properly seeking declaratory relief against a criminal judgment.28 In summary, when a petitioner files an application in this Court seeking a common-law extraordinary writ, that request does not transform a criminal matter into a civil matter, and we must examine the substantive nature of the petitioner's claims to determine whether the matter is criminal or civil.
¶22 Dutton claims that he was imprisoned without benefit of counsel, and that Midwest City failed to follow the U. S. Supreme Court opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, which guarantees counsel for indigent defendants imprisoned by municipal court process.29 The Response by Midwest City states that Argersinger "appears to apply to municipal courts." Although we do not decide this issue, we must note: (1) The authority before us provided by both Dutton and the city indicates that a municipality's power to imprison an indigent person must be exercised in the context of providing that person counsel for the process which results in his or her imprisonment;30 and (2) Our Court of Criminal Appeals has applied Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, for more than thirty years in criminal proceedings involving Oklahoma municipalities.31 Dutton's action in this Court is a challenge to criminal convictions based upon his personal constitutional rights.32 Challenges to a criminal judgment and sentence based upon personal constitutional rights possessed by a defendant in a criminal proceeding are claims that the Court of Criminal Appeals addresses every day, including a claim based upon the absence of a required attorney for the criminal defendant.33 This Court does not assume original supervisory jurisdiction on this type of claim.
¶23 The second distinction is when an alleged institutional deficiency is raised and the proper functioning of a governmental entity is to be adjudicated. These adjudications do not include an adjudication of the elements of a defendant's criminal offense, defenses, and personal rights a defendant possesses in his or her criminal proceeding as they relate to the criminal cause of action, judgment, or sentence. For example, in State v. Lynch, this Court properly assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate the institutional and constitutional deficiency arising when attorneys who represented criminal defendants were unconstitutionally compensated.34 Similarly, in Sanders v. Followell, the Court properly assumed original jurisdiction when a trial judge incorrectly applied a statute setting a lawyer's fee for representing a criminal defendant. The controversy adjudicated by this Court did not involve a part of the criminal cause of action, defenses thereto, or issues relating to the propriety or enforcement of a sentence upon a criminal judgment.35
¶24 An additional example of this distinction is found in Walters v. Ethics Commission.36 The litigation before this Court in Walters included both a supervisory writ proceeding and an appeal from the District Court.37 In the supervisory writ proceeding, we issued a writ to prevent the District Court from reviewing any action of the Ethics Commission in making a referral of a matter under its investigatory power to a District Attorney.38 A referral by the Commission was for the purpose of a prosecutor exercising discretion involving the institution of a criminal cause of action in the District Court. In the appeal, we explained the requirements for the proper functioning of the Ethics Commission and we addressed a party's specific claim that statutes were facially unconstitutional.39 This party also brought a specific allegation concerning the Commission's application of statutes as to him, and we also addressed that claim in the context of Ethics Commission proceedings that occur prior to institution of a criminal proceeding.40 On the issue whether the party's conduct at issue had been a criminal act, we declined to adjudicate that issue. We observed that the Commission's actions were preparatory to a criminal action being filed in a separate proceeding, and were not proper for adjudication at that time in either the District Court or this Court.41 Justice Opala's concurring opinion, joined by Simms, J., explained that the Court appropriately reversed the District Court's order while addressing the issues concerning the proper procedure to be used by the Ethics Commission, and had also wisely abstained from addressing whether the party's conduct was a violation of a statute: "Because violators of the Act's pertinent provisions are liable to criminal penalties, . . . [and] the decision regarding criminal liability for one's conduct must always be left to the court with cognizance over the offense charged."42 In summary, in Walters the Court distinguished between (1) a claim to adjudicate that a government entity was not functioning according to law and (2) a claim to adjudicate whether one or more elements to a criminal cause of action had been committed by a party to the proceeding. The present action requires the Court to determine if Dutton brought any type of proceeding other than a challenge to a criminal conviction, and we conclude that no request within our supervisory or superintending jurisdiction is made by him.
¶25 The third distinction involves our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority in a particular case. For example, when the Court of Criminal Appeals acts in a controversy where no appellate jurisdiction is vested in that Court, then this Court may assume jurisdiction and delineate that Court's jurisdiction.43 Dutton's purported photocopy of the order by the Court of Criminal Appeals states that the court declines jurisdiction and dismisses his case because: "Petitioner failed to attach to the Petition in Error a certified copy of the District Court Order being appealed as required by . . . [the rules of the court]. As Petitioner has provided an insufficient record for review, this Court declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matter." Similarly, this Court has stated that filing the judgment appealed in this Court is a necessary predicate for appellate review, and its absence may result in a dismissal.44 This Court has similarly dismissed a proceeding due to a party's failure to follow the rules of this Court.45 No excess of jurisdiction appears on either the face of the order of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the record submitted by Dutton herein.
¶26 Fourthly, the Legislature has created civil claims as well as Supreme Court jurisdiction in certain matters although our exercise of jurisdiction may have an impact on a criminal proceeding,46 and there are a few proceedings involving our appellate jurisdiction in matters which are related to a lower court criminal proceeding.47 If the Legislature has properly created a legal cause of action as a civil jurisdiction matter then this Court has the constitutional and legislatively-mandated responsibility to recognize it as within the jurisdiction of this Court.48 Dutton does not show how his request is encompassed within other various specific circumstances where civil original jurisdiction is exercised by this Court, although our exercise may involve or affect a lower court criminal proceeding.
III. Original Superintending Jurisdiction
¶27 Dutton filed pleadings in this Court invoking this Court's original jurisdiction. The Oklahoma Constitution vests this Court with original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs and a general superintending control over all inferior courts, agencies, commissions, and boards created by law.49 The Court's supervisory writ jurisdiction over lower courts is not identical to this Court's superintending-control jurisdiction over all courts, agencies, commissions, and boards.50 We have explained that "It is not always easy or necessary to note the line of demarcation between the two."51 Confusion between the two types of jurisdiction may arise because superintending-control jurisdiction is usually exercised by the use of writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari.52 However, the form of our superintending-control remedial order is not limited to the specified constitutional writs.53 The Court has used its superintending control when fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities in various contexts, such as supervising the practice of law pursuant to the Court's Art. 7 § 1 power,54 enforcing rules of procedure for courts,55 and deciding publici juris issues involving a serious conflict between different governmental agencies or branches of government.56 There is no clear legal right to a writ of superintending control and the issuance of such a writ is in the discretion of the Court.57
¶28 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has been granted statutory authority by the Legislature to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of article 27 of the Municipal Code; and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, it has the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts.58 This statute is consistent with the Supreme Court's civil jurisdiction because it authorizes the Court to create procedures and practices of statewide application.
¶29 The type of corrective relief within the jurisdiction conferred by this statute is one to correct institutional deficiencies and not one to adjudicate individual proceedings determining criminal liability. Nowhere in the statute is this Court given the power to issue writs of either supervisory or superintending control to review an individual criminal proceeding in a municipal court. One reason for this is that the authority to issue writs to a municipal court not of record lies in the District Court, which court also has the statutory appellate criminal jurisdiction over the municipal court criminal case.59 Appeals from criminal convictions in municipal courts of record are filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals using the procedures authorized for appeals from district courts.60 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has no general superintending power over the lower courts, the writs it issues are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,61 and the scope of the relief afforded by those writs involves criminal matters. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters and jurisdiction to issue supervisory writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, that Court is the court which uses a writ power to supervise a criminal matter in a criminal controversy or action that is proceeding in the District Court.
¶30 Relief from a criminal judgment and sentence in a municipal court not of record lies in the municipal court, District Court, and Court of Criminal Appeals.62 Dutton's pleadings do not seek relief against an institution and the imposition of state-wide rules.63 He seeks relief in the form of an order vacating his convictions or an order directing the District Court to provide him with a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions.
¶31 We have also used "superintending control" in the context of (1) issuing prohibition to prevent a trial court from denying a person's fundamental right of notice and an opportunity to be heard in a judicial proceeding,64 and (2) noting the publici juris issue presented by a state-wide procedure for collecting jury fees as implemented by a particular District Court Clerk.65 We have also assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate "an arguable claim" that a violation of a federal constitutional right had occurred by application of specific state statutes.66
¶32 Dutton's claim is that he was imprisoned without the benefit of counsel appointed to represent him, and that he was denied a federal constitutional right. The constitutional grant of superintending control in this Court is not an unlimited power, but a power that is exercised within the definition of "judicial power" as vested in this Court by Article 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution. If a party files a pleading in this Court and requests a determination of his or her legal rights, then a particular type of Article 7 judicial power is invoked in a particular context and the Court acting on that pleading is functioning in the role of an "adjudicator" and not, for example, legislatively or administratively.67 In summary, Dutton is asking the Court to adjudicate a case. In the exercise of our original supervisory or superintending jurisdiction, when we "adjudicate a case" we must possess both subject matter jurisdiction68 and a justiciable controversy69 as shown by the parties' pleadings; and our adjudication is limited by the parties pleadings70 unless the scope of the adjudication is expanded by one of the few well-known exceptions. Additionally, this expanded adjudication in the context of an exercise of superintending control jurisdiction is itself circumscribed by the usual principles of law applicable to remedies, such as an alternate exclusive remedy defeating the exercise of such jurisdiction.71 Examples of adjudicatory superintending control jurisdiction being dependent upon application of subject-matter and justiciability principles are found in opinions such as Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley,72 Democratic Party v. Estep,73 and Ethics Commission v. Cullison,74 and more recent opinions such as Coates v. Fallin.75
¶33 Our superintending control jurisdiction is created by Article 7 §§ 1 and 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution and that jurisdiction must be construed in harmony with the constitutional exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters that is vested in the Court of Criminal Appeals via enactments of the Legislature.76 Dutton is requesting that we adjudicate the legality of his criminal convictions by an exercise of our superintending control in the context of this Court lacking a general constitutional power for appellate review of final judgments and sentences in criminal cases.77 It is correct that the historic division between civil and criminal appellate-review jurisdiction has not been a rigid line and this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have had a shared responsibility in specific circumstances.78 That shared responsibility has usually occurred because this Court has been required to define a "criminal case" or matter for purpose of appellate review when the court for such review was not expressly stated in the statute,79 or when a statutory scheme incorporates both criminal and civil matters or power,80 or when we have explained sui generis proceedings and a shared appellate-review jurisdiction exists.81 Dutton's controversy is not one within the shared responsibility of this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals or a controversy where no appeal has been provided by statute.
¶34 The Court of Criminal Appeals is constitutionally vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases" as implemented by legislation.82 The Legislature has provided an appellate procedure for an appeal from a municipal court to the District Court and then an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. There is no appeal or writ of error from the Court of Criminal Appeals to this Court.83 There is no doubt that this Court may correct a deficient statutory remedy in the context of an adjudication.84 But adjudicatory jurisdiction of appeals from Dutton's criminal convictions does not lie in this Court. Dutton may not circumvent the statutory appellate procedures by seeking appellate review of his criminal conviction in this Court.85
¶35 It is nothing new for this Court to examine the scope and effect of a party's requested relief to determine whether this Court is impermissibly intruding upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals. For example, in State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, the Department of Corrections was statutorily required to apply earned credit days towards a prisoner's sentence of incarceration. We explained that the scope of the statute in the controversy applied to alter a criminal judgment and sentence and was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.86 The issue of attorney representation of an indigent criminal defendant is a criminal matter by its nature, and thus proper for adjudication within a District Court criminal proceeding and appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.87
¶36 We conclude that Dutton's pleadings attempt to invoke an original supervisory or superintending adjudicatory jurisdiction of this Court for the purpose of providing him with an appellate review of his municipal criminal judgments and sentences, and we decline to assume original jurisdiction on such claims.
IV. Alternative Remedies
¶37 Dutton has ten filings in this supervisory proceeding.88 None of these filings show that he is without remedies in the District Court or subsequent appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. More than forty years ago, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Relief Act (22 O.S. §§ 1080-1089) "contains no requirement that an applicant be in custody, under any form of restraint or supervision, or that the sentence be unsatisfied in any respect."89 Dutton's release from confinement would appear to present no theoretical bar to seeking post-conviction relief.90
¶38 The orders are not before us, but we may take judicial notice of the dockets of District Courts.91 In the three District Court actions, 2013-1619, 2013-1620, and 2013-1622, the first and last were "Dismissed without prejudice" and in 1620 its current status appears to be "pending." All of his applications for post conviction relief were filed with the docket designation "CV" for "Civil Misc.: OTHER - CIVIL NO DAMAGES
¶39 The concept of an adequate remedy appears in several areas of the law with slightly different and overlapping meanings. In the context of creating a remedy and providing equitable relief, we have indicated that when a party has an action at law an equitable remedy will not be available.92 Similarly, equity is not invocable when an adequate statutory remedy exists.93 In the context of challenging a judgment, a statutory remedy will preclude a party from successfully invoking equity.94 Of course, in these contexts the available remedies must be adequate, but adequacy is not measured by whether Dutton obtains the exact relief he desires, i.e., his convictions are voided or he gets a new appeal in this proceeding. Adequacy of a remedy in this context is determined by whether the law provides a means for complete relief for a person with the type of claims Dutton is raising, i.e., a reasonable opportunity to obtain the relief he seeks.
¶40 Generally, in the context of a civil proceeding when the federal constitution requires this State to provide an adequate remedy for a person claiming the denial of a federal constitutional right by the State, the adequacy of an available remedy at law is not measured by that particular party's eventual success on the merits of his or her litigation, but whether a person in that party's circumstances is provided with a clear and certain opportunity for obtaining complete relief at law.95 For example, if a state exacts a tax in violation of the federal constitution, then it must provide an opportunity to recover those taxes because "a denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment."96 But even in the context of a deprived federal constitutional right, a State may require a person to comply with a clear and certain state procedure when seeking a legal remedy for that deprived federal right.97 Dutton's action raising federal constitutional claims does not exempt him from using available statutory or common-law proceedings to vindicate his claims. The District Court has stated that his applications for post-conviction relief were denied without prejudice to him seeking relief in the municipal court. Dutton has failed to show why he should not be required to pursue relief in accordance with state statutes and the orders of the District Court.
V. Motion for Counsel, Oral Argument and an Evidentiary Hearing
¶41 Dutton filed a motion requesting the Court appoint counsel to represent him in this proceeding. This Court has noted a right to counsel possessed by a defendant in a criminal prosecution, and that the right is expressly conferred by Art. 2 § 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.98 Dutton's proceeding in this Court does not subject him to either criminal fine or punishment, and it is not a criminal prosecution or a statutorily authorized direct appeal from his criminal judgments and sentences. His proceeding in this Court is not a statutorily authorized direct attack on his convictions, but a collateral attack 99 in a civil proceeding seeking an extraordinary superintending writ to review judgments based upon criminal causes of action that were rendered in criminal proceedings.
¶42 There is no doubt that the assistance of a legal practitioner is fundamental to due process "in certain types of civil litigation, aspects of which are analogous to criminal proceedings."100 We have concluded that legal authority clearly demonstrates that this Court has no authority in this collateral civil proceeding to either void Dutton's convictions or direct the District Court to provide him with an appeal of his criminal convictions. We note the District Court has denied his applications for criminal post-conviction relief without prejudice. We conclude that appointed counsel would not be of assistance in this proceeding and deny Dutton's application for appointed counsel.101 Because we decline to assume original jurisdiction on the merits of Dutton's claims and because such relief is appropriate in a different court, we deny his motion for an oral argument and an evidentiary hearing.
V. Conclusion
¶43 We assume original jurisdiction solely on the issue of our jurisdiction to hear Dutton's claims. Dutton has failed to show that he lacks adequate remedies in either a municipal court or the District Court. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner's cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court. We conclude that Dutton's claims are criminal matters and we decline to assume original jurisdiction on his claims or grant him relief on them without prejudice to him presenting them, in the proper court.102
¶44 COMBS, V. C. J., WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, and GURICH, JJ, concur.
¶45 REIF, C. J., KAUGER, and COLBERT, JJ., concur in result.
FOOTNOTES
1 Appendix, Aug. 29, 2014, exhibit 5, page 3, orders of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dutton v. City of Midwest City, Nos. PC 2014-0632, PC 2014-0633, and PC 2014-0634.
2 The federal court based its conclusion on Heck v. Humphrey,
3 Petitioner's Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 113,170 (Aug. 29, 2014) pp. 16-17.
4 Petitioner's Motion to Provide Relief, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 113,170 (Nov. 14, 2014) pp. 11-12.
5 Although The City of Midwest City is not a named party in the style of this proceeding as filed by Dutton, The City of Midwest City entered an appearance herein and we requested a response addressing Dutton's allegations. The Court also provided an opportunity for the District Attorney for Oklahoma County to file a response to Dutton's pleadings.
6 Sanders v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission,
7 See, e.g., Hall v. Geo Group, Inc.,
8 See, e.g., Miller v. Fortune Insurance Co.,
9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction to determine whether it or the Court of Criminal Appeals exercises jurisdiction in a particular controversy. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4: ". . . and in the event there is any conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final." See, e.g., Smith v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections,
10 Hobbs v. German-American Doctors,
11 Cooper v. Reynolds,
12 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed,
13 11 O.S.2011 § 27-101: "A municipality may create a municipal court, as provided in this article, which shall be a court not of record. This court may be created in addition to a municipal criminal court of record. References in Sections 27-101 through 27-131 of this title to the municipal court shall mean the municipal court not of record established under the authority of the provisions of this article."
14 11 O.S.2011 § 27-103: "The municipal court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all prosecutions wherein a violation of any ordinance of the municipality where the court is established is charged."
15
A. An appeal may be taken from a final judgment of the municipal court by the defendant by filing in the district court in the county where the situs of the municipal government is located, within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment, a notice of appeal and by filing a copy of the notice with the municipal court. In case of an appeal, a trial de novo shall be had, and there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) and costs.
B. Upon conviction, at the request of the defendant, or upon notice of appeal being filed, the judge of the municipal court shall enter an order on the docket fixing an amount in which bond may be given by the defendant, in cash or sureties for cash in an amount of not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than twice the amount of such fine. Bond shall be taken by the clerk of the court wherein judgment was rendered. Any pledge of sureties must be approved by a judge of the court.
C. Upon appeal being filed the judge shall within ten (10) days thereafter certify to the clerk of the appellate court the original papers in the case. If the papers have not been certified to the appellate court, the prosecuting attorney shall take the necessary steps to have the papers certified to the appellate court within twenty (20) days of the filing of the notice of appeal, and failure to do so, except for good cause shown, shall be grounds for dismissal of the charge by the appellate court, the cost to be taxed to the municipality. The certificate shall state whether or not the municipal judge hearing the case was a licensed attorney in Oklahoma.
D. All proceedings necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be had in the appellate court.
16 See note 15 supra, at 11 O.S.2011 § 27-129 (A).
17 See note 15 supra, at 11 O.S.2011 § 27-129 (A). Section 27-129(A) was amended by 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws Ch. 2, § 1 (eff. Nov. 1, 2015), and which states in part that "... there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), plus costs, fees, and assessments."
18 11 O.S. § 27-132: "An appeal may be taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals from the final judgment or order of a district court in an appeal from a final judgment of a municipal court in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are taken from a district court to the Court of Criminal Appeals."
19 In re Opinion of the Judges,
20 In the Matter of M.B.,
21 20 O.S.2011 § 40: "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction, coextensive with the limits of the state, in all criminal cases appealed from the district, superior and county courts, and such other courts of record as may be established by law."
22 City of Elk City v. Taylor,
23 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
24 See State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, supra, note 20, observing that "As the Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly stated, in a criminal case the 'essential part of the judgment is the punishment and the amount thereof.'" Cf. Lockett v. Evans,
25 Paxton v. State,
26 State v. Powell,
27 State ex rel. Coats v. Hunter,
28 An action for a declaratory judgment will not lie "to launch an impermissible collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence in a criminal case." Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington,
29 Argersinger v. Hamlin,
30 Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra; Scott v. Illinois,
31 Jackson v. City of Oklahoma City,
We also note that two authors have stated that in 1997 the State of New Jersey became the first state to enact legislation requiring every municipal court to have at least one municipal public defender appointed by the governing body of the municipality to represent an indigent defendant accused of an offense, which if convicted, would subject the defendant to imprisonment. Robert J. Martin and Walter Kowalski, "A Matter of Simple Justice": Enactment of New Jersey's Municipal Public Defender Act, 51 Rutgers L.Rev. 637, 676-677, 694 (1999).
32 See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb,
33 See, e.g., Hinsley v. State,
34 State v. Lynch,
35 Sanders v. Followell,
36 Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Comm'n,
37 Walters,
38 Walters,
39 Walters,
40 Walters,
41 Walters,
42 Walters,
43 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
44 Willitt v. ASG Industries,
45 See, e.g., Rugg v. Layton,
46 See, e.g., Courtney v. State,
47 An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. Dunn v. State,
48 In Oklahoma, a right to appeal from an exercise of judicial discretion in cases of law and equity, excluding criminal matters, is a constitutional right subject to legislative requirements for the manner invoking that appellate jurisdiction. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4; Wells v. Shriver,
49 Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4, provides in part that: "The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law."
50 Board of Commissioners of Harmon County v. Keen,
51 Board of Commissioners of Harmon County v. Keen,
52 Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison,
53 Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison,
54 The Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 7 § 1, vests "judicial power" in the Supreme Court and that vesting "gives it the right to regulate the matter of who shall be admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court and inferior courts, and also gives it the right to regulate and control the practice of law within its jurisdiction." In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma,
The Court's Art. 7 § 4 superintending power over "inferior courts" includes an authority to control and regulate the practice of law. State v. Lynch,
55 State ex rel. Freeling v. Kight,
56 Ethics Commission v. Cullison,
57 Butler v. Breckinridge,
58 11 O.S.2011 § 27-131:
"The Supreme Court is authorized to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of this article, and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, shall have the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts of Oklahoma to consider matters calculated to bring about a speedier and more efficient administration of justice."
59
The district court in each county wherein a municipal court is established shall have the same jurisdiction to issue to the municipal court writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari as the Supreme Court now has to issue such writs to courts of record.
60 11 O.S.2011 § 28-128:
Appeals may be taken from a judgment or order of a municipal criminal court of record to the Court of Criminal Appeals in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are now taken from the district courts to the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters, and no appeals other than those herein provided shall be allowed.
61 Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon,
62 See, e.g., Houghton v. City of Wewoka,
63 Because his pleadings do not raise this issue we need not address the type of factual support or record in an original jurisdiction proceeding that is needed for a request that the Court create court rules for state-wide application.
64 Muggenborg v. Kessler,
65 Naylor v. Petuskey,
66 Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Board,
67 Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n,
68 The focus of a subject matter jurisdiction analysis is on the nature of the pled action in relation to the power of a court to adjudicate and grant relief in an action of that nature. The phrase subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to deal with the general subject involved in the action or the nature of the cause of action, and this jurisdiction is present when a court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed,
69 Generally, the focus of a justiciability analysis is on the parties and the nature of their adverse legal interests in the particular pled controversy, and not on the nature of the pled cause of action as it relates to the power of the court to address that type of action. See, e.g., Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation,
This focus on the interests of the parties has been present when we addressed a justiciable controversy in the context of declaratory relief and have said that justiciability is present when there is: (1) a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Chrysler Corp. v. Clark,
District Courts possess "unlimited jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article . . . ." Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 7(a). Reeds v. Walker,
70 Generally, the Court's adjudicatory judicial power in an original action is limited to the facts and issues framed by the pleadings and as amended by the partes' briefs in this Court. La Bellman v. Gleason & Sanders, Inc.,
71 For example, one of the well-known exceptions occurs in a public-law controversy where the Court may grant corrective relief upon any applicable legal theory, raised by a party or sua sponte, when that theory is dispositive of the controversy and is supported by the record. Lincoln Farm, L.L.C. v. Oppliger,
72 In Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley,
73 Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep,
74 Ethics Commission v. Cullison,
75 Coates v. Fallin,
76 In re Initiative Petition No. 314,
77 In re Opinion of the Judges,
78 See, e.g., Hale v. Board of County Commissioners of Seminole County,
79 See, e.g., State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
80 See, e.g., Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoenas v. Powers,
81 Contempt proceedings are sui generis, Henry v. Schmidt,
82 Jackson v. Freeman,
83 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
84 Farris v. Cannon,
85 Darnell v. Higgins,
86 State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
87 See, e.g., Griffin v. State,
88 Dutton filed: (1) Entry of Appearance (August 29, 2014); (2) Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, (August 29, 2014); (3) An Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (August 29, 2014); (4) Motion to Appoint Counsel, (August 29, 2014); (5) Appendix of Citations of Authority and Exhibits, (August 29, 2014); (6) Proof of Service (August 29, 2014); (7) Motion to Provide Relief (Nov. 14, 2014); (8) Notice of Change of Contact Information (December 30, 2014); (9) Petitioner's Objections and Legal Argument, etc. (March 10, 2015); and (10) Petitioner's motion for evidentiary hearing, oral argument, and aid of counsel (April 17, 2015).
89 Battle v. State,
90 22 O.S.2011 § 1080, states that:
Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(a) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state;
(b) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(c) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(d) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(e) that his sentence has expired, his suspended sentence, probation, parole, or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
(f) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy;
may institute a proceeding under this act in the court in which the judgment and sentence on conviction was imposed to secure the appropriate relief. Excluding a timely appeal, this act encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods of challenging a conviction or sentence.
91 Collier v. Reese,
92 Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.,
93 Muskogee Fair Haven Manor Phase I, Inc. v. Scott,
94 Denning v. Van Meter,
95 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,
96 Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
We note that a federal constitutional requirement for a State court providing a remedy for a constitutional deprivation is not a rule of universal application. While Congress does not possess the power, under Article I of the U. S. Constitution, to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts, Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to the enforcement power of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Alden v. Maine,
97 Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
98 Towne v. Hubbard,
99 A direct attack is an attempt to avoid or correct a judicial proceeding in some manner provided by law, such as by an appeal, or motion for new trial. House v. Town of Dickson,
A collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or to deny its force and effect in some manner not provided by law; that is, in some other way than by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or motion for a new trial. In re Hyde,
100 Towne v. Hubbard,
101 We also deny Dutton's motion for hearing and oral argument because the authorities clearly show that this Court has no authority to adjudicate the merits of Dutton's claims.
102 A limited adjudication on the question of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits of the controversy. State v. Herndon,
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|
| None Found. |
| Cite | Name | Level | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| HOUGHTON v. CITY OF WEWOKA | Discussed | ||
| PAXTON v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. COATS v. HUNTER | Discussed | ||
| BLADES v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| CITY OF ELK CITY v. TAYLOR | Discussed | ||
| HINSLEY v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| MURRAH v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY | Discussed | ||
| HARGROVE v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| GRIFFIN v. STATE | Discussed at Length | ||
| SMITH v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| CAMPBELL v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| JACKSON v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| LUNA v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| BATTLE v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Chrysler Corp. v. Clark | Discussed | ||
| Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Com'n | Discussed at Length | ||
| State ex rel. Turpen v. A 1977 Chevrolet Pickup Truck | Discussed | ||
| In re INTEGRATION OF STATE BAR OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler | Discussed at Length | ||
| State v. Lynch | Discussed at Length | ||
| Naylor v. Petuskey | Discussed | ||
| Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in Multicounty Grand Jury Case No. CJ-92-4110 Before Dist. Court of Oklahoma County v. Powers | Discussed | ||
| Ethics Com'n of State of Okl. v. Cullison | Discussed at Length | ||
| STATE ex rel. CRAWFORD v. CORPORATION COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| OKLAHOMA CITY v. ROBINSON | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. FREELING v. KIGHT | Discussed at Length | ||
| Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington | Discussed | ||
| Stallings v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n | Discussed | ||
| Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd. | Discussed | ||
| HINKLE v. KENNY | Discussed | ||
| DUNN et al. v. STATE. | Discussed | ||
| DENNING v. VAN METER | Discussed | ||
| SMITH v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS | Discussed | ||
| GLACKEN v. ANDREW | Discussed at Length | ||
| WELLS v. SHRIVER | Discussed | ||
| JETER v. DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY | Discussed | ||
| In re OPINION OF THE JUDGES. | Discussed at Length | ||
| IN RE HESS' ESTATE | Discussed | ||
| GORDON v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed | ||
| LA BELLMAN v. GLEASON & SANDERS, INC. | Discussed | ||
| RUGG v. LAYTON Co. Supt. | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. BLANKENSHIP v. FREEMAN | Discussed | ||
| BUTLER v. BRECKINRIDGE | Discussed | ||
| Jackson v. Freeman | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO. v. BROWN | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. YOUNG v. WOODSON | Discussed | ||
| STATE v. TORRES | Discussed | ||
| HENRY v. SCHMIDT | Discussed | ||
| REEDS v. WALKER | Discussed | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF M.B. | Discussed at Length | ||
| HOUSE v. TOWN OF DICKSON | Discussed | ||
| MOVANTS TO QUASH MULTICOUNTY GRAND JURY SUBPOENA v. DIXON | Discussed | ||
| COLLIER v. REESE | Cited | ||
| STATE v. POWELL | Discussed | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF HYDE | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. MOTHERSHED | Discussed at Length | ||
| COURTNEY v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley | Discussed | ||
| LINCOLN FARM, L. L. C. v. OPPLIGER | Discussed | ||
| KRUG v. HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC. | Discussed | ||
| COATES v. FALLIN | Cited | ||
| HALL v. THE GEO GROUP, INC | Discussed | ||
| LOCKETT v. EVANS | Cited | ||
| SANDERS v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed | ||
| WILLITT v. ASG INDUSTRIES, INC. | Discussed | ||
| STATE v. ex rel. COMM'N OF LAND OFFICE v. CORPORATION COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| CARDER v. COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS | Discussed at Length | ||
| Draper v. State | Discussed | ||
| HALE v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF SEMINOLE CTY. | Discussed at Length | ||
| Initiative Petition No. 314, In re | Discussed | ||
| Towne v. Hubbard | Discussed at Length | ||
| Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n | Cited | ||
| Muggenborg v. Kessler | Discussed | ||
| Berry v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co. | Cited | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF INCOME TAX PROTEST OF REDBIRD | Discussed at Length | ||
| State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., Application of | Discussed | ||
| Farris v. Cannon | Discussed | ||
| Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep | Cited | ||
| DARNELL v. HIGGINS Co. Supt. | Discussed | ||
| SANDERS v. OKLAHOMA EMPL. SEC. COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| MUSKOGEE FAIR HAVEN MANOR v. SCOTT | Discussed at Length | ||
| In re Oklahoma Boll Weevil Eradication Organization | Discussed | ||
| HOBBS v. GERMAN-AMERICAN | Discussed at Length | ||
| BOARD OF COM'RS OF HARMON CTY. v. KEEN | Discussed at Length | ||
| HERNDON v. HAMMOND | Discussed | ||
| BUCK v. DICK | Discussed at Length | ||
| STATE ex rel. IKARD v. RUSSELL | Discussed | ||
| Johnson v. Johnson | Discussed | ||
| Title 11. Cities and Towns | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Creation of Municipal Court Not of Record | Cited | ||
| Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari | Cited | ||
| Appeals | Discussed at Length | ||
| Orders Relative to Procedures and Practices by Supreme Court | Cited | ||
| Appeal to Court of Criminal Appeals | Cited | ||
| Appeals | Cited | ||
| Title 20. Courts | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Title 21. Crimes and Punishments | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Repealed by Laws 1991, HB 1612, c. 238, § 37, emerg. eff. July 1, 1991 | Cited | ||
| Title 22. Criminal Procedure | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Post-Conviction Procedure Act - Right to Challenge Conviction or Sentence. | Discussed at Length | ||
| Accusation Presented by Grand Jury | Cited | ||
| Presentation of Accusation by County Commissioners or Judge and Treasurer -Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Title 28. Fees | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Civil Actions - Charge in Addition to Flat Fee | Cited | ||
| Title 51. Officers | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Attorney General - Duties | Cited | ||
OSCN navigation
- Home
- Courts
- Court Dockets
- Legal Research
- Calendar
- Help
- Previous Case
- Top Of Index
- This Point in Index
- Citationize
- Next Case
- Print Only
DUTTON v. CITY OF MIDWEST CITY
Case Number: 113170
Decided: 06/30/2015
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Cite as:
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
RODNEY DUTTON, Petitioner,
v.
THE CITY OF MIDWEST CITY, and THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondents.
APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
¶0 Petitioner sought an extraordinary writ in the Oklahoma Supreme Court and challenged his convictions in three criminal proceedings in the municipal court for The City of Midwest City. He also requested an alternative remedy that would compel the District Court to provide him with a new appeal of his convictions in the District Court. We assume original jurisdiction for the sole purpose of determining our jurisdiction to review Petitioner's allegations. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner's cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AND ALL
REQUESTS FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO PETITIONER SEEKING RELIEF IN THE APPROPRIATE COURT
Rodney Dutton, Midwest City, Oklahoma, Petitioner Pro se.
David F. Howell and J. Steven Coates, Midwest City, Oklahoma, for Respondent, City of Midwest City.
EDMONDSON, J.
¶1 We assume original jurisdiction on the question whether this Court has original jurisdiction to adjudicate both the merits of the claim or cause of action that the Dutton (or Petitioner) has pled in this Court and the associated remedies he requests. We decline to assume original jurisdiction on either the merits of Dutton's cause of action or his requests for relief as pled by him in this Court.
¶2 Dutton pleads a cause of action challenging the correctness of a judgment and sentence in three municipal criminal matters. He seeks an adjudication on the legal correctness of these judgments and sentences in this proceeding, and in the alternative he requests an extraordinary remedy to compel the District Court to provide him a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions in the District Court. We conclude that the pled cause of action and remedy sought by him involve criminal matters that are not within the original jurisdiction of this Court. We conclude that Dutton's action in this Court should be dismissed without prejudice to him seeking appropriate relief in the proper court.
I. Pleadings of Dutton and The City of Midwest City
¶3 Dutton alleges that on April 15, 2013, he was convicted in the municipal court of the City of Midwest City, Oklahoma, of the charges of assault, public intoxication, and domestic assault and battery. He states that he was sentenced to thirty days in jail. He states that he was incarcerated for a felony charge on November 24, 2011, which was ultimately dismissed, and he "was released on his own recognizance on about March 7, 2013," and then transferred to the Midwest City jail for trial on his municipal charges. He alleges that he was released from the Midwest City jail on May 10, 2013. He states that while he was incarcerated on the felony charge he was represented by a "public defender."
¶4 He states that he filed three applications for post-conviction relief in the District Court after his release. He alleges that the District Court dismissed the applications for the reason that they should have been filed with the municipal court in Midwest City. His application for this Court to assume original jurisdiction was filed on August 29, 2014, approximately one year and three months after his release.
¶5 Dutton alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied counsel at trial and was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. He alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied (1) advance notice of the municipal charges against him, (2) a fair trial due to insufficient evidence, and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (3) counsel for an appeal, (4) a direct appeal, (5) "out-of-time appeal," (6) an adequate post-conviction remedy, and (7) counsel for a post-conviction appeal. In his filing herein entitled "Motion to Provide Relief," he alleges that he was "denied his 6th and 14th Amendments rights to counsel and a fair trial and subsequently denied his right to an appeal of wrongful convictions by the city of Midwest City, Oklahoma."
¶6 Dutton alleges that shortly prior to his trial in municipal court he was provided with a written notice of one of the charges against him. He states that the judge refused his request to have a lawyer appointed for him. He states that after the City's prosecutor failed to appear for his trial, the judge questioned the witnesses and refused Dutton's request to cross-examine the witnesses.
¶7 Dutton alleges that the District Court of Oklahoma County:
. . . has delayed and denied the Petitioner in his pursuit of relief in this matter . . . and while "the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals provide him some relief at first and then declined to hear his appeal when the court reporter or court clerk failed to provide him a stamp-filed certified copy of the District Court's order dismissing two of his three post-conviction applications under the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals own rules.
Application to Assume, Aug. 29, 2014, at pg. 2, material omitted.
Dutton's appendix of exhibits, and his other filings in this Court, fail to contain photocopies of any the orders allegedly issued by the District Court of Oklahoma County about which he complains. He alleges that he sought relief in the District Court by filing applications for post-conviction relief pursuant to Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
¶8 Dutton's Appendix does contain purported uncertified photocopies of orders issued by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Three orders, which show docket designations for post-conviction appeals, state that the Court of Criminal Appeals declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matters because Dutton failed to attach to his petition in error a certified copy of the District Court order being appealed, as required by the rules for the Court of Criminal Appeals.1
¶9 Dutton's Appendix also contains a purported photocopy of an order of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing his motion for the court to reconsider "declining jurisdiction of his post-conviction appeals from Oklahoma County." The court explains that a petition for rehearing that challenges the court's decision in post-conviction appeal is not allowed.
¶10 Midwest City's response states that Dutton's allegations relate to three different factual episodes resulting in a criminal prosecution for assault and battery on his wife, prosecutions for assault on a police officer and public intoxication, and then an arrest for felony possession of incendiary devices. He was released from jail, awaiting trial on the felony charge, and returned to the municipal jail for prosecution of the misdemeanors.
¶11 The response states that Dutton and his wife filed two civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claimed that his constitutional rights were violated by Midwest City and its officials in the context of Dutton's arrests, convictions, and sentence of incarceration. The federal court's order dismissing, in part, Dutton's claims lists the violations of constitutional rights as alleged by Dutton and his wife in the federal proceeding.
Mr. Dutton's claims, construed liberally because of his pro se status, appear to be as follows: 1) a First Amendment violation, based upon an alleged retaliation for the comment he made while leaving the courtroom ["I'll see you in federal court."]; 2) a Fourth Amendment claim, based on his arrest and prosecution without probable cause; 3) denial of due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 4) denial of assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 5) an Eighth Amendment claim, based on failure to protect him from abuse by a fellow inmate; and 6) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, both plaintiffs assert First and Fourteenth Amendment claims for loss of consortium and violation of their "right to pursue life and happiness together in their marriage and individually without wrongful interference by officials of [the] government."
Order, Jan. 3, 2014, at p. 3, Rodney Dutton and Shirley Dutton v. City of Midwest City, et al., No. CIV-13-0911-HE, U. S. Dist. Crt., W. D. Okla., (explanation added).
The federal court concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based upon allegations of an unconstitutional conviction when state law provided a means for challenging the conviction.2 Midwest City states that Dutton's appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit was determined by that court to be premature due to Dutton's claims still pending before the federal District Court. Midwest City states that Dutton's claims against it remain pending in the federal court. Midwest City's appendix filed herein also contains uncertified photocopies of two orders by The District Court of Oklahoma County dismissing, without prejudice, Dutton's applications for post-conviction relief.
¶12 Dutton filed a reply to the city's response. He states his innocence of the crimes for which he was convicted. He argues: (1) his municipal arrest was illegal, (2) the trial in the municipal court was not fair because he was not provided with an attorney, and (3) his municipal convictions are void because no record exists of the evidence used against him at the municipal trial. He also objects to the appearances made in this proceeding by two attorneys who filed a response for Midwest City. He requests that this Court "dismiss" these two attorneys from this proceeding.
¶13 In his reply, Dutton requests this Court adjudicate his convictions to be "invalid, null, and void" and to also grant the relief as set forth in his Application filed with this Court. In his Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, he requests an order of this Court directing the District Court of Oklahoma County "provide him a direct appeal with appointed counsel from Midwest City Municipal Cases docketed as #2011-4369 - Domestic Violence, #2011-5808 - public intoxication, and #2011-5808 - assault and/or any other relief that is appropriately just."3 Dutton also states he seeks an order "overturning, vacating, and barring" the municipal convictions, or alternatively the Court provide him with a direct appeal of his convictions in the District Court with appointed counsel.4
II. The Court's Original Supervisory Civil Jurisdiction
¶14 This Court issued an order and requested Midwest City brief the issue whether this Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims made by Petitioner.5 The city's response argues that (1) the matter before this Court is criminal in nature, (2) "Petitioner has an adequate remedy available under the Post-Conviction Relief Act" (22 O.S. §§ 1080-1089), (3) the Court of Criminal Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to review orders issued pursuant to the Post-Conviction Act, and (4) this Court should not exercise jurisdiction over Dutton's claims.
¶15 A court has a duty to inquire into whether it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action that has been brought before the court.6 This Court has stated a similar rule in various contexts.7 One application of this rule is found in explanations stating a court has an inherent power to adjudicate whether it possesses jurisdiction in the particular matter before that court,8 and this Court has the constitutional duty to determine whether a matter is within this Court's jurisdiction or within the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.9
¶16 Subject matter jurisdiction is the "power to deal with the general subject involved in the action"10 or the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.11 The Court has explained that subject matter jurisdiction of a court is invoked by pleadings filed by a party with a court and which show that the court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented, or power to grant the relief sought.12 Our inquiry requires us to examine the nature of Dutton's pled cause of action and the remedy he seeks in this Court and determine whether that cause of action and remedies for that action are within the jurisdiction of this Court.
¶17 The Legislature has authorized a municipality to create a municipal court not of record.13 A municipal court not of record has original jurisdiction to hear and determine prosecutions based upon an alleged violation of a municipal ordinance.14 The City of Midwest City has a municipal court not of record.
¶18 A final judgment of a municipal court not of record may be appealed by filing a notice of appeal in both the municipal court and in the District Court in the county where the municipal government is located.15 The notice of appeal is to be filed "within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment" of the municipal court.16 The appellate proceeding in the District Court is a trial de novo with a right to a jury trial in certain circumstances.17 A District Court adjudicates an appeal from a final judgment of the municipal court not of record, and the form of the District Court's adjudication is a "final judgment or order of a District Court," and that final judgment or order of the District Court may be appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.18
¶19 The Oklahoma Constitution states that the appellate jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court "shall be coextensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity; except that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases until otherwise provided by statute...."Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4 (emphasis added). We have explained that the Oklahoma Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction to provide appellate review of a judgment on a criminal cause of action upon creation of the Criminal Court of Appeals,19 and we have recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters.20 The statutes relating to municipal courts not of record and appeals to both a District Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals contain no provision for the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction in these matters. Additionally, the Legislature has provided that "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction, coextensive with the limits of the state, in all criminal cases appealed from the district, superior and county courts, and such other courts of record as may be established by law."21 In City of Elk City v. Taylor, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that a prosecution of a cause of action in a municipal court imposing criminal penalties of incarceration, fines, or both, is considered as a criminal cause of action.22
¶20 Dutton's pleadings fail to distinguish this Court's jurisdiction in civil matters from the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal appeals when it adjudicates a criminal cause of action, e.g., personal criminal liability, defenses thereto, and the imposition and execution of a criminal sentence. Secondly, his pleadings do not distinguish claims within the civil jurisdiction of this Court when they are based upon institutional deficiencies apart from a judicial adjudication of a criminal judgment and sentence in a particular case. Thirdly, Dutton does not distinguish our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority. Fourthly, he does not show how his request is encompassed within other various circumstances where civil jurisdiction exists in this Court, although its exercise may involve a criminal proceeding in a different court.
¶21 The first distinction involves the issue defining civil and criminal matters for the purpose of defining a civil matter within this Court's supervisory civil jurisdiction and a criminal matter which is not. We have often explained that if a petitioner's claim is of such a nature that it is normally reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a properly filed proceeding in that Court such as a direct appeal or post-conviction appeal, then the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not assume jurisdiction on that claim.23 The scope of claims that are criminal-jurisdiction in nature includes those previously brought by a criminal defendant when using the form of a common-law writ to challenge his or her criminal judgment and sentence.24 This is so because the Legislature created a post-conviction remedy that supplanted the common-law writs and redefined what post-conviction claims may be made.25 Under the Constitution and statutes of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, all other appellate courts and the District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody."26 But "the traditional right to writs of habeas corpus in criminal cases has been incorporated into and amplified by Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Relief Act . . . and is therefore considered to be a criminal action" when used to challenge a criminal judgment and sentence.27 Dutton's pleadings may not be construed as properly seeking declaratory relief against a criminal judgment.28 In summary, when a petitioner files an application in this Court seeking a common-law extraordinary writ, that request does not transform a criminal matter into a civil matter, and we must examine the substantive nature of the petitioner's claims to determine whether the matter is criminal or civil.
¶22 Dutton claims that he was imprisoned without benefit of counsel, and that Midwest City failed to follow the U. S. Supreme Court opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, which guarantees counsel for indigent defendants imprisoned by municipal court process.29 The Response by Midwest City states that Argersinger "appears to apply to municipal courts." Although we do not decide this issue, we must note: (1) The authority before us provided by both Dutton and the city indicates that a municipality's power to imprison an indigent person must be exercised in the context of providing that person counsel for the process which results in his or her imprisonment;30 and (2) Our Court of Criminal Appeals has applied Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, for more than thirty years in criminal proceedings involving Oklahoma municipalities.31 Dutton's action in this Court is a challenge to criminal convictions based upon his personal constitutional rights.32 Challenges to a criminal judgment and sentence based upon personal constitutional rights possessed by a defendant in a criminal proceeding are claims that the Court of Criminal Appeals addresses every day, including a claim based upon the absence of a required attorney for the criminal defendant.33 This Court does not assume original supervisory jurisdiction on this type of claim.
¶23 The second distinction is when an alleged institutional deficiency is raised and the proper functioning of a governmental entity is to be adjudicated. These adjudications do not include an adjudication of the elements of a defendant's criminal offense, defenses, and personal rights a defendant possesses in his or her criminal proceeding as they relate to the criminal cause of action, judgment, or sentence. For example, in State v. Lynch, this Court properly assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate the institutional and constitutional deficiency arising when attorneys who represented criminal defendants were unconstitutionally compensated.34 Similarly, in Sanders v. Followell, the Court properly assumed original jurisdiction when a trial judge incorrectly applied a statute setting a lawyer's fee for representing a criminal defendant. The controversy adjudicated by this Court did not involve a part of the criminal cause of action, defenses thereto, or issues relating to the propriety or enforcement of a sentence upon a criminal judgment.35
¶24 An additional example of this distinction is found in Walters v. Ethics Commission.36 The litigation before this Court in Walters included both a supervisory writ proceeding and an appeal from the District Court.37 In the supervisory writ proceeding, we issued a writ to prevent the District Court from reviewing any action of the Ethics Commission in making a referral of a matter under its investigatory power to a District Attorney.38 A referral by the Commission was for the purpose of a prosecutor exercising discretion involving the institution of a criminal cause of action in the District Court. In the appeal, we explained the requirements for the proper functioning of the Ethics Commission and we addressed a party's specific claim that statutes were facially unconstitutional.39 This party also brought a specific allegation concerning the Commission's application of statutes as to him, and we also addressed that claim in the context of Ethics Commission proceedings that occur prior to institution of a criminal proceeding.40 On the issue whether the party's conduct at issue had been a criminal act, we declined to adjudicate that issue. We observed that the Commission's actions were preparatory to a criminal action being filed in a separate proceeding, and were not proper for adjudication at that time in either the District Court or this Court.41 Justice Opala's concurring opinion, joined by Simms, J., explained that the Court appropriately reversed the District Court's order while addressing the issues concerning the proper procedure to be used by the Ethics Commission, and had also wisely abstained from addressing whether the party's conduct was a violation of a statute: "Because violators of the Act's pertinent provisions are liable to criminal penalties, . . . [and] the decision regarding criminal liability for one's conduct must always be left to the court with cognizance over the offense charged."42 In summary, in Walters the Court distinguished between (1) a claim to adjudicate that a government entity was not functioning according to law and (2) a claim to adjudicate whether one or more elements to a criminal cause of action had been committed by a party to the proceeding. The present action requires the Court to determine if Dutton brought any type of proceeding other than a challenge to a criminal conviction, and we conclude that no request within our supervisory or superintending jurisdiction is made by him.
¶25 The third distinction involves our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority in a particular case. For example, when the Court of Criminal Appeals acts in a controversy where no appellate jurisdiction is vested in that Court, then this Court may assume jurisdiction and delineate that Court's jurisdiction.43 Dutton's purported photocopy of the order by the Court of Criminal Appeals states that the court declines jurisdiction and dismisses his case because: "Petitioner failed to attach to the Petition in Error a certified copy of the District Court Order being appealed as required by . . . [the rules of the court]. As Petitioner has provided an insufficient record for review, this Court declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matter." Similarly, this Court has stated that filing the judgment appealed in this Court is a necessary predicate for appellate review, and its absence may result in a dismissal.44 This Court has similarly dismissed a proceeding due to a party's failure to follow the rules of this Court.45 No excess of jurisdiction appears on either the face of the order of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the record submitted by Dutton herein.
¶26 Fourthly, the Legislature has created civil claims as well as Supreme Court jurisdiction in certain matters although our exercise of jurisdiction may have an impact on a criminal proceeding,46 and there are a few proceedings involving our appellate jurisdiction in matters which are related to a lower court criminal proceeding.47 If the Legislature has properly created a legal cause of action as a civil jurisdiction matter then this Court has the constitutional and legislatively-mandated responsibility to recognize it as within the jurisdiction of this Court.48 Dutton does not show how his request is encompassed within other various specific circumstances where civil original jurisdiction is exercised by this Court, although our exercise may involve or affect a lower court criminal proceeding.
III. Original Superintending Jurisdiction
¶27 Dutton filed pleadings in this Court invoking this Court's original jurisdiction. The Oklahoma Constitution vests this Court with original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs and a general superintending control over all inferior courts, agencies, commissions, and boards created by law.49 The Court's supervisory writ jurisdiction over lower courts is not identical to this Court's superintending-control jurisdiction over all courts, agencies, commissions, and boards.50 We have explained that "It is not always easy or necessary to note the line of demarcation between the two."51 Confusion between the two types of jurisdiction may arise because superintending-control jurisdiction is usually exercised by the use of writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari.52 However, the form of our superintending-control remedial order is not limited to the specified constitutional writs.53 The Court has used its superintending control when fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities in various contexts, such as supervising the practice of law pursuant to the Court's Art. 7 § 1 power,54 enforcing rules of procedure for courts,55 and deciding publici juris issues involving a serious conflict between different governmental agencies or branches of government.56 There is no clear legal right to a writ of superintending control and the issuance of such a writ is in the discretion of the Court.57
¶28 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has been granted statutory authority by the Legislature to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of article 27 of the Municipal Code; and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, it has the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts.58 This statute is consistent with the Supreme Court's civil jurisdiction because it authorizes the Court to create procedures and practices of statewide application.
¶29 The type of corrective relief within the jurisdiction conferred by this statute is one to correct institutional deficiencies and not one to adjudicate individual proceedings determining criminal liability. Nowhere in the statute is this Court given the power to issue writs of either supervisory or superintending control to review an individual criminal proceeding in a municipal court. One reason for this is that the authority to issue writs to a municipal court not of record lies in the District Court, which court also has the statutory appellate criminal jurisdiction over the municipal court criminal case.59 Appeals from criminal convictions in municipal courts of record are filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals using the procedures authorized for appeals from district courts.60 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has no general superintending power over the lower courts, the writs it issues are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,61 and the scope of the relief afforded by those writs involves criminal matters. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters and jurisdiction to issue supervisory writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, that Court is the court which uses a writ power to supervise a criminal matter in a criminal controversy or action that is proceeding in the District Court.
¶30 Relief from a criminal judgment and sentence in a municipal court not of record lies in the municipal court, District Court, and Court of Criminal Appeals.62 Dutton's pleadings do not seek relief against an institution and the imposition of state-wide rules.63 He seeks relief in the form of an order vacating his convictions or an order directing the District Court to provide him with a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions.
¶31 We have also used "superintending control" in the context of (1) issuing prohibition to prevent a trial court from denying a person's fundamental right of notice and an opportunity to be heard in a judicial proceeding,64 and (2) noting the publici juris issue presented by a state-wide procedure for collecting jury fees as implemented by a particular District Court Clerk.65 We have also assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate "an arguable claim" that a violation of a federal constitutional right had occurred by application of specific state statutes.66
¶32 Dutton's claim is that he was imprisoned without the benefit of counsel appointed to represent him, and that he was denied a federal constitutional right. The constitutional grant of superintending control in this Court is not an unlimited power, but a power that is exercised within the definition of "judicial power" as vested in this Court by Article 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution. If a party files a pleading in this Court and requests a determination of his or her legal rights, then a particular type of Article 7 judicial power is invoked in a particular context and the Court acting on that pleading is functioning in the role of an "adjudicator" and not, for example, legislatively or administratively.67 In summary, Dutton is asking the Court to adjudicate a case. In the exercise of our original supervisory or superintending jurisdiction, when we "adjudicate a case" we must possess both subject matter jurisdiction68 and a justiciable controversy69 as shown by the parties' pleadings; and our adjudication is limited by the parties pleadings70 unless the scope of the adjudication is expanded by one of the few well-known exceptions. Additionally, this expanded adjudication in the context of an exercise of superintending control jurisdiction is itself circumscribed by the usual principles of law applicable to remedies, such as an alternate exclusive remedy defeating the exercise of such jurisdiction.71 Examples of adjudicatory superintending control jurisdiction being dependent upon application of subject-matter and justiciability principles are found in opinions such as Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley,72 Democratic Party v. Estep,73 and Ethics Commission v. Cullison,74 and more recent opinions such as Coates v. Fallin.75
¶33 Our superintending control jurisdiction is created by Article 7 §§ 1 and 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution and that jurisdiction must be construed in harmony with the constitutional exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters that is vested in the Court of Criminal Appeals via enactments of the Legislature.76 Dutton is requesting that we adjudicate the legality of his criminal convictions by an exercise of our superintending control in the context of this Court lacking a general constitutional power for appellate review of final judgments and sentences in criminal cases.77 It is correct that the historic division between civil and criminal appellate-review jurisdiction has not been a rigid line and this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have had a shared responsibility in specific circumstances.78 That shared responsibility has usually occurred because this Court has been required to define a "criminal case" or matter for purpose of appellate review when the court for such review was not expressly stated in the statute,79 or when a statutory scheme incorporates both criminal and civil matters or power,80 or when we have explained sui generis proceedings and a shared appellate-review jurisdiction exists.81 Dutton's controversy is not one within the shared responsibility of this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals or a controversy where no appeal has been provided by statute.
¶34 The Court of Criminal Appeals is constitutionally vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases" as implemented by legislation.82 The Legislature has provided an appellate procedure for an appeal from a municipal court to the District Court and then an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. There is no appeal or writ of error from the Court of Criminal Appeals to this Court.83 There is no doubt that this Court may correct a deficient statutory remedy in the context of an adjudication.84 But adjudicatory jurisdiction of appeals from Dutton's criminal convictions does not lie in this Court. Dutton may not circumvent the statutory appellate procedures by seeking appellate review of his criminal conviction in this Court.85
¶35 It is nothing new for this Court to examine the scope and effect of a party's requested relief to determine whether this Court is impermissibly intruding upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals. For example, in State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, the Department of Corrections was statutorily required to apply earned credit days towards a prisoner's sentence of incarceration. We explained that the scope of the statute in the controversy applied to alter a criminal judgment and sentence and was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.86 The issue of attorney representation of an indigent criminal defendant is a criminal matter by its nature, and thus proper for adjudication within a District Court criminal proceeding and appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.87
¶36 We conclude that Dutton's pleadings attempt to invoke an original supervisory or superintending adjudicatory jurisdiction of this Court for the purpose of providing him with an appellate review of his municipal criminal judgments and sentences, and we decline to assume original jurisdiction on such claims.
IV. Alternative Remedies
¶37 Dutton has ten filings in this supervisory proceeding.88 None of these filings show that he is without remedies in the District Court or subsequent appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. More than forty years ago, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Relief Act (22 O.S. §§ 1080-1089) "contains no requirement that an applicant be in custody, under any form of restraint or supervision, or that the sentence be unsatisfied in any respect."89 Dutton's release from confinement would appear to present no theoretical bar to seeking post-conviction relief.90
¶38 The orders are not before us, but we may take judicial notice of the dockets of District Courts.91 In the three District Court actions, 2013-1619, 2013-1620, and 2013-1622, the first and last were "Dismissed without prejudice" and in 1620 its current status appears to be "pending." All of his applications for post conviction relief were filed with the docket designation "CV" for "Civil Misc.: OTHER - CIVIL NO DAMAGES
¶39 The concept of an adequate remedy appears in several areas of the law with slightly different and overlapping meanings. In the context of creating a remedy and providing equitable relief, we have indicated that when a party has an action at law an equitable remedy will not be available.92 Similarly, equity is not invocable when an adequate statutory remedy exists.93 In the context of challenging a judgment, a statutory remedy will preclude a party from successfully invoking equity.94 Of course, in these contexts the available remedies must be adequate, but adequacy is not measured by whether Dutton obtains the exact relief he desires, i.e., his convictions are voided or he gets a new appeal in this proceeding. Adequacy of a remedy in this context is determined by whether the law provides a means for complete relief for a person with the type of claims Dutton is raising, i.e., a reasonable opportunity to obtain the relief he seeks.
¶40 Generally, in the context of a civil proceeding when the federal constitution requires this State to provide an adequate remedy for a person claiming the denial of a federal constitutional right by the State, the adequacy of an available remedy at law is not measured by that particular party's eventual success on the merits of his or her litigation, but whether a person in that party's circumstances is provided with a clear and certain opportunity for obtaining complete relief at law.95 For example, if a state exacts a tax in violation of the federal constitution, then it must provide an opportunity to recover those taxes because "a denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment."96 But even in the context of a deprived federal constitutional right, a State may require a person to comply with a clear and certain state procedure when seeking a legal remedy for that deprived federal right.97 Dutton's action raising federal constitutional claims does not exempt him from using available statutory or common-law proceedings to vindicate his claims. The District Court has stated that his applications for post-conviction relief were denied without prejudice to him seeking relief in the municipal court. Dutton has failed to show why he should not be required to pursue relief in accordance with state statutes and the orders of the District Court.
V. Motion for Counsel, Oral Argument and an Evidentiary Hearing
¶41 Dutton filed a motion requesting the Court appoint counsel to represent him in this proceeding. This Court has noted a right to counsel possessed by a defendant in a criminal prosecution, and that the right is expressly conferred by Art. 2 § 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.98 Dutton's proceeding in this Court does not subject him to either criminal fine or punishment, and it is not a criminal prosecution or a statutorily authorized direct appeal from his criminal judgments and sentences. His proceeding in this Court is not a statutorily authorized direct attack on his convictions, but a collateral attack 99 in a civil proceeding seeking an extraordinary superintending writ to review judgments based upon criminal causes of action that were rendered in criminal proceedings.
¶42 There is no doubt that the assistance of a legal practitioner is fundamental to due process "in certain types of civil litigation, aspects of which are analogous to criminal proceedings."100 We have concluded that legal authority clearly demonstrates that this Court has no authority in this collateral civil proceeding to either void Dutton's convictions or direct the District Court to provide him with an appeal of his criminal convictions. We note the District Court has denied his applications for criminal post-conviction relief without prejudice. We conclude that appointed counsel would not be of assistance in this proceeding and deny Dutton's application for appointed counsel.101 Because we decline to assume original jurisdiction on the merits of Dutton's claims and because such relief is appropriate in a different court, we deny his motion for an oral argument and an evidentiary hearing.
V. Conclusion
¶43 We assume original jurisdiction solely on the issue of our jurisdiction to hear Dutton's claims. Dutton has failed to show that he lacks adequate remedies in either a municipal court or the District Court. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner's cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court. We conclude that Dutton's claims are criminal matters and we decline to assume original jurisdiction on his claims or grant him relief on them without prejudice to him presenting them, in the proper court.102
¶44 COMBS, V. C. J., WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, and GURICH, JJ, concur.
¶45 REIF, C. J., KAUGER, and COLBERT, JJ., concur in result.
FOOTNOTES
1 Appendix, Aug. 29, 2014, exhibit 5, page 3, orders of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dutton v. City of Midwest City, Nos. PC 2014-0632, PC 2014-0633, and PC 2014-0634.
2 The federal court based its conclusion on Heck v. Humphrey,
3 Petitioner's Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 113,170 (Aug. 29, 2014) pp. 16-17.
4 Petitioner's Motion to Provide Relief, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 113,170 (Nov. 14, 2014) pp. 11-12.
5 Although The City of Midwest City is not a named party in the style of this proceeding as filed by Dutton, The City of Midwest City entered an appearance herein and we requested a response addressing Dutton's allegations. The Court also provided an opportunity for the District Attorney for Oklahoma County to file a response to Dutton's pleadings.
6 Sanders v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission,
7 See, e.g., Hall v. Geo Group, Inc.,
8 See, e.g., Miller v. Fortune Insurance Co.,
9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction to determine whether it or the Court of Criminal Appeals exercises jurisdiction in a particular controversy. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4: ". . . and in the event there is any conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final." See, e.g., Smith v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections,
10 Hobbs v. German-American Doctors,
11 Cooper v. Reynolds,
12 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed,
13 11 O.S.2011 § 27-101: "A municipality may create a municipal court, as provided in this article, which shall be a court not of record. This court may be created in addition to a municipal criminal court of record. References in Sections 27-101 through 27-131 of this title to the municipal court shall mean the municipal court not of record established under the authority of the provisions of this article."
14 11 O.S.2011 § 27-103: "The municipal court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all prosecutions wherein a violation of any ordinance of the municipality where the court is established is charged."
15
A. An appeal may be taken from a final judgment of the municipal court by the defendant by filing in the district court in the county where the situs of the municipal government is located, within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment, a notice of appeal and by filing a copy of the notice with the municipal court. In case of an appeal, a trial de novo shall be had, and there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) and costs.
B. Upon conviction, at the request of the defendant, or upon notice of appeal being filed, the judge of the municipal court shall enter an order on the docket fixing an amount in which bond may be given by the defendant, in cash or sureties for cash in an amount of not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than twice the amount of such fine. Bond shall be taken by the clerk of the court wherein judgment was rendered. Any pledge of sureties must be approved by a judge of the court.
C. Upon appeal being filed the judge shall within ten (10) days thereafter certify to the clerk of the appellate court the original papers in the case. If the papers have not been certified to the appellate court, the prosecuting attorney shall take the necessary steps to have the papers certified to the appellate court within twenty (20) days of the filing of the notice of appeal, and failure to do so, except for good cause shown, shall be grounds for dismissal of the charge by the appellate court, the cost to be taxed to the municipality. The certificate shall state whether or not the municipal judge hearing the case was a licensed attorney in Oklahoma.
D. All proceedings necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be had in the appellate court.
16 See note 15 supra, at 11 O.S.2011 § 27-129 (A).
17 See note 15 supra, at 11 O.S.2011 § 27-129 (A). Section 27-129(A) was amended by 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws Ch. 2, § 1 (eff. Nov. 1, 2015), and which states in part that "... there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), plus costs, fees, and assessments."
18 11 O.S. § 27-132: "An appeal may be taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals from the final judgment or order of a district court in an appeal from a final judgment of a municipal court in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are taken from a district court to the Court of Criminal Appeals."
19 In re Opinion of the Judges,
20 In the Matter of M.B.,
21 20 O.S.2011 § 40: "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction, coextensive with the limits of the state, in all criminal cases appealed from the district, superior and county courts, and such other courts of record as may be established by law."
22 City of Elk City v. Taylor,
23 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
24 See State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, supra, note 20, observing that "As the Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly stated, in a criminal case the 'essential part of the judgment is the punishment and the amount thereof.'" Cf. Lockett v. Evans,
25 Paxton v. State,
26 State v. Powell,
27 State ex rel. Coats v. Hunter,
28 An action for a declaratory judgment will not lie "to launch an impermissible collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence in a criminal case." Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington,
29 Argersinger v. Hamlin,
30 Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra; Scott v. Illinois,
31 Jackson v. City of Oklahoma City,
We also note that two authors have stated that in 1997 the State of New Jersey became the first state to enact legislation requiring every municipal court to have at least one municipal public defender appointed by the governing body of the municipality to represent an indigent defendant accused of an offense, which if convicted, would subject the defendant to imprisonment. Robert J. Martin and Walter Kowalski, "A Matter of Simple Justice": Enactment of New Jersey's Municipal Public Defender Act, 51 Rutgers L.Rev. 637, 676-677, 694 (1999).
32 See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb,
33 See, e.g., Hinsley v. State,
34 State v. Lynch,
35 Sanders v. Followell,
36 Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Comm'n,
37 Walters,
38 Walters,
39 Walters,
40 Walters,
41 Walters,
42 Walters,
43 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
44 Willitt v. ASG Industries,
45 See, e.g., Rugg v. Layton,
46 See, e.g., Courtney v. State,
47 An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. Dunn v. State,
48 In Oklahoma, a right to appeal from an exercise of judicial discretion in cases of law and equity, excluding criminal matters, is a constitutional right subject to legislative requirements for the manner invoking that appellate jurisdiction. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4; Wells v. Shriver,
49 Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4, provides in part that: "The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law."
50 Board of Commissioners of Harmon County v. Keen,
51 Board of Commissioners of Harmon County v. Keen,
52 Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison,
53 Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison,
54 The Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 7 § 1, vests "judicial power" in the Supreme Court and that vesting "gives it the right to regulate the matter of who shall be admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court and inferior courts, and also gives it the right to regulate and control the practice of law within its jurisdiction." In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma,
The Court's Art. 7 § 4 superintending power over "inferior courts" includes an authority to control and regulate the practice of law. State v. Lynch,
55 State ex rel. Freeling v. Kight,
56 Ethics Commission v. Cullison,
57 Butler v. Breckinridge,
58 11 O.S.2011 § 27-131:
"The Supreme Court is authorized to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of this article, and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, shall have the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts of Oklahoma to consider matters calculated to bring about a speedier and more efficient administration of justice."
59
The district court in each county wherein a municipal court is established shall have the same jurisdiction to issue to the municipal court writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari as the Supreme Court now has to issue such writs to courts of record.
60 11 O.S.2011 § 28-128:
Appeals may be taken from a judgment or order of a municipal criminal court of record to the Court of Criminal Appeals in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are now taken from the district courts to the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters, and no appeals other than those herein provided shall be allowed.
61 Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon,
62 See, e.g., Houghton v. City of Wewoka,
63 Because his pleadings do not raise this issue we need not address the type of factual support or record in an original jurisdiction proceeding that is needed for a request that the Court create court rules for state-wide application.
64 Muggenborg v. Kessler,
65 Naylor v. Petuskey,
66 Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Board,
67 Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n,
68 The focus of a subject matter jurisdiction analysis is on the nature of the pled action in relation to the power of a court to adjudicate and grant relief in an action of that nature. The phrase subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to deal with the general subject involved in the action or the nature of the cause of action, and this jurisdiction is present when a court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed,
69 Generally, the focus of a justiciability analysis is on the parties and the nature of their adverse legal interests in the particular pled controversy, and not on the nature of the pled cause of action as it relates to the power of the court to address that type of action. See, e.g., Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation,
This focus on the interests of the parties has been present when we addressed a justiciable controversy in the context of declaratory relief and have said that justiciability is present when there is: (1) a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Chrysler Corp. v. Clark,
District Courts possess "unlimited jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article . . . ." Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 7(a). Reeds v. Walker,
70 Generally, the Court's adjudicatory judicial power in an original action is limited to the facts and issues framed by the pleadings and as amended by the partes' briefs in this Court. La Bellman v. Gleason & Sanders, Inc.,
71 For example, one of the well-known exceptions occurs in a public-law controversy where the Court may grant corrective relief upon any applicable legal theory, raised by a party or sua sponte, when that theory is dispositive of the controversy and is supported by the record. Lincoln Farm, L.L.C. v. Oppliger,
72 In Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley,
73 Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep,
74 Ethics Commission v. Cullison,
75 Coates v. Fallin,
76 In re Initiative Petition No. 314,
77 In re Opinion of the Judges,
78 See, e.g., Hale v. Board of County Commissioners of Seminole County,
79 See, e.g., State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
80 See, e.g., Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoenas v. Powers,
81 Contempt proceedings are sui generis, Henry v. Schmidt,
82 Jackson v. Freeman,
83 Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,
84 Farris v. Cannon,
85 Darnell v. Higgins,
86 State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
87 See, e.g., Griffin v. State,
88 Dutton filed: (1) Entry of Appearance (August 29, 2014); (2) Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, (August 29, 2014); (3) An Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (August 29, 2014); (4) Motion to Appoint Counsel, (August 29, 2014); (5) Appendix of Citations of Authority and Exhibits, (August 29, 2014); (6) Proof of Service (August 29, 2014); (7) Motion to Provide Relief (Nov. 14, 2014); (8) Notice of Change of Contact Information (December 30, 2014); (9) Petitioner's Objections and Legal Argument, etc. (March 10, 2015); and (10) Petitioner's motion for evidentiary hearing, oral argument, and aid of counsel (April 17, 2015).
89 Battle v. State,
90 22 O.S.2011 § 1080, states that:
Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(a) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state;
(b) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(c) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(d) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(e) that his sentence has expired, his suspended sentence, probation, parole, or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
(f) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy;
may institute a proceeding under this act in the court in which the judgment and sentence on conviction was imposed to secure the appropriate relief. Excluding a timely appeal, this act encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods of challenging a conviction or sentence.
91 Collier v. Reese,
92 Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.,
93 Muskogee Fair Haven Manor Phase I, Inc. v. Scott,
94 Denning v. Van Meter,
95 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,
96 Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
We note that a federal constitutional requirement for a State court providing a remedy for a constitutional deprivation is not a rule of universal application. While Congress does not possess the power, under Article I of the U. S. Constitution, to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts, Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to the enforcement power of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Alden v. Maine,
97 Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
98 Towne v. Hubbard,
99 A direct attack is an attempt to avoid or correct a judicial proceeding in some manner provided by law, such as by an appeal, or motion for new trial. House v. Town of Dickson,
A collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or to deny its force and effect in some manner not provided by law; that is, in some other way than by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or motion for a new trial. In re Hyde,
100 Towne v. Hubbard,
101 We also deny Dutton's motion for hearing and oral argument because the authorities clearly show that this Court has no authority to adjudicate the merits of Dutton's claims.
102 A limited adjudication on the question of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits of the controversy. State v. Herndon,
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|
| None Found. |
| Cite | Name | Level | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| HOUGHTON v. CITY OF WEWOKA | Discussed | ||
| PAXTON v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. COATS v. HUNTER | Discussed | ||
| BLADES v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| CITY OF ELK CITY v. TAYLOR | Discussed | ||
| HINSLEY v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| MURRAH v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY | Discussed | ||
| HARGROVE v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| GRIFFIN v. STATE | Discussed at Length | ||
| SMITH v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| CAMPBELL v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| JACKSON v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| LUNA v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| BATTLE v. STATE | Discussed | ||
| Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Chrysler Corp. v. Clark | Discussed | ||
| Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Com'n | Discussed at Length | ||
| State ex rel. Turpen v. A 1977 Chevrolet Pickup Truck | Discussed | ||
| In re INTEGRATION OF STATE BAR OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler | Discussed at Length | ||
| State v. Lynch | Discussed at Length | ||
| Naylor v. Petuskey | Discussed | ||
| Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in Multicounty Grand Jury Case No. CJ-92-4110 Before Dist. Court of Oklahoma County v. Powers | Discussed | ||
| Ethics Com'n of State of Okl. v. Cullison | Discussed at Length | ||
| STATE ex rel. CRAWFORD v. CORPORATION COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| OKLAHOMA CITY v. ROBINSON | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. FREELING v. KIGHT | Discussed at Length | ||
| Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington | Discussed | ||
| Stallings v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n | Discussed | ||
| Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd. | Discussed | ||
| HINKLE v. KENNY | Discussed | ||
| DUNN et al. v. STATE. | Discussed | ||
| DENNING v. VAN METER | Discussed | ||
| SMITH v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS | Discussed | ||
| GLACKEN v. ANDREW | Discussed at Length | ||
| WELLS v. SHRIVER | Discussed | ||
| JETER v. DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY | Discussed | ||
| In re OPINION OF THE JUDGES. | Discussed at Length | ||
| IN RE HESS' ESTATE | Discussed | ||
| GORDON v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed | ||
| LA BELLMAN v. GLEASON & SANDERS, INC. | Discussed | ||
| RUGG v. LAYTON Co. Supt. | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. BLANKENSHIP v. FREEMAN | Discussed | ||
| BUTLER v. BRECKINRIDGE | Discussed | ||
| Jackson v. Freeman | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO. v. BROWN | Discussed | ||
| STATE EX REL. YOUNG v. WOODSON | Discussed | ||
| STATE v. TORRES | Discussed | ||
| HENRY v. SCHMIDT | Discussed | ||
| REEDS v. WALKER | Discussed | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF M.B. | Discussed at Length | ||
| HOUSE v. TOWN OF DICKSON | Discussed | ||
| MOVANTS TO QUASH MULTICOUNTY GRAND JURY SUBPOENA v. DIXON | Discussed | ||
| COLLIER v. REESE | Cited | ||
| STATE v. POWELL | Discussed | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF HYDE | Discussed | ||
| STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. MOTHERSHED | Discussed at Length | ||
| COURTNEY v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed | ||
| Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley | Discussed | ||
| LINCOLN FARM, L. L. C. v. OPPLIGER | Discussed | ||
| KRUG v. HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC. | Discussed | ||
| COATES v. FALLIN | Cited | ||
| HALL v. THE GEO GROUP, INC | Discussed | ||
| LOCKETT v. EVANS | Cited | ||
| SANDERS v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed | ||
| WILLITT v. ASG INDUSTRIES, INC. | Discussed | ||
| STATE v. ex rel. COMM'N OF LAND OFFICE v. CORPORATION COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| CARDER v. COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS | Discussed at Length | ||
| Draper v. State | Discussed | ||
| HALE v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF SEMINOLE CTY. | Discussed at Length | ||
| Initiative Petition No. 314, In re | Discussed | ||
| Towne v. Hubbard | Discussed at Length | ||
| Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n | Cited | ||
| Muggenborg v. Kessler | Discussed | ||
| Berry v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co. | Cited | ||
| IN THE MATTER OF INCOME TAX PROTEST OF REDBIRD | Discussed at Length | ||
| State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., Application of | Discussed | ||
| Farris v. Cannon | Discussed | ||
| Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep | Cited | ||
| DARNELL v. HIGGINS Co. Supt. | Discussed | ||
| SANDERS v. OKLAHOMA EMPL. SEC. COMM'N | Discussed | ||
| MUSKOGEE FAIR HAVEN MANOR v. SCOTT | Discussed at Length | ||
| In re Oklahoma Boll Weevil Eradication Organization | Discussed | ||
| HOBBS v. GERMAN-AMERICAN | Discussed at Length | ||
| BOARD OF COM'RS OF HARMON CTY. v. KEEN | Discussed at Length | ||
| HERNDON v. HAMMOND | Discussed | ||
| BUCK v. DICK | Discussed at Length | ||
| STATE ex rel. IKARD v. RUSSELL | Discussed | ||
| Johnson v. Johnson | Discussed | ||
| Title 11. Cities and Towns | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Creation of Municipal Court Not of Record | Cited | ||
| Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari | Cited | ||
| Appeals | Discussed at Length | ||
| Orders Relative to Procedures and Practices by Supreme Court | Cited | ||
| Appeal to Court of Criminal Appeals | Cited | ||
| Appeals | Cited | ||
| Title 20. Courts | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Title 21. Crimes and Punishments | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Repealed by Laws 1991, HB 1612, c. 238, § 37, emerg. eff. July 1, 1991 | Cited | ||
| Title 22. Criminal Procedure | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Post-Conviction Procedure Act - Right to Challenge Conviction or Sentence. | Discussed at Length | ||
| Accusation Presented by Grand Jury | Cited | ||
| Presentation of Accusation by County Commissioners or Judge and Treasurer -Jurisdiction | Cited | ||
| Title 28. Fees | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Civil Actions - Charge in Addition to Flat Fee | Cited | ||
| Title 51. Officers | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Attorney General - Duties | Cited | ||
