Plаintiff Michelle Dutra sued her former employer, defendant Mercy Medical Center Mt. Shasta (Mercy), for defamation and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged Mercy committed libel per se by communicating to her and others in a private meeting its grounds for terminating her employment. She alleged Mercy discharged her in violation of the public policy codified at Labor Code section 132a, which generally prohibits discharging an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
The trial court granted Mercy’s motion for summary adjudication against the defamation cause of action. It concluded Mercy’s communicating its grounds for terminating plaintiff was a conditionally privileged сommunication under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), and that plaintiff had failed to introduce triable issues of material fact that would defeat the privilege, including showing the publication wаs motivated by malice.
After selecting the jury for trial on the remaining wrongful termination cause of action, the court granted Mercy’s motion to dismiss the action on the ground the Workers’ Cоmpensation Appeals Board (WCAB) has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under Labor Code section 132a. The court gave plaintiff an opportunity to amend her сomplaint, but she refused.
Plaintiff contends (1) the trial court improperly granted the motion for summary adjudication because, she asserts, the issue of malice can be decided оnly by a jury and not on summary adjudication and (2) the trial court has jurisdiction to hear claims for wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code section 132a.
We conclude the trial court did nоt err, and we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Because plaintiff’s appeal raises only issues of law, we will not recite the undisputed facts in detail. Plaintiff worked for Mercy as a housekeepеr. She injured her back at work on January 31, 2008, while pulling a linen barrel across a snow-covered alley. She filed a workers’ compensation claim that day.
Mercy terminated plаintiff’s employment on March 19, 2008. Mercy informed plaintiff the grounds for her termination in a confidential meeting attended by plaintiff, a union steward, and Mercy supervisors. Mercy terminated her for (1) continuing to gossip while on duty and after being counseled
Plaintiff did not include a copy of hеr complaint in the record. According to the trial court, plaintiff alleged Mercy committed libel per se when it communicated in the confidential meeting with others present she was being terminated for check fraud. She also alleged she was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
DISCUSSION
I
Summary Adjudication of Defamation Claim
II
Jurisdiction to Hear Wrongful Termination Based on Labor Code Section 132a
Plaintiff claims the trial court had jurisdiction to try her cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code sectiоn 132a (section 132a). The Supreme Court established in City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998)
Section 132a extends certain civil rights protections to employees who are injured in the course of their employment. The statute first declares it is the “policy of this state that there should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment.” (§ 132a.) The statute makes it a misdemeanor for an employer to discharge or
The statute grants to the WCAB jurisdiction to remedy violations. To seek reinstatement and recover lost wages, the employee initiates proceedings by filing a petition with the WCAB. The statute vests the WCAB “with full power, authority, and jurisdiction to try and determine finally all matters spеcified in this section subject only to judicial review, except that the appeals board shall have no jurisdiction to try and determine a misdemeanor charge.” (§ 132a.) Obviously, a triаl court has no jurisdiction to hear a civil cause of action for an employer’s breach of section 132a.
Plaintiff asserts her cause of action is different. She sought reсovery under the common law action of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. She claims section 132a is the public policy that was violated, and that City of Moorpark allows her tо seek recovery notwithstanding the statute’s vesting of adjudicatory authority in the WCAB.
City of Moorpark does not go as far as plaintiff suggests. City of Moorpark did hold that section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy against disability discrimination and does not preclude an employee from pursuing remedies under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) and common law wrongful termination remedies. (City of Moorpark, supra,
Thus, we still must decide whether a violation of section 132a can form the basis of a common law action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy—an issue City of Moorpark did not address. We conclude a violation of section 132a cannot be the basis of a tort action fоr wrongful termination.
City of Moorpark reiterated the high court’s test for determining whether a particular policy can support a common law wrongful termination claim. That test includes a substantive limitation that governs this case. The court stated that for a policy to support a common law cause of action, “[t]he
Section 132a includes limitations оn its scope and remedy that prevent it from being the basis of a common law cause of action. The statute establishes a specific procedure and forum for addressing a violation. It also limits the remedies that are available once a violation is established. Allowing plaintiff to pursue a tort cause of action based on a violatiоn of section 132a would impermissibly give her broader remedies and procedures than those provided by the statute. Thus, the statute cannot serve as the basis for a tort claim of wrоngful termination in violation of public policy, and the trial court correctly granted Mercy’s motion to dismiss the action.
Plaintiff argues she is entitled to seek recovery for the wrong сommitted against her because her termination fell outside of the “compensation bargain” of a normal employment relationship, and thus she is not subject to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. (See Shoemaker v. Myers (1990)
The point has no relevance here. We agree in accordance with City of Moorpark that section 132a was not plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for redrеssing her wrong. There were other remedies she could have pursued for the alleged discrimination against her, and indeed the court before dismissing the action gave plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint to seek those remedies. Plaintiff, however, chose not to amend her complaint. It was plaintiff that through declining to amend her complaint foreclosed all possible remedies except the WCAB.
The trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s action.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendants. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
Hull, J., and Duarte, J., concurred.
Notes
See footnote, ante, page 750.