137 Cal. App. 2d 481 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1955
Vinton H. Butcher and his wife, parents of Paul Butcher, deceased, brought action against the City of Santa Rosa High School District and Rollo Norris, an instructor employed by the school, to recover damages for the death of their son. In another action Dennis Rehe, a minor, by his guardian ad litem brought action against the school district and Norris for damages for personal injuries suffered by him in the same accident. His father sued for expenses incurred. Both boys were members of a class in automobile mechanics which the respondent Norris was teaching. Each complaint charges negligence on the part of Norris. The respondents pleaded the general issue and also contributory negligence.
The evidence showed the following: Respondent Norris had been regularly employed as a teacher of automobile mechanics at the high school for eight years. The course was designed so as to give the students practical experience and was, therefore, conducted as supervised shop work. There were 14 or 15 students in the class and under the supervision and instruction of Norris they worked on automobiles, some of which belonged to members of the class. They disassembled and reassembled, and learned the technique necessary to such work. The class members worked in various areas of the shop and freely moved about the area while in class for the purpose of getting and replacing tools and equipment, for consultation with the instructor, and such like related purposes. Norris gave general instructions on various phases of automobile mechanics and repairs and the students were encouraged to bring their own cars upon which to work, with his help and supervision. Two or three weeks prior to the accident, one of the high school students, Donald Saunders, who was a member of another class, brought in a stripped down automobile which he apparently wished to convert into a
It is conceded by respondents that the question of whether or not Norris was negligent was to be resolved by the jury as an issue of fact and that, therefore, the trial court properly submitted that issue to the jury. The errors urged on appeal by appellants are confined to claims of error in instructions given.
The court instructed the jury as follows: "One, who for purposes of his own, voluntarily places himself in a position of danger, assumes the risks ordinarily incident to such a position and must use a quantum of care commensurate with the danger. ’ ’ This instruction failed to inform the jury that before the defense of assumed risk can succeed the evidence must disclose either actual or implied knowledge of the risk and an appreciation of the magnitude thereof. As applied to the two boys who stopped by Donald's car and for a short interval watched him operating the torch it is questionable whether from the evidence the jury could even have found support for a holding that they knew and appreciated the extent of the risk involved. To be sure, they knew that Donald was operating a torch, but there is no showing that they knew either how close the tank that exploded was to the flames and sparks being emitted by the torch or that they appreciated the danger of explosion if flames or sparks from the torch ignited gases issuing from the tank. Assuming, however, that such an assumption of risk might have been predicated upon the facts in evidence, nevertheless the court failed to inform the jury of the vital element of knowledge which must exist before a risk can be assumed and the assumption constitute a defense to a charge of negligence from the existence of the risk. (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 161-162 [265 P.2d 904] ; Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375, 385 [240 P.2d 580] ; Prosser on Torts (1941), p. 386.) While it might be argued that the use of the word “voluntary” in defining assumption of risk inferentially includes the element of knowledge, nevertheless we think that if the defense is to be submitted to a jury the jury must be told clearly that the doctrine has no application unless there was knowledge, express or implied, of the existence of the risk, together with an appreciation of the extent of the danger.
The trial court with appropriate instructions and at
The foregoing leaves the record in condition that as a reviewing court we cannot say whether the jury found Norris not to have been negligent, or found Norris to have been negligent but found further that the two boys had assumed the risk of injury, or found Norris to have been negligent but also found the boys to have been guilty of contributory negligence. Therefore the errors pointed out are reversible. (Plotts v. Albert, 120 Cal.App.2d 105, 108 [260 P.2d 621] ; Hoyt v. Southern Pac. Co., 6 Cal.App.2d 49, 53 [44 P.2d 363].)
Both the judgments appealed from are reversed.
Peek, J., and Sehottky, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 29, 1955. The opinion was modified to read as above. Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the. Supreme Court was denied January 25, 1956.