Dustin Lаppin, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-2208
Court of Appeals of Indiana
June 14, 2021
Riley, Judge.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, The Honorable Sheila Carlisle, Judge, The Honorable Stanley E. Kroh, Magistrate, Trial Court Cause No. 49G03-2007-F3-21144
Valerie K. Boots
Joshua C. Vincent
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Riley, Judge.
[1]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[2] Appellant-Defendant, Dustin Lappin (Lappin), appeals his conviction for robbery resulting in bodily injury, a Levеl 3 felony,
[3] We affirm.
ISSUE
[4] Lappin presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court violated Lappin‘s right to a public trial when the court limited the public‘s attendance to audio-only during voir dire and limited public seating during trial in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[5] Early in 2020, Geoffrey Wilson (Wilson) became Facеbook friends with Lappin. They chatted on Facebook for a couple of months before they met in person at a gas station in downtown Indianapolis. On June 6, 2020, Lappin sent a message to Wilson, asking to “hangout” again and to pick him up at a hotel in Plainfield. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 167). When Wilson arrived at the hotel, Lappin еntered Wilson‘s Jeep, carrying a backpack and duffel bag. They then drove around “aimlessly,” deciding what they should do. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 168). They eventually ended up parking in a parking lot on the southwest side of Indianapolis, in the Mars Hill neighborhood. After talking for a couple of hours in the vehicle, Wilson decided to return home. As Wilson exited thе parking lot, Lappin asked him to stop at another parking lot. Wilson did so, thinking that Lappin just needed to use the restroom before leaving. As soon as
[6] As Wilson exited the car, he began honking the car‘s horn and screaming for help. People started to approach, and Wilson went for the hatchet. During the ensuing struggle, Lappin pushed Wilson into the front seat of the Jeep and eventually fled into a tree line at the edge of the parking lot with the keys. When Lappin emerged from the woods, he was wielding a two-by-four piece of lumber. He entered the Jeep and started to leave. One of the bystanders attemptеd to prevent Lappin from leaving and grabbed the door of the vehicle. The bystander‘s hand became stuck and he fell to the ground, injuring his hand and knee. Wilson‘s vehicle was found later that night abandoned in Plainfield. Approximately one week later, the same bystander noticed Lappin walking in the neighborhood. The bystander approached Lappin and subdued him until the police arrived and arrested Lappin.
[7] On July 7, 2020, the State filed an Information, charging Lappin with armed robbery, a Level 3 felony; and robbery resulting in bodily injury, a Level 3 felony. On October 1, 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Lappin proceeded to a jury trial. The trial was not conducted in Marion Superior Court 3‘s normal courtroom, but instead was moved to Marion County Traffic Court because, as explained by the trial court, it was “the only place we‘ve been able
we do have plenty of room out in the lobby. And one of our bailiffs will be in the lobby, so if there are members of the public who want to watch the trial, they‘ll be wеlcome to come into the lobby during jury selection. If either side knows of any individuals that will be coming in, please let us know so we can identify them and keep them separate from any prospective jurors. Just so we —— you know, we want to be careful there‘s not any communication between the public and the prospective jurors. We do have some concerns about privacy with the live stream. Also the [c]ourt [has an] obligation to ensure that the proceedings are not recorded or rebroadcast. There is significant concern with live streaming that we can‘t ensure that. We give an admonition, and know it‘s on that —— on the live stream thеre‘s little —— whatever you call the word that‘s blip on its screen that has that warning, but —- that is significant concern the [c]ourt has. But, yes, we can make accommodations for having members of the public. We have limited amount of seats in the courtroom, but we will have some seats outside in the lobby. And especially after jury selectiоn is finished, there —— there‘s seats out there, although, I‘m not sure we‘ll be broadcasting the trial out to the lobby.
Lappin has competing constitutional rights at this point. The right to speedy trial, which we are prioritizing. But there‘s also the right to public trial. That encompasses the public being able to make sure that the —— that the system is working the way that it should. The witnesses to have to testify in front of strangers other than the jurors, other people, which increases the likelihood that they‘re going to tell the truth. And also if there are peоple, either in [Lappin‘s] family or the witnesses’ family, or the alleged victim‘s family that might have health issues, that they should be able to watch the live stream and that that would be the open [c]ourt -- the public part of the trial and speedy trial that [Lappin] has right to. And our position is that having two seats in here for the State and two seats for the defense is insufficient for that. We would request, at the least live stream to the lobby of the trial, but preferably the live stream that the court have set up and have used for the previous cases. Also think there may be an issue – don‘t know if the front doors are even unlocked right now, if people wanted to come into thе courtroom, so think that sounds like not an open court to me[.]
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 18). The trial court overruled the objection, finding that:
The open to attendance definition means “Individuals have the right to freely attend and observe criminal proceedings.” We are in an unprecedented time right now, and we —— we‘ve tried to make accommodations for that. We have someone stationed out at the front door —— that‘s how it was when I came in. And we‘ll make sure that we do have someone stationed out at the front door. If there‘s anyone that wants to come watch the trial. Do you know is there is anyone that fits that category related to [Lappin] or anyone else interested in this that has health concern, that‘s not able to come to court? Just want to make sure there‘s
no one specific that you can identify that wants to come watch the trial and is not able to come here due to health reasons or other reasons.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 19). After the venire panel was seated and the presentation of evidence was concluded, the jury found Lappin guilty as charged. On November 20, 2020, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing at which it vacated the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction and imposed a twelve-year sentence, with four years suspended, fоr robbery resulting in bodily injury, as a Level 3 felony.
[8] Lappin now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[9] Lappin contends that his right to a public trial was violated when the trial court closed the courtroom to members of the public during voir dire and limited public attendance during the remainder of the trial.
[10] The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ...”
[11] However, the right to a public trial is not unlimited. Hackett v. State, 360 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 1977). The right can be limited by other interests of justice “such as the defendant‘s right to a fair trial or the government‘s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 45. Situations where other interests override the рresumption of openness of the courts will be rare and a careful balancing of the interests at issue must occur. Id. The United States Supreme Court has set forth a four-part analysis for courts to use in determining whether to close proceedings to the public:
(1) The party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, (2)
the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and (4) it must make findings adequate to support the closure.
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. In order to obtain a reversal for a violation of the right to a public trial, a defendant does not need to show specific prejudice. Williams, 661 N.E.2d at 1244. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to show specific prejudice resulting from closure of a courtroom. Id. Because the loss to both the defendant and society from improperly closing courtrooms is intangible, the рrejudice of the non-public proceeding is implied. Id.
I. Voir Dire Proceedings
[12] Relying on the test articulated in Waller, Lappin contends that the live audio stream of the voir dire proceedings was not a reasonable alternative to the closure of these proceedings to the public. He asserts that “[t]he trial court‘s agreement to let members [of the public] sit in the lobby, where audio of voir dire was being streamed, was an insufficient substitute for a live-stream.” (Appellant‘s Br. pp. 15-16).
[13] In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, our supreme court, in response to Governor Holcomb‘s declared public health emergency, issued In the Matter of Administrative Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Indiana Trial Courts Relating to the 2019 Novеl Coronavirus (COVID-19), No. 20S-CB-123 (Mar. 16, 2020), in which it allowed trial courts to limit spectators in the courtrooms to the extent necessary
[14] In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1984), the United States Supreme Court found that the California court improperly closed six weeks of voir dire to the public, including the press. The Court held that the closure, in an аttempt to increase the candor in the responses by individual jurors in a trial where the defendant was charged with the rape and murder of a teenage girl, was not narrowly tailored to protect privacy, while maintaining the openness essential to public confidence in the criminal justice system. Id. We do not believe Press-Enterprise Co. to be on point for the situation at hand. At the core of Press-Enterprise Co. was the overbreadth of the trial court‘s response of complete closure of the courtroom to a legitimate privacy interest—that of potential jurors who may be required to reveal personal matters during a criminal trial in which they were called upon to serve. Here, the trial court was faced with a
II. Trial Proceedings
[15] With respect to the remainder of the trial proсeedings, Lappin asserts that “[w]hile the best safeguard of these values [of a public trial] is a fully open courtroom, the ongoing pandemic has undoubtedly made that difficult. A live-
[16] Although during the remainder of the trial, public access to the courtroom was limited to four spectators due to COVID-19 restrictions, the courtroom was not closed. Public access to attend the trial in person was available, and there is no evidence that individuals were turned away or prevented from attending. To the contrary, when the trial court inquired whether the parties knew of any potential spectators who were planning to attend in person, none were identified. Accordingly, as the trial court was open to the public and no person was turned away, Lapрin failed to establish that his right to a public trial was denied.
CONCLUSION
[17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not violate Lappin‘s right to a public trial.
[18] Affirmed.
[19] Mathias, J. and Crone, J. concur
