In this uninsured motorist (“UM”) case, Yolanda Durrah appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing her renewal action against Carmen Hernandez and State Farm Fire and Cаsualty Company. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
“We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under the de novo standard of review.” (Citation and punсtuation omitted.)
Sadi Holdings v. Lib Properties,
Durrah later voluntarily dismissed her complaint without prejudice and then refiled it against Hernandez and State Farm within six months, but after the expiration of the statute of limitation. She *50 personally served State Farm with her renewal action, but did not serve Hernandez with it in any manner. According to the trial court’s order, 1 both Hernandez and State Farm mоved to dismiss Durrah’s renewal action. The court granted Hernandez’s motion to dismiss based upon Durrah’s failure to serve Hernandez personally in the original aсtion. Based upon its dismissal of Hernandez, the trial court concluded that Durrah could not meet her obligation to obtain a judgment against Hernandez as a сondition precedent to her right to recover against her UM carrier and dismissed Durrah’s renewal action against State Farm.
1. Durrah contends the trial court erred by dismissing her renewal action against State Farm because she served Hernandez by publication for purposes of obtaining a nominal judgment agаinst her in the first action. We disagree.
The trial court properly dismissed the case against State Farm based upon the rule that when an uninsured motorist is dismissed basеd upon a lack of personal service before a plaintiff obtains a nominal judgment against the UM carrier, the case against the UM carrier must bе dismissed as well. See
Cohen u. Allstate Ins. Co.,
The court then properly dismissed the renewal action against State Farm because no judgment could be obtained against the uninsured motorist. See
Brown v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co.,
The renewal statute applies only to actions that are valid prior to dismissаl. . . . While service by publication may be used pursuant to OCGA § 33-7-11 for purposes of complying with the condition precedent for pursuing one’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier, it is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.
(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.)
Costello,
supra,
2. Durrah contends in thе alternative that the General Assembly eliminated the condition precedent of a judgment in a 2006 amendment to the UM statute, OCGA § 33-7-11. According to Durrah, the judicially-сreated requirement for a judgment against the uninsured motorist stemmed from the following italicized language in former OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1):
No automobile liability policy . . . shall be issuеd ... in this state . . . unless it contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which said insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages frоm the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The 2006 amendment substituted “for bodily injury, loss of consortium or death of an insured” for “all sums which said insured shall bе legally entitled to recover as” in subparagraph (a) (1). Based on the deletion of the words “legally entitled to recover” from the UM statute, Durrah assеrts that the General Assembly intended to abolish the requirement that a judgment be obtained against the uninsured motorist as a condition precedent to recovery from a UM carrier. Again, we disagree.
As recognized in Justice Carley’s special concurrence in
Dees v. Logan,
The language of the [formеr] statute is plain and it is not illogical. It clearly states that the insurer is to pay “all sums which (the) insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the ownеr or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.” [Cit.] All means all, every single one. Since the insured in this case is entitled to recover damages for the death of his son against the owner or driver of the unin *52 sured vehicle, he is entitled to recover those damages against his insurer.
Moreover, the “legally entitled to recover” language in former OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) was not the only statutory language used to suppоrt the conclusion that a judgment against the uninsured motorist is a condition precedent to recovery against a UM carrier. The conclusion in Girtman was
further strengthеned by the provisions of the Act which grant to the insurance company the right to be subrogated to the rights of its insured against such uninsured motorist after it has paid a claim arising under this law. If the contention of the appellee that the legal liability of the uninsured motorist to her could be adjudicated in this action should be upheld, then the long-standing principles respecting the conclusiveness of judgments, that is, that judgments shall be conclusive and binding only as between the parties and their privies, would have to be violated, or else the right granted to the insurance company by the law, to be subrogated to the claim of its insured against such uninsurеd motorist, would be rendered ineffectual since the insurance company would be subjected to the risk of having to relitigate the issue of the uninsured’s liability before the same or a different tribunal under different circumstances *53 with the attendant risk of a different conclusion as to the liability of the uninsured motorist being reached. We will not attribute to the legislature an intent to reach such an illogical or unjust result.
Girtman,
supra,
Finally, we must construe statutes “to square with common sense and sound reаsoning. It is the duty of the court to consider the results and consequences of any proposed construction and not so construe a statute as will result in unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature.” (Citation omitted.)
Five Star Steel Contractors v. Colonial Credit Union,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
We do not have the entire record before us because the partiеs submitted a joint stipulation of facts in their record appendix in lieu of the record below.
In
Girtman,
we held that no suit could be brought against a UM carrier before a judgment had been obtained from the uninsured motorist.