Thе employee was injured September 28, 1912. His average weekly wages were thеn $22. He was paid the maximum compensation under the statute until September 7, 1914.
In deciding the question of the employee’s average weeldy wages before his injury, the board was right in considering what in fact his weekly earnings wеre before he was injured, and not what they would have been after the injury if he had nоt been injured, and in disregarding the circumstances that because of labor conditions, his weekly wages, if he had not been injured, now would be $19.40. His weekly wages before hе was injured were $22 and not a less amount, and it was unimportant, therefore, in passing on this question, to take into account what he would have earned if business conditions had not caused a general reduction in wages. St. 1911, c. 751, Part II, § 10, provides that in cаse of partial incapacity the employee is to be paid “one half the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury аnd the average weeldy wages which he is able to earn thereafter.” St. 1914, c. 708, § 5, dоes not apply to this case. The board found that the employee actually earned $13.20 a week since his return to work, but it also found that his wages "would have bеen $15, had it not been for dullness and depression in business.” This finding, we think, clearly shows that he was able to earn $15 a week, notwithstanding his injuries, but because of trade conditions he wаs able to earn only $13.20. The statute contemplates compensation fоr diminished capacity to earn wages, and the injured employee, in common with others, must bear the loss resulting entirely from business depression.
Neither Sullivan’s Case,
In Septimo’s Case,
In the case at bar there is a specific finding that thе employee is now earning $13.20, instead of $15, because of dullness in trade. This is equivalent to a finding that his inability to earn $15 a week is caused not by his incapacity or his injury, but solеly because of business conditions; and there is no claim made of total incаpacity, as in the Septimo Case.
It follows that the decree of the Superior Court
So ordered.
Notes
Made by McLaughlin, J.
