171 Pa. 193 | Pa. | 1895
Opinion by
The first article of the constitution of this state, known as the bill of rights, declares that all men are possessed of certain inherent and inalienable rights. One of these is the right to acquire, possess, and protect property. The preservation of this right requires both that every man should be answerable for his own acts and engagements, and that no man should be required to answer for the acts and engagements of strangers over whom he has no control. A statute that should impose such a liability, or that should take the property of one person and give it to another, or to the public, without making just compensation therefor, would violate the bill of rights, and would be for that reason unconstitutional and void: Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 66; Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. 265; Kneass’s Appeal, 31 Pa. 87; Wolford v. Morgenthal, 91 Pa. 30 ; Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431. It is in furtherance of the right to acquire, possess and protect property that sec. 18, of the bill of rights prohibits the enactment of laws that shall interfere with or impair the obligation of contracts. The tendency toward class legislation for the protection of particular sorts of labor has been so strong, however, that several statutes have recently been passed that could not he sustained under the provisions of the bill of rights. Such was the case in Godcharles v. Wigeman, supra. Such was the case with some recent provisions relating to mechanic’s liens, and such is alleged by the appellant to be the ease with some of the provisions of the act of 1891, P. L. 176, under which this action was brought.
The mine foreman is also required to examine at least once every day “ all slopes, shafts, main roads, ways, signal apparatus, pulleys, and timbering, and see that they are in safe and efficient working condition.” After having thus most effectually taken the management of his mining operations out of his hands and committed it to officers of its own creation, whose employment is made compulsory upon him, the statute in sec. 8, of art. 17 imposes upon the mine owner a liability for the neg
The duty of the mine owner is to employ competent bosses or foremen to direct his operations. When he does this he discharges the full measure of his duty to his employees and he is not liable for an injury arising from the negligence of the foreman : Waddell et al. v.’Simoson and Wife, supra. A vice principal is one to whom an employer delegates the performance of duties which the law imposes on him, and the employer is responsible because the duty is his own. As to the acts of the workmen and the manner in which they do their work, the duty of the employer is to employ persons who are reasonably competent to do the work assigned them, and if he finds himself mistaken in regard to their competency, to discharge them when the mistake is discovered. But he is nob responsible for the consequences of their negligence as these may affect each other: Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42. Now the act of 1891 undertakes to reverse the settled law upon this subject and declare that the employer shall be responsible for an injury to an employee resulting from the negligence of a fellow workman. Prior to the act of 1891 the man whose negligence caused the injury was alone liable to'respond in damages. He might not always have property out of which a judgment could be collected, but the plaintiff must in any case take his chances-of the solvency of the defendant against whom his cause of action lies. ^The act of 1891 undertakes to furnish a responsible defendant for the injured person to pursue. Passing over the head of the fellow servant at whose hands the injury was received, it fastens on the owner of the property on which the-accident happened, and declares him to be the guilty person on whose head the consequences of the accident shall fall. To see the true character of this legislation we must keep both lines of objection in mind. We must remember that the injury complained of is due to the negligence of a fellow workman for which the master is responsible neither in law nor morals. We must also remember that this felíow workman has been.
This disposes of this appeal so far as the Kingston Goal Company is concerned. But why should the certified mine foreman be relieved from the consequences of his negligence ? The jury have found that the injury was duo to his want of attention to his proper duties, and his liability is clear without regard to our mining laws. But the statute required him to examine the roads and ways in use in the mine each day. He knew the film of rock separating the upper from the lower working was but eight feet thick at best. He knew that the supports for this film were not in line with each other in the upper and lower workings. He knew that layers of the rock were falling off, that the thickness of the floor was reduced under the way on which the accident occurred to about five feet, and that not far away it had fallen down into the lower working; yet with all this knowledge he did nothing, so far as we can learn, to increase the security of the way. Whether his conduct be considered with reference to the statute, or regardless of it, his failure to do what ho must have known to be necessary was a neglect of duty such as should render him liable to his fellow servant who has suffered from it. Some difficulty has been suggested growing out of the pleadings, but the declaration is not before us. We cannot determine therefore whether an amendment is necessary in order to sustain the judgment against him.
The judgment against Wm. Jones is affirmed.