38 So. 926 | Fla. | 1905
On the 4th day of April, 1904, appellee interposed a demurrer to the bill upon the following grounds:
"1. There is no equity in said bill.
2. Complainant has an adequate remedy at law.
3. Said bill purports to show an agreement between two parties, complainant and defendant herein, but does not set out what said agreement was nor whether the same was written or verbal.
4. Said bill does not set up a statement of facts sufficient to show the existency of a partnership between complainant and defendant.
5. Said bill charges no contract or obligation on part of defendant."
On the 23rd day of July, 1904, this demurrer came on to be heard before the judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, the judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit being disqualified, by whom an order was made sustaining the same.
On the 18th day of August, 1904, the cause came on for further hearing before the judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, by whom a final decree was rendered dismissing the bill, reciting therein that the complainant refused to amend the same.
From this decree appellant entered an appeal to the present term of this court, assigning three errors, the *499 first two being based upon the sustaining of the demurrer and the third upon the final decree dismissing the bill.
The bill of complaint and the exhibits attached thereto comprise some eleven typewritten pages, but, in view of the conclusion which we have reached, we believe that we have given sufficient synopsis thereof for an intelligent understanding of the opinion.
In equity, as well as at law, a pleading is to be most strongly construed against the pleader thereof, and in passing upon a demurrer to a bill every presumption is against the bill. This follows from the established principle of pleading that it is incumbent upon a complainant to allege in his bill every fact, clearly and definitely, that is necessary to entitle him to relief; and if he omits essential facts therefrom, or states such facts therein as show that he is not entitled to relief in a court of equity, he must suffer the consequences of his so doing. Richardson v. Gilbert,
Applying these tests to the bill, we are of the opinion that it signally failed to comply with the requirements above cited. The allegations therein show that the partnership existing between appellant and appellee had been dissolved, there being an express statement therin as to certain matters having transpired since "the dissolution of the partnership between your orator and the defendant." It is further shown by the bill that appellee had conveyed to appellant all the partnership property in Clay county, both real and personal, in accordance with the agreement made and entered into between them; the consideration for the conveyance and dissolution being the assumption by appellant of the debts of the partnership, as well as certain individual indebtedness in part of the appellee. No fraud or misrepresentation upon the part of appellee is charged in the bill, and we fail to find any grounds set forth therein which would entitle appellant to an accounting from appellee in a court of equity. Where one partner transfers his entire interest in the partnership concerns to his copartner so as to vest in the latter the partnership assets as his sole property, a dissolution of the partnership results. Schleicher v. Walker,
We are of the opinion that the demurrer was properly *501 sustained to the bill, therefore, the decree appealed from will have to be affirmed, and it is so ordered, at the cost of appellant.
COCKRELL and WHITFIELD, JJ., concur.
TAYLOR, P. J., and HOCKER and PARKHILL, JJ., concur in the opinion.
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